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RICHARD LOWITT
Tins first detailed biography of Morris traces the
great liberal's Me, views, and political develop
ment to his entrance into the U.S. Senate in
1913. In examining the metamorphosis of a rising
young lawyer with mortgage interests into a
leader of the Progressive movement, the book
gives a thorough account of the political growth
and maturing of a man who became one of the
foremost legislators in American history.
The early chapters draw a vivid picture of
Norris' boyhood on an Ohio farm in a staunchly
Republican family, his life during college and
law school days, and his young adulthood as a
lawyer and businessman in Nebraska, the state
with which he is identified. After serving as judge
of the district court, Norris was elected to the
House of Representatives, where he spent five
vigorous terms.
These were the years of Norris* insurgency
from regular Republican ranks in Congress to
lead the fight against Speaker Joe Cannon's iron
control of the rules of the House, a battle which
Norris finally won in 1910 and which brought him
national acclaim. They 'were the years of Norris*
maturing as a progressive in politics, from his
early support of Roosevelt's legislative program,
to the Progressive Republican League, to his tire
less championing of progressive candidates in the
dramatic 1912 presidential election.
Norris brought to the political scene a rare
quality the stubborn belief that principle is
more important than expediency, the individual
of more value than property, and integrity the
best guide for behavior in any activity includ
ing politics. The events of the legislator's early
career, as well as the shaping pf the views which
{^continued on back flap)
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Preface
IT is MY PURPOSE in the following pages to relate in some detail the
career through 1912 of one of the more remarkable political person
alities in American history. George W. Norris was an unobtrusive man.
He did not attract attention because of the power of his personality,
his oratory, demagoguery, control of a machine, or position as spokes
man for a particular point of view or powerful vested interest. Yet he
was a commanding figure in both houses of the Congress and in his
home state of Nebraska.
While some individuals command attention because they rise
above their backgrounds to positions of political prominence, and
others, from privileged backgrounds, seek to understand the problems
and viewpoints of their constituents, Norris fitted neither pattern. Like
Lincoln he was an uncommon common man. He chose the simple and
the unpretentious, and was more at home in the parlor than in the
drawing room. He preferred small town America; Main Street was
always more attractive than Connecticut or Fifth Avenue. Yet he could
understand and sympathize with the common man whether he lived
on a windswept Nebraska farm, in Beaver City or McCook, Nebraska,
or in the slum sections of Omaha. America to him was Nebraska writ
large. And when he examined the world beyond the United States, his
angle of vision remained the same. He believed that people were
primary, that property rights, while important, were never superior to
personal liberties, and that a high sense of moral values should charac
terize the behavior of men in government, business, or any other area of
human endeavor. His outlook could be summed up in the classic
advice of a homesteader to his children: "Tell the truth, stay out of
debt, don't be afraid of work, and remember when you pray that God
helps those that help themselves." In the context of American thought,
such views automatically classified Norris as a nineteenth-century
liberal in the Jeffersonian tradition. And indeed he was, though he
never read Jefferson or placed Jefferson, let alone Lincoln, among his
patron saints.
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But Norris was also something more. He was one of the best
parliamentarians in American political history. He was fortunate in
that his sparse small town education, while somewhat scanty in cul
tural content, stressed rhetoric and debate. From his earliest years in
school he was continually exposed to parliamentary procedure, the
knowledge which in later years enabled him to defeat "Uncle Joe"
Cannon, win the Muscles Shoals fight, and achieve the remarkable
record which made him one of the most useful legislators in American
history. That he did all of these things almost singlehandedly is ex
traordinary in an age when party organization, machine rule, and
pressure politics were expanding their influence and causing increased
public and scholarly scrutiny.
As he came to political maturity the welfare state was being
forged. Norris was not interested in building the power of the central
government per se. But if privilege was in any way extorting undue
profits from people (and people, to Norris, were the neighborly folks,
not necessarily native-born Americans, he knew in Beaver City and
McCook), he would not hesitate to use federal power to curb or super
sede it. Moreover, his small town background helped him to under
stand that the Industrial Revolution, with which he never came in
direct contact, had created a national economy and that only central
ized authority could cope with it. The railroad, the mortgage loan busi
ness, and the land speculation of his environment made him aware
that people's lives could be vitally affected by factors and forces in
other parts of the state or nation, by problems not primarily local or
regional in character.
As a political personality, though a stalwart Republican in his
younger days, he quickly and naturally fell in step with the policies of
Theodore Roosevelt, who was president when Norris reached Wash
ington, D.C. His career in Nebraska during the Populist revolt had
paved the way for his insurgency and later progressivism. He was not
an intellectual. He was not given to philosophizing about political
theory or the role of government. He was not one to absorb political
history or the biographies of prominent Americans.
History for George Norris began with the Civil War, which claimed
the life of his only brother, and continued on through the New Deal
into World War II. It paralleled his life span and served as his frame
of reference. Rooted in
nineteenth-century values and traditions, he
played a role in meeting most of the challenges of the first half of the
twentieth century. And like most American liberals, he was a prag-
matist. He met issues as they arose and was concerned with their
effect on people everywhere. If curbing privilege meant increasing the
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power of the federal government, he would support such measures. If
it meant government supervision, development, or control of natural
resources in the interests of all the people, he would favor this as well.
In this book I have tried to present, chiefly from manuscript and
other primary sources, a biography that will do justice to the man. To
understand the career of a political personality who was a master of
legislative process necessitates careful attention to detail to parlia
mentary procedure, to bills and amendments to bills, to particular
clauses in bills, to debate in short, to the daily routine of a member
of Congress. I have not tried to force any pattern upon my subject.
Rather, I have tried to write concretely, to pay attention to significant
details, to record observations, and to avoid excessive generalizing.
Many generalizations relevant to recent American history are not based
on adequate primary research and consequently are continually being
revised or rejected. More valid ones, I think, will emerge after nu
merous studies in depth, such as that attempted in this volume, have
been made.
When I began this biography I had few preconceived notions about
George Norris. Working through the huge collection of his papers in
the Library of Congress, processing a segment of them for the Manu
scripts Division, examining other relevant collections, reading the
Congressional Record, and doing all the other research such a study
entails convinced me that I was fortunate in my continual contact
with the career of an admirable person who was also one of the great
men of our recent history. This volume studies Norris' career through
the campaign of 1912 which witnessed his election to the United States
Senate. In a concluding volume I intend to complete his biography.
RICHARD LOWITT
New London, Connecticut
March, 1963
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Certainly, Gentlemen, it ought to be the happiness and
glory of a representative to live in the strictest union, the closest
correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with
his constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with
him; their opinions high respect; their business unremitted at
tention. It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, his pleasure, his satis
factions, to theirs, and above all, ever, and in all cases, to prefer
their interest to his own.
But his unbiased
opinion, his mature judgement, his enlight
ened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to
any set of men living. These he does not derive from your pleasure,
no, nor from the law and the Constitution. They are a trust from
Providence, for the abuse of which he is deeply answerable. Your
representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgement;
and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your
opinion.
From the Speech to the Electors of Bristol
November 3, 1774
by EDMUND BUBKE
Chapter 1
In the Beginning
YOBK TOWNSHIP, Sandusky County, Ohio, about three and a half miles
east of Clyde, which was Sherwood Anderson's prototype of small
towns in the Middle West, was the birthplace of George W. Norris
on July 11, 1861. On the western fringe of the Western Reserve and
on the eastern border of the "Black Swamp" area, Sandusky County
as part of northwestern Ohio comprised the last frontier area in the
state.
Immigrants started penetrating and transforming it during the
decade of the 1820*s. Many were en route to lands in Illinois, Indiana,
and southern Michigan; others settled, despite agues and fevers, in
this level and wet region. The extreme northwestern corner of Ohio
had, by the census of 1830, a population of three thousand.
1 While
the original settlers had come chiefly from New York out of New
England, during the 1830's others from Pennsylvania and southern
Ohio were arriving along with Germans who had in the 1820's settled
along the Sandusky River in Seneca County, due south of Sandusky
County.
The area in which Norris was born was inhabited largely by
Pennsylvania Dutch farmers. At the time of his parents* arrival in
1846, northwest Ohio was rapidly emerging from the pioneer stage but
it still retained and reflected the simpler social and economic condi
tions associated with the frontier.
Sandusky County was primarily a wheat area; during the Civil War
years it produced from two to five hundred thousand bushels of
wheat.2 It was also a vegetable and orchard district, and Clyde be
came a milling and later a canning center. Sherwood Anderson, who
lived there some twenty years later, succinctly summed up its agricul
tural experience: "The soil on the farms about the town was a light
sandy loam that would raise small fruits, corn, wheat, oats or potatoes,
but that did particularly well when planted to cabbages." 3 Cabbages,
which provided a staple for many a poor farm family and which be
came a major crop during Anderson's childhood, were not known to
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many of the earlier farmers. Stands of timber were numerous and in
cluded beech, oak, and walnut.
Into this agricultural area moved the parents of George Norris in
the summer of 1846. They had been married on Christmas day, 1838,
in Monroe County, New York. Chauncey Norris was thirty-one years
of age at the time of Bis marriage and had lived most of his life in
nearby Cayuga County.
4 His bride, Mary Magdalene Mook, a Penn
sylvania Dutch girl of twenty, is supposed to have met Chauncey at
a house-raising ceremony. The couple started their Me together on a
farm in Monroe County. In 1846, at the time of their departure for
Ohio, they lived in Batavia, New York, with a family of four children.
The youngest child, a month-old daughter, died shortly before
Chauncey loaded family and furniture into a wagon and headed west
to join his wife's brothers as a farmer in Sandusky County.
Chauncey succeeded on his York Township farm. He cleared the
land of trees, stumps, and rocks. He planted crops of wheat, corn and
vegetables, along with fruit trees, and built a modest but substantial
home, still standing today,
5 And Chauncey and Mary Norris increased
the size of their family in Ohio. Twelve children were born of this
marriage: two died, Elizabeth just before they left New York for Ohio,
and Ida, less than three years old and the last child in the family, in
1867. Eight children were born in Ohio; besides Willie as George
William was called by his parents the only other male child was the
eldest, John Henry, born in 1839. In July of 1861 when Willie was
born, his father was fifty-four and his mother forty-three. His two
eldest sisters were already married.
During the early years of Willie's life, the Civil War raged. The
people of Ohio were bitterly divided over the issues involved. San-
dusky County, in almost every major election throughout the nine
teenth century, gave its votes to Democratic candidates, though not by
large majorities.
6 Most of the farmers in the township the Norris
family included were Republicans.
7 While there were antislavery and
abolitionist families in the county, they did not dominate, nor was
there overwhelming Unionist sentiment manifested when war was de
clared. The Norris family certainly were antislavery in their views,
and the nearby city of Sandusky was a terminal point for the Under
ground Railroad.
The county, despite opposition to the Civil War, contributed its
share of soldiers. Among over twenty-three hundred men who en
listed was John Henry Norris. At the outset of the struggle, he had
promised his mother that he would not volunteer. However, in Janu-
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ary, 1864, he broke his promise and joined the Fifty-fifth Ohio Volun
teer Infantry. The Fifty-fifth Ohio had participated in some major
engagements in Tennessee in the autumn and winter of 1863 at Mis
sionary Ridge and in the Knoxville campaign immediately afterward.
It enjoyed a brief furlough in Ohio in January and February of 1864,
when John Henry enlisted. In the spring the regiment participated in
the "March to the Sea." At the battle of Resaca, Georgia, in mid-May,
John Henry suffered seemingly inconsequential wounds in the right
hip and left thigh. Within a fortnight he was dead at the age of
twenty-five.
8
Thus the tragedy of war struck the family. Before the year 1864
was over, however, an even greater blow was inflicted upon the
family circle. Chauncey Norris, on December 1, 1864, contracted
pneumonia, and before the week ended, he was dead and buried in
the little community cemetery, with neighbors, Mary Norris' kin, and
his family as mourners. Norris later wrote this description of the family
situation at that time: "Three of the girls had married and had estab
lished homes of their own. Six sisters Henrietta, Mary Adelaide,
Elizabeth, Erie Ann, Emma, and Clara and I remained with my
mother on that cold and bleak December day when my father was
buried, to share the heritage of the Ohio farm."
9 Within a year Willie
Norris, age three and a half, found himself the only man left in the
family.
Mary Mook Norris, age forty-six, now became for her .younger
children the heart and soul of the family. There was an eighty-acre
farm to be maintained and Mary, although pregnant with her last
child, assumed this task along with her household duties. She was a
loving, anxious, and above all a hard-working mother. Although she
had no spare time to herself, she made some available to her children,
insisting that they receive an education. The family's lot was not an
easy one. Mary Norris was not only the center of the home, but she
quickly became for her son home itself. She made almost every piece
of clothing worn by any member of the family. At harvest time she
would take her place in the field. "Her hair was unstreaked; she walked
erect"; her son could never remember a song upon her lips, nor ever
recall her humming a tune.10 Her sensitive, rather melancholy tempera
ment became a part of the little boy which he retained for the rest of
his life.
Mary Norris, while providing little intellectual or cultural stimula
tion for her children, did much to mold their moral and social values.
Her concern for the poor and their problems was later reflected in
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her son's concern with problems of social justice. Her interests were
neither selfish nor limited to the present, and she passed on to her
children a feeling for the importance of planning for the future.
11
Though she was not a church member, she raised her children be
lieving in the absolute goodness and righteousness of the Lord. She
read the Bible aloud on Sunday afternoons to her children. It was
probably at this time the only book in the home. She believed the
Bible literally and frowned upon dancing and card playing for many
years. Indeed, her son never attended a dance until after he left home.
He was not duly impressed with the Gospel teachings he heard at
home or at the church services and occasional revivals he attended.
He was disturbed and confused over matters of church and religion
which he later resolved, like his mother, by not joining any church
and, unlike her, by reading volumes which stressed science as op
posed to supernaturalism, such as John William Draper's History of the
Conflict between Religion and Science.12
Even by prevailing standards the Norris family was poor. Cash on
hand was always very meager and the family was a large one. But
nobody was rich there or then; they lived in the simple abundance of
that time and place, and did not consider themselves poor. In July,
1867, less than three years after her husband's death, Mary Mook
Norris married a neighbor, Isaac Parker, whom her son later charac
terized as "an elderly, quiet Pennsylvanian of Dutch blood, and an
expert wood-worker." Now the family circle was again complete, and
part of the burden was removed from the mother's shoulders. Little is
known of this marriage, except that after twenty-five years it ended
in divorce. 13 Norris barely mentions the marriage itself in his auto
biography, but devotes many pages to his schooling, labors, and
pleasures while at home after his mother's second marriage.
Young Will Norris very quickly assumed his place in the fields, and
took pride and pleasure in the work. He developed into a sturdy
youngster, and though he was the "favorite" of his mother and his
older sisters, there was too much work to be done for him to be
coddled in any noticeable way. Every summer during his school years
while living at home he worked as a farm hand either on the family
farm or on neighboring ones. Long before reaching maturity he was
able to do a man's work, having early acquired the strength and
ability to perform the most difficult of farm chores. He also became
an expert marksman in a place where squirrel hunting was considered
a supreme sport.
The family farm was already well stocked with fruit trees: apple,
peach, and cherry, yet his mother one warm spring afternoon called
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him to assist her in planting another. Will could not understand why
his mother toiled to plant a tree when there were seemingly enough
trees on the farm and when it probably would bear fruit only after
her death. His mother's remark that somebody would see the tree
blossom and enjoy the fruit impressed her son. Here was planning and
concern for future generations.
14
Will Norris attended the Mount Carmel district school, a mile and
one-half from the farm house. He enjoyed school and studied almost
every evening by candle light. He remembered his teachers with
gratitude and corresponded with some of them in later years. And it
was in the classroom that he was introduced to two subjects which
would stand him in good stead later on oratory and parliamentary
procedure. From that time on, while pursuing his education, Norris
was always active in the debating society, furthering his forensic
ability and at the same time increasing his knowledge and under
standing of parliamentary procedure.
During his years at the district school, Norris became interested in
the law and in politics. He saw cases tried in the courtroom in Clyde
and, enjoying this experience immensely, decided he wanted to become
a lawyer. Colonel J. H. Rhodes, a local attorney, may have influenced
his decision and helped to develop his interest in Republican politics.
Will was an ardent supporter of President Hayes, and had followed
the entire 1876 campaign through the pages of the Cincinnati Times.
By devious means he had managed to get to Fremont, the county
seat, to hear Hayes deliver his acceptance speech. The rallies, parades,
bands, and oratory all aroused his intense partisanship.
15
In the fall of 1877 Emma, Clara, and George Norris appeared in
Berea, Ohio, to enroll as students at Methodist-sponsored Baldwin
University. John Henry Norris had attended the University between
1858 and 1860. Baldwin advertised itself as an institution "within the
reach of the poor young man and young woman."
16 This fact, plus its
relatively short distance from home, must have provided an additional
impetus to Mary Norris in agreeing to let her children attend. The
school was in dire financial difficulties and its campus was not a
particularly impressive one. Its president, Dr. Aaron Schuyler, mathe
matician and writer of textbooks > was an able scholar and wrote the
algebra text through which Will Norris struggled. The student body
for the academic year 1877-78 numbered 241. Mary Norris would have
been delighted to know that the college catalogue commended Berea
as a town of "moral salubrity" with "no grog shops or seductive loung
ing places in the village."
17
The young students in Berea rented the second story of a house
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on the edge of town where they proceeded to set up housekeeping,
dividing the chores among them. They lived as frugally as possible
and devoted most of their time to studying. Norris and his sister Clara
were enrolled in the Preparatory Department, while Emma was regis
tered in the College Department. Norris was officially listed as a
junior student in the classical course, and his record as a student at
Baldwin was outstanding. At the end of the academic year, he re
ceived a perfect "10" grade for seven courses and "9.85," "9.8," and
"9" for the others. Latin and mathematics were the most important
subjects in the classical course of study, although Norris also studied
American history, grammar, physiology, and botany.
18
Outside of the classroom, as in Mount Carmel district school, Will
participated in the debating society. However, there were now other
forms of diversion available, and the sixteen-year-old scholar was
quick to seize them. Singing popular songs, engaging in that most
important of extracurricular activities, the "bull" session, participating
in an occasional prank these were activities that the young farm boy
had rarely been able to indulge in at home. They satisfied his gregari
ous inclinations, especially after a period of hard academic work.
After a most satisfying year at Baldwin, Norris spent the summer
working on the farm. He found this work a bit more arduous after a
winter of sedentary activity. Since his funds were exhausted and his
mother unable to supply him with any more, Will sought a teaching
position for the fall to earn the wherewithal to continue his education.
His first teaching job was in the Long School district near Whitehouse
in Lucas County, Ohio, where his oldest sister, Lorinda Castle,
lived with her family.
Norris enjoyed teaching school. Occasionally, especially in his first
job, he had discipline problems, but in most instances his pupils
were eager, attentive, and relatively tractable youngsters. Their young
teacher was not always a stern, scholarly taskmaster. Living in the
community with the family of one or the other of his pupils, he made
friends easily. Most evenings he devoted to reading; his determination
to become a lawyer was still strong. During the year at the Long
School district he spent weekends with his sister in nearby White-
house, a gathering place for young teachers in the vicinity. Emma
and Clara also spent time with the Castle family. Here the young
folk would enjoy the weekend free from the socially imposed restric
tions on unmarried schoolteachers in rural
villages. Will Norris
blossomed forth as an actor in play productions, sang in the various
entertainments, and engaged in sprightly conversation, something he
was usually unable to do while teaching school or working on the
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farm. Also, against his mother's dictates, he learned to dance.
19 Will
and the other young teachers, after such pleasant weekends, would
return to their students for another week of .school.
Having saved as much of the $150 salary as possible from his
teaching position, he declined the invitation to teach the following
term. He spent the summer working at home on the farm. In the fall
of 1879 he entered the Northern Indiana Normal School and Business
Institute at Valparaiso, Indiana. The school, later known as Valparaiso
University, was located in the southeast part of town overlooking
miles of marshlands. It was administered as a nonsectarian, self-sup
porting, and self-governing coeducational college, even though it was
endorsed by the Methodist Church and Porter County, Indiana. Its
president, Henry Baker Brown, an excellent administrator and educa
tor, developed the plant and strengthened the faculty. The institution
became known as die
'poor man's Harvard* and in 1914-15 boasted a
student body of six thousand, second only in size to that of the older
eastern university.
20
Two main features characterized the institution: the absence of
entrance requirements and the low cost of living. There were four
terms of eleven weeks each and a fifth lasting six weeks, so that a
student could start or resume his studies at any one of five times
during the year. The duration of a course of study leading to a degree
depended on the student's previous preparation, but at least one
year of residence was required. By eliminating middlemen and pur
chasing in quantity and by producing some of its own foodstuffs, the
school had lowered the cost of living for students and staff. Board and
room in Flint Hall cost $1.40 a week and tuition was $18 per term.21
Norris completed the classical and elocution courses before turning to
the law. During his years at Northern Indiana Normal School, Will
was one of the more popular students, liked and respected by his
peers.
22 In 1880, aged nineteen he received a college degree and was
admitted to the law course.
Norris found in Valparaiso the same spirit of social equality and
democracy that he knew in Ohio. Few students came from back
grounds that were markedly different from his. Most were serious
about their studies, though few were so serious that they would ignore
the opportunity to engage in gregarious extracurricular activities. Will
joined the debating teams and enrolled in a course devoted to debat
ing. He developed a florid style and learned many of the tricks of
oratory that were so prevalent in that period. In this way he increased
his self-assurance.
Elocution courses with Professor M. E. Bogarte gave him an op-
8 GEORGE W. NORRIS
portunity to discuss and debate politics. The election of 1880 occurred
while Norris was teaching school at Monclova, Ohio, prior to entering
law school. He participated as a member of a horse troop in a large
torch light parade for James A. Garfleld. Garfield was something of a
hero to Norris and his assassination moved him deeply. While national
politics aroused Norris' intense Republican partisanship, campus
politics at Valparaiso were much more important and aroused even
more intense partisanship.
28
In keeping with his interest in campus politics and debating, Norris
joined the Crescent Literary Society. Every Friday night there was a
public program of speeches, essays, and music in which the Crescent
and other literary societies participated. Rivalry was keen among
societies and within each society. Will Norris and Charley Hyde, repre
senting opposing factions within the Crescent, were chosen as the
society's candidates for the oration contests against the other groups.
Bitter feeling was intensified and, when Norris won the contest with
an address, "The Traitor's Deathbed," Hyde's supporters sought re
venge. This they achieved by defeating Norris by one vote in the
election for president of the society.
While the Hyde faction was celebrating its triumph, Norris and
his nine supporters met to form an organization which would have a
great influence on all their lives, the L.U.N. the Loyal United Nine
or, as their opponents called it, the Lunatics Under Norris. The or
ganization, to which no new members could be admitted, was officially
launched with a banquet in the Merchants' Hotel at Valparaiso on
August 6, 1883. It was agreed that every August the members would
have a reunion and a banquet. As the years went by these reunions
came to be treasured. Norris and Ermon E. Smith of Dodge City,
Kansas, who were the last survivors, attended a total of fifty-nine
banquets, the last one in 1941 at Norris' cottage overlooking Rainbow
Lake, one of a chain of sixteen lakes near Waupaca, Wisconsin. In
the early years of the organization, most of the reunions were held at
lake resort areas in Iowa and Wisconsin; in the twentieth century,
however, most were held in the L.U.N. cottage overlooking Rainbow
Lake. Here the members and their families built summer houses and
spent their vacations. Here their children and grandchildren became
acquainted and formed friendships that continued after the deaths of
the original members.
24
The year the L.U.N. was formed was also the year in which Norris
obtained his law degree and was admitted to the Indiana bar. Thus
in the late summer of 1883, George Norris, age twenty-two, returned
to his mother's farm in York Township, Ohio, with a law degree in
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his possession and his college years at an end. It must have been a
very proud mother who greeted her son on his return from Indiana.
His plans were uncertain. Norris no doubt puzzled over what the
future held for him and where he would practice. Colonel Rhodes in
Clyde was willing to let him clerk in his law office until he made a
decision. Norris accepted this offer. In Clyde he continued his studies
and acted as Rhodes' office boy. He also taught a term at Mount
Carmel school where he had been a pupil. It was his mother, how
ever, who made the suggestion that brought about his departure from
home. Mary Norris, learning of the booming opportunities in the
Pacific Northwest from colonizing agents, conceived the idea of sell
ing the farm and starting anew. Her son decided to go to Washington
Territory, establish his law practice, and then, if all went well, he
would send for her.
Using almost all his savings, Norris purchased a ticket to Walla
Walla in Washington Territory and traveled across country on the re
cently completed Northern Pacific Railroad in an emigrant train
sleepers attached to a freight from St. Paul. The journey lasted an
entire week, and he arrived at his destination tired and dirty with his
funds running low. Walla Walla, he quickly decided, was no place for
a young lawyer and his aging mother to settle. The town was desolate
and uninviting. Land was expensive and jobs were scarce. Norris
sought a teaching position to replenish his funds and, accepting the
only one available, boarded a train for Bolles Junction in a remote
part of the country. Though Bolles Junction appeared on the map to
be a sizable community, it was anything but that. He spent his first
night there sleeping on the floor in the house of a Mr. Lee, president of
the school district. The next day Norris set up housekeeping in a
crude shack, formerly used by a maintenance crew on the railroad
and now serving as a storeroom for railroad equipment.
The schoolroom was equally crude. Since there were but seven
pupils in the district, Norris conducted school only in the mornings.
The afternoons he had to himself and often went hunting or fishing
with Mr. Lee. Norris found that he still was a crack shot, especially
with a revolver. Occasionally on sunny afternoons, he would sit back
in his chair at school and fire at woodpeckers who darted in and out
of the room.25
Norris was not pleased either with his teaching position or with
Walla Walla. He had decided to return east as soon as he could re
plenish his funds. At the end of the school term he went to the nearby
community of Dayton to investigate the possibilities of establishing
a law practice. There he managed to get involved with a logging boss
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in a quarrel which almost resulted in gunplay. This incident, coupled
with his dissatisfaction with his job and location, convinced him once
and for all that Washington Territory was not the place for him.
Thus George Norris, at the age of twenty-three, eager to put his
legal talents to the test and his training to use, purchased a ticket on
the Oregon Short Line and the Union Pacific to the city of Lincoln in
the Cornhusker State of Nebraska.26 He chose this state because his
mother owned eighty acres of land in Johnson County, in the south
eastern part of the state, and because he had a kinsman, David Mook,
in the area. It also appealed to him because his late sister Effie had
gone there after her marriage. Nebraska now seemed a logical place
for the young lawyer to further himself in his chosen career.
Chapter 2
Nebraska, 1885-90: Prosperity
GEORGE NOBRIS did not stay long in Nebraska on his first trip. His
money ran out, and he returned to Ohio for a last term of teaching,
this time at Warrensville in Cuyahoga County. There he boarded
with a sister as an economy measure. At the end of the school term,
determined to return to Nebraska, he borrowed over three hundred
dollars from his sister Melissa, and received from his mother the deed
to her Johnson County land.
With a college classmate and fellow L.U.N. member, EL H. Har
rington, he opened a law office in March, 1885, in Beatrice, the seat of
Gage County, one of the richest agricultural areas in the state.
Despite the fact that Nebraska was booming, the partnership did not
prosper and the partners were soon disillusioned; Norris recalled,
"We had nothing to bring us business no associations and no con
nections." 1 Perhaps they did not give themselves enough time to get
started; perhaps they did not get along together in a small office with
few clients to challenge their abilities. Whatever the reason, during
the summer of 1885 the firm of Norris & Harrington was dissolved.
Harrington went back east, and Norris, in September, hoping for
better opportunities, moved farther west into the thriving Republican
River Valley country. He chose Beaver City, the seat of Furnas
County, as his destination. Since the Burlington and Missouri Rail
road had not yet reached this area, he hoped that here his practice
could develop with the country. Fully aware that he would need
considerable capital, Norris sold the Johnson County land for $1,500.
Then, with his few belongings, he traveled by railroad to Arapahoe
and thence by wagon almost due south to Beaver City.
The period during which Norris arrived in Nebraska was the most
prosperous in the history of the state up to that time. With above
average rainfall, agriculture prospered and, encouraged by "boomers/*
settlers came in ever increasing numbers. In 1880 the state's population
was 452,402; ten years later it had increased to over one million
people. Norris arrived in Beaver City in 1885; before the decade was
11
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over he had become secretary of the Beaver City Board of Trade and
was offering agents five dollars for each person who purchased a
quarter-section of land or $1,000 worth of city property. The Board
of Trade supplied these agents with advertising matter and agreed to
pay the railroad fare for any settler.
2 The extension of the Burlington
and Missouri Railroad throughout the western part of Nebraska was
the major factor in the rapid growth of population. By 1887 a branch
line of the railroad reached Beaver City, enabling it to participate
more directly in the general prosperity.
Furnas County, though organized in 1873, was still in many areas
raw prairie when Norris arrived in the autumn of 1885. Broken land
and cultivated fields seemingly were islands surrounded by a gentle
rolling sea of short grass on the slowly rising sod which was punc
tuated occasionally with steep slopes and rough land. The Republican
River, which flowed across the northern part of the county, was the
main body of water in the region. One of its tributaries, Beaver Creek,
along which the county seat was located, flowed not quite parallel to
it in the south central part of the county. Neither stream was navi
gable; the bed of each was sandy, bordered by low, sandy banks,
while the Republican was not only shallow but also relatively wide.
Furnas County is located in a subhumid region, an area with a
mean annual rainfall of about twenty-two inches.
8 Its rough lands and
sandy areas provide excellent grazing places for cattle, while the
better lands were devoted at first to corn and wheat. By the end of
the nineteenth century forage crops, particularly alfalfa, were raised
along the streams. Now, in the twentieth century, irrigation is used
to insure more adequate crops. Along the streams are maple, ash, elm,
box elder, and cottonwood trees. Cattle and produce from the county
make their way into the Omaha and Denver markets.
While very different from the Ohio Norris knew and loved, the
new country was not totally beyond his previous experience, and he
soon came to love and later to understand it as well. Arriving as the
country was being rapidly developed, he saw it originally at its very
best in a period of prosperity during a lush and languid autumn
season.
Settlers in southwestern Nebraska generally did not understand
the climate of the Great Plains. Many farmers and town builders
moved into the region believing, from its generally luxuriant ap
pearance, that it did not differ markedly from the known agricultural
areas farther east. Others, who had heard of conditions on the plains
in the previous decade, reassured themselves with the popular de-
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lusion that climate somehow changed with settlement and that rain
fall followed the plow. The early experience of settlers and farmers
during the ISSO's was usually pleasant and profitable. They therefore
accepted these conditions as normal and regarded any marked change
from them as abnormal and temporary. It would be several years
hence before Norris and other settlers obtained a more valid under
standing of the region, an understanding based on bitter experience.
On the north bank of Beaver Creek is situated Beaver City. First
settled in 1872 by J. H. McKee, it is the county seat and principal
town (the population in 1895 was over fifteen hundred
4
) of the Beaver
Valley. Here George Norris would make his home, marry, start raising
a family, and launch his career in law, in business, and in politics.
Before the prosperous decade of the 1880's was over, the community
boasted an $18,000 courthouse and a $15,000 high school.
5 Across the
square from the courthouse was an old farm building owned by
David H. Lashley, who was to become Norris' father-in-law. The
building was used as a hotel and office building. Later, in 1893, it was
torn down, and the Norris block, an office building still in use today,
was erected in its place. Beaver City, small though it was, had two
newspapers: the Times and the Tribune. The latter, a Republican
paper, was edited by Fletcher W. Merwin, who became an intimate
aide to Norris when he entered politics. The former was owned by
John T. McClure, an able lawyer, a Democrat, and later a Populist
leader in the area. Two banks, the Furnas County Bank and the First
National Bank of Beaver City, were organized soon after Norris
arrived.
At the outset, life in Beaver City was far from easy for tie young
lawyer. His clothes were threadbare; he usually did most of his own
washing. In the winter he took to burning corn to keep his office
warm. Once a week he got a shave, paying at the rate of twelve shaves
for a dollar. A shoeshine was reserved only for very special occasions,
such as a trip to Lincoln or Omaha. Apparently, in his early days in
Beaver City, besides sporting the mustache already evident in his
years at Valparaiso, Norris affected a cowboy hat and possibly other
aspects of western dress.
6
Despite his relative poverty, Norris was delighted with the region,
the town, and the people. Here he found again what he had experi
enced in Ohio and at college: social equality along with a feeling of
fraternity and good will among his fellow citizens. Everybody's latch-
string was out. Every man by and large was trusted and accepted
regardless of his background until he did something to convince his
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associates that their trust and friendship were mispkced. Norris be
came so impressed with Beaver City that he tried
to interest one of his
sisters in buying a house and settling there.
7
Norris easily made friends in the community and the surrounding
countryside. Having joined the Odd Fellows lodge at Clyde in his
twenty-first year, he now transferred his membership
to Beaver City.
Bob Scott, the warden of the lodge, became an early friend and intro
duced Norris to jackrabbit stew.
8 Scott may have been a member of
the party of four who were hunting quail when Norris was
acci
dentally shot. The members had separated, each seeking to bag
as
many birds as possible, when Norris was shot in the
face. When the
others found him, he was on the ground in extreme pain, unable to
see, groping on his hands and knees, feeling for the gun,
and intending
to kill himself. Two of the members of the party carried him to a
nearby house while the other ran for a doctor.
Norris feared at first
that he had been completely blinded, but found his sight returning
even before the doctor examined him. Initially the doctor thought he
would lose the sight of one eye, but on second examination revised
this opinion and agreed that Norris' sight would be saved. Twenty-
two pieces of shot were taken out of his face.
At least two were
permanently embedded in his flesh.
9 For several years after this acci
dent, Norris understandably took no great interest in hunting and
devoted himself almost entirely to his law practice and other business.
Norris opened a two-room office south of the courthouse square.
Until his marriage in 1889 he worked in one of the rooms, lived in the
other, and dined out. Despite the desire to utilize his professional
training, he found it necessary to engage in other activities along
with
the law. Indeed, he later wrote, "The first money I made in Nebraska
was in the land business, and often I made more money in the land
business than in the law business." 10 Shortly after his arrival he pur
chased a quarter section of land which he later sold at a profit. He also
started to acquire real estate in Beaver City. His activities were typical
of young western lawyers who were trying to earn a living without
a corporate connection as their chief source of income.
Nebraska, as a comparatively new state, desperately needed capital
to maintain the prosperity of the 1880's and to attract new settlers,
The inhabitants had to go outside of the state for much of their work
ing capital. While rainfall remained adequate and crops bountiful, land
values increased rapidly. Though agriculture and stock raising were
the principal occupations, urban development began on a large scale,
and railroad construction continued without abatement.
Enterprising farmers and town dwellers who wanted to improve
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their holdings found it easy to borrow money from loan companies,
commercial banks, insurance companies, and even from individuals.
Such mortgages seemingly offered an excellent opportunity for the
small investor. They could be held in modest amounts, and the interest
rates were high. Investors throughout the East and North poured
their savings into companies which proceeded to loan millions of dol
lars in the West. By 1889 Kansas and Nebraska had 134 incorporated
mortgage companies. Including companies organized in other states
but operating in Kansas and Nebraska, the number reached at least
two hundred. Between 1884 and 1887 the number of farm mortgages
placed in Nebraska was six thousand and their value was $5,467?362.
n
Newly arrived farmers were immediately subjected to heavy ex
pense for buildings, farm machinery, fencing, seed, livestock, and
taxes before they could show adequate returns. In the beginning, their
outlay was much greater than their income. What little money they
brought with them quickly disappeared. Merchants had to sell on
credit, and professional men, like Norris, had to wait for their
fees. The borrowing of money seemed to be a necessity for the satis
factory development of the country; without mortgages, development
would have proceeded at a much slower pace.
12
At the outset Norris engaged in the mortgage-loan business and
found it profitable. With good crops and more settlers migrating to
the country, land values increased and as a result, loans were given
a safe margin. This led investors to seek more mortgages, and loan
companies to attempt to increase their business by urging their agents,
of whom Norris was one, to lend more money. Soon irresponsible
agents and companies were loaning money on poor investments and
encouraging farmers to borrow more than they actually needed. Some
observers noted that this extensive mortgage business was draining
money out of the area by the payment of interest.
13 With the failure
of crops in the short-grass country beginning in 1890> worse effects
would appear.
George Norris, as an ambitious young lawyer, quickly found that
there were ways of making money in conjunction with legal work.
He took advantage of them, and earned most of his livelihood as an
agent for various companies and individuals engaged in the mortgage-
loan business. If Norris was unable to collect, he could initiate legal
proceedings. In the beginning all went well, but as debtors ran into
difficulties, the job became a delicate and difficult one for a person
with political ambitions who wished to remain on good terms with his
neighbors.
For a while, Norris sold insurance as an agent of the National
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Fire Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut. In 1889 he sought
to act as agent for the Yost Typewriter Company, but was turned
down on the basis that his other business and his inability to type
would prevent him from showing their machine to its best advantage.
In another instance, an Iowa businessman desired to obtain Norris'
services to rent and care for his livery stable and other real estate in
Beaver City.
14 However, these examples were extraneous to his main
line of endeavor, which was that of agent for various individuals,
banks, and corporations engaged in some aspect of the mortgage-loan
business.
Norris' work continually took him away from Beaver City. He
traveled throughout the country making collections, seeking prospec
tive customers for loans, observing conditions, and preparing reports.
In the course of this work Norris met people in all walks of life. He
won the respect and confidence of most people with whom he came
in contact, and formed some lasting friendships. Since many of the
notes he sought to collect were small, his fees were also small.
15
The Vigilant Wholesale Creditors' Agency of Omaha, whose motto
was "The Race Is to the Swift," carefully defined the fees their agents,
among whom was Norris, were to receive. If the note was paid on
demand or presentation, the charges were 5 per cent on the first $200
and 2M per cent on the excess. "In all other cases/' stated their printed
form, the following fees were to be charged "without respect to time
or effort expended": 10 per cent on claims under $100, 5 per cent on
excess to $700, and 2& per cent on excess of $700. No charge was to
be less than $1.50 and, most important, the agent making die collec
tion would receive two-thirds of all the fees. The remaining one-third,
along with the proceeds, would then be remitted to the agency in
Omaha.16
Norris also acted as agent for some large firms which desired the
services of a local attorney to make their collections. Among them
R. G. Dun & Co., with headquarters in New York and branch offices
in 135 cities. This company, established by famed abolitionist Louis
Tappan in 1841, claimed that it was the oldest mercantile agency in
the world. Other large firms such as Thurber, Wyland and Company
of New York and the Credit Guarantee Company of Minneapolis
acquired Norris' services. He served as agent and collector for William
Deering and Company of Chicago, producers of harvesting machin
ery.
17 The larger firms often had a branch office or a general agent in
Nebraska, and it was the office manager or agent who contacted
Norris.
These companies employed Norris as an attorney when it was
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necessary to bring suit against a debtor in Furnas County and vicinity.
If the plaintiff lived outside of Nebraska, Norris had to make certain
that the petition for foreclosure of a mortgage was in accord with
Nebraska statutes before it was filed and a summons issued. There
were court fees and service charges involved in these proceedings and
usually a commission rather than a fee for Norris' services. In most
instances, before court action was taken, Norris was consulted by the
attorney in the plaintiffs home town as to the possibility of settling the
case without recourse to the law. Prior to 1890, however, Norris was
rarely called upon to initiate legal action. Most debtors in southwest
Nebraska managed to meet their obligations, and creditors had little
cause for complaint.
18
Though Norris acted as agent or representative for many firms and
individuals in the various aspects of the mortgage-loan business, he
did most of his work for J. H. Miles and the First National Bank of
Rulo, Nebraska, of which Miles was vice-president.
19 It is not known
how, where, and when Norris met Miles, but Miles took an interest in
the young lawyer, trusted him, and expressed confidence in his judg
ment and ability. Norris continued to work in various capacities with
Miles after he left the Bank of Rulo for the one at Falls City. The
association continued until shortly after the turn of the century when
Miles retired. Norris discounted notes, loaned money, bought and
sold land, and performed other services for Miles and the Rulo bank.
At the outset, Norris was associated in this work with George Shafer
of Beaver City, but by the end of 1889 they dissolved this arrangement
and both men worked on their own.20 Norris and Shafer remained on
amicable terms and were associated in business again at the end of the
century.
In December, 1888, Norris decided to investigate conditions in
Salt Lake City with the idea of settling there and continuing his work
with Miles in the Utah territory. Norris felt that he was intruding upon
Shafer's business. And perhaps the incessant traveling and collecting
was beginning to sap his strength. Whatever the reasons, he went to
Salt Lake City for the ostensible purpose of investigating the possi
bility of opening a bank. After being away from Beaver City for less
than two weeks, Norris returned, confirmed in the opinion that his
future would be no better in Salt Lake City than in Beaver City.
21
The connection with Miles gave Norris opportunities to participate
directly in the mortgage-loan business. With his knowledge of local
conditions he made good investments, securing the necessary funds
from the bank in Rulo. He also invested money for members of his
family, once informing his sister Melissa that he could loan $1,500 of
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her money "for IQ% where it will be secure" and where he could make
a profit on it himself.
22
By the end of 1889 Miles decided to seek a new banking connec
tion and close the First National Bank of Rulo. He began looking for
another community in which to start a bank, finally deciding upon
Falls City, the county seat. Miles' shifting of banks necessitated a
rearrangement of Norris' activities so that most
of his accounts could
be closed when the bank in Rulo shut its doors.23
In the spring of 1890, shortly after the First National Bank closed,
the cashier of the Bank of Rulo, a competitor of Miles' bank, wrote to
Norris inquiring if he would loan money for this bank as he had done
for Miles'. Norris agreed, although he indicated that he probably
could not do as large a business as he had done for their former com
petitor because the terms on which he was to conduct this new busi
ness were .now very rigidly defined. The Bank of Rulo was more
cautious in its mortgage-loan business than Miles, primarily because
its officers were new to the business and because economic conditions
were changing.
24
By 1890 Norris' interest in the mortgage-loan business was begin
ning to wane. He refused an offer from Miles to accept the position of
cashier in his new bank at a salary of $1,200 for the first year and the
privilege of purchasing up to one-fifth of its stock.
25 Part of the reason
for refusing the offer was his desire to remain in the legal profession
and to pursue the interest in politics which thus far he had been forced
to relegate to a subsidiary position.
But there was another reason for refusing the offer. On June 1,
1889, when Norris was not yet twenty-eight years of age, he married
a belle of Beaver City, Pluma Lashley. The Lashleys had come from
Iowa to Beaver City shortly after its founding in the 1870's. David
Lashley had risen rapidly as a businessman in the thriving community.
He owned a considerable amount of real estate, built a substantial
house, and operated a prosperous grist mill on Beaver Creek about a
mile out of town. Lashley's daughter, Pluma, had been born in Iowa,
in 1864, and at the time of her marriage was a tall, attractive, dark-
complexioned woman three years younger than her husband. They
started their life together in a rented four-room cottage which they
had carefully and tastefully furnished.
26
Before the couple had been married a year, Pluma's father died.
Norris had the task of settling the estate and keeping the gristmill in
operation. Shortly afterwards the newlyweds moved into the Lashley
home so that Pluma would have the companionship of her mother
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while Norris was traveling. This relieved some of his anxiety and re
morse at being away from home.
After five years in Beaver City, George Norris had established
himself as a rising young man in the community. He had arrived with
a minimum of cash, but through his own initiative and ability had
developed a prosperous business which brought him into contact with
men in all walks of life. He was becoming known, liked, and respected
a difficult feat for a person who had to collect money. He was sym
pathetic and fair in his business dealings, and people quickly learned
to trust his word, while many business firms throughout Nebraska
and some larger western and national concerns sought his services.
Within five years he had paid off most of his debts, could promptly
meet his obligations, owned a few choice real estate items, and in a
small way participated in the mortgage-loan business. He was happily
married to the daughter of one of Beaver City's leading citizens and
had a promising future. True, he was not practicing law as much as he
might have desired, but he could not have secured as many agencies
as he did without his law degree. Moreover, most lawyers in the
region, unless they worked full time for the railroad or held public
office, earned their livelihood in approximately the same way. This
type of work was significant in fie development of the West. In
Nebraska it enabled young George Norris, during the boom period
of the 1880's, to sink his roots in a region that he would henceforth
consider his home. While he was able to start his adult life in Nebraska
in a period of prosperity, adversity in the last decade of the nineteenth
century would test his character and, incidentally, launch his political
career.
Chapter 3
Nebraska, 1890-95: Adversity
THE BOOM PERIOD in southwestern Nebraska was coming to an end by
the late 1880's. Since the prosperity of the country depended on satis
factory prices for agricultural produce, overproduction and over-
expansion started the deflationary process which lack of rain, drought,
and hot winds accelerated, thereby adding physical misery to people
already overburdened with economic woes. Capital had been invested
here and elsewhere in the West beyond reasonable amounts which
could insure immediate returns. The debt burden, both public and
private, was heavy, and some eastern investors were becoming sus
picious that their funds had not been prudently invested. A day of
reckoning seemed to be at hand. Drought caused widespread crop
failure in 1890, and this in turn brought the situation to a head.
The farmer's woes were aggravated by the fact that the price he
received for his products, despite fluctuations, went steadily down
ward during the last twenty years of the nineteenth century while
his fixed costs, such as freight, interest, machinery, and taxes, generally
remained steady or did not decline from their boom-time high level
as rapidly or as far as the farmer would have liked. Seldom during
these years did the market price of grain equal the cost of production.
At times during the 1890's, the drought was so severe in some places
that no crops were harvested and farmers were forced to turn their
livestock loose to forage for themselves. A nationwide panic and de
pression complicated these problems, and struck the final blow to many
western fanners and townspeople who pulled up stakes and moved out
of the region.
1
In this period of adversity, the companies which had been so eager
to lend money only a few years before had little cash and were
reluctant to lend what they had. Much money was withdrawn and
potential lenders were frightened away by the court rulings which in
many Nebraska counties granted stays of six to nine months or even
longer, depending on the amount of money involved, before fore
closure proceedings could be made final.2
20
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Unable to secure funds through real estate mortgages, many farm
ers were now forced to accept chattel loans borrowing money on
their livestock and agricultural implements. For the five-year period
ending May 31, 1895, the number of chattel mortgages recorded by
the state auditor of Nebraska was 539,323.3 The average assessed valu
ation of farm land in Furnas County dropped from $3.64 per acre in
1880 to $2.09 in 1890, and by 1900 it had risen only to $2.30. In the
neighboring county on the west, Red Willow, the figures ran as fol
lows: 1880-44.81, 1890-41.86, 1900-$1.54.4 Conducting business of any
sort during this period was exceedingly difficult; making collections
on notes as they fell due was almost impossible.
The decade of the 1890's, to the people of the short-grass country,
was a time of struggle with debt, bad credit, and decreasing values.
Few new debts were incurred, and old ones, owing to clamoring credi
tors, were reduced as much as possible. Many were foreclosed. Some
people, instead of continuing the struggle, left the region; but most of
them, believing that drought and bad times were the exception and
that rain and better times would soon return, grimly held on. They
had invested heavily in the Republican River Valley; they had raised
their children and buried their dead in lonely country cemeteries;
they now considered this area their home and they intended to hold
on to their property.
With a better understanding of the subhumid region, drought-
resistant crops, irrigation, and with a more balanced agricultural
economy, the people of the future would find it less difficult to live
and prosper in the midst of a challenging environment. For those
who remained throughout these troubled times, a bond was forged that
manifested itself in a growing regional consciousness, an awareness
that their part of the West was different from other areas. The "old
settlers*
"
picnics and reunions thus became very meaningful to these
early sod-busting and sod-dwelling farmers as the last years of the
nineteenth century receded into history. Norris' experiences during the
1890's enhanced his understanding of people and their problems and
thereby helped to make him an outstanding public servant.
Throughout the decade his major activities in the mortgage-loan
business were with the Bank of Rulo, and with Miles and the newly
organized First National Bank of Falls City. Norris was pleased with
the Bank of Rulo and its cashier, B. F. Cunningham, because they
did not take advantage of drought-stricken farmers and avoided fore
closing whenever possible. However, while the bank was willing to
grant extensions or renewals on its notes, it was reluctant to allow
Norris to loan more money.
5
22 GEORGE W. NORRIS
In 1891 there was a record rainfall of over twenty-five inches; crops
were excellent, and debtors, temporarily at least, were able to meet
their obligations. Few people, however, were willing to borrow money
at the prevailing rate of 10 per cent. Norris tried to convince the Bank
of Rulo that he could make a few safe loans if it would accept 8
per cent interest payable in advance. A merchant in Beaver City, he
wrote, was ready to borrow $2,000 on six or eight months time on
these conditions. But the bank was unwilling to loan money at 8 per
cent when it could loan all the money it desired at a higher rate of
interest.6 Unable to conclude satisfactory arrangements, Norris severed
his connection with the Bank of Rulo -in 1892.
On the other hand, Miles, who settled in Falls City in July, 1891,
and went to work as cashier of the First National Bank, quickly re
newed his business with Norris. Soon Norris was making almost all his
loans for this bank. The Falls City bank, like the one in Rulo, had no
trouble making loans at 10 per cent. Though Miles allowed Norris to
place a few choice loans, he was unwilling to let him expand his activ
ity. Because of the precarious national financial situation and the
nationwide panic which began in the summer of 1893, Miles feared a
run on the bank or the failure of a correspondent bank, and did not
want to commit himself too deeply to any line of endeavor.
7 These
events and the policies resulting from them severely limited Norris'
activities.
As the panic broadened into a depression, drought and hot winds
added to the plight of already desperate people. Because the rainfall
was woefully inadequate in 1893 and 1894,8 crops were almost a total
failure, and Norris found it more difficult to conduct his declining busi
ness for Miles. Debtors could not sell property and creditors could
not collect on their notes and accounts. By the end of 1894 Norris
claimed that he had never seen money so hard to obtain.9
Norris' work for Miles and the First National Bank of Falls City
was the most important aspect of his career as an agent in the mort
gage-loan business. At the same time, however, he also acted as an
agent for other individuals and concerns. He continually told credi
tors that it would be difficult if not impossible to collect until nature
relented and abundant crops were harvested. Meanwhile, holders of
notes requested extensions because they had nothing to market and
no money to meet their obligations. Norris advised some creditors not
to take a client to court because under Nebraska law "he would be
entitled to a stay of nine months." If the debtor were conscientious
and nature helpful, he might pay sooner without a court order.10
If the debtor were unable to pay and the company unwilling to
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grant an extension or a renewal (which might be secured by a chattel
mortgage or increased interest), Norris would then have to institute
foreclosure proceedings, an activity he seldom indulged in during the
booming decade of the 1880's. By foreclosing and obtaining judg
ments, more than ever before, Norris now used his legal talents in
connection with the mortgage-loan business.
11
Aside from his dealings with the two banks in Richardson County,
Norris now did most of his mortgage-loan business for two companies
and an individual. One company, Burnham, Trevett & Mattis, was
located in Beatrice and was a regional organization. The individual,
Stanley E. Filkins, was a lawyer of Medina, New York, who had heavy
investments in and around Beaver City. Snow, Church & Company was
a national collection company with its Nebraska branch office located
in Omaha.
The relationship with Burnham, Trevett & Mattis was a pleasant
one for Norris. He handled their legal work, foreclosing when neces
sary, and found that the concern was "willing to extend every
courtesy to a borrower" when he tried "to do the right thing." After
foreclosing on a piece of property, Norris was requested to try to
"scare up a buyer" because the land the company had acquired was of
little value to it and necessitated the payment of taxes. Burnham,
Trevett & Mattis, being a Nebraska concern, was fully aware of the
difficult conditions people faced; the firm understood what a good
soaking rain meant to a struggling farmer. Its members were also
sympathetic to Norris* political aspirations, even though these aspira
tions would probably entail the loss of his services.
12
When Filkins* agent in Beaver City resigned to become commis
sioner of the United States District Land Office in McCook, Norris
hoped to succeed him. However, he was not successful until 1894,
when Filkins considered enlarging his investments in the area. By
that summer Norris was handling all of Filkins' Nebraska investments.
He was making collections, trying to rent and sell property, obtaining
chattel mortgages from customers who wanted renewals, securing
judgments, and foreclosing when necessary.
13
The relationship of George Norris with Snow, Church & Company
was the most formal and least satisfactory of his mortgage-loan con
nections. The company, with twenty-nine offices throughout the
United States, professed to be the most vigilant collection agency in
the country. But Norris was not impressed with its cold efficiency.
After several months he wrote the chief of the Omaha office that thus
far the agency had yielded him "the magnificent sum of $1.34," a
sum substantially lower than the postage fees incurred, for bringing a
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court action necessary to secure a judgment. The only other claim
of consequence he had received was immediately taken out of his
hands.14
Besides his difficult work in the established channels of the mort
gage-loan business, Norris continued his side ventures in real estate
and other activities. Several insurance companies sought his services,
chiefly to aid in collections. Nebraska law required that any insurance
company having an agency in a county must also appoint an attorney
residing at the county seat. While real estate ventures were more time
consuming than insurance work, the opportunities for making im
mediate profits in insurance were very limited. In 1887 he had pur
chased 160 acres of land in Greeley County, Kansas, for $800. Early
in 1891, he purchased 220 acres of land near Beaver City for $2,400;
it contained both timber and water. Since it was virtually impossible
to sell land, he sometimes tried to trade lots located in Kansas and
other parts of Nebraska. Occasionally property owners asked him to
try to sell their property. For selling a client's land Norris received
the regular commission of 5 per cent on the first thousand, and 2%
per cent on the balance.
15
His most extensive real estate activities, however, were in and
around Beaver City where he collected rent and generally attended
the property of absentee owners. Norris usually took his commission
out of the rent money. Collecting rent was a difficult and troublesome
chore. Some tenants would depart just before their rent was due,
others were forced to sell their crops at ruinous prices in order to make
some payment to the landlord. A dwelling house in Beaver City could
be rented for about six dollars per month. The rent on a house Norris
had purchased as an investment for a sister in Ohio "from the first of
May to the first of October" in 1894 amounted to $45. 16 At such rates,
his commission could not have amounted to a very large sum, especially
when compared to the time and energy he had to spend looking after
the property.
The major problem Norris had with real estate in Beaver City in
volved the mill, part of which he and his wife inherited from the
Lashley estate. All of the heirs agreed that Norris, the executor of
the estate, should sell it. The mill was sold for $8,000 to a man named
Andrew Jackson who apparently had borrowed $5,000 from the late
Mrs. Lashley to make the purchase. Jackson soon failed in business
and was left with no money and heavy debts. Norris decided to take
over the mill and the $2,500 mortgage on it rather than allow it to be
sold at a sheriffs sale. By buying the mill and renting it, he hoped to
insure a steady income to pay taxes and interest on the mortgage, and
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eventually to make a profit for the Lashley heirs. Noris assumed re
sponsibility for managing the mill until a buyer could be found, but,
owing to the depression, found it impossible to sell the property. By
the end of 1895 the mill was in a critical condition, in need of an over
hauling of its machinery before it would be in satisfactory working
order.17
While Norris was not anxious to assume the heavy responsibility
of the Lashley mill, he did assume another responsibility in 1893 with
greater enthusiasm. Despite the financial stringency, he had accumu
lated some funds and thought he could borrow even more to erect
a two-story brick business building in Beaver City the Norris Block.
Early in die year he initiated the necessary real estate transactions.
The local brickyard agreed to supply the necessary bricks, and con
tracts were awarded for the lumber and iron work. Before the winter
was over all arrangements had been completed and construction was
under way.
18
Norris wanted to buy only for cash, and asked various business
firms to quote him prices with this understanding. By June, however,
the Panic of 1893 was well under way and banks became increasingly
hesitant about making loans. Only after Miles and Norris had fully
explained to the Board of Directors of the Falls City Bank their
arrangements did the board members agree to take his note for
$5,000.19 Thus Norris' policy of buying only for cash was quickly
jeopardized and his difficulties started. By building in a period of
financial panic which quickly broadened into a national depression,
Norris had overextended himself at a time when all sensible business
men were sharply curtailing their activities.
By autumn, despite difficulties, the Norris Block was almost com
pleted. The building faced north and east on the square, and had the
name "Norris" and the year "1893* engraved on its pediment. Norris
requested that the Beaver City Post Office be moved from Hopping's
Drug Store to his building, suggesting among other reasons that its
location would then be over five hundred feet nearer to the railroad
depot. He had the building insured against fire, windstorms, and tor
nadoes, moved his office to the second floor, and reserved the first floor
for the post office.
20 This space, however, was taken by the Furnas
County Bank, which eventually caused Norris much more difficulty
than the post office.
As the depression deepened, the Norris Block brought in less and
less money in rent. By 1895 Norris had to borrow money on his life
insurance policies to meet his mounting financial obligations. In
April, 1895, the Furnas County Bank failed, depriving Norris of both
26 GEORGE W. NORRIS
the rent of his chief tenant and nearly $1,400 he had deposited in its
vaults.21
The day after the bank failed, the next best tenant in the building,
the owner of a stock of general merchandise, also failed. The other
tenants, who likewise had been doing business with the bank, were
unable to pay their rent. The result was that by June, 1895, Norris
was receiving rents of $3 per month instead of the $74 he had orig
inally anticipated. He had ample property but no buyers, and could
not pay anything on his loans until a crop was ready for market. Nor
ris first tried unsuccessfully to borrow from friends to whom he had
previously loaned various sums, and then called upon his more affluent
L.U.N. classmates, who responded most generously.22
The failure of the Furnas County Bank came at a most inoppor
tune time for George Norris, interfering with the political activities
in which he was engaged. Whereas previously business, to his regret,
had to take precedence over politics and had to be shared with legal
work, henceforth law and politics would be Norris' chief concerns. His
numerous and varied business contacts helped to make his political
and legal work easier. Though not a Populist (his. dedication to the
Republican party was too great for that), Norris well understood why
the new party gained in influence and power. He knew the difficulties
people faced and the grievances they harbored, having experienced
some of them himself. He first began to interest himself in politics in
Nebraska in 1890, just as the Populist party in the state was being or
ganized. The People's Independent party, to give it its official name,
would provide Norris with his earliest political antagonists.
Chapter 4
Populism and Politics
ON July 29, 1890, at Bohanan's Hall in Lincoln, more than eight hun
dred delegates and several hundred well-wishers witnessed the launch
ing o a new political party, one that claimed to speak for discontented
and economically depressed farmers and workers. This party wreaked
havoc upon the traditional political structure of the state, and it swept
like wildfire through the debt-ridden short-grass country of southwest
Nebraska, Populists, during the decade, were elected to every major
political office, though at no time were they able to dominate the state
without help from the older political parties. In 1890, for the first time
since Nebraska became a state, the Republican party met defeat at the
polls, and numerous measures designed to alleviate the discontent that
became abundantly evident with drought and depression were seri
ously considered by the legislature.
The Populists in Nebraska gained most of their followers from the
ranks of dissatisfied Republican farmers and small businessmen. By
1894, when William Jennings Bryan wrested control of the Democratic
party in the state from its conservative leaders, discontented Demo
crats had a leader and soon a program that articulated their needs and
desires. While many Republicans would support the new party, family
traditions, social pressures, and antagonisms dating back to the Civil
War made it impossible for most of them to support the Democratic
party. Eventually most of these people went back to their old party
and tried, as Bryan had done with the Democratic party in Nebraska
and on the national level, to reform it from within. Their children,
growing up in a political environment that called for effective govern
ment action to promote the general welfare by curbing corporate
wealth and privilege, would carry many of the ideas and policies they
heard expounded in their youth into the progressive wing of the Re
publican party in the new century.
Many of the farmers, small businessmen, and professional men in
Nebraska who remained true to the Republican party fully understood
most of their opponents' complaints and recognized the validity of
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some of their remedies. However, they felt with some justification that
many Populist leaders bordered on demagoguery in their political con
duct and that reform could be better obtained within the framework
of the party of Lincoln. George Norris, who quickly found himself a
lone Republican lawyer surrounded by a mob of Populists, was among
those who took this stand.1 He later wrote of this period, "I could see
nothing unnatural about this Populist movement. It represented human
misery and poverty. It came into existence as naturally as the sea
sons."
2 Thus at the time when Populism was sweeping across the
Great Plains Norris launched his political career.
He started it in the most disastrous way possible with a defeat.
This was the only defeat he ever met at the polls until his last cam
paign for public office in 1942; his political life began and ended with
rejection at the polls. In 1890 he sought the office of prosecuting attor
ney of Furnas County. His opponent, John T. McClure, was also his
rival as the outstanding lawyer in Beaver City. McClure, owner of the
Beaver City Times, was a former Democrat turned Populist, and he
handily defeated Norris on election day. The Populist party gained
control of both houses of the state legislature and elected two con
gressmen, one of whom, W. A. McKeighan, whose district included
Furnas County, also received the Democratic nomination. .
Norris campaigned vigorously, curtailing his other activities to
devote as much time as possible to politics, and paying most of the
expenses himself.
3 However, the post of prosecuting attorney did not
elude him. Twice he was appointed to fill out unexpired terms and
once in 1892 he was elected. His mortgage-loan business, his legal
work, and his strenuous campaigning helped to make him known
personally to almost every voter in Furnas County. Thus without un
due effort on his part Norris became a Republican party leader. In
1891 Furnas County Republicans wanted to nominate him for district
judge and rumors to this effect appeared in the press.4
It was politics that brought Norris into contact with W. S. Morlan
of McCook, undoubtedly the most powerful figure in Republican
party circles in southwestern Nebraska. As general attorney for the
Burlington and Missouri he wielded considerable influence, and Norris
usually requested railroad passes from him. The two men at times
worked together on a case and Morlan, whenever the opportunity
arose, sent legal business to Norris. Morlan was an exceptionally gen
erous man at times; in one instance, for example, he refused to accept
any money on a case in which Norris had done most of the work.
Morlan was an able lawyer and was very demanding of his associates
and assistants. No Republican candidate could obtain a nomination
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for office in Red Willow County without his approval, and he enjoyed
almost as much power throughout the region.
Morlan was undoubtedly responsible for Norris' becoming the
local attorney in Beaver City for the Burlington and Missouri. It is
not known when Norris first assumed this job, but by 1894 he was very
much a part of the company,5 and was in its employ while he served
as prosecuting attorney. But when he went on the bench a full-time
job, which his previous public office was not he gave up this work
with the Burlington and Missouri and his other business as well.
The 1892 election saw Norris again seeking the office of prosecuting
attorney. Ignoring national and state candidates and issues in this elec
tion, he concerned himself almost exclusively with his particular cam
paign. He was optimistic about his chances. Since his opponent, a
Mr. Harper, was not highly reputed as a lawyer, Norris wanted his
own supporters to portray him as a capable attorney, one who would
be competent to look after the business of the county. If his candidacy
was presented in this light, Norris believed that despite overwhelming
Populist sentiment in the county he could be elected.
6 And he was
elected, even though the fusion candidate McKeighan, won handily
in the newly created Fifth Congressional District which included
southwest Nebraska, and a Populist, James B, Weaver, received almost
a two-hundred vote majority over Benjamin Harrison in Furnas
County. This was the first time in the county's history that it cast its
presidential vote for other than a Republican candidate.
7
With his election Norris found that his work as a lawyer also
increased. Since the prosecuting attorney was usually about the court
house, lawyers as well as clients throughout the county sought his
services or asked his advice. Tax matters came within his purview,
because with the hard times more and more people were unable to
pay their taxes. And as chief law enforcement officer of the county,
Norris had to prosecute criminals and take action in related matters.
With the increase in legal duties, Norris* other business, already
declining because of drought and depression, was not unduly affected.
However, he had to make adjustments to be on hand when the district
and county courts were in session. To avoid confusion, for example,
he tried to have no cases before a justice of the peace during a term of
the district court. And as time went on, he resented the numerous
impositions on his time and service by citizens who thought that as
prosecuting attorney he should handle their legal work free of charge.
As an aspirant to higher public office, as a Republican officeholder in
a Populist area, he could not afford to antagonize too many people.
Therefore Norris performed many petty legal services for citizens
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who did not distinguish between his public office and his private legal
work.8
In 1894 he did not seek re-election and was able to devote his
energies to aiding Republican candidates.
As a leading politician in
Furnas County he could control some convention votes, usually
the
Beaver City delegation, in favor of particular
candidates. Conse
quently, party leaders contacted
him to use his influence for their
particular candidates. There were county, district,
and state conven
tions in 1894 and Norris attended them all.
The state convention held in Omaha on August 22, was the most
important. Norris secured passes
for the Furnas County delegates
from Morlan and attended to other details.
9 The delegates to the
Republican state convention from southwest Nebraska must have been
in a grim mood as they boarded the Burlington and Missouri cars. In
May a severe frost had ruined thousands of acres of early corn. Rain
fall had been far from adequate, and late in July a furnace-like wind
had withered much of the corn crop. Norris and his fellow delegates
looking out of their car windows saw the results of this devastation.
They understood effects of panic, depression, and crop failure in terms
of their own area. In Omaha they could comprehend what it meant
in terms of an urban area: large numbers of unemployed, row upon
row of houses with boarded windows, newspaper columns filled with
notices of foreclosures and sheriffs' sales.10
That Norris was not unknown outside of his corner of the state was
evident as the convention assembled. A candidate for attorney gen
eral wrote to him as a person "of influence in shaping the disposition
of your delegation." However, Norris did not play a prominent role at
the convention. Thomas J. Majors, who had the support of the Burling
ton Railroad, obtained the gubernatorial nomination. With the excep
tion of the candidate for secretary of state, all the candidates came
from the eastern part of the state. The entire ticket was composed of
regular, standpat Republicans and the platform was fully in accord
with their views. It ignored the .events which Norris and his fellow
delegates experienced and had to deal with in their daily lives. While
it denounced the Democrats, the platform did not notice the Populist
policies.
11
Norris campaigned for the entire ticket in what turned out to be a
furious as well as a confusing campaign. The results from Furnas
County were most encouraging, for the county was fully redeemed
from Populist control. On the state level, however, the Democrats and
Populists presented a fusion ticket and their candidate, Silas A. Hoi-
comb, defeated Majors in the race for governor. Edward Rosewater,
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Republican owner of the Omaha Bee, had refused to endorse Majors
and had thrown his paper's support behind Holcomb. This proved to
be a decisive factor in Majors' defeat, as Republicans captured the
other state offices, controlled the legislature, and failed to elect a con
gressman only in the Sixth District. In the Fifth District William E.
Andrews became the first Republican congressman from this new
district.
Norris was pleased with the results of the campaign. He had
stumped the district in behalf of Andrews and other Republican can
didates. He had renewed his acquaintance with Republican leaders in
nearby counties and had met others for the first time. He now was
known to a larger number of voters than ever before. The campaign in
1894 was in effect a trial run. Rather than seek another term as
prosecuting attorney, Norris had decided to try for the office held by
Populist D. T. Welty, judge of the Fourteenth Judicial District.
Welty was far from popular among the lawyers who appeared in
his court. His ability both as judge and lawyer was questioned. More
over, Norris was convinced that he showed favoritism to Populist de
fendants by continuing cases whenever possible, or by canceling,
usually, the spring term of his court.
12 Whereas in the recent election
Republicans had recaptured many offices from Populist incumbents,
Norris now sought to redeem the judiciary from the taint of Populism.
Shortly after the 1894 election, he began to devote his energies
to the judicial race. First, of course, came the task of securing the
necessary delegates for nomination. By January, 1895, he had started
an extensive correspondence throughout the eight counties comprising
the district, sounding out sentiment and making inquiries about poten
tial delegates who might favor his nomination.13
The judicial convention was to be held at McCook in mid-Septem
ber, and as the summer of 1895 came to an end Norris intensified his
efforts. His chief contenders for the nomination were W. R. Starr of
Indianola and a Mr. Benson of McCook. But of equal, if not greater,
importance to Norris was the opposition candidate. Welty was seeking
renomination, but there was a possibility that McClure also would
seek the nomination. McClure, who had defeated Norris for prosecut
ing attorney in 1890, would be a powerful opponent because he was
an able lawyer and had many followers throughout the district.
When the Republican county conventions were held in August all
three candiates intensified their activities to win delegates favorable
to their candidacy. Norris did most of his work through letters. He
relied heavily on his supporters to inform him of local developments.
Once the county conventions were held, the efforts of the candidates
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were focused on obtaining control of each of the eight county delega
tions that would gather in McCook on September 18. Since both op
ponents were residents of Red Willow County and a fight between
their followers could only redound to his advantage, Norris made
great efforts to win delegates from this county.
Norris and his supporters by the end of August were most optimis
tic. Indeed, he questioned whether he should attend the McCook con
vention. Supporters advised him pro and con. But in the end Norris
decided against attending, although he did put in an appearance at
several fairs in the district shortly before the judicial convention
assembled. 14
Events were occurring just as Norris desired. The Populist con
vention early in September renominated Welty by a thumping ma
jority, and the Democrats nominated a separate candidate. At the
last minute he met requests of delegates for transportation to the
Republican convention. He felt certain that he would win the
nomination.15
Despite the efforts of Starr and Benson, Norris was nominated on
the first ballot. Welty, though an easier opponent than McClure
would have been, still had several advantages that would prove dif
ficult to overcome. He was the incumbent and a Populist in an area
where Populist sentiment was still powerful. His work as a judge,
which outraged Norris and other lawyers because of his flimsy knowl
edge of the law and his failure to hold court for a full session, pleased
the numerous defendants who had reaped the benefits of his decisions
and actions. After his nomination, Norris received the following note
from Welty:
I feel much pleased and congratulate you on your nomination
for the high office of District Judge, and hope you may have the
pleasure to return the compliment after November 5th.16
Norris had several assets during the campaign. First he had the
help of McClure, who exerted all of his influence against Welty, using
his control of the Beaver City Times to this end. As a result, not a
single newspaper in Furnas County, the home county of both candi
dates, supported Welty. In addition there were many prominent dis
trict Democrats, such as A. C. Shallenberger, a future congressman
and governor, who helped Norris by making no effort to assist Welty. 17
It was also to Norris' advantage that fusion between Demo
crats and Populists, unsuccessful in 1894, did not work during this
campaign either. The Democrats nominated a separate candidate.
POPULISM AND POLITICS 33
Last but not least among the list of assets was Morris* own reputa
tion for fairness and consideration in the mortgage-loan business.
This insured voters that if elected Norris would not indiscriminately
foreclose mortgages and agree to sheriffs* sales of property.
Early in the campaign, Norris, eager to win all possible support,
may have made a visit to the German settlement, traditionally a Demo
cratic stronghold, north of Arapahoe. The effort to win votes, how
ever, was not always carried on scrupulously. Some of Norris' sup
porters actually purchased votes and later presented him with a bill for
their expenses. After the campaign, one individual while explaining
his expenses wrote, "I have paid all the parties I agreed to except one
German, $5.00. I have not seen him since election, but he will prob
ably be in town and I will have to pay him.**
1S
C. E. Hopping, Beaver City drugstore proprietor, served as chair
man of the judicial committee managing the campaign. Republican
stalwarts made great efforts for Norris, because they realized that
every vote he received and every victory their party won would bring
the demise of the Populist party in Nebraska that much closer.
Throughout the campaign, Norris was deluged with requests by Re
publican leaders for railroad passes to bring workers to their home
precincts for election day. Railroad passes also provided an excellent
method of winning disgruntled Democrats and Populists into the
Republican fold. Many men, owing to the hard times, roamed about
the countryside seeking odd jobs. Their votes, it was believed, would
go to the candidate who provided them with transportation. 19
By the end of October Norris* mail indicated that his chances were
good; none of the letters were pessimistic. The Republicans attacked
Welty as a judge. The fact that he did not discriminate between bona
fide residents and nonresidents impressed some voters. Norris op
posed Welty's "continual and almost endless continuancy for people
who had long ago left the country with no intention of returning or
redeeming their lands,'* and his habit of showing little leniency for
resident mortgagors who were unable to meet interest payments be
cause of crop failures and low prices. Norris argued that if elected
he would grant resident farmers as much consideration as the law
permitted.
20
McClure in the Beaver City Times blasted Welty as a tool of the
Burlington and Missouri and other partisan papers took up this
theme.21 It is doubtful that Norris, a railroad attorney who was
literally trying to trade passes for votes, denounced his opponent
along these lines. His campaign was geared on a more personal level;
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he directed his efforts toward meeting as many voters as possible and
stressing the need for judicial integrity.
W. W, Barngrover, the Democratic candidate, was not seriously
considered by the electorate, most of whom regarded the campaign
primarily as a race between Norris and Welty. But Barngrover's
presence on the ticket prevented Norris from achieving a clearcut
victory. Norris won by two votes, and only after much time was spent
in debate and litigation was he granted a certificate of election.
However, shortly after the polls closed on November 5, as the first
unofficial returns came in, Norris thought his election was assured
without any doubt. He defeated Welty in Fufnas County by over
three hundred votes and by over two hundred in Red Willow, the
most populous counties in the district. Indeed, he seemingly carried
all but the predominantly Populist counties of Hitchcock and Frontier
where Welty's majority was not as large as expected. The first un
official results proclaimed a Norris victory,
22 a verdict verified by the
eight county canvassing boards in the judicial district. The result was
Norris, 4,612; Welty, 4,610; Barngrover, 431.
Judge Welty immediately raised the cry of fraud, claiming that
the figures in Union precinct, Furnas County, had been changed to
give Norris a two-vote lead. If the ballots had not been tampered with,
Welty argued, he would have carried the precinct by four votes and
with it the election. He did not say that Norris manipulated the votes,
and never in the furor that arose did Welty accuse Norris personally
of direct involvement in the fraud. As soon as Welty aired these
charges, Norris contacted all judicial committee chairmen and re
quested them to examine carefully the precinct records in their respec
tive areas for irregularities. He soon found evidence in other pre
cincts and heard rumors to the effect that votes properly belonging
to him had been rejected. One chairman wrote, "I think we can collect
enough evidence of irregularities in Hayes Cbunty alone to make 15
votes in your favor."
23
Norris and his supporters also uncovered evidence of fraud in
Frontier County which went for Welty in the election. The county
sheriff believed that Norris 'lost more votes by irregularities than
Welty," and that "a recount would increase the number" of his votes.
Norris thought that A. R. Curzon, a Republican banker of Curtis, was
involved in some of these irregularities, because he had not assured
Curzon that if elected he would favor moving the county seat from
Stockville to Curtis. Thus Norris was prepared, if necessary, to pre
sent charges to combat Welty's.24 However, until Welty took legal
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action, Norris was the newly elected judge of the Fourteenth Judicial
District of the state of Nebraska.
Since Welty's charges were public and Norris' evidence private,
the accusation of fraud would occur in many future campaigns. At the
time, however, the press throughout the state carried the story of his
election along with Welty's charges, and letters of congratulations
poured in upon Norris from delighted Republicans. What Norris ex
pected and this was his reason for collecting evidence of election
frauds was that Welty would apply to the Nebraska Supreme Court
for a writ of mandamus to force a correction of the canvass. On No
vember 15, Welty and a group of his advisers met in an Indianola law
office behind closed doors arid curtained windows," and several days
later Welty did as Norris expected. Since Norris already had evidence
of fraud and more was being unearthed by his friends, he had no
doubt he would be able to hold the office, though it might take a legal
contest to do so.25
Welty filed a suit charging fraudulent returns from Union precinct
in Eurnas County. He claimed that his opponent's tally had been
changed from forty to forty-six after the county board certified the re
turns, and that it was C. S. Anderson, McClure's law partner, who
changed the votes in the pollbook on the Sunday following the
canvass. Welty alleged that the pollbook figures did not tally with
those of the county commissioners, and that the additional six votes
gave Norris a plurality of two. Both Anderson and County Clerk
McFadden were Populists who, as suporters of McCIure, probably
favored Norris* election. Partisans of both men argued these charges,
while Norris* followers countered them by alleging that many Norris
votes had been thrown out by prejudiced election boards on the
grounds of irregularities in marking.
On November 26, 1895, the Furnas County canvassing board met
in Beaver City, pursuant to the mandamus of the Supreme Court, and
re-examined tie judicial vote of the entire county. Their results showed
that Norris still carried the county by two votes even though the
Union precinct pollbook had been tampered with, as Welty had
charged. The converted six votes were disallowed, but four more votes
for Norris were found in the recanvass. The county tally as certified
by the board was 1,375 for Norris and 881 for Welty, making a total
for the judicial district of 4,612 votes to 4,610 in favor of Norris.
26
In accord with these findings, on November 29, every member of the
state canvassing board signed a certificate of election which declared
Norris the legally elected judge of the fourteenth Judicial District.
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The action was taken after a long session and over the initial objec
tions of Governor Silas A. Holcomb, a Populist and a member of the
board.27
Thus, by the end of November, Norris' election finally became
official. Welty said he would file his oath of office with the secretary of
state28 and continue to serve, while he brought an ouster proceeding
against Norris in the Supreme Court of the state. Norris, with McClure
acting as his attorney, went to Lincoln in April, 1896, to attend a meet
ing of the Supreme Court at which a commissioner was to be ap
pointed to take evidence. In Lincoln they learned that Judge Welty
had dismissed his action.29
Norris later claimed that if the contest had been tried and his
evidence presented, he would have won by between fifty and one
hundred votes.30 When a correspondent asked why he did not counter
Welty's charges with evidence of his own, he replied, "We have not
taken the pains to give it publicity as Judge Welty always does
when he thinks he finds something wrong, but prefer to abide our
time, and let the matter come up for the first time in court."
31 How
ever, since Norris never had this opportunity, political enemies con
tinued to charge that the election had been stolen for him.
After ten years in Nebraska, George Norris, age thirty-four, had
carved a remarkable career for himself. He was about to enter upon
his judicial duties after engaging in one of the hardest fought cam
paigns in southwestern Nebraska, and had every reason to be satisfied
and even optimistic about a promising judicial career and, perhaps,
higher political attainments. He was one of the youngest district court
judges in the history of Nebraska.
But, despite numerous reasons for optimism, Norris was somewhat
melancholy and depressed as the year ended. He was disturbed by
the litigation with Welty, displeased about the behavior of some of
his supporters, and burdened by the heavy expenses incurred during
the campaign (over $3,500), He was afraid that a contested court
case would bankrupt him, and was dismayed by the lack of aid and
encouragement he received from the Republican party.
32 Norris be
lieved that conspiracy, corporations, and corruption were united to
secure his political downfall.
Norris had fought a vigorous, skilful campaign, one that few ob
servers thought at the outset he would win. Yet a brooding sense of
melancholy overwhelmed him, a sense of isolation that made him
seem solemn and sad in a moment of triumph. Norris enjoyed cam
paigning. The melancholy that made him almost feel sorry for him
self set in after the results were known. In later campaigns, too, he was
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aware of the fact that his party was not greatly interested in support
ing his contest. This increased his sense of isolation and made him
realize that in politics he was almost always on his own. These traits,
evident by the end of his first important campaign, became more pro
nounced and were more widely observed in future years.
Chapter 5
The Family Man
DURING the campaign, the ensuing litigation, and general confusion
following his contested victory, George Norris was too busy to fully
enjoy his infant daughter, Hazel. Since Mrs. Norris had previously
given birth to a stillborn child, the parents were especially delighted
with Hazel, born in January of 1895. In February of 1897 another
daughter, Marian, blessed their household. Pluma Norris proved her
self a devoted wife and mother and the family circle was a very happy
one.
After her mother's death in 1894 Pluma found the house too large
for the needs of her family. Norris had difficulty selling the property
because of the depression, but at the end of the century he was
finally able to make a satisfactory arrangement. The family then moved
to a house more suitable to its needs in McCook, the seat of neighbor
ing Red Willow County.
Though he was busy with judicial and family responsibilities,
Norris did not ignore his mother in Ohio. Whenever he went east,
usually to attend IOOF conventions, he arranged to visit with her and
his nearby sisters. He spent the entire month of August, 1896, visiting
with his mother on the family farm and seeing old acquaintances in
Clyde and other nearby communities. In 1897 his mother and a sister
vacationed in Nebraska.1
In 1892 his mother had divorced Isaac Parker, charging him with
gross neglect of duty on the grounds that he did not adequately pro
vide her with clothing and other necessities.
2 In order to ease the
financial burdens of his mother, who was allowed to resume the name
of Norris, her son suggested that she apply for a pension as the needy
mother of a gallant soldier who had died for his country.3
Norris was solicitous about his mother's welfare and continually
inquired about her in his letters to Melissa, who lived in Clyde. Mary
Norris, after her divorce, claimed that she wanted to sell the farm
and spend the remainder of her days in Nebraska. But because of her
38
THE FAMILY MAN 39
failing health, the lack of a good offer for the farm, and her son's
financial difficulties, she made no effort to move.4
By the end of the century Mary Norris was living with her daughter
Melissa. She made periodic visits back to the farm, which was then
operated by a tenant, and delighted in the atmosphere. She examined
the fruit trees, drank in the balmy spring air, and tasted the fruit as it
ripened. She discussed the prospects of the wheat crop with the tenant.
Visits to the farm made her nostalgic and she talked about moving
back to the old place and selling or renting the fields to nearby farmers
so that she could live in the house. Her health, as she approached her
eighth decade of life, was slowly deteriorating, and frequent colds
depleted her strength. Her interest in her grandchildren was great,
and she was full of advice on how to raise them. After a trip to Ohio
in 1897, Hazel talked for months about her grandmother and was
eager to visit her again whenever the opportunity arose.
5
As a thirty-four-year-old judge, Norris found that his greying hair
and recently grown beard helped to give him a more mature appear
ance, and made him a known figure as he traveled through the eight-
county judicial district. On formal occasions he wore a wing collar,
though he avoided it whenever possible in the interests of comfort.
He was not yet sporting the cigar which characterized his congres
sional career, but was experimenting with pipes during this period.
Since he preferred thinner soled shoes than he could buy in Beaver
City, he bought his shoes, along with baby furniture and other items,
from a mail-order catalogue.
6
Norris enjoyed music, and after his marriage he rented and later
purchased a piano. Now he could enjoy to the utmost an evening at
home with friends, neighbors, and later children to harmonize with
his baritone voice. Together they sang what later generations would
call "the old favorites." Effervescent water and lemon sour which he
ordered in Iowa added to the merriment on these occasions. It is
interesting to note that shortly after he purchased a piano, Norris tried
to sell his pool table, probably a relic of bachelor days.
7
During the difficult years of the 1890's, Norris increased his library
and kept abreast of current events. He purchased many law books,
although shortly after his election to the bench, he was forced to sell
a number of them to the West Publishing Company in order to pay
his debts to that firm.8
Besides local newspapers, Norris subscribed to the Nebraska State
Journal, published in Lincoln, which he relied upon for state and na
tional news. To obtain a volume of letters by his favorite humorist,
Petroleum V. Nasby, he subscribed to the Toledo Weekly Blade, which
40 GEORGE W. NORRIS
offered the volume. To obtain a Lincoln volume, he subscribed to the
North American Review. He received other national periodicals, such
as the Literary Digest, and much children's literature to encourage his
youngsters as they learned to read. During the expansionist decade of
the 1890's, he became so interested in Hawaii that he entered a sub
scription for the Honolulu Advertiser. Thus, in Beaver City, George
Norris achieved what he had missed on the Ohio farm: the solace of
music, an entrance to the world of literature, and a broader perspec
tive on current events.9
During their residence in Beaver City, the growing family experi
enced the usual illnesses, aches, and pains. Since Norris had to be
away from home for long periods of time (when court was in session
he rarely managed to remain at home for more than a week), he was
concerned about Pluma and the children if they were ill. In September
of 1896 Norris himself was bedridden for several weeks with a lame
back which mended very slowly.10
In March of 1897 the entire family, including the hired girl, came
down with an affliction that kept Norris too busy attending sick
people to open his mail. Confusion and chaos reigned in the house
hold. In February of 1899, every member of the family, except Norris,
again became sick. Pluma remained ill over a month and by mid-April
she still had not fully recovered. In May, Norris used a railroad pass
provided by Morlan to take her to Lincoln to seek further medical
attention and to have her dental work done.11
When his family was in its usual good health, Norris looked forward
to brief visits at home when court was in session. He relished the
longer intervals when it was not in session. Norris was indeed a doting
parent, watching with pleasure the development of his two daughters,
Hazel and Marian. He wrote, "No sweeter nor nicer girls have the
privilege of residing on this earth/' Hazel looked so much like him
that he claimed, "If she belonged to any other family than the one of
which I am the head it would be a good cause for divorce from me."
By the end of the century Hazel was taking an interest in the com
munity and was terribly concerned about the health of a barefoot
boy who went by the house, while Marian, a healthy and chubby
three-year-old, talked the family almost to distraction.
12
A few diversions also took Norris away from the family circle. Trips
to IOOF conventions were an example, though Norris usually de
posited his family with his mother or sister in Ohio before proceeding
to the convention
city. Before the children were born, Pluma and
George in June of 1893 had a wonderful trip to the Chicago Fair. On
the Fourth of July and other such occasions Norris indulged his
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oratorical talents, keeping his name before the public in a favorable
way. The L.U.N. reunions, another diversionary activity, soon came
to be a family affair as the members appeared with their wives and
children.
It was the pressure of world events, particularly the Spanish-
American War, that threatened most ominously to take Norris away
from his family. He wanted to enlist and undoubtedly could have
obtained a field commission, but he knew it would probably shorten
his mother's life if a second son went to war. Norris was grateful that
his judicial duties overwhelmed him with work at this time. He wrote
to a sister, "I am afraid I will get the war fever if I am not kept
busy." Though he supported the war and its results, he did not let
them preoccupy his thoughts. He contributed twenty-five dollars to
help pay the traveling expenses of the First Regiment Nebraska Volun
teers, which had participated in crushing the forces of Aguinaldo in
the Philippine Islands.
13
Norris' major diversion, aside from his children, was the organiza
tional life in which he participated. Occasionally this became so time-
consuming that it ceased to be a diversion. But usually he delighted in
it and formed many lasting friendships. In an indirect way it aided
his political ambitions; lodge brothers had supported him in all of his
campaigns and would continue to do so in the future. Membership in
various organizations gave him a wide range of contacts throughout
the state, while fraternal activities enabled him to travel and renew
these acquaintances. The IOOF, the Odd Fellows, was the organiza
tion to which he devoted most of his attention while a resident of
Beaver City. At the outset, Norris participated in Knights Templar
conclaves in Holdrege, but by the time he became a judge his free
time was almost exclusively devoted to IOOF affairs. He served as a
delegate to the Sovereign Grand Lodge from Nebraska in the IOOF
and attended annual sessions of that body in Boston and Detroit. In
1896-97 Norris served as Grand Master of the Odd Fellows in the
jurisdiction that included Nebraska and part of South Dakota. This
job, he estimated, consumed about three-fourths of his time, and he
was thankful as his term drew to a close. His active interest in the
IOOF declined after his service as representative to the Sovereign
Grand Lodge. This was a position to which he was elected without
opposition and by acclamation, an extraordinary occurrence and one
which Norris deeply appreciated. His experiences, which he never ex
plained, in the Sovereign Grand Lodge had not been what he antici
pated; he became disillusioned and had no desire to be re-elected.
By the end of the century Norris, though a member of several fra-
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ternal and benevolent associations, was no longer an active participant
in any of them.
14
Other than his election as a judge, most aspects of Norris' adult
life in Nebraska were not very different from those of other young
western lawyers. His interest in politics, concern with family, and
participation in various organizations were and still are typical of
lawyers in small towns throughout America. The office of county
prosecuting attorney was and still is for many lawyers the first rung
on the ladder of political advancement. Typical too, during this decade
of drought and depression, were the financial problems and accom
panying worries. After 1896 his affairs, like other people's, began to
ease owing to the return of adequate rainfall, good crops, and, ac
cording to Republican politicians, "McKinley Prosperity."
When Norris was elected to the bench he was heavily in debt and
was preoccupied for several years with the need to pay off these
obligations. He owned property on which he had realized very little
and which he either hoped to sell or to rent profitably. His salary as
a judge was $2,500 a year, and by 1897 he was able to pay the
premiums on $9,600 worth of life insurance.15 The struggle to get out
of debt was a long and difficult one. Throughout his life the memory
of it and the fear of its recurrence made Norris conservative about
fiscal affairs. This conservatism and his belief that no one should spend
more than his income were noted in his public life from that time on.
Meanwhile, though on the bench, Norris maintained a lively in
terest in his business transactions. Though he could no longer engage
in the mortgage-loan business, he continued to speculate to buy and
sell real estate and to manage various holdings for himself and for
members of his family. When he first came to Nebraska he borrowed
money from some of his sisters. Later he invested funds for them.
When he was heavily in debt he again borrowed money from his
sisters, though he never told his mother of his financial embarrass
ment.16
Because of his financial difficulties, Norris tried to sell some of his
land. During the campaign of 1896 he found it unsalable because of
the political excitement. It was equally difficult to borrow money on
land; one company wrote, "If McKinley is elected, we think we will
be in the market but we do not care to make any investments while
there is an uncertainty as to what kind of money a person will be paid
back in." Norris was also informed by one of his creditors that unless
McKinley was elected, he would have to pay his note when due and
could expect no extension. After McKinley's election, he was able to
renew it on generous terms,
17
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When his land was occupied by a farmer, Norris usually helped
decide what crops would be raised. He preferred alfalfa and some
times gave instructions on how to plant it. When the crops were har
vested, Norris received an "owner's part of the crop." At times, he
would write to the Department of Agriculture making inquiries and
requesting seed samples.
13
Occasionally he had to take legal action against land purchasers
who did not make payments on their notes. He did this only after
giving repeated extensions and accepting numerous promises which
were not fulfilled. When a case came to court Norris preferred, if
possible, to reach a compromise solution. In one instance, a pair of
debtors unable to meet their obligation assigned him some of their
real estate in Beaver City. Other debtors made other arrangements. By
1898 conditions had improved so much that Norris told Miles, "Good
level land on the bottom suitable for alfalfa cannot be bought any
where in Furnas County for much less than $20,00 per acre and most
of it is higher than that." Moreover, if the 1898 crops were good, real
estate anticipated "the greatest rush" in the history of the short-grass
country by the spring of 1899. Consequently Norris urged Miles to
purchase land, and he tried with . whatever funds he could scrape
together to obtain either land or mortgages.
19
Renting space in the Norris Block was a continuing and embar
rassing problem. The empty building stood as a monument to Norris'
lack of financial wisdom. After the failure of the Furnas County Bank,
he assumed ownership of its safe and other fixtures; these he offered
to sell to a prospective buyer if he would agree to establish a new
bank and rent the space at a reduced rate. This plan, however, met
with no success. Another office in the building was left vacant when its
occupant, a doctor, left town without paying his rent, suggesting that
Norris collect it from patients whose accounts were unpaid. However,
by March of 1898 the building was fully rented and Norris" financial
worries declined. He now was able to liquidate his obligations and
derive some income from his real estate holdings.
20
His most perplexing and difficult financial problem, while not fully
settled at the end of the century, had turned out far better than he had
expected. The death of Pluma's mother had left Norris with two items
to dispose of the Beaver City mill and the house in which the family
was living.
21 The family resided in the latter until 1899 when it was
finally sold, after a long search for a buyer.
The history of the mill was more complicated. In 1888 Pluma's
father had given a mortgage to James H. Tallman on 240 acres of
land for $2,500. This land contained Lashley s original residence, the
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mill, a barn, a small house for a tenant, and other improvements. At
Lashley's death in 1890, his widow inherited the mill and the build
ings and assumed the mortgage. Pluma's brother,
Charles P. Lashley,
inherited the balance of the property, which Norris later bought from
him. The deed of conveyance distinctly stated that he was not to pay
any part of the mortgage. The mill property, believed
to be worth
about ten thousand dollars, consisted of the buildings and the water
power, mill race, and dam, and twenty acres
of land. The mill was
almost at the center of the twenty acres. At the time of her death,
Sarah Lashley had not paid off the $2,500 mortgage, and it was
this mortgage which caused the difficulty in settling
the estate.22
When Mrs. Lashley and later owners sold the mill property, the
conveyances all stipulated that
the grantee assumed and agreed to
pay the $2,500 mortgage. The owners in 1898 had improved
the
property and were beginning to show a profit
on its operation. They
were, however, unable to pay the mortgage, and the holder, after
several extensions, was about to begin foreclosure proceedings in
March, 1898.
At this point Norris, after borrowing funds from Miles, suggested
a compromise. He proposed to pay $2 ?000 cash for the assignment of
this mortgage, but before this offer was accepted Norris bought the
mill outright from the owners. He then offered the property for sale
at $4,000. Unable to locate a purchaser, he accepted the offer of
George Shafer, who gave him a note for a half interest in the mill.
With the help of Miles, the partners then installed modern machinery
and renovated the mill. Shafer handled its management, but Norris
took a lively interest in it.
23
Drain though the will was on his time and energy, Norris was learn
ing, almost against his will, about milling. By the summer of 1899,
business was so good that the partners could not meet the demand
for their flour. They installed a gasoline engine so the mill could al
ways operate at capacity. When Norris returned to Beaver City after
holding court, he immersed himself with mill business until he had
to depart for another court session at another county seat. The income
from the mill undoubtedly assuaged Norris for the need to work even
during brief respites from judicial duties.
24
By the end of 1899, Norris and his partner agreed to rent the mill
if the right man could be found. Since the partners had spent over
twenty-five hundred dollars in repairs, neither was willing to sell at a
price that attracted potential buyers. The best means of getting back
their investment and making a profit, they thought, was to rent the
property to an experienced miller. Such a person was W. W. Tallman,
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who had previously worked at the mill when Norris first came to
Beaver City. Norris had faith in Tallman's experience and ability and
hoped eventually to sell the property to him. Thus when Norris moved
from Beaver City to McCook in 1899, arrangements were being made
to rent the mill,25 and a costly, complicated, and contentious problem
seemed to be on its way toward a satisfactory solution.
Though the mill consumed most of his spare time, it helped
relieve Norris' financial embarrassment. In the twentieth century
private business matters would not preoccupy him to the extent they
did at this time. As he moved on to the national scene, Norris' financial
position became more comfortable, though he rarely could afford
luxuries of any kind. Fortunately his tastes were simple and moderate,
and he was able to provide for the modest needs of his family with
out suffering the pangs of anxiety and the curse of debt he had experi
enced in the last decade of the nineteenth century.
By 1900 he was paying off his long-standing obligations, receiving
his greatest pleasure from settling accounts with his L.U.N. friends.
He returned the money formerly borrowed on his life insurance and
increased the amount he held a final measure of his improving finan
cial status. In November, 1899, he took out an $8,000 policy with the
Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, acknowledging the fact
that he was beginning to experience the prosperity that seemed to be
pervading the United States. With his private life now on a financially
secure basis, Norris could devote a greater portion of his time and
energies to his career as judge of the Fourteenth Judicial District of
the State of Nebraska.26
Chapter 6
Judge Norris
GEORGE NOBKIS found his job as a district judge both challenging and
enjoyable. In his autobiography he claimed, possibly forgetting his
financial troubles at the time, that the seven years he spent on the
bench were the most satisfactory years of his life. He even wondered
if he had made a mistake to leave his post for a political career in
Washington.
1
Certainly when he mounted the bench, he was achiev
ing a status and a salary ($2,500) that set him well above his dis
tressed fellow citizens,
As a judge, more so than as a prosecuting attorney or as a lawyer
in the mortgage-loan business, Norris came in contact with a wide
range of people and their multifarious problems, with "human nature
in all of its nobility and goodness; and all of its weakness and error."
All of this had its effect. During his years on the bench he wrote',
"My sympathies were to be broadened, my understanding of life en
riched, and my conceptions of simple justice strengthened." 2 He met
a
variety of situations which required either his decision or his precise
instructions to a jury, and in so doing he increased his understanding,
knowledge, and respect for the law and its processes.
Almost thirty years before Norris became a judge, a young Boston
lawyer with a philosophical bent, reviewing a volume in the American
Law Review, succinctly noted the significant role that busy western
judges, like Norris, performed. Oliver Wendell Holmes praised them as
men who were "more intent on adapting the law to modern require
ments than on standing in the ancient ways." Norris, like many of his
colleagues, with little opportunity in his previous preparation for the
study of legal scholarship or philosophy, and almost no opportunity
in his present position, would have been regarded with contempt by
many of Holmes* more proper associates in the Boston bar. But as
Holmes noted, with many of Norris' colleagues in mind, one could not
expect of them that "businesslike common sense" which was to be
found among the lawyers of the western states.3 Holmes, with his in
sight and understanding of legal realities, adequately described the
46
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role that Norris fulfilled as a district judge. Morris was a realist and a
pragmatist in the dispensation of justice. Conditions as they existed
in rainless, poverty-stricken, debt-ridden southwestern Nebraska were
basic considerations in his decision making.
To a visitor from Holmes* Boston, Norris and his colleagues on the
bench and bar would have seemed rather crude at the outset. They
dressed plainly; some were quite careless in their personal appear
ance. Few were as well educated as Norris; most had less preparation
in law. Outside of the few words of barbarous Latin jargon they had
extracted from law books, and usually mispronounced, they knew noth
ing of foreign languages unless they were brought up in an immigrant
home, which they generally considered a liability. Even the English
language was mingled with variations that would have grated harshly
upon the ears of the Harvard-trained lawyer. If a lawyer or Norris
himself said, "It looks like the plaintiff will win his case," or, of a man
in jail, "He wants out," the Boston visitor would have had difficulty
separating the speaker from his phrase or believing that he could
really be a man of learning or ability. But if the visitor had daily
contact with his western counterparts, witnessed the competitive trial
in court, observed the actualities of life which concerned them, and
recognized their ability "to think under fire to think for action upon
which great interests depend," he would have realized that the bench
and bar of western Nebraska, though they lacked the cultural polish
and intellectual tone of his own Boston, were indeed not very dif
ferent in professional skill and ability. Certainly the visitor would have
noted after observation and contact that Judge Norris' mind in its
analytical and logical capacities was well suited to the law. He would
have seen that Norris had a shrewd sense and a keen knowledge of
human nature and that he was capable of clear thinking and of fluent
and forcible, if not elegant, speech and writing. And if the proper
Bostonian observed carefully enough he would have noted that these
western Nebraska lawyers and judges, though they exhibited very few
of the ornaments of learning, possibly had a better perspective of life
and the things that are useful in it than many of his associates.
4
In some respects the bar of the eight-county judicial district was
comparable to a large family over which Norris presided. He soon
knew, lawyers in each county and met with them early in the morn
ing in the courtroom to make up the issues and dispose of matters
preliminary to the official opening of his court. He usually held two
sessions in each county during the annual term of the district court,
one involving equity cases and the other jury trials. The first session
occurred during the winter or spring, while the second convened in
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the autumn or winter. There were so many cases on the docket during
the first year Norris presided that he called a special
session and held
court during the summer months of 1896 at each county
seat.
As a judge, beginning in January 1896, Norris stood in marked con
trast to his predecessor, Welty. During the campaign it was charged
that Welty had played politics from the bench by favoring debtors
and Populists over creditors and Republicans. It was
claimed that
rather than foreclose, Welty would cancel a session of his court and
thereby prevent debtors from losing their property.
Norris too had to
meet the difficult problem o ordering foreclosures and sheriffs' sales,
but unlike Welty he was courteous, capable, and impartial in the
administration of his judicial office.
Norris' solution to the foreclosure problem was not markedly dif
ferent from Welty's. If the individual who lived on the property that
was presented for foreclosure had made every effort to meet his pay
ments but had been unable to do so because of the drought, Norris
hesitated to order a sheriff's sale and thereby complete the foreclosure
proceeding. Had he strictly followed the law, he would have confirmed
each sale as it appeared before him, but he wrote, "It is a very hard
and difficult thing to take away from a man his home when it is all
he has, and where he is trying to save it and pay the debt, and has
been prevented from doing so by some act of Providence, or some cir
cumstance beyond his control."
Believing it wiser to pursue a course of mercy than to follow the
strictly legal path, Norris would grant extensions whenever he thought
the debtor was honest, industrious, and sincere in his desire to meet
obligations. Norris admitted that some people possibly obtained
exten
sions by "false and fraudulent representations," but he preferred "to
lean to the side of mercy" and pursue the course that he thought was
"mercifully and morally right/'
5 This may not have been impartial
justice, but given the difficult economic conditions and the desperate
plight of many citizens, it represented a realistic effort to find a middle-
ground between continual foreclosures and long-term extensions.
In such cases, Norris was facing an historic situation with prece
dents deep in the American past. Foreclosure meant that the fanner
would lose his farm and much of his chattel property, and thus would
be without means to plant or harvest a crop. Sheriffs' sales rarely
brought in enough money to satisfy creditors, while debtors could
become a public charge. Therefore whenever he was convinced
that a farmer was doing everything possible to pay off his note, Norris
was willing to give the person an opportunity "consistent with justice
and right" to save his homestead. If after granting an extension, how-
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ever, Norris had reason to believe that the individual involved was
not doing everything possible to meet his obligation, he would refuse
to grant a further extension, thereby bringing about the foreclosure.
6
Norris confirmed sales only if the mortgage indebtedness was in
excess of the value of the land and the owner could in no way benefit
from an extension. In cases where he felt a farmer would eventually
meet his obligations, he postponed confirmation until the next term. In
all cases he took into account the value of the land and the means
the farmer had available to meet his debt. Before Norris granted an
extension, the farmer had to agree to pay on his note any cash he
possessed and any income he could anticipate from his current crops,
and to pay taxes on his property.
7
Since Nebraska had no moratorium legislation until the New Deal
period, each judge had to work out a solution to this problem. Norris*
solution, while more moderate than his predecessor's, was at first pro
tested with equal bitterness by the attorneys for the mortgage holders.
However, after it had been applied for two or three years it met with
general satisfaction. Norris believed this policy provided the best pos
sible way for the creditor to get his money, since a sheriff's sale was no
guarantee that he would be reimbursed for the full amount of his loan.
8
Thus, while Norris served as a district judge, numerous debt-ridden
farmers were able to pay off their mortgages and maintain ownership
of their property. At the same time Norris was able to retain the
respect of both creditors and debtors and obtain the support of most
citizens in the district for his fair policy. He avoided the animosities
that Populist Judge Welty had aroused, and increased his chances for
re-election when his term came to an end in 1899.
While foreclosure proceedings were the most important and nu
merous of the cases that appeared on his docket, Judge Norris had
other duties to perform. Some of them had political overtones. In one
instance, a bank in the district failed, and Norris had to appoint a re
ceiver to untangle its activities and list its assets prior to final disposi
tion. Receivers worked for a small salary; none received more than
fifty dollars a month. But owing to the hard times, lawyers through
out the district sought such appointments. It was not always easy to
find a competent and unbiased man. However, by the autumn of
Norris' first year on the bench, economic conditions improved and
these appointments virtually ceased.
9
As a judge, Norris had to decide if injunctions should be issued
upon receipt of petitions and affidavits demanding them. He also had
to determine whether it was worthwhile to issue judgments against
debtors who were not meeting their obligations. (In such instances he
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usually followed a policy similar to that of foreclosure proceedings.)
Norris also felt obligated to answer requests for information addressed
to him in his judicial capacity. Could he approve testimony given
before a justice of the peace and on the basis thereof issue citizenship
papers? Could he inform a young lawyer as to the most promising com
munity to start a practice in his district? Of course in no instance did
he offer legal advice. Legal ethics and Nebraska law prohibited this
because of the possibility that he would have to adjudicate a case
where his advice, if offered, played a significant role.
10
.
Human interest cases provided a form of social recreation and a
topic of endless discussion to citizens in small towns. When a murder
case was on the docket, Norris tried to have no other jury cases pend
ing until the case was decided. As prosecuting attorney he had ap
peared before a jury in cases involving murder, adultery, and other
seamy aspects of the human condition. As a judge, therefore, he found
no novelty in such proceedings. He looked at each case as sympa
thetically as possible and considered the welfare of the innocent vic
tims of such proceedings to be of primary significance. After the jury
reached its decision, he would then dispose of the case. Occasionally
he disagreed with its decision and expressed his disagreement. Toward
criminals Norris rarely showed clemency,, sentencing them to the limit
of the law.11
One aspect of his public life did not change from the days before he
was elected to the bench: Norris, like most public officials, traveled
by railroad with a pass. Now, however, he was no longer deluged with
requests for free transportation. The passes were usually supplied by
George W. Holdrege, general manager of the Burlington and Missouri
in Nebraska or Charles F. Manderson, former United States senator
and general solicitor of the road; passes for his family were usually
obtained from W. S. Morlan.12 He received passes for all railroads in
the state. Fortunately for Norris, no major case involving a railroad
came before him. Passes at this time were taken for granted except
by a minority of disgruntled citizens and, as a former railroad attorney,
Norris saw nothing objectionable or at least nothing worthy of public
criticism in their use.
His railroad pass and the few requests he $till received for free
transportation served to remind Norris that, although he was a judge,
he had been elected to office on the Republican party ticket. Though
he did not neglect political activity, he was circumspect in his par
ticipation. He was an ardent Republican, but he was also a judge
serving all the people of the Fourteenth Judicial District. For this
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reason he was unable to participate actively in the crucial and exciting
campaign of 1896.
W. E. Andrews, incumbent congressman from the Fifth District,
was one of the few Republicans Norris felt called upon to support.
Indeed, he felt a heavy obligation to Andrews which he explained by
referring to his recent judicial campaign:
When all the combinations of circumstances, and underhanded
politics was united against me, and when even the Republican
State Committee and the leading Republican Dailies of the state
were silent and gave no encouragement or support, . . . you un
like all the remainder of the leading Republicans in Nebraska, put
your shoulder to the wheel, and did everything in your power to
bring about my election.13
Both men were aware that the incumbent's chances were not very
bright, since fusion between the Democrats and Populists was working
once again. Norris wrote Andrews early in the campaign that "if
God will send us rain, and the present Congress makes no mistakes,"
Andrews would have an excellent chance of returning to Washington.
But rather than sit back and await these divine and fortuitous events,
Norris proposed "to do a few things in the way of nominating the
right man in opposition" to Andrews.
There was talk of nominating Welty as the Populist congressional
candidate. Norris believed that he would be an easy candidate to de
feat and proposed, if Andrews thought it desirable, to "control enough
of the Populists" in Furnas and Red Willow counties to keep down any
opposition at least until after Welty was nominated. Welty would
make an inferior candidate, Norris explained, because his position on
mortgage foreclosures, which had made him so powerful a judicial
opponent, would do him little good in a congressional fight.
14 This
rumor, however, was not realized and the fusion candidate, R. D.
Sutherland, overwhelmed Andrews in the election.
Behind the scenes Norris played a minor role in the campaign of
1896. He informed Republican candidates of sentiment in his district
and contributed to county campaign funds. He tried to commit conven
tion delegates to particular candidates and arranged transportation to
the state convention in Omaha for others. Moreover, he was besieged
with requests to support various county candidates. He helped in
whatever ways possible and only once did he pointedly refuse a re
quest. This request was made by the chairman of the Republican State
Committee, who notified him that the finance committee had fixed an
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assessment of twenty-five dollars as his share of the campaign fund.
Norris refused to pay on the grounds that in his judiciary campaign
the previous year he spent over thirty-five hundred dollars and re
ceived no assistance from the Republican State Committee. He be
lieved the committee should not request contributions until the salary
($2,500 a year) from his office equaled the amount he had expended
in securing it.
15
Fusion candidates swept almost every available office in Nebraska
in 1896. Bryan carried the state while Populist Silas Holcomb was re-
elected governor by a greater majority than Bryan obtained over
McKinley. Republicans, as a result of the election, found themselves
a very small minority in both houses of the state legislature. In the
Fifth Congressional District, Andrews and almost all of the lesser Re
publican candidates went down to defeat. After the election, Republi
can officeholder George Norris found himself almost isolated as one of
the few Republicans in public office in his district. The election, how
ever, helped to enhance his status among Republicans as a candidate
who, in a predominantly Populist area, could get elected to an im
portant public office.
After the election Nebraska Republicans found some solace for
their overwhelming defeat in McKinley's victory. Norris regretted that
he was
"living in Mexico" and quoted the Bible, "What doth it profit
a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul/' He remem
bered that others had suffered more directly than he in the past cam
paign. He recommended Andrews for a lucrative federal position.
Fortunately his court was not in session until January, 1897, so that
he had ample time to recover his perspective and consider the political
future.16
Norris' loyalty to the Republican party remained unshaken, and
he continued to participate in politics as far as his judicial duties
would allow. He tried to keep abreast of state and national develop
ments, but he did not feel qualified to comment fully upon any but
district developments in his correspondence. As the 1897 campaign
for state, county, and local offices got under way, Norris tried to size
up the situation. It was a confusing picture.
On the first of September there occurred in Lincoln the initial con
vention of what Norris called "the three ring circus that is opposing
us." Populists, Democrats, and Free Silver Republicans each met in
separate groups at the capital city, but all agreed on a fusion ticket
to oppose the Republicans in the November election. Though Norris
knew that many Populists and some Democrats were disgusted with
this arrangement, he was unwilling to prognosticate the outcome. If
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dissatisfied Populists could "be induced to come back into the ranks,"
then Norris thought Republican prospects would be very good. Un
fortunately for Norris and his fellow Republicans, fusion was still effec
tive in the 1897 election. Its candidates swept the available state
offices and made gains in county offices as well.17
The results throughout the Fourteenth Judicial District were no
different from those throughout the state. "Not quite a Waterloo,"
wrote a county judge to Norris, "and perhaps if providence permits
by keeping away Bryan, drought and grasshoppers we will still be able
to make a gallant fight two years from now." Another correspondent,
an editor of a Republican newspaper, informed Norris of the results in
his county with the quip, "We have met the enemy and we are
theirs." 18
Yet Norris was not too pessimistic about the results of this off-year
election. The fusion majority in Nebraska had been reduced nearly
one-half and elsewhere his party carried some states that had for
merly been in the other column. Had it not been for the defalcation of
two former Republican officeholders, the party, Norris believed, would
possibly have carried the state. However, even in this matter, where
two Republican officials were sentenced for stealing state funds, Norris
could still see a bright side. By assisting in their conviction, and thus
purifying their own ranks, the party "at no late date" could again
win respect and confidence. Furthermore, fusion between Populists
and Democrats was an ill-fitting arrangement and could not be counted
on to function smoothly in the future. Thus Norris could see at this
time of defeat opportunities for his rejuvenated party at coming elec
tions.19
The state elections of 1898 proved that Norris was correct. Though
his party lost every major state office, it retained control of the con
gressional seats it previously had won in the first and second districts
and, most important, it won control of the state legislature. Norris
ardently supported the gubernatorial candidacy of Monroe L. Hay-
ward, who was defeated by less than three thousand votes by Populist
W. A. Poynter, the fusion candidate. This time, Norris cheerfully
contributed his assessment of thirty-five dollars to the state cam
paign fund.
20
Norris' political pulse began to quicken after the improved show
ing of his party in 1898. No doubt he was flattered when friends sug
gested he was meant for higher office than district judge. A high rank
ing Nebraska Odd Fellow wanted him to enter the race for the United
States Senate. Norris had previously confided to this friend that some
day he would like to serve in the House of Representatives, and
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eventually to secure a more permanent government job, as defeated
Republican incumbents from Nebraska already had done. When the
state legislature met to choose a United States senator in 1899, Norris
received one vote for this esteemed office.21
Thus as his first term as district judge came to an end, Norris,
heartened by the good will manifested toward him, considered his
chances for renomination and re-election. Whereas he formerly felt
glum about his political future, the election of 1898, his improved
financial status, and the general satisfaction with his judicial admin
istration, made Norris' political optimism come to include his own
prospects as well.
Chapter 7
Triumph and Tragedy
POPULISM was still rampant in Nebraska in 1899 when Norris* judicial
term came to an end. The state was unredeemed, as far as the Re
publican party was concerned; it remained so after the off-year elec
tions in 1899. Silas A. Holcomb, former governor, handily defeated his
Republican opponent for judge of the Supreme Court and fusion
candidates won the other state-wide contests. But in the Fourteenth
Judicial District, a Populist stronghold, George Norris was re-elected
by an impressive margin.
Earlier in the year, Norris was not unduly optimistic about his
chances. As far as he knew there would be no opposition to his re-
nomination. The election, however, was another question. Norris be
lieved the Populists had a majority of between three hundred and
four hundred votes in the district. If they gave their votes to his op
ponent, his defeat was assured. Furthermore, in February a bill was
before the legislature which, had it passed, would have legislated him
out of office by adding four heavily Populist counties to the judicial
district.1
Though nothing came of this bill, Norris realized that if he
were to be re-elected he would have to wean a goodly number of
Populist voters back into the Republican fold. Accordingly, by July,
he was requesting county leaders to send him the names of Populists
who were formerly Republicans and were inclined toward the middle
of the road.2
Norris also hoped to capitalize on the fact that fusion between
Populists and Democrats rarely worked smoothly. Indeed Democrats
were already threatening that unless allowed to name more candidates,
they would put .a separate ticket in the field. Norris knew too that
John T. McClure was interested in the Populist nomination and
would be a difficult opponent to defeat. Therefore Norris was most
interested in news of rifts between Populists and Democrats.3
And there were serious rifts in the camp of the opposition. Ex-
Judge Welty and his followers, recalling McClure's support of Norris
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in 1895, were determined to prevent McClure from obtaining the
nomination. The Republicans did all they could to support these
dissensions. Norris, tied down with judicial duties and not yet willing
to campaign openly, conducted an extensive correspondence to keep
abreast of political developments.
4
Early in September the Populist judicial convention chose the
prosecuting attorney of Gosper County, a Mr. Miller, to oppose
Norris. Because Miller was not a strong candidate, and because there
was dissension at the convention, Norris' chances of breaking the
Populist majority in the district were considerably improved. Mc
Clure, in a speech to the delegates, indicated that he would have
conducted a mudslinging campaign. Norris, therefore, had reason to
be satisfied with the results of the Populist convention.
5
The news that Republican county conventions had proceeded
with a minimum of friction and a greater manifestation of party
harmony than had been exhibited for many years also helped to
brighten the campaign picture. So optimistic was Norris about the
political situation that on September 12 he left on a vacation to visit
his mother in Ohio and to attend the Sovereign Grand Lodge of the
IOOF at Detroit He planned to return in time to attend the Re
publican Judicial Convention at McCook on September 27. When he
left on vacation there was no opposition to his nomination, and Norris
boldly prognosticated, "This will be a Republican year, and ... I
ought to be reelected."
6
As expected, he was renominated by acclamation. Unexpected,
however, was the sudden withdrawal of Miller and the substitution of
McClure as his opponent. Attorney Miller withdrew because of illness;
a paralyzed throat made it impossible for him to campaign. Though
Norris now faced a skilful, dangerous, and difficult opponent, his
optimism did not disappear. He exhorted his supporters to greater
efforts. Furthermore, now that McClure was his opponent, Norris
gained an unexpected ally in Welty, his previous opponent and a
bitter political enemy of MicClure.
7
McClure campaigned vigorously, holding meetings and speaking
individually to many voters. Norris, relying on his supporters to do
this work, maintained a posture of judicious aloofness and followed the
course of the campaign in correspondence and conversation. McClure
undoubtedly hurt Norris personally by the type of campaign he con
ducted. He denounced Norris, claiming he was fraudulently elected in
1895. These denunciations had a ring of authenticity because McClure
had been hired to present Norris' case in the litigation following the
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1895 victory. McClure argued that while he had made use of every
legal turn to sustain his client, the ethics of his profession prevented
him from divulging details presented in strictest confidence. In speech
after speech and in the columns of his Beaver City Times and other
Populist papers he attacked Norris as fraudulently holding public
office.8
These charges were effectively combated. Welty wrote letters
claiming that though fraud was perpetrated in 1895, Norris was not
guilty and indeed knew nothing about it. Toward the end of the
campaign Welty took the stump and spoke against McClure.
9
On November 3, 1899, the Beaver Valley Tribune published a
series of affidavits, including a letter by Welty, a statement by Norris,
and reports of two members of the 1895 Furnas County canvassing
board, all refuting the charge of fraud on the part of Norris and sug
gesting that McClure's law partner was responsible for distorting some
of the returns. Thus four days before the election, Norris with Welty's
aid was able for the first time to present to the public his side of the
disputed election of 1895.
Norris' notarized statement, included among the affidavits, repre
sented the closest he came to actual campaigning. But Republican
leaders left virtually no stone unturned on his behalf. Wavering Demo
crats and Populists were personally informed of Norris' merits by
precinct leaders. Republican lawyers impressed on their clients the
importance of keeping Judge Norris on the bench. One Republican
stalwart spoke to most of the Populist leaders in his county and secured
promises of support from others to spread the Norris gospel. He indi
cated the nature of his activities when he wrote, "Of course you under
stand these men don't neglect their own work and devote it to others
without compensation, and I am advancing for you the necessary
money to make the campaign.'*
10
William Jennings Bryan appeared in western Nebraska in October
to speak on behalf of Democratic and Populist candidates. Norris no
doubt was pleased when one of his supporters claimed that Bryan's
trip lost him very few votes. Biased though this observer was, he pre
sented an unorthodox picture of Bryan as a campaigner. He wrote:
So listless was the crowd that not even one cheer was given the
party from start to finish, and although Bryan posed in old cloth
ing to catch the rural vote it deceived no one and the farmers
felt and afterwards expressed themselves that this was just a de
vice to catch their votes. To show the apathy of the managers of
the Bryan crowd, (he) spoke from an old lumber wagon. No
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seats were provided and the different members of the party dur
ing the speaking sat on the sharp edges of the wagon box
until
the meeting concluded.
11
The election results showed that Norris had correctly sized up the
political situation. He won an impressive victory. Since both candidates
were residents of Beaver City, it must have been especially gratifying
to Norris to carry the community by over one hundred votes, though
he lost Furnas County, which had given him a large majority in 1895,
by a very slim margin. Ex-Judge Welty was so elated that he threw his
cap on the floor, stamped his feet, and asked his friends to
burn the
cap which they obligingly did. He also wrote Norris a congratulatory
letter claiming that the voters had "rebuked the rascality of the
would-be leaders of the Populist Party at Beaver City."
12
Welty at
last had his revenge against McClure. And McClure, who had sup
ported Norris in 1895 against Welty, was now defeated by Norris
with
the support of Welty. Factional fights among Furnas County Populists
played the major role in electing and re-electing Norris as a district
judge.
Since McClure and his followers did not charge him with official
misconduct in office, Norris believed the voters had censured and con
demned the opposition for the course they pursued. The official can
vass gave him a majority of 440. He ran between 1,000 and 1,500
votes ahead of his ticket and carried all but two counties, Furnas and
Gosper. While McClure won Furnas County by only twenty-seven
votes, Norris had no reason to feel disturbed about its loss, especially
since he carried Beaver City.
13
In a letter to Welty, Norris acknowledged that Welt/s efforts and
those of his Populist friends accounted for many votes. In all, the
campaign for re-election cost Norris less than fifty dollars, forty of
which at the outset he had turned over to the treasurer of the district
judicial committee. This sum is all the more remarkable when one
recalls that the 1895 campaign with its litigation and dispute almost
bankrupted him.
14
Early in December, Norris received his certificate of election as
judge of the district court for the Fourteenth Judicial District. But he
was much too involved with the plans and preparations involved in
moving his family to McCook to take more than casual notice of it.
The house in Beaver City had been sold and by December he had
purchased a home in McCook, the seat of Red Willow County.
McCook was centrally located and was the largest, and most prosper
ous community in the entire judicial district. The main line of the Bur-
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lington and Missouri Railroad ran through it and the Republican River
flowed past it. In 1900, McCook claimed a population o 2,445. It
boasted a waterworks and an electric light plant, both privately owned,
along with eight churches, four schools, and a municipal park located
almost directly across the street from Norris* home on Main (now
Norris) Avenue in the north end of town. It had a police department,
consisting of two full-time officers, and a volunteer fire department.
Two public halls, a saloon, and a municipal park provided recrea
tional facilities for the local citizenry. McCook also had a jail, though
this was seldom occupied.
15
The town had been laid out by the Lincoln Land Company in
June, 1882, and was originally known as Fairview. The name was
changed to honor Major General Alexander McDowell McCook, one
of the famous fighting McCooks eight brothers and a father, all of
whom served as officers in the Union army during the Civil War.
McCook quickly became a railroad town and a trading center for
farmers who brought large quantities of corn and alfalfa for shipment
to Omaha or Denver. Because the town was a division point on the
Burlington and Missouri main line to Denver, the railroad employed
many men in its shops and roundhouse. Other railroad employees who
traveled this line made McCook their home. Until 1905 it was also the
site of a United States Land Office. The community, with its pleasant
homes, numerous trees, many civic improvements, and hard-working
but diverse population, was a pleasant one and the family quickly felt
at home. Certainly the move was a sensible one for Norris, who found
the town's central location convenient for traveling throughout the dis
trict.
Before moving to McCook, Norris succeeded in settling the estate
of Mrs. D. H. Lashley. He also hired two men to supervise his real
estate holdings in Beaver City. Tenants in the Norris Block and else
where henceforth would pay their rent and present their complaints
to C. H, Wilson, who superintended the building, or to J. F. Fults> who
acted as rental and collection agent. Thus Norris became an absentee
landlord.16
By the end of March Norris' family was settled in their new
quarters, and Norris was able to resume his regular activities with
little interference. Judicial duties were more conveniently arranged
due to the more adequate transportation available at McCook. But
they still kept him away from his family for extended periods. Since
1900 was a presidential election year as well as a census year, he was
deluged with requests for transportation to the various Republican
conventions, despite the fact that Nebraska now had a law making it
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a crime to give a pass to attend any political meeting, and with peti
tions to appoint loyal Republicans as census enumerators.
As the spring court term came to an end and the various state
political conventions were held, Norris began to look forward to his
summer vacation before the national political campaign was launched
in the fall. He expected to visit some of his sisters and his mother in
Ohio before proceeding to Richmond, Virginia, for the annual IOOF
conclave.17 There also was a gathering of the L.U.N. scheduled in
August. Most of these plans went astray, however, because of unex
pected misfortune in the family.
In June, Norris' mother died suddenly at the age of eighty-two in
the family farmhouse at York Township. He arrived in Ohio for the
funeral, emotionally upset and physically exhausted. The sight of his
mother in death caused him intense anguish, though outwardly he
remained calm. As her only living son, he was haunted by the knowl
edge "that if there was anything she most desired at the final end, it
was that her boy might be there so she might give him her departing
blessing." A month later Norris was still heartbroken and depressed.
He claimed, "If it were not for the little ones I have here I would
prefer that I might be taken back there and laid by my mother's side."
The fact that Norris did not see his mother before her sudden death
(she was neither bedridden nor ill) no doubt was partly responsible
for this feeling of remorse. This feeling in turn helped to unleash the
melancholy which now overwhelmed him.
18
Norris gradually became reconciled to his grief during the summer
of 1900, which he spent in McCook, and began to overcome his melan
choly with the help of his daughters and with the news that Pluma
was pregnant once again. For at least two months he did not engage
in any social activities, though he did meet his financial obligations.
Fortunately, his court was in recess until the fall.
19
Among the financial matters requiring his attention was that of his
mother's will According to this document, Norris was to serve as one
of the executors and as trustee for the sums bequeathed to his children.
The only personal item he received was his brother's watch, a memento
much prized by his mother.20
Norris' recovery, spurred on by his involvement with his family, was
at last effected by the activities of the political campaign that was
underway. Although economic conditions in Nebraska had improved
considerably since 1896, a summer drought had once again caused
hardship in the southwestern sections. Crops had been burned out by
the blazing sun and withered by the dry heat that pervaded the re
gion. The railroad contributed to the political uncertainty by discharg-
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ing "quite a number of their employees'* because of the sharp decline
in traffic. For these reasons, Norris and his fellow Republicans expected
the battle against the Populists and their Democratic allies to be an
arduous one, despite the fact that Populism elsewhere had markedly
declined or disappeared.
21
At the end of August, Norris indulged in his first social activity
since his mother's death; he attended the Sovereign Grand Lodge of
the IOOF at Richmond, Virginia. He returned to McCook in September
for the opening of his court and the beginning of the national cam
paign. There he was faced with a vexing problem: court in Hayes
County was scheduled to start the same day October 1 that Theo
dore Roosevelt was to speak in McCook. Though Norris "greatly ad
mired the fighting Colonel," and hated to miss an opportunity to hear
him speak, he refused to postpone the court opening to attend a
partisan political meeting. Instead, he arranged for the jury panel and
lawyers to go to McCook while he remained in court tending to neces
sary but perfunctory details.
22
Believing it unwise for a person holding his position to make parti
san speeches, Norris concluded that he probably could do more good
for the Republican cause by "quietly working" with people. He thought
that the campaign of 1864 was repeating itself in 1900; the attacks on
the administration were similar to those made then, "and if you would
take the speeches and editorials of that campaign and change the name
of Lincoln to McKinley you would have them as they now appear."
23
Thus Norris' contribution to the Republican victory in 1900 was not
an obvious one. But both W. S. Morlan, the candidate for Congress,
and F. M. Rathbun of the state committee were satisfied that the course
he pursued was the correct one. Norris spent more than two hundred
dollars of his own and engaged in many personal talks more, he
thought, than any other individual including the candidates. At the
end of October he felt that he had done "a great deal of good," and
the chairman qf the Republican State Committee agreed. Early in
November, Norris encouraged absentee Republicans with railroad
passes to return to their precincts to vote on election day.
24
The results of the election gave Republicans in southwest Nebraska
cause for both elation and depression elation because Bryan was
defeated and C. H. Dietrich was elected governor, and depression
because Morlan by less than five hundred votes lost to A. C. Shallen-
berger for congressman. While the Republican party regained control
of the state, in southwestern Nebraska Norris and his fellow Republi
cans still had to redeem their district from the control of the Populist
and Democratic parties.
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In the Fifth Congressional District, where Norris voted, the Re
publican political picture was not promising. Since 1896 Republican
candidates had been defeated in congressional elections. With the
exception of Norris himself no Republican had been elected to a signi
ficant political office embracing more than a municipal or county area.
Indeed, though Morlan turned in a creditable performance, the election
of 1900 helped to convince many Republicans in southwestern Ne
braska that George Norris was the best vote getter the party had in
the short-grass country.
After the election, now that the Republican party was powerfully
entrenched on the national scene, Norris believed that his next political
responsibility was to help loyal Republicans obtain government jobs,
particularly postmasterships. However, politics was no longer an im
mediate or pressing problem and he began once again to interest him
self in other activities. As the year ended Norris was trying to con
vince J. H. Miles that money could be doubled in a very short time by
taking advantage of the numerous opportunities that were developing
in land speculation.
25
Thus relaxed and somewhat elated, Norris seemed to have over
come his recent grief. His family was a constant source of satisfaction
and there was anticipation of a new arrival in the spring. He was again
participating in fraternal and incidental business activities. Though
political ambition burned within him, there was little he could do
about it at this time. Certainly he had every reason to believe that the
future would offer
exciting new opportunities. The political and eco
nomic upheaval of the 1890's was now receding into history and the
new century seemed to offer the hope and opportunity he had en
visioned when he arrived .in the short-grass country fifteen years be
fore. True, the fifteen years Norris had spent in Nebraska had not been
years of complete frustration and collapse. He had risen to a position
of prominence. But his hopes and ambitions led him to suspect that
the coming years would be even more rewarding. However, before his
expectations could be realized, an even greater loss than that of his
mother would befall him.
Chapter 8
Greater Tragedy and Readjustment
THE YEAR 1901 started auspiciously enough for George Norris. While
holding court for Judge H. M. Grimes in North Platte in the Thirteenth
Judicial District, Norris was pleased to receive a letter from State
Senator E. N. Allen informing him that if the bill recently introduced
in Congress providing for another United States district judge for
Nebraska was enacted, he would procure for Norris the endorsement
of as many members of the state legislature as possible. Though the
proposal came to naught, it revealed that other office-holding Republi
cans deemed him worthy of a higher office than the one he occupied. 1
He planned to adjourn court in mid-February for two or three
weeks so that he could be on hand when Pluma had her baby. Since
court was held in McCook prior to adjournment, he was able to be at
home for at least a month prior to the birth of the baby. Early in
March Norris canceled the coming term of his court because "there was
nothing of great importance" on the docket. This cancellation enabled
him to spend at least two more weeks in McCook after the baby ar
rived.2
On March 21, 1901, a third daughter, Gertrude, was torn to the
Norrises. Five days later Pluma, age thirty-seven, was dead and Norris
was left with three little girls. The suddenness of her death again
threw the household into chaos and made it impossible for more than
a few friends to attend the simple funeral held in the parlor of tie
Norris home. Once again Norris was overcome with grief, and had to
rely on others to attend to the necessary details and arrangements.
3
Overwhelmed though he was, Norris had too much to do and too
many pressing and immediate matters to handle to give full vent to
his sorrow. He bore his loss remarkably well, considering his reaction
to his mother's death the previous year. By April he had recovered
enough to tackle some of his legal correspondence.
Fortunately for the family, Norris* sister Emma came from Toledo
to live with them in McCook. After the nurse left, Emma devoted most
of her time and attention to the newborn infant, and Norris hired a girl
63
64 GEORGE W. NORRIS
to perform the remaining household chores. Emma, however, super
vised, if she did not perform, all the necessary activities. The children
liked her, and Norris felt no undue anxiety when he left home. He
knew his family was under loving and capable surveillance.
4
To complicate matters even more at this trying time, Hazel, age six,
broke her arm. Then Pluma's sister in Arkansas, who had been unable
to attend the funeral, wrote requesting various heirlooms and other
items that had been borrowed from her. She stated that she was glad
he had decided not to break up his home, but, if he ever changed his
mind, she wanted to care for the children.5
By July the hired girl had left and Norris had to find someone to
help his sister manage the household. Despite his difficulties, he was
determined to provide a home for his daughters. Under no circum
stances would he send them to live with relatives. This summer, as in
the previous one, he turned down all invitations to deliver public
addresses. But this summer he did make plans to attend the annual
L.U.N. meeting, and in August he was again chosen as a delegate to
the Sovereign Grand Lodge IOOF.
Household arrangements proved so satisfactory that shortly after
Pluma's death Norris was able to pick up the threads of his disrupted
life. A year later Emma went to Ohio for an operation and placed baby
Gertrude with another sister in Ohio until she had recovered and was
able to return to McCook. Norris took care of Hazel and Marian until
her return and claimed that he and the children got along very well
without any supervision, though they had the help of another hired
girl
6
Since smallpox was rampant in parts of his judicial district Norris
canceled three sessions of his court in 1901.7 Unable to drown his sor
rows in judicial work, he turned his attention to financial affairs. He
did not philosophize, as he later did, about death, nor did he seem in
any outward way unduly affected by his great loss.
It was at the end of September in a letter to United States Senator
Dietrich that Norris inadvertently revealed some of his anxieties and
inner tensions. He commented on his recent loss, his heavy insurance
burden, and other debts. He explained that he found the expenses
connected with his office unduly heavy and his salary hardly adequate.
It was with the hope of increasing his income that he inquired of the
senator about judicial or legal positions available in the Philippine
Islands. By changing his environment and by plunging into a new job,
Norris hoped to solve his financial problems and begin a new existence.
Dietrich, however, was unable to aid him, chiefly because Norris knew
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no Spanish. The matter was never brought up again, although Dietrich
later helped him get elected to Congress.
8
In the fall there was politics to absorb and interest him, but the
1901 campaign was not a major one. In August, Norris attended the
Republican State Convention at Lincoln where he met United States
Senator J. H. Millard and other high officials in the party. During the
campaign, he worked for the Republican ticket by conversing with
candidates and voters, but he did not participate in any formal way.
The campaign, despite the dry weather and hot winds, was unexciting,
even for an off-year election. The fusion movement was waning and
Republican candidates easily won the few state-wide posts available.
In the short-grass country the party recaptured county and local offices
from Populist or Democratic incumbents. The lone exception to this
pattern in the Fourteenth Judicial District was in Gosper County where
Populists maintained all but three of the offices at stake in the election
9
Once the campaign was over and Norris saw how handily the
Republicans won, he rather regretted that he had not become a
candidate for Supreme Court judge. He consoled himself by reflecting
that service on the Supreme Court would have meant working much
harder for the same pay. The only object in seeking such a position,
he mused, would be to enlarge and improve his practice in the future
since Norris presumed that he would eventually drift back into
private law practice.
10
Thus as the year 1901 drew to a close George Norris, who had
previously envisioned better things for himself in the new century,
found himself in a rut. Trying to raise three daughters after the sudden
death of his wife, holding court and tending to numerous fraternal and
financial matters, he was active enough. But his expenses were exceed
ing his income and this worried him. Furthermore, though he found
satisfaction in his work, his children, and his friends, there was some
thing missing; he was not being challenged to the full extent of his
ability. Given his ambition, a larger stage than the Fourteenth Judicial
District was necessary to make full use of his talents and compensate
for the loss of his wife. He had inquired about the possibilities of
judicial or legal work in the Philippine Islands and had regretted that
he did not seek the Supreme Court nomination; now he would have
to bide his time and make sure that he did not let the next opportunity
bypass him.
At least until early in 1902 Norris
7
life did not markedly differ from
the pattern that it had previously followed. Court sessions kept him
away from home. With his sister's help he was maintaining a home for
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his children, although the household did not always
run smoothly.
Most of the hired girls neglected their chores,
and Emma, whose
health was not of the best, had to perform their work as well as
her
own.11
The mill at Beaver City was an old problem which he hoped
to
solve by selling the property. No purchaser appeared
and by the
summer of 1902 Norris and Shafer were willing to sell it on almost any
terms, allowing payments to be made to suit the purchaser. They
were
anxious to get rid of what they now considered
a "white elephant." To
add to Norris' anxiety, in January, 1902, there was a fire
in Beaver City
that burned out nearly all the south side of the square except
the
Norris Block, which was slightly damaged.
12
During this period, Norris became interested
in the school systems
of Beaver City and McCook. He met an attractive McCook teacher,
Ella Leonard, and tried unsuccessfully to persuade her to accept a
position in the Beaver City schools.
In April, 1902, Norris was elected
to the McCook School Board, and, seeing Miss Leonard more fre
quently, he soon began to take a more personal interest
in her.13
Seeking a greater outlet for his talents and ambitions, Norris, early
in 1902, had "practically decided'* to seek the Republican congressional
nomination. Fletcher Merwin, editor of the Beaver Valley Tribune and
one of the few persons to whom Norris had confided this decision, was
sure that he would win not only the nomination but the election as
well.14 Though only one Republican had been elected from the con
gressional district since its creation in 1892, and though he had served
but a single term, Merwin's optimism was not entirely misplaced. Since
1-900 the Republican party had been wresting political power through
out Nebraska from the hands of the Democrats and Populists. W. S.
Morlan, who had never held public office and was considered by some
to be a tool of the Burlington and Missouri, had been defeated in the
congressional campaign in 1900 by less than five hundred votes. With
Republicans in control of the national, state, and many county govern
ments, and with Norris' impressive 1899 judicial victory in mind,
Merwin had a basis for optimism in his realistic appraisal of the
political situation.
Since Morlan had previously let it be known that he did not intend
to seek the congressional seat again, Norris now had an opportunity
to announce his own candidacy. Merwin agreed to make the initial
announcement in the columns of the Tribune. Norris, however, re
quested that Merwin make no mention of Morlan's decision not to run.
He believed that other papers would bring this out and that, if the
GREATER TRAGEDY AND READJUSTMENT 67
first announcement of his candidacy noted Morlan's decision, it might
appear to Morlan's enemies that he was running with Morlan's ap
proval and backing.
15
Before the story of his candidacy appeared, Norris was busy laying
the groundwork for his nomination. He wrote numerous letters to
prominent Republicans throughout the eighteen-county congressional
district which embraced all of southwestern Nebraska and several
southcentral counties. He claimed that he had been urged by "quite a
large number of Republicans in different parts of this Congressional
District" to enter the race. He said that he would take no offense
should any individual oppose his candidacy, but that he preferred to
know in advance how his correspondent felt about it. Norris, as in the
past, did not wish to engage in a political fight unless he felt reasonably
assured of attaining his goal.
16
As he prepared for the contest, Norris thought he would be the only
candidate from the western end of the district and that he would prob
ably have the support of the delegates from the eight counties com
prising his judicial district. He requested Judge H. M. Grimes in the
Thirteenth Judicial District, a small portion of which was in the Fifth
Congressional District, to keep him informed of political sentiment in
this area. When Grimes replied that he too was about to enter the con
gressional race in his district, Norris wrote back, explaining what he
believed to be true in his own case as well: "Your judicial district will
go with you . . . and with that judicial district at your back I do not
believe there will be any difficulty in getting the nomination."
17
Along with party workers, Norris contacted lawyers and bankers
who, through their daily work, usually came in contact with large num
bers of people. He concentrated his efforts on his judicial district, con
vinced that if delegates from these counties went to the convention
solidly in his favor, the nomination was assured. He continued through
correspondence and courthouse conversations to let as many Republi
cans as possible know of his candidacy, while claiming that he had no
intention of making a personal canvass for delegates. And whenever a
correspondent's reply was encouraging, Norris suggested that he talk
to the Republicans in his particular precinct and use his influence in
securing a delegation favorable to his candidacy. In this way, while
maintaining an impassive pose, Norris worked incessantly for the
nomination.18
Late in March one development made Norris realize he would have
to engage in a more vigorous campaign. Morlan came out in favor of
State Senator Allen of Furnas County, and, in Frontier County, a
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Dr. Andrews announced his interest in obtaining the nomination. By
backing both Allen and Andrews, Morlan seemed
determined to pre
vent Norris from receiving the nomination.
Since Morlan was the chief railroad attorney in the area, his
opposition could be damaging. It meant that Norris
would be unable
to obtain passes while his opponents could
use them freely. Neither
Morlan nor Norris, however, appeared to have the support of the
Burlington and Missouri. G. W. Holdrege, its general manager
in
Nebraska, was supporting a candidate from the eastern
end of the con
gressional district. Despite these developments,
Norris did not become
unduly pessimistic. He believed in several instances that
Morlan had
"overdone the matter," and that Morlan s opposition could redound to
his favor. 19
Why Morlan suddenly opposed Norris is not clear. The two had
never been close associates and Morlan, in their previous relations, had
always been the senior figure. Perhaps Morlan thought that by oppos
ing Norris he could deadlock the convention and, despite
his official
statement that he did not intend to run, obtain the nomination for a
second time. Whatever the reason, Norris knew that Morlan's opposi
tion would be most effective in Furnas and Red Willow counties,
where he had considerable prestige and influence among local Republi
cans.
One aspect of this development was of inestimable benefit to
Norris. The fact that the Burlington and Missouri Railroad officials
were supporting other candidates meant that he would gain support
among farmers and shippers who had grievances with the railroad and
harbored increasing resentment against it. Also, the fact that he tem
porarily lost the ability to obtain transportation for friends and sup
porters made it easier for him to oppose free passes. He also gained
the experience of engaging effectively in politics despite the loss of an
important source of patronage, something that would stand him in
good stead in later years.
Even with Morlan's help, Allen's candidacy did not make much
headway. Only one newspaper, the Arapahoe Mirror, supported him.
In a widely distributed April issue, it charged, without presenting any
details, that Norris had made a "deal" for the purpose of selecting his
successor. Norris quickly denied the allegation claiming it was
"absolutely groundless and without any reason whatever." He added
that if elected to Congress he would take no part in the selection of
his successor. In this way Norris was able to keep the support of
Republican attorneys who were interested in his judicial position. A
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statement to this effect was sent to the Beaver Valley Tribune and was
widely distributed.
20
By mid-May, before the county conventions met, there were more
than a dozen candidates in the field. Norris, however, had a larger
following than any other individual. If he received the support of all
the delegates from his judicial district he would have fifty-three of the
eighty-nine votes necessary for nomination. Allen, backed by Morlan,
was his only opposition in the entire judicial district, and Norris did
not believe that they could control many delegates.
21
On May 20 the Furnas County convention met at Beaver City and
passed without opposition a resolution instructing the delegates to the
congressional convention to support Norris* candidacy. Allen appeared
and withdrew his name. The activities of this convention virtually
assured that all other county conventions in the judicial district would
follow suit. Norris was now convinced he would have the largest
number of delegates at the Hastings Convention.
22
When the convention assembled at Hastings on June 10, every
delegate from the eight counties comprising the Fourteenth Judicial
District was for George Norris. The other ten counties had instructed
their delegates for different candidates. Captain Adams from Superior
in Nuckolls County at the extreme eastern end of the congressional
district seemed to be his strongest opponent. On the first ballot Norris
received seventy-one votes, while his nearest opponent, Adams, had
but twenty-nine. On the fifth ballot Norris received the nomination
with 122 votes, a large majority. His nomination was not obtained
at the expense of party harmony; good feeling prevailed both before
and after the convention which one newspaper called "one of the pret
tiest free-for-all political races ever run in the Fifth congressional
district." 23
Norris was largely successful in maintaining his original posture
of having the office seek the man. He accomplished this with a mini
mum of friction and therefore could count on unified party support in
the fall campaign. Further omens that augured well were abundant
rainfall (over twenty-one inches, the best rainfall in over a decade), a
large wheat crop, and an increasing demand for grain. Thus Norris
felt confident of success in November.24
Before he could take a well-deserved vacation, he had to organize
a congressional committee and get acquainted with party leaders in
the eastern end of the congressional district. Norris chose his devoted
friend Fletcher Merwin as chairman of the committee, and J. E. Kelley
of McCook as secretary. Norris believed one of the officers of the
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committee should live in his home town so that there would be no
difficulty in communicating. Indeed, the completed committee con
tained a representative of each of the eighteen counties in the district,
but only one of its officers came from outside of Norris' judicial dis
trict.25
With this important task disposed of, Norris, less than ten days
after the Hastings Convention, made a cautious campaign promise
designed to win him support in Hall County, the most populous county
in the Fifth Congressional District. He pledged that if elected he would
direct all of his efforts toward securing funds to erect a federal build
ing in Grand Island, the largest city in the district. The claim of Grand
Island for a public building, Norris said, should take precedence over
that of any other community within the district.26
Before the Democrats and Populists held their convention, Norris
had perfected his organization for the hard campaign to come. He had
committed himself to a public building for the largest city in the dis
trict. He had contacted individuals who traveled throughout the dis
trict in the course of their business and had persuaded them to inform
him of political conditions. He had also prepared a statement and affi
davits to send to Republican editors when the need arose, presenting
the facts in regard to the 1895 disputed election.
27 Thus when the
opposition nominated,, as expected, the incumbent congressman, A. C.
Shallenberger, Norris was fully prepared to engage in the most difficult
campaign of his budding career, a campaign that would determine
whether he could move on to the larger stage that he sought as an
outlet for his talents and abilities and as a solution to his financial and
personal problems.
Chapter 9
The 1902 Campaign
WITH the nomination safely secured, Norris was compelled by illness
to take to his bed and was not fully recovered until the third week in
July. He then began setting his political house in order for the cam
paign.
One of his first statements was that he would assist no candidate in
securing his judicial post. If he and the Republican candidate for
governor, John H. Mickey, were both elected, Norris pledged to resign
his judgeship after Mickey's inauguration, thereby allowing the new
governor to name his successor. If the incumbent governor, Ezra P.
Savage, were elected, Norris promised to resign on January 1, 1903,
thereby allowing Savage to appoint a district judge.
1
By taking this
stand on the matter of his successor, Norris hoped to avoid losing the
support of aspirants to his post.
In an attempt to anticipate the issue of the disputed 1895 election,
Republican newspapers presented their readers with affidavits, notably
those written by D. T. Welty, explaining Norris' position. The 1895
election was an old issue and had not been successfully used against
him in the past. Norris had no reason to believe that it could be so
used at this time.
Early in the campaign, Norris made another decision that helped
avoid possible pitfalls. He refused to endorse anyone for a federal
position, particularly postmaster candidates. He avoided local political
quarrels and disputes and notified all who sought his endorsement that
he would make no effort along these lines until after the election.2
However, Norris could not avoid requests for railroad passes. Burling
ton officials claimed that during the summer months so many people
went off on vacation to the Colorado Rockies they thought it advisable
to curtail free transportation. Despite this proscription Norris was able,
when he thought it necessary to obtain transportation for individuals
who might be of help in his campaign.3
The transportation problem became more difficult because some
local Republican leaders made commitments which Norris could turn
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down only at the risk of losing votes. One wrote requesting transporta
tion for a "Catholic pop" who promised to deliver at least six votes
"out of his own church." Another made a similar request for a Popu
list who promised to work among the German farmers in Webster
County. This same politician also urged Norris to provide transporta
tion for a Populist saloonkeeper in Red Cloud who could do much good
among his Bohemian countrymen. In one instance, a
committee mem
ber was unable to obtain a pass for a Scandinavian leader in his
county and purchased railroad tickets out of his own pocket, explain
ing that it "wouldn't do to lose him." These free passes represented
a
commitment which could pay off in votes on election day.
4
Though Norris later had every reason to be grateful
to Senator
C. H. Dietrich, and possibly owed his election to the senator's efforts,
at the outset he thought Dietrich was indirectly doing him harm. Die
trich desired to remove a deputy revenue collector from his post.
Norris thought that such a change during the campaign would be "a
very bad political move," since the collector was a Union veteran and
a hard worker for the Republican party. Norris asked G. W. Holdrege
of the Burlington and Missouri to persuade the senator to retain the
official at least until after the election.5
If Norris was disturbed or annoyed with Senator Dietrich in this
instance, he kept the grievance to himself. He never mentioned it
again in his correspondence. And as the campaign progressed he re
peatedly sought the senator's services, which were always forthcoming.
Matters pertaining to irrigation and postal routes were the two areas
where the senator's aid was important Indeed in the latter area it was
crucial.
On June 17, 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt signed into law a
bill
calling for the reclamation of arid lands in the West. Under its
terms the federal government would construct dams and reservoirs
for irrigation purposes. Norris was convinced that there was a natural
location for a reservoir along the border of Red Willow and Hitchcock
counties.6 He desired to have a dam located there and hoped that the
specific site could be agreed upon before election day. He wrote to
the secretary of the interior to arouse interest in the plan.
Norris was prompted into action because his opponent, A. C. Shal-
lenberger, claimed that he was the "sole mover and prime originator"
of the law and that several projects would soon be located in the dis
trict While Norris doubted his opponent's claims, he nevertheless
requested that Senator Dietrich meet with the state engineer and any
federal officials who might come to Nebraska and arrange matters so
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that Congressman Shallenberger would not have them in tow and
thereby reap political advantage from their visit.
7
The senator responded with a valuable suggestion of his own. He
asked Norris to have Republicans in the westernmost counties write
letters urging Dietrich to secure the location of artesian wells in these
counties. Previously Dietrich had held a long conference with F. H.
Newell, chief of the newly organized Bureau of Reclamation. Newell
informed him it would be easier to recommend the digging of artesian
wells if the people themselves requested it. Dietrich added that it
would do Norris "a great deal of good" to let voters know that he was
aware of their interests.8 Thus with Dietrich's help Norris was able
to obviate the promises of his opponent.
In this matter Norris was on the defensive, trying to neutralize
Shallenberger's claims more than anything else. However, in the case
of establishing rural postal routes he was able to press a telling advan
tage. Early in the campaign Senator Dietrich received requests from
two towns in the district asking that he hasten the establishment of
proposed rural routes. He relayed these requests to the post office
authorities for immediate action. In the meantime, Dietrich thought,
Norris might get in touch with these postmasters and have the informa
tion go out that he was consulting with Dietrich and soon expected
to have the matter satisfactorily disposed of.
9 Here was a political
weapon that Shallenberger, a Democrat, could not use, while Norris
utilized it very effectively.
Senator Dietrich also sent Norris a letter containing two lists of
rural routes in the Fifth Congressional District. One list contained
routes that had been favorably recommended but were not yet in
operation. Norris at his own discretion could tell interested parties that
he would consult with Dietrich and insist upon having them put into
operation as quickly as possible.
The other list contained routes that had been requested but were
not yet inspected and approved. Here, Dietrich suggested> Norris
should select those routes he deemed politically beneficial. Then he
could inform people that he would urge an early inspection of the
proposed rural routes. Through Dietrich's efforts the Post Office
Department promised to send a special agent to investigate them.
Since these routes had to be approved by officials in Washington, time
was of the essence. The routes had to go into operation before election
day if Norris were to benefit from the results of having brought them
about so quickly.
10
So impressed was Norris with these vote-getting opportunities that
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he went further and asked Dietrich if it would be possible to secure
star routes for two communities which had requested them. Dietrich
immediately wrote the second assistant postmaster general,
who issued
an advertisement endorsing one of the routes. The route was scheduled
to go into operation several weeks before election day.
11
Dietrich was also able to report by the end of September that
favorable action would be taken on the reports that the special agent
was filing from the district. In October he suggested that
Norris inform
the postmasters that official notification
would soon be forthcoming.
Becoming bolder as he received this news, Norris began mentioning to
voters that if he were a congressman rather than merely a candidate,
these routes already would have been in operation. Herein was an
advantage, he argued, of having a congressman of the
same political
persuasion as the president.
12
Thus through Senator Dietrich's efforts, Norris was able to take
advantage of a form of federal "pork" that was unavailable
to his
opponent. In September he sought a more direct type of aid when he
wrote the chairman of the National Republican Congressional Com
mittee, J, W. Babcock of Wisconsin, for financial assistance. Babcock
responded with a thousand-dollar contribution and several thousand
copies of speeches by prominent Republicans. But throughout the
campaign Norris made no effort to raise money from federal officials
(including postmasters) in the district. It was the custom in Nebraska
that these people pay assessments to the state committee and he had no
desire to interfere with its work. 13
Valuable though this aid was, Norris still had to campaign through
out the district in order to wrest the congressional seat from Shallen-
berger, a tireless and able politician. Moreover, Shallenberger brought
Champ Clark of Missouri and other Democratic colleagues into the
district while Norris was unable to get a prominent out-of-state Repub
lican to speak on his behalf. Shallenberger boasted of the many bills
he had introduced and of other important things he was doing in
Washington. Norris noted that the bills had died in committee and
argued that a Republican congressman supporting a Republican
administration, ably led by President Roosevelt, could do more for the
people of the Fifth Congressional District. He also explained that
Shallenberger, who claimed to represent the farmers of the district,
was really a banker in private life. Norris insisted that he knew more
about agriculture and farmers* problems than his opponent. Toward
the end of the campaign, he challenged Shallenberger to a corn-
husking contest to demonstrate who the real "farmer" candidate was. 14
Norris concentrated his efforts on the more populous eastern end
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of the district where he was not widely known and where the large
cities, Hastings and Grand Island, were located. Most of his "non-
partisan" speeches before gatherings of Odd Fellows and old soldiers
in August were in this area, as were a majority of the newly established
rural routes. He counted on the support of politicians in the judicial
district to turn out the vote while he made himself known elsewhere.
Merwin in Beaver City kept Republican newspapers supplied with
news about Norris, while his own recently reorganized paper, the
Beaver City Times-Tribune, loyally supported Norris' cause. However,
Norris refused to purchase the support of at least two editors who
claimed that they would endorse "the ones who furnished the dough."
Fortunately he was able to arrange his judicial duties, with one brief
exception, so that he would not hold court until after the election.
15
Meanwhile, his opponent, "a man of impressive personal appear
ance, with piercing eyes, handsome features, a fine head set upon an
athletic body, and a fine speaking voice," was conducting a relentless
campaign.
16 In his speeches he stressed his support of inflationary
measures and favored the regulation of trusts. He made much of his
sympathy with farmers and of legislative measures designed for their
benefit. On the other hand Norris, when discussing national issues,
favored reciprocity as well as the protection of the American working-
man and the home market. He stood with Roosevelt on the trust ques
tion and charged that "Democratic obstructionists" were primarily
responsible for their existence. Any indication of his future lack of
partisanship could not have . been discerned in these campaign
speeches. However, his former Populist opponent, Welty, manifested
his loss of partisanship by issuing a statement on October 15, 1902,
reviewing once again the 1895 election. He observed, "The people
know him to be a man whose honesty is unquestioned and whose
moral character is unassailable. They will resent as they have done
before,, regardless of politics, any attempt to injure his fair name or
to detract from his well-earned and good reputation.'* Thus again
Norris hoped to benefit from the gradual disintegration that was crack
ing the alliance between Populists and Democrats. Prosperity, good
crops, abundant rainfall, and the careful weaning by politicians of
former Republicans out of the fusion fold worked to the advantage of
Republican candidates.
17
After a debate between Norris and Shallenberger at the end of
September in Republican City, both candidates and their advisers
were so impressed, with its possibilities that they agreed to hold a
series of five debates commencing October 21. While Norris, unlike
Shallenberger, did not have to concern himself with any serious disaf-
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faction in party ranks, he was worried lest abundant crops and pros
perity, instead of being an asset, boomerang and lead to a disastrous
complacency by keeping voters away from the polls. With most
farmers behind in their threshing, there was a possibility that on elec
tion day, if the weather were good, they would attend to their crops
and not to politics.
18
After the second debate, Norris received an interesting evaluation
from a minor Republican officeholder. He commented upon the
"masterly way" in which Norris impressed the audience by citing the
records of recent Republican administrations. Though the writer was
biased, Norris undoubtedly agreed with the validity of his observa
tions:
Of one thing I am certain and that is that he (Shallenberger) was
at all times on the defensive, trying to explain his record and at
no time willing to tell how he would do or what he is willing to
go on record as standing for.
19
The writer concluded by observing that Shallenberger would have "to
talk fast" and discuss pertinent issues, not bills that died in committee,
to convince voters that he should serve another term. This letter and
others show that Norris followed the administration on all points when
he discussed national issues.
Another observer at this debate thought that Norris' presentation
was better than Shallenberger's and that he raised enough questions
on the
"money matter" and "trust proposition" to cause some Populists
to question their alliance with the Democrats.
20
Norris, indeed, was
well prepared to meet Shallenberger in public debate. While not a
flamboyant and emotional orator, as was his opponent, he impressed
an audience by sound sense, logic, and familiarity with his subject.
He was not an exciting speaker, but he gave the impression of an
industrious and capable candidate who as a congressman would fully
devote himself to the interests of his constituents. In short, the air of
inherent or natural dignity which had aided him in his judicial cam
paigns served Norris equally well in this campaign.
However, Norris, who was downcast after the first three debates
owing to the vocal support manifested for his opponent, lost his dig
nity and possibly his temper in the last two debates, including the
one at McCook. He attacked Shallenberger in a most vindictive way,
claiming he was practicing deception by masquerading as a friend of
the farmer. He ridiculed Shallenberger and his family banking and
business connections and pointed with pride to his own farm back-
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ground and ability. It was in this connection that he challenged
Shallenberger to a corn husking contest.
21
On election day, Tuesday, November 4, 1902, the candidates, worn
out by campaigning, impatiently awaited the first returns. However,
the party organizations still had important jobs to perform. Helpers
with wagons provided transportation to the polls; others engaged in
last-minute attempts to obtain votes. Farmers busily threshing wheat
had to be convinced that it was important for them to quit their fields.
George Allen, an astute local politician, predicted that Norris would
carry Clay County by two hundred or more votes ( Norris* majority in
that county was 184) and assured the candidate that though party
officials in Lincoln had some doubts about Norris7 ability to carry the
Fifth Congressional District, he had none.22 And Allen was correct.
Republican candidates were elected in almost every contest in the
1902 election. Mickey was elected governor by over five thousand
votes, while the average Republican majority on the remainder of the
state ticket was a little over thirteen thousand. All Republican candi
dates for Congress were elected, except in the Second District where
incumbent David H. Mercer was defeated by Gilbert M. Hitchcock,
publisher of the Omaha World Herald. In the Fifth District the vote
was very close; Norris won with a precarious majority of 181 votes,
receiving 14,927 to 14,746 for Shallenberger, Democrat and Populist,
and 496 for John D. Stoddard, Prohibitionist.23
Once the results were known, pandemonium prevailed among
Norris' supporters. "In 1895," wrote one, "you redeemed the Four
teenth Judicial District from Populism. Now you have restored the
Fifth Congressional District." While Mickey ran ahead of Norris in
most counties, Norris did much better than Morlan had done two
years before. Nebraska's United States senators sent a joint congratu
latory telegram proclaiming "the complete triumph for Republican
principles in Districts heretofore dominated by Fusionists." Nebraska
was now fully redeemed from "the Pernicious Principles of Populism
and the Foolish Fraud of Fusionism," and Norris played an important
role in its redemption.
24
Norris now had to attend to many details emanating from the
campaign. Merwin, who had not put in a bill for his expenses, had
to be paid. He informed Norris, "There are several fellows who want
something." He asked only one personal favor and that was for a rail
road pass for "a tip-top good fellow" who had done some hard work
among a colony of farmers.
25
Another politician informed Norris that he had dealt with an
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individual who worked with him in a Bohemian settlement. He gave
him the railroad pass Norris sent "and settled with him otherwise."
This worker had relied on similar individuals to get out the vote; some
he paid at the time and others he promised to pay after the election.
His total expenses came to about two hundred dollars and included
such items as hiring teams from local livery stables, advertising, hiring
a band, and sending telephone messages.
26
Thus Norris in his first campaign for national office was able to
achieve a narrow but impressive victory and become the second Re
publican to represent the Fifth Congressional District. Improved agri
cultural conditions, adequate rainfall, and the generally prosperous
state of the union helped to lay the groundwork for his victory>
27
as
did the gradual weakening of the bonds that had held the Populist-
Democratic alliance together. Above this foundation was a superstruc
ture that included the federal aid Senator Dietrich was able to mobi
lize, adequate financial support from the Republican party, and the
personal popularity of President Roosevelt to whose wagon Norris
hitched his political star. Finally, the most significant factor was Norris
himself his personal popularity, his ability as a campaigner, his usual
appearance of dignified judicial calmness in his black suit, white shirt,
and black string tie, plus his devoted supporters who gave unstintingly
of their time, energy, and money. Together they helped to eke out the
less than two-hundred vote majority. Victory opened new horizons for
forty-one-year-old George Norris. It also brought new responsibilities
as well as many trivial but politically important details.
Chapter 10
Congressman-Elect
SINCE the Fifty-eighth Congress would not convene until November,
1903, Norris had a year to wait before taking a seat in the House of
Representatives. The year emerged as one of the most eventful in his
life, a period of endings and of new beginnings in both his private and
public life. The most obvious change that occurred in the congressman-
elect was in his physical appearance. When he appeared at the bar of
the House in November, 1903, Norris sported a weeping-willow mus
tache; the beard was gone and his hair was now heavily tinged with
grey. Behind the noticeable change in his appearance lay the events,
some tragic and others happy, of the year of waiting by the newly
elected congressman from the Fifth District of Nebraska.
After the election, Norris had the leisure to look after his personal
affairs. Most nagging was the long-standing problem of the mill at
Beaver City. In July, 1902, the dam to the mill was washed out by
floodwaters on Beaver Creek and a new one had to be installed. In
September the partners thought they had a buyer, but he had very
little cash, and they did not want to sell the mill on time unless some
security was given. Negotiations were also made with other potential
purchasers in Pennsylvania and Iowa, but none proved satisfactory.
Finally in the spring of 1903, an agreement was worked out with
George E. Hotchkills of Loup City, Nebraska, whereby he paid the
partners $1,000 in cash and gave them a mortgage for the balance>
amounting to $4,000. Before the final details were completed, Hotch
kills came to Beaver City and was operating the mill.
Both partners knew the mill property was worth more than $5,000,
but neither Norris nor Shafer was a miller. Norris was no longer a
resident of Beaver City and Shafer did not care to look after its over-all
operation. Furthermore the partners had been unfortunate in their
experience of renting the mill. They had found that as a rule the lessee,
when his term was about to expire, let the property run down. This
usually meant that Norris and Shafer had to devote time and energy
to redeeming the good name of the mill. Therefore they decided to
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sacrifice to make the sale. Thus, after thirteen years, Norris was finally
free of this property which had caused him irritation and annoyance
and which he never really wanted.
1
Norris' real estate also needed tending. Fults and Hopping contin
ued to look after his property in Beaver City. Occasionally Norris
asked Merwin to perform a chore for him in this connection. Norris'
relationship with these men was informal and friendly. Neither Fults,
a lawyer, nor Hopping, a druggist, derived his livelihood from this
work. They helped Norris more from friendship than for anything else.
Both men continued this arrangement after he moved to Washington,
D.C.2
During the campaign Norris was not pressed or embarrassed for
want of money. He was able to give twenty-five dollars to the Odd
Fellows Home Fund though this contribution no doubt had political
overtones. In October he promptly paid the premiums on two large
insurance policies which totaled almost five hundred dollars. After the
election Norris found, too, that he could afford to remodel his home
in McCook and take his first real vacation, albeit a short one, since the
death of his wife. He took a trip into Colorado and possibly New
Mexico. Though his financial condition was satisfactory, he still found
it necessary to request payment from people who owed him money.3
Norris also began to again take a more active interest in McCook
affairs. In September, 1902, a public library had been opened. It was
housed in the basement of the Red Willow County Courthouse where
Norris held court and maintained a judicial chamber. From this van
tage point he had ample opportunity to observe the large numbers of
people using the library. He wrote to Andrew Carnegie the following
June, requesting a donation for the erection of a separate building in
the
city. Eventually Carnegie did contribute and McCook today boasts
a handsome public library building.
4
Besides his personal business affairs and his emerging role as a
public figure of consequence in the short-grass country, Norris was
plagued all through the campaign with a health problem. Since his
teeth were extraordinarily sensitive, he sought a dentist who could
drill them without pain. In December, before leaving on vacation, he
wrote to Dr. H. C. Miller, a dentist and also postmaster of Grand
Island, inquiring whether Miller could care for teeth in a painless way
and, if so, whether he could arrange an appointment. Two weeks later,
Dr. Miller assured Norris that he could treat his teeth without undue
pain.
5
Norris, delighted at finding such a dentist, went to Grand Island
late in April. For nine consecutive days Dr. Miller fixed his teeth,
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afterward claiming that it was "the largest and most severe operation"
he had ever performed at one time. At the end of the eighth day Norris
was taken with chills followed by fever. In spite of this he had the
work completed the following day and was consumed with a fever
while in the chair. Miller's fee was $125.6
Theodore Roosevelt arrived in Grand Island at this time and Norris
appeared with him despite his illness. As soon as Norris returned to
McCook, he become much more seriously ill, took to his bed, and
almost died from blood poisoning and other complications. He was
dangerously ill for over three weeks and did not fully recover for
several months. In addition to blood poisoning, he suffered from
nervous prostration and was very weak and debilitated. Fletcher Mer-
win came to look after him and quickly sent for Doctor C. C. Green of
Beaver City. The doctors were afraid that the infection would reach
the brain, in which case "the termination would have been fatal and
sudden." Fortunately the blood poisoning was arrested and on May 18,
1903, Merwin wrote, "We consider Judge Norris now out of all
danger."
7
With his nervous system seemingly shattered, Norris, though he
was out of immediate danger by the end of May, was still a very sick
man. Microscopic examination indicated kidney trouble, though the
doctors thought this to be only temporary. Norris took various tonic
prescriptions to regain his strength and equilibrium, and was told by
doctors and friends to get adequate rest, sunshine, and care. Dr. Green
suggested that he give up smoking, and Norris did not object. At the
end of May, Dr. Green announced that his patient had no need of more
medicine and that, if he did not overexert himself, he would be well
on the way to a complete recovery.
8
From all over the state came letters inquiring about Norris' illness.
9
Governor Mickey requested Merwin to convey his hope for a rapid
recovery and suggested that Norris, when able, call upon him in Lin
coln. Merwin, who remained with Norris in McCook, handled most
of the correspondence and kept the patient abreast of political devel
opments. By June 4, Norris was again handling his own mail and in
forming correspondents that he expected to leave for a long Wisconsin
vacation at Delavan Lake as soon as he regained a bit more strength.
10
In his correspondence he told no one the secret which he must have
divulged to those who cared for him during his illness that he
planned to be married before going to Wisconsin. After the death of
Pluma in 1901, Norris, with three young children to look after and an
intensive political campaign to wage, certainly had little time for
romance. Yet it was obvious that he eventually would remarry, since
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he was desperately in need of companionship,
a helpmate, and a
mother for his girls. That he was considered
a most eligible bachelor
is evident from correspondence with a young lady
in Lincoln who
signed her letters "Jeanette," and of whom very little is
known. She
invited him to several occasions in Lincoln and, although it is not
known whether he attended these particular events, it is certain that
they saw each other several times. That
Norris was not romantically
interested in her is indicated by the fact that he did not tell her of his
illness. From her letters she appears to have been much too flighty and
too deeply involved in the doings of
Lincoln society to suit Norris
7
tastes.
11
However, Norris was becoming romantically interested in the
McCook schoolteacher Ellie Leonard, who knew the first Mrs. Norris.
Miss Leonard was well liked by her students in McCook, and after
Pluma's death, Norris began to notice her in more than a casual way.
In March, before his visit to Dr. Miller, Norris wrote A. J, Green, a
watchmaker and optician, about purchasing a ring. Thus they may
have considered announcing their engagement before his illness.
12
Possibly his illness and convalescence, when Miss Leonard was un
doubtedly on hand often, led them to fix a wedding date.
Contemplating remarriage two years after Pluma's death
must have
caused Norris some trying moments. In March, at the same time he
was purchasing a ring, he was also completing arrangements
for the
erection of a monument on his lot in the McCook cemetery. Also in
March he received word that his eldest sister Lorinda, at whose home
he had enjoyed such pleasant times while teaching school in Ohio, had
died. He must have undergone great emotional confusion and upheaval
during this period.
After the school term ended, Miss Leonard returned to her parents'
home in San Jose, California, and Norris, announcing his intention of
vacationing in Wisconsin, left at the end of June for the Pacific Coast.
In the home of Ellie's parents, on July 8, 1903, Ellie Leonard and
George Norris were married.
13
Their Wisconsin honeymoon gave Norris a chance to recover his
strength and to introduce his L.U.N. friends to his new wife when they
gathered for the annual reunion. During this reunion one decision was
made which pleasurably affected the L.U.N. members and their fami
lies for the rest of their lives. They decided, chiefly upon Norris' inves
tigation and prodding, to purchase an island in Rainbow Lake where
members might build cottages and where the annual meetings would
henceforth be held. Only four members,- including Norris, felt they
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were able to contribute toward the $950.00 asked for the island. The
price seemed a small consideration for such a wonderful site.
14
Rainbow Lake, a perfect vacation setting, is one of a chain of
twenty-three lakes southwest of Waupaca, Wisconsin. Its clear waters
still attract fishermen seeking pickerel, bass, trout, and other varieties.
The entire chain, spring-fed, cold, and clear, is set in deep hollows
between low rounded hills. The lakes offered opportunities for rest,
relaxation, and escape from intense summer heat, and Norris came to
cherish his days there as the years went by. With the purchase of the
island the problem of annual meetings and vacations was forever
solved for Norris and his fellow L.U.N.
agitators from the old days at
Valparaiso.
Meanwhile most of the friends of George and Ellie Norris read of
the marriage in the McCook paper, where a brief announcement ap
peared. After Norris* departure for California, neither Merwin nor
Norris' children, who remained in McCook with their aunt, knew his
exact whereabouts. After this marriage, Norris wrote, "There came into
my home ... a real mother to my motherless children/' Once again
his family circle was complete and his children quickly came to love
Ellie as their new mother. Indeed she soon became for these youngsters
the only mother they knew, and, as Norris later wrote, "Never was there
a more considerate or more tender hearted, loving mother."
15
September found Norris and his bride back in McCook redecorating
the house to suit the taste of its new mistress. Norris at this time also
indulged himself and bought a fine bound set of the collected works of
one of his youthful heroes, Robert W. Ingersoll, the famed Republican
orator and agnostic.
16 But most important of all, the return to McCook
brought with it preparations for a new life in Washington, D.C.
Not that Norris had neglected to prepare for his new role. Since
the election he had been attending to political matters. One of the first
things he had to consider was resigning as a district judge. He had
promised not to recommend any candidate, but to allow a Republican
governor to appoint whomever he desired. Norris kept this pledge
in good faith. When, after the election, Governor-elect John Mickey
asked him about a successor, he refused to express any choice and
wrote to the governor restating his position.
17
His first official action as a newly elected congressman was to sup
port, along with the other Republican members of the Nebraska
congressional delegation, the candidacy of Joseph G. Cannon of Illi
nois for the speakership of the House of Representatives. Cannon
wrote him a grateful personal note? claiming that his help, along with
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that of the delegation, went far toward settling the
contest. Norris
showed no trace of independence in this matter, since Joseph W. Bab-
cock of Wisconsin was also seeking this position, and Norris had good
reason to be grateful to him. As chairman of the
1902 Congressional
Campaign Committee, Babcock had helped him with funds
and litera
ture.18
With the defeat of Congressman Mercer in the Second District a
position on the Committee on Public Grounds and Buildings
became
vacant. Senator Dietrich advised Norris to put in a request for this
vacancy "as quickly as possible" to Speaker Cannon.
Since First Dis
trict Congressman Elmer Burkett was a member of the Appropriations
Committee, Dietrich thought it essential that Norris secure this posi
tion to retain for the state of Nebraska membership on key committees,
thereby maintaining its influence in Congress.
19 Norris made every
effort to obtain it.
At this time he was unaware of any cleavages within his party.
Indeed, as a freshman congressman, he was more interested in securing
favorable committee assignments than in anything else, desiring above
all an appointment to the Committee on Public Lands and Buildings.
But as a newly elected congressman, he did not consider it wise to ask
directly for the position. He therefore let Dietrich and Burkett know
of his desire and requested that they discuss the matter with the new
speaker before he approached Cannon.
20
In February of 1903 Norris made a brief trip to Washington,
where he talked to Cannon about service on this committee. The
Speaker asked Norris to contact him again some time before the con
vening of Congress. When Norris later wrote to Cannon he presented
his case in a way that undoubtedly appealed to the politically astute
Speaker. He noted that all the other Nebraska districts that had elected
Republicans to Congress had done so by large majorities, that he had
been elected by a majority of only 181 votes and was the only Republi
can, "with one exception," who had represented the district since the
advent of the Populist party. Furthermore, Norris suggested the neces
sity of an appropriation for a public building at Grand Island if the
district were to remain in the Republican fold. This goal could best be
achieved, he argued, by his serving on the Public Lands and Buildings
Committee. By way of conclusion he frankly stated to the Speaker:
There is no doubt but that the appropriation by Congress of
money for the building of a public building at Grand Island would
make my re-election sure> and while it is of no particular impor
tance to the country or the Republican Party that I should be
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returned any more than any other person, yet it is of considerable
importance that a Republican should be elected in this district,
which I think could be easily secured if this one matter were at
tended to. I think these matters have, perhaps, been brought to
your attention by the senators from this state, and while I do not
want, in any way, to embarrass you in your difficult task, still I
sincerely hope you may be able to give the matter consideration
which I believe it deserves, and decide it as you may think best
under all the circumstances.21
Norris also requested information about his new duties from
Charles F. Manderson, former U.S. senator (1883-95), and now chief
attorney of the Burlington and Missouri Railroad in Nebraska. He
confessed his ignorance of the customs, rules, and regulations of the
Congress and hoped that Manderson would aid him in learning about
these subjects. He told Manderson of his desire to serve on the Com
mittee on Public Lands and Buildings and hoped that the ex-senator
could be of assistance in this matter.22 Thus Congressman-elect Norris
did his best before he went to Washington to put himself in good
standing with the Burlington Railroad and the Republican organiza
tion, two of the most powerful agencies in the political structure of the
state.
Another important task which faced Norris at this time was that of
securing the services of a competent secretary who knew the district
and could keep him abreast of local developments. For this difficult job
Norris wanted Merwin,. who had served as chairman of his congres
sional committee in the recent campaign. After the election he had
presented Merwin with a typewriter and a desk as a token of gratitude
and soon thereafter tried to convince him to take the job. Merwin, who
wanted to remain in Beaver City and edit his paper, claimed that he
could not live on the salary, though he recognized that service in
Washington would provide valuable experience for a newspaper editor.
Norris suggested that Merwin serve as his secretary only when
Congress was in session and continue to write for his paper when in
Washington. With slight modifications Merwin agreed to the plan, and
Norris obtained the competent services of a seasoned political observer
and a personal friend.
23
Even though the Fifty-eighth Congress was scheduled to convene
at the end of 1903, Norris' service as a member of Congress actually
started the day after election when district patronage problems were
literally thrust in his lap. The request for free transportation was a
familiar one. But other patronage matters primarily concerning pen-
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sions and postmasters were new, and he set about familiarizing
him
self with them. Soon after his election he wrote the commissioner of
pensions requesting information about the
rules and regulations per
taining to the work of the bureau.
24
In the matter of postmasters he had much more work to do. First he
had to determine the politics of all the postmasters in the district, since
not all were Republicans. Then there was the matter of
rural routes,
the granting of which had been so helpful in the campaign. By
the end
of 1902 Norris was explaining to irate citizens that
work on rural
routes had been suspended owing to a small appropriation and that
nothing could be done until more money was granted by Congress.
He
wrote to officials in the Post Office Department requesting that the
twenty-six approved rural routes in the district be put into operation
and that the petitioned routes be acted upon as quickly as possible.
25
Finally, before his departure for Washington, Norris participated
in a sensational murder trial that brought him to the attention of citi
zens throughout Nebraska. In March, 1903, he agreed to assist the
prosecuting attorney of Frontier County in stating the case for the
family of the victim, a young girl named Tracy Puls, and in trying to
prove that her death was caused by a bullet and bruises inflicted by
one Charles Frymire.
The case came to trial in October, laden with political significance.
Congressman Norris was assisting Prosecuting Attorney L. H. Cheney,
while the defense was represented by J. L. White, the fusion candidate
for district judge in an election that was a month away, Presiding in
the courtroom was Judge R. C. Orr, appointed by Governor Mickey to
fill out Norris' unexpired term, and now seeking the office in his own
right. Attorney White brought these implications before the court
while presenting the defense's side. He warned the jury in a harangue
that lasted more than an hour that they should not be swayed "by the
silent, secret influence that would be present in the prosecution of the
case in the person of Congressman Norris/'
26
In presenting the case against Frymire, Norris recounted the de
tails, including die little known fact that "Tracy Puls gave premature
birth to a child of five or six months gestation, the child of Charles
Frymire and that the premature birth was caused by the bullet wound
in the wall of the uterus or womb." The jury returned a verdict of man
slaughter, and Judge Orr sentenced Frymire to ten years at hard labor.
Throughout his term he was to be placed in solitary confinement on
each February 1, the anniversary of Tracy Puls' death.
27 Norris' part
in this dramatic case served as a farewell before his departure for
Washington to start his career as a congressman.
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On November 9, 1903, George Norris, in a neatly pressed black suit,
stiff white shirt and collar, and black string tie, appeared before the
bar of the House of Representatives and took the oath of office. His
grey hair and his neatly trimmed weeping-willow mustache added to
his serious demeanor and gave increased maturity to his forty-two
years. The oath was administered at the opening of a special session
of the Fifty-eighth Congress. At this time he officially learned that
newly elected Speaker Cannon had been most generous in his commit
tee assignments, giving Norris the coveted place on the Committee
on Public Grounds and Buildings, as well as an assignment to the Com
mittee on Election of President, Vice-President and Representatives.
Thus George Norris, the new Republican congressman from the Fifth
District of Nebraska, at last had arrived on the national scene and now
would have the opportunity to put his talents to the test on a broader
scale than ever before.
Chapter 11
Congressman Norris
As A FKESHMAN in Congress, assigned a seat in the rear of the chamber,
Norris had to worry about getting re-elected almost before he could
learn the rules and procedures of the House of Representatives. Con
gressman Wesley L. Jones of Washington, whose seat was next to
Norris, guided him whenever possible and quickly disillusioned him
about the statesmanship of Joseph W, Babcock, of whom Norris had
thought highly. Norris was amazed to learn that Babcock's wonderful
orations had never been delivered but were merely inserted into the
Congressional Record.
1
Equally amazing to the new member was the knowledge that no
bill could be discussed on the floor unless the Speaker, as Chairman
of the Rules Committee, gave his approval. When Chairman Charles
W. Gillet of Massachusetts called the Committee on Public Grounds
and Buildings together, the group discussed the possibility of drafting
and presenting an omnibus building bill. The senior Democratic mem
ber of the committee, John H. Bankhead of Alabama, presented a mo
tion, which carried unanimously, that the chairman seek a conference
with the Speaker and ascertain if the committee could introduce a
public building bill.
2
As a freshman member, Norris, of course, had no illusions about
what he would be able to accomplish. However, with the country
relatively prosperous, and with the virtual assurance of federal funds
spent in the district through an omnibus building bill, Norris believed
his constituents would be satisfied and contented enough to reward
him with another term in Congress. He had no reason to speak, let
alone to challenge his party; yet that is exactly what he did when he
rose on June 13, 1904, "with no little embarrassment and some hesi
tancy ... to say a word or two in favor of the Civil Service Commis
sion and the civil-service law." 3
President Theodore Roosevelt on November 17, 1903, had changed
the removal rule giving the president and department heads greater
discretion and power to remove incompetent employees. At least one
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member of the Civil Service Commission doubted that this change was
an improvement.
4 And those members of Congress who were not in
sympathy with the merit system began an attack on the civil-service
system. Previously, in the Fifty-seventh Congress, the Civil Service
Commission had been criticized after an effective investigation of post
office scandals aroused spoilsmen in both parties. Norris, by defending
the Civil Service in his maiden speech, sided with the president against
the standpatters in his party. Repeal the law, Norris concluded, "and
you put on the bargain counter of partisan politics the appointment of
all the officers under the Government/* 5
If his first speech in Congress de-emphasized partisanship and was
indicative of his later career, his only other extensive statements on the
floor were intensely partisan. They were devoted to lambasting the
Democrats for their continual opposition to rural free delivery. This
speech is significant because it revealed an aspect of Norris that was
inherent in his background and which remained with him throughout
his life. It is summed up by the following sentence, delivered at the
close of the address: "It is at the rural fireside that virtue, morality, and
patriotism have reached their highest state."
6
That the rural life represented the "good life" and that the city was
the source of crime, disease, disloyalty, and anarchy was an attitude
that prevailed throughout nineteenth-century rural America. Indeed
it lingered on in the new century. Norris expressed it here in order to
cast aspersions on the Democrats for their opposition to rural free
delivery, but he firmly believed that he was voicing a fundamental
truth when he uttered it. This partisan speech represented Norris'
major oratorical effort in his first term as a congressman.. But before
the session ended, he was focusing on Nebraska politics and his cam
paign for re-election.
7
He returned to Nebraska at the end of the session confident that
the voters would approve his service in Congress. He returned as he
had left, a partisan Republican and a devoted supporter of Roosevelt,
seeing no incompatibility in these two positions. He also returned with
as much of Speaker Cannon's approval as did any other freshman in
Congress.
8
The 1904 Republican Congressional Convention for the Fifth Dis
trict was scheduled to convene at Hastings on May 12. Thus before
Norris returned to Nebraska many chairmen had called county con
ventions and had already chosen delegates favorable to his renomina-
tion. When the Hastings convention met, Norris was renominated by
acclamation, though the Hastings Daily Republican claimed there were
two dissenting votes.
9
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With the nomination safely secured, Norris was able to observe
national political developments before
lie launched his campaign. Be
cause he could not afford a trip to the Republican National
Convention
in Chicago, he refused the invitations
of Congressman James R. Mann
and of an old friend of his to be. their guest during the convention. He
thought that the Republican convention
would
"prove to be a tame
show as compared with the three ringed circus
at St. Louis" where
Bryan had pledged a battle to keep control
of the Democratic party.
10
As Norris predicted, the Chicago convention,
which on June 23
nominated Roosevelt and Senator Charles W. Fairbanks of Indiana,
was a tame show. The Democratic convention witnessed the return
to power of more conservative eastern
leaders. Bryan lost control, and
a New York judge, Alton B. Parker, who favored the gold standard,
received die nomination. Parker's nomination left many devoted sup
porters of Bryan in the Democratic
and especially in the Populist party
in Nebraska and elsewhere with no choice but to vote for Roosevelt,
who was closer to Bryan in his views than was Parker.
11
The nomination of Judge Parker hastened the demise of the Popu
list party in Nebraska. The party had been so greatly
reduced in mem
bership that the basis of representation to
the convention that chose
the delegation to the Populist National Convention
in Springfield,
Illinois, was one delegate for each two hundred votes cast for Weaver
in 1892. As one Nebraska editor remarked at this time, "The Populist
party has reached the point where it is nothing with
fusion and nothing
without it" 12
If the Popuist party in Nebraska was in the process of deteriorating,
the Democratic party, owing to Bryan's loss of control at St. Louis, was
in a weakened position. Thus Populist candidates were able to
dominate the fusion process. And strong Democratic campaigners,
like A. C. Shallenberger in the Fifth District, decided not to participate
in the election. They feared that Roosevelt would pull to victory the
weaker members on the Republican ticket.
Populist ideas, after years of agitation, had gradually penetrated
the Republican party hierarchy.' Many of the leaders in Nebraskia and
on the national scene now accepted the view that government would
have to play a larger role in promoting the general welfare. Certainly
in 1904 the Republican party appeared as the more liberal of the major
parties.. And many a former Bryan supporter now made his way into
the party and became a devoted follower of Roosevelt. These develop
ments redounded to the benefit of Norris and numerous other Republi
can nominees.
One aspect of the campaign in Nebraska no doubt disturbed
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Norris. This was the fact that Senator Dietrich, who had been so
instrumental in his first campaign, did not receive party support for a
second term. He had become a liability because he secured the re
moval of the Hastings post office into a building that he owned.
Furthermore, it also became known that he had collected a salary as
governor while he was already serving as United States senator.
13
Congressman Burkett of the First District received the Republican
endorsement. Railroad opposition to Burkett helped to convince many
voters that the Republican party was now following Roosevelt's brand
of progressivism.
Norris conducted the early part of his campaign, as in 1902, by
speaking before various nonpartisan groups. By midsummer local
leaders were optimistic and their enthusiasm was quickly communi
cated to the candidate. With the lack of cooperation between Populist
and Democratic state organizations, with Alton B. Parker heading the
Democratic ticket and Theodore Roosevelt leading the Republicans,
with abundant crops, adequate rainfall, and good prices making for a
satisfied farm population, Republican leaders in Nebraska certainly
had good reason for optimism.
14
George Allen, Norris' campaign manager, worked long and hard.
He arranged transportation for individuals who might be able to get
votes, contacted editors throughout the district, arranged to collect
funds from the postmasters, and visited disgruntled Republicans,
remedying their grievances wherever possible. He also made surrepti
tious efforts to appeal to rank and file members of the opposition, who
were ready to reject fusion. He noted, "They could fuse when Bryan
was in the lead as he stood for many things that the Pops did or at
least pretended to and they could follow him with very good grace,
but Parker being antagonistic to everything that the Pops advocated
why it simply deadens the whole deal/' In addition to these activities,
Allen, a veteran, visited old soldiers and spoke in favor of Norris.
15
The Democrats and Populists held their congressional conventions
at Hastings on August 24, and soon Norris learned that his opponent
would be H. H. Mauck. Shallenberger had been offered the nomina
tion of both parties, but declined. Mauck literally had obtained the
nomination through default; none of the other fusion leaders desired
it. As a result, most observers believed that it would be "practically
impossible" to defeat Norris.
16
By mid-September there were four candidates seeking to represent
the Fifth Congressional District in Washington, a Socialist and a
Prohibitionist candidate having been chosen by their respective party
conventions. The appearance of these two new candidates meant
92 GEORGE W. NORRIS
further difficulties for the fusionists as some former Populists would
be attracted to both of these reform candidates. While the Republicans
would gain some fusion votes, very few of their supporters
would be
attracted by either of the new candidates. Their appearance further
improved Norris' position, and led his manager to believe, "We will
catch them coming and going."
17
Norris and his supporters were certain of ultimate victory when it
became evident that Harry Mauck was a most uninspiring campaigner.
He aroused little of the enthusiasm and attracted none of the crowds
that Shallenberger had. Furthermore, Norris learned that Congressman
Babcock, chairman of the Congressional Campaign Committee, con
sidered Norris' race one of the closest in the nation and was deter
mined to carry it on election day. With this end in mind, Speaker
Cannon agreed to speak in the district for three days at the end of
September.
18
By mid-October Norris already had stumped throughout the dis
trict, speaking six days a week and appearing in a different community
every day. Occasionally he spoke in two or more villages on the same
day. In the last weeks of the campaign, Allen traveled with Norris,
briefing him on local situations and introducing him to leading citizens
in the eastern end of the district, which Allen knew better than Norris.
Allen thought the crowds were good and that Norris spoke very well,
even though the weather at the end of October was far from satisfac
tory for campaign purposes. Norris, in his speeches, stressed the point
that those who went into the Populist movement in good faith could
not conscientiously support Parker and the Democratic ticket in 1904.
19
Despite lack of widespread editorial support and notwithstanding
his colorless personality, Harry Mauck, through the efforts of his
manager, waged a vigorous campaign by hurling numerous irrespon
sible charges at his opponent. And in the week before election Shallen
berger took the stump with Mauck. As a last-ditch effort to stave off
defeat, the Democratic National Committee contributed five hundred
dollars to his campaign, and Bryan came to speak on Mauck's behalf.
Norris heard that Bryan attracted large crowds but generated little
enthusiasm. Bryan did not touch on national issues and made no men
tion of Parker or Roosevelt in his speeches. So confident was Allen of
victory that he did not plan to spend election eve with Norris. Even
Merwin, much more cautious than Allen, predicted victory. And Norris
himself had no reason on election eve to doubt his chances.20
On election day, November 8, 1904, the Republican ticket won an
overwhelming victory. Roosevelt had 336 electoral votes and a plurality
of more than two and a half million votes. Republican candidates won
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all major offices in Nebraska. All six candidates for Congress defeated
their fusion opponents and Congressman Burkett was assured of a
Senate seat by polling 107,595 votes in the preferential primary.
George Norris in the Fifth Congressional District received a majority
of more than five thousand, polling 19,645 votes. Not a single county in
Nebraska cast its vote for Parker, nor did Norris lose a single county in
his district. In Perkins, one of the remote and thinly settled counties,
the vote was a tie, standing 161 for each candidate. A prominent
Nebraska historian commenting on the campaign wrote, "The final
figures in the nation announced the death of the People's party and
foreshadowed the return of Mr. Bryan as leader of the Democrats.*'
21
Norris, delighted with this splendid victory, in contrast to his 181-
vote plurality in 1902, claimed that aside from the president, Speaker
Cannon deserved credit for the "land-slide" election results. He be
lieved that Cannon's
"able, honest and wise administration" of his
position had been "one of the great elements" in the national Republi
can triumph. Norris wrote the Speaker, "Your position is the second one
in the nation, and the confidence that all have in you has made many
votes for the Republican ticket all over our country, because it has
been recognized that Republican success meant the retention of your
self in that high and honorable position." Grateful to Cannon for his
visit during the campaign, Norris assured the Speaker that if in
his humble way he could help advance Cannon's interests he would
find it an "extreme pleasure" to do so.
22
After the election Norris had almost no time to relax before return
ing to Washington for the third and lame duck session of the Fifty-
eighth Congress, scheduled to convene on December 5, 1904. This time
Norris planned to bring his wife and three children with him. He
hoped to be in Washington by the first of December, to get his family
settled and the older girls, Hazel and Marian, registered in a public
school before Speaker Cannon brought the House of Representatives
to order.23
The third session of the Fifty-eighth Congress started in a most
disagreeable way for the re-elected gentleman from Nebraska. Wash
ington weather was damp and cold and soon his entire family was
sick. Norris also found that his official duties involved much harder
work. Merwin, who was on hand to aid him, noted at the end of
January, "The Judge is mighty busy with affairs of state." Norris sum
marized the situation more succinctly when he remarked, "I have had
my hands full." 24
Work on the Committee on Public Lands and Buildings consumed
much time. Norris was a member of the subcommittee which was con-
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sidering the erection of public buildings.
The subcommittee, after re
viewing the Nebraska situation, recommended two buildings,
at Grand
Island and at York, and three sites for buildings. Within a month the
House appropriated $100,000 for a public building at Grand
Island.
Thus Norris fulfilled a 1902 campaign pledge even though^
the bill
ultimately was enacted into law without this item
included.25
During this session he also showed for the first time
an interest in
improving the processes of government by amending the Constitution.
Though House Joint Resolution 166 died in committee,
his concern
with it did not. The resolution provided for a national election every
four years, at which time all of the members of the House of Repre
sentatives and one-half of the Senate, one member from each state,
would be elected directly by the people. Every eight years there would
be a presidential election. The great reform in this resolution, Norris
thought, would be the election of senators by the people, though the
other changes seemed equally important to him. Since his resolution
lengthened the term of senators by two years, he thought it might
receive favorable consideration by that body, The lower house, Norris
realized, would undoubtedly agree to any resolution which doubled
the term of its members, while a single eight-year term for the chief
executive could readily be defended.
26
Though he was investigating national and constitutional issues,
Norris voted with his party on all major pieces of legislation and
devoted most of Ms time to the affairs of his district. The appropriation
for a federal building helped him as did his concern for Union veter
ans and their pensions. Since Congress was in no mood to benefit a
dwindling segment of the population, many of whom were already
being cared for at public expense, Norris actually could do little to aid
dependent veterans. Nevertheless, he "stood ready to support any
measure" which would serve to treat with more liberality and con
sideration these "brave and noble boys."
27
Moreover, Norris was faced with the loss of potent patronage in his
home town. In 1904 an agent of the Department of the Interior con
ducted an investigation of the McCook land office and shortly there
after it was closed. The work of the McCook office, it was announced,
would be included in the Lincoln
.land district, comprising southern
and southeastern Nebraska.28
Sentiment in McCook was against the removal of the office. Many
citizens were disposed to hold their congressman responsible. Resi
dents having business at the land office would now have to travel to
Lincoln, at the other end of the state. People were also charging that
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the deeds to available government lands now could be placed within
easier reach of the railroads and "that crowd of grafters and
swindlers," and were now beyond the reach of the people. The land
office had been located in McCook since 1882, and while some citizens
realized it was only a question of time before it would be closed, few
were willing to admit that the time had come.29
Norris, realizing that the loss of the McCook land office could
counteract popularity he would gain from the Grand Island federal
building, set out to explain the government's policy in this matter. He
claimed that its closing was legal, that other land offices were being
discontinued, and that it was the intention of the Department of the
Interior eventually to cancel all the Nebraska land offices except the
one at Lincoln. Whether this explanation soothed aroused citizens,
Norris was not able to discern. Fortunately the closing came almost
immediately after the 1904 election, so that it would not be a burning
issue in the next congressional campaign.
30
Thus most of Norris' activities in the Fifty-eighth Congress were
routine and pertained largely to the affairs of his district. He concen
trated, as every congressman must, on serving constituents. As a fresh
man, however, he did speak several times on matters of more than local
or sectional interest, and was becoming interested in improving the
processes of government by making it more democratic and respon
sible. He performed his job conscientiously and may have worked
harder than most members. He was in the good graces of Speaker
Cannon and accepted as well the leadership and policies of Roosevelt.
There was little to indicate in his first term that he would later lead the
insurgency movement in the House of Representatives. It was only
when the party's executive leadership broke down and senior members
in Congress tried to assume it that Norris emerged as an outstanding
figure.
When the lame duck session came to an end in March, 1905,
Norris, his family, and his secretary were glad to return to Nebraska.
They may have witnessed Roosevelt's inauguration, but, since the
Norrises were not interested in participating in Washington society,
it is doubtful that they attended the evening festivities. In Nebraska
at the end of March, Merwin resigned as secretary because his news
paper was losing business. His resignation was unexpected and Norris
would have been at a loss to replace him, had Merwin not mentioned
as his successor a young lawyer in McCook, Ray McCarl, a recent
graduate of the University of Nebraska Law School and an experi
enced stenographer.
31
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With the matter of a successor to Merwin quickly settled, Norris
now had at least eight months of freedom from legislative duties and
the prospect of a summer free from campaigning. In short, he could
enjoy his first extended rest since his honeymoon in 1903. This vacation
brought with it an opportunity to travel to Europe.
Chapter 12
The Large View: International
and National
THE FAMILY, especially the children, who had talked of little else
during the last month of the session, were delighted to return to
Nebraska. Home in McCook, Norris sought to keep his political fences
in
repair. In Washington he had secured from lameduck Senator
Dietrich some of the free government documents available in his
office. Now he distributed them among his constituents.1
Thoroughly familiar with numerous departmental procedures, he
was able to inform his constituents of the various rules and regulations
necessary to obtain, for example, a rural free delivery route or a pen
sion.2 He had made sure that the Department of Agriculture knew that
he represented a district where alfalfa, wheat, and corn were the
principal crops and that, as a usual thing, the area did not receive as
much moisture as the eastern part of Nebraska. Norris hoped the de
partment would find it possible to conduct experiments with these crops
"with a view to the introduction of varieties particularly adapted to
the conditions there, which would result in a great benefit to the
farmers of the district." He also had urged that seed corn, wheat, and
alfalfa be sent to leading farmers for experimental purposes and that
the semi-arid districts not be forgotten by government research sci
entists.3
In the Fifty-ninth Congress he had spoken in favor of an amend
ment providing funds for dry farming, which would make productive
"a very large scope of country'' that heretofore had been considered
useless for agricultural purposes. In these remarks, he showed an inti
mate knowledge of agricultural techniques, explaining to his colleagues
the
"Campbell system," a method of dry farming that had been
experimented with in his district.
4 Thus at the outset of his congres
sional career, Norris expressed an interest in improving agricultural
production in the short-grass country. He knew that the soil, which
basically was very rich, needed more moisture. He was intent upon
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filling this need by increasing the farmer s knowledge
of dry farming
and other techniques, by putting sturdier seeds in his hands,
and later
by providing vast irrigation facilities that would
make farmers better
able to cope with the vicissitudes of nature.
In Washington Norris had supported a bill introduced by a
Nebraska colleague, Moses P. Kinkaid, which, when signed into law
by President Roosevelt on April 28, 1904, affected the pattern
of public
land distribution, particularly in Nebraska. In conjunction with the
Reclamation Act of 1902 it marked a major and more realistic change
in the land policy of the United States. Briefly, the
law permitted any
one to acquire a homestead of 640 acres if he
had lived there for five
years and made at least $800 worth of improvements. Its effect
was a
remarkable increase of homesteading in western Nebraska, where
small-scale ranching now became possible.
5
Traveling through this area shortly after his return
from Washing
ton, Norris found that the great majority of claims had been filed by
men who intended to make their permanent homes there. The settle
ment of this vacant land, he thought would help remove many illegal
fences that had been placed on the public domain by unscrupulous
cattlemen. In conversation with a county assessor, Norris learned that
in five precincts the population had increased by ninety families and
that this fact was quickly registered in the rising value of taxable
personal property. Such evidence helped convince him that the law
was a beneficial one.6
However, because of the numerous violations by cattlemen in the
sparsely populated sand-hills region, Norris soon modified his views.
He came to favor a plan whereby the state would assume ownership
of these lands and then either sell or lease them to the cattlemen.
Since most of the land available under the Kinkaid Act was located in
Nebraska, he believed that the state could deal with violations better
than the national government, which did not have enough agents on
hand to see that cattlemen did not unlawfully extend their fences and
intimidate would-be settlers. Moreover, the funds derived from selling
or leasing land could be used to improve the state school system.
7
Though affairs in the district kept him busy during May and June,
it was the forthcoming trip to Europe, as a delegate 'to the Interparlia
mentary Union, that excited him. To be a delegate to this conference,
an individual had to be a member of the highest legislative body of his
government. The union's object was to encourage a sentiment which
would ultimately result in the abandonment of warfare between na
tions, and it had in mind, among other such calamities, the Russo-
Japanese War then in progress. The organization had no official con-
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nection with any government and its work was of an advisory nature,
though the calibre of its membership gave it a quasi-official status.
The leader of the American delegation, Congressman Bartholdt of
Missouri, had been responsible for the Interparliamentary Union meet
ing in St. Louis in 1904 and for Roosevelt's invitation to its members
to visit the White House, where he had promised to support a second
peace conference at The Hague. While Norris did not attend the 1904
meeting and had refused Rartholdt's initial request that he be a dele
gate to the 1905 conference, he eventually decided to attend the
Brussels meeting of the union.
8
After enjoying a brief vacation with his family in Wisconsin, Norris
left New York on August 12 on the Red Star Line steamer, Vaderland.
The vessel docked at Antwerp, and Norris arrived in Brussels about a
week prior to the opening session.9
At the thirteenth meeting of the Interparliamentary Union the
American delegation made two significant suggestions. It called for
the preparation of a model arbitration treaty and recommended that
steps be taken toward the establishment of an international organiza
tion with jurisdiction to enact into law such statutes as might be neces
sary to insure peace among nations. After much debate and discussion
it was decided to refer these matters to the next meeting of the Hague
Conference. Norris, as well as most of the other members of the Ameri
can delegation, spoke in favor of these resolutions.
10
At the close of the conference, the Belgian representatives invited
all the delegates to a reception in the building where Napoleon's of
ficers had assembled on the eve of Waterloo. The rooms were deco
rated with the colors of all nations. At the very same time the peace
commissioners at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, were concluding the
details of the treaty ending the Russo-Japanese War. As Norris later
recalled:
The finest band in Belgium was playing her national air. In the
midst of it the music suddenly ceased. AH eyes were turned to the
rostrum. We saw the leader of the band seize from the decorations
of the hall the American flag, and using it as a baton, he waved it
over the heads of the musicians, and in answer to his action, there
burst forth the rapturous strains of the Star-Spangled Banner. For
a moment, and a moment only, there was silence, and then there
burst forth a roar of applause which clearly indicated that every
one there understood that beneath the fathomless deep the electric
spark had brought the welcome news that on the shores of America
an agreement for peace had been signed. On the occasion of
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nearly one hundred years before the revelry was interrupted by
the booming of cannon, but on this occasion it was
the joyous
message that under the leadership of America the peace
of the
world had been established. That was an occasion . . . when it
was greater to be an American citizen than to wear a
crown.11
Norris recalled this incident and his brief trip to Germany many times
during his career. Back home in McCook, after an enlightening
and en
joyable European trip, Norris learned that application had been
made
in favor of President Roosevelt as the American candidate for the
Nobel Peace Prize because of his efforts in concluding the Russo-
Japanese War. Norris had mistakenly believed that the prize
could not
be awarded to a head of state, and would have preferred and strongly
supported Congressman Bartholdt as the American candidate because
of his work as head of the American delegation to various meetings of
the Interparliamentary Union.
12
Before returning to Washington, he acceded to several requests to
talk about his recent trip. A friend, who attended the lecture in the
Clay Center Opera House, noted that people sat still and were atten
tive throughout. Norris had no prepared speech, but spoke, as he
always spoke in Congress or during a campaign, extemporaneously.
Moreover, he insisted that, since he did not expect any pay, no admis
sion should be charged.
13
Though not actively participating in the 1905 state-wide campaign,
Norris nevertheless urged Republican leaders to turn out the vote on
election day.
14 As expected, Republican candidates won most of the
available offices and Norris turned his attention to the convening of
the Fifty-ninth Congress early in December. Though Speaker Cannon
refused to commit himself about committee assignments, he told Norris
to rest assured that the matter would receive "consideration from one
who has the most friendly feeling toward yourself both from the
personal and political standpoint.
5' 15
Norris agreed to some extent with the criticism of the rules of the
House of Representatives then being voiced, but felt that the fault lay
in the large and unwieldy size of the body and not, as he was later to
believe, in the power of the Speaker. Limitations on debate were neces
sary if any work was to be accomplished. Discussion and legislation,
he knew, were controlled to a great extent by the older members who
enjoyed great influence in House affairs. Realizing that he would enjoy
no influential role in this Congress, Norris wanted to remain on a
committee where he could be instrumental in having federal funds
allocated for his district. Realistic in his appraisal of the House of
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Representatives and of his negligible role in its functioning, Norris, as
the Fifty-ninth Congress prepared to convene, was unaware of any
tyranny or undue power exercised by Speaker Cannon.
16
Departing for Washington ahead of his family, Norris found a
pleasant apartment on Mintwood Place near Rock Creek Park. In a
neighboring apartment lived a freshman congressman from North
Dakota, Asle J. Gronna, and the two families soon became very
friendly.
17 Mrs. Norris was pregnant and the family looked forward to
a new addition some time in February or March.
On February 23, 1906, very early in the morning, Mrs. Norris
gave birth to twin boys, both of them dying within twenty-four hours.
For a while she hovered between Me and death, remaining on the
critical list at Providence Hospital for several days. Her husband, un
willing to let her return to Nebraska with the bodies of the dead in
fants for burial, reluctantly decided to have them cremated. This ex
perience was a painful ordeal for the entire family. It deeply affected
Norris, who rarely mentioned it either in conversation or in corre
spondence.
18
On Capitol Hill Norris found, when Congress convened, that Can
non had rewarded him with a place on the Committee on Labor in
addition to membership on the two committees on which he had pre
viously served. Despite his trip to Europe, he showed little interest
in foreign affairs. The Alaskan boundary dispute, the Russo-Japanese
War, the Panama Canal, and other aspects of American expansion
were not topics of discussion in his letters or public addresses.
Domestic and largely local issues occupied his attention. However,
during this session his horizon continued to expand. He received a
petition from the leading citizens of McCook protesting pogroms in the
Russian Empire, and both he and his secretary signed it and sent it on
to the president. He was also in sympathy with the idea of sending
Chinese students to the United States. 19 But his primary interest in
world affairs focused on the Philippine tariff measure, supported by the
administration and providing for free trade with this newly acquired
dependency.
On January 13, 1906, Norris delivered his longest speech of the
session reviewing the Philippine question and proclaiming his opposi
tion to the bill. He pointed with pride to the American achievement
of bringing material improvements, educational facilities, and a court
system to the islands. He noted that according to the tariff law in
operation all revenue collected from Philippine imports was being
turned back into their treasury, thereby providing funds necessary to
administer this dependency. If the administration bill was passed, the,
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American people, Norris argued, would then have to provide these
funds out of increased taxation.
He came to the core of his opposition when he noted that the beet-
sugar men, who, incidentally, had established one of the first beet-
sugar factories in the United States in Grand Island, Nebraska, did
not favor the measure. Like them, he claimed it would benefit the
"sugar trust.'
7
Since the bulk of the imports from the Philippine Islands
consisted of cane sugar which had to be refined before it could be
consumed, Norris noted that there was but one purchaser of raw sugar
in the United States, the sugar trust. Free trade thus would further
benefit the trust since it could arbitrarily fix the price for raw sugar
received by producers in the Philippines. This occurrence would in
turn fix the price to the American consumer. Sugar refiners would have
a greater opportunity to increase their profits with no corresponding
reduction in consumer prices, while the Philippine producers would
not receive a better price for their sugar. Speaking of the producer
who was supposed to benefit from this bill, Norris said, "We are giving
him a gold brick, and while he is innocently picking at the gilt on the
outside and discovering the deception on the inside the sugar trust
walks away with the swag and the Filipino is holding the sack/* He
thought a better name for the bill would be, "An act for the purpose
of deceiving the Filipino, for menacing an American industry, and for
the enrichment of the sugar trust."
The menaced American industry was the beet-sugar industry, the
development of which would be retarded by this measure. Since beet-
sugar factories would most likely be established either in western Ne
braska or eastern Colorado, Norris was concerned about any measure
which could retard the future development of his district. He therefore
included as part of the peroration of his argument a traditional appeal
for protection.
20
Opposition to this bill placed Norris in an embarrassing position.
His views ran counter to those of the president whom he claimed to
support, and his opponents in Nebraska would be sure to notice this
contradiction. Furthermore, his opposition may have endangered his
standing with Speaker Cannon.
Norris was criticized for his opposition but he was ready with a
defense of his position. The tariff measure, he claimed, was unimpor
tant as compared "with the great corporation question/* And on this
issue he was in full accord with the president. Moreover, Norris was
convinced that Roosevelt advocated the measure
"simply because it
was recommended to him by Secretary Tart." But, Norris assured an
irate constituent, his stand did not jeopardize his relations either with
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the president or with Speaker Cannon; "You must certainly admit that
a member of Congress who would do nothing except follow the views
of some other person would be nothing more or less than a cipher."
21
Despite reassurances, Norris was concerned lest his enemies use
this vote as a lever in opposing his renomination. He wrote numerous
letters explaining his position and arguing that the subject had been
overestimated in its importance to the president. He also was not
happy about Washington rumors that he was an "insurgent" and
would oppose the president on other aspects of his program.
22
In view of his later career, it is rather ironic that Norris gained his
initial reputation as an insurgent for supporting the theory of protec
tion, while being labeled an opponent of the first trust-busting presi
dent simply because -he opposed further favors to an already powerful
corporation. However, criticism leveled against Norris also indicated
Roosevelt's great popularity in Nebraska. The people by and large
accepted his moral posture of an increased role for the federal govern
ment to curb some of the corporate privileges prevalent in American
life.
Though Norris defended the theory of protection in his opposition
to the Philippine tariff bill, he was not dogmatic and he recognized
inequities in the prevailing Dingley Tariff. Sentiment for revision was
rising, but he recognized that change for the sake of change could
perpetrate greater inequities than already existed: "The very an
nouncement that the tariff is to be revised would immediately have a
very depressing influence upon the business of the entire country.
Everybody would want to wait and see what the new tariff was going
to be before urging any business proposition involving large sums of
money." Since revision was an intricate and politically volatile subject,
he said it should be undertaken immediately after an election by a
special session of Congress and never during an election year when it
would become an obvious political "football."
Despite sentiment for tariff modification, Norris believed that
Roosevelt was eminently correct in not calling a special session of Con
gress for this purpose after his overwhelming election in 1904. It
should only be attempted, he argued, when no other major item of
legislation was to be considered. Since the administration had given
priority to the question of the regulation of railroad rates, tariff revi
sion would have .to wait. This view, Norris believed, was also Roose
velt's view. No mention of tariff revision appeared in his annual
message, nor did he call a special session of Congress.
23
As Norris sagely observed, the president was more interested in
railroad regulation than in the tariff. And it was to this former topic
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that the first session of the Fifty-ninth Congress devoted much oHts
attention. Norris was fully in accord with the administration's position
of granting power over rates to the Interstate
Commerce Commission.
For over thirty years the railroads of Nebraska had been
a subject
of political controversy. They were in politics, particularly Republican
politics, and their influence was again noticeable
now that the party
had returned to power. However, Democratic and Populist hostility
and suspicion, and the desire to curb their power,
in the 1890's had
engendered a sentiment that carried over
into the new century. Many
young leaders in the Republican party in Nebraska
were talking very
much like the Populists and Bryan Democrats a decade earlier in their
hostility to railroad influence and boss rule. Such sentiment, prevalent
in other states as well, encouraged Roosevelt in his desire to grant
effective power to the Interstate Commerce Commision to regulate
railroads and other common carriers. Norris was swept along by this
rising tide in Nebraska; his attitude toward the railroads
now became
openly critical. The previous hostility of W. S. Morlan, the Burlington's
powerful agent in McCook, toward Norris' candidacy in 1902,
no
doubt, helped in pushing him into the more liberal wing of his party.
Shortly before Norris left for Washington he received a letter
indicative of the more critical attitude toward the railroad. The writer,
a political leader, said that the stock shippers in his county
were com
plaining of inadequate and detrimental freight service. Stock ship
ments to Denver, for example, were taking much more time than
necessary because the Burlington lines required freight train crews to
rest, while it charged the shippers from sixteen to eighteen dollars
per car extra freight. The delay caused a shrinkage in the collective
weight of the cattle (hence in their value), and added to their risk of
injury or death.
24 Thus with businessmen, farmers, and cattlemen dis
turbed by the railroad's shipping policies, it required no great courage
for a politician to openly attack the railroad. And many did so less
from conviction than from mere opportunism.
In Washington, once the president requested Congress to enact a
railroad rate bill, Norris proclaimed himself in "perfect sympathy"
with these views. He intended to aid in the enactment of an adequate
law that would give some legal body the power to fix a fair rate.
25
In explaining his decision to his former political adviser, ex-Senator
Manderson, chief of the Law Department of the Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy Railroad Company, Western Division, Norris wrote:
Ever since the beginning of this rate agitation, I have inter
ested myself in the question. I had read volumes speeches, argu-
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ments, resolutions, etc., on the subject. I have devoted all the time
at my disposal to this subject. I know that I have been conscien
tious and honest in trying to reach a just conclusion just to the
public and the railroads alike.
He claimed that hostility to the Burlington raikoad in southwestern
Nebraska had become noticeable only after the system had come under
the control of James J. Hill in 1901. Until that time the Burlington had
come as close to meeting and supplying the wants of its customers and
patrons as any railroad in existence, while the people along its lines
exhibited friendly feeling toward the road and its managers. Since that
time, however, there had been a change for the worse; merchants and
customers in the smaller towns had become prejudiced against the road
and its policies. Norris illustrated what he meant by noting:
There was a time, not many years ago, when a merchant in one
of these towns could order goods from Omaha, Lincoln > Kansas
City or St. Joseph, knowing with an absolute certainty within an
hour or two of the time when that order of goods would reach
him. He could order something he had sold to a customer and be
able to guarantee a prompt delivery at least within a day or two.
He could order by wire, knowing when he did so exactly when
the goods so ordered would be delivered at his home station.
Conditions have radically changed. At the present time it is not
an uncommon thing for goods to be ordered and not delivered un
til from twenty to thirty days, when in the ordinary course of
business it should not require more than two to three days to make
such delivery, and such was the case in former days.
This lack of desire to accommodate local shippers, it seemed to
Norris, had come about by the adoption of what was called "the ton
nage rule," an arrangement whereby the number and frequency of
trains over a particular line depended on the tonnage shipped. Some
freight trains, Norris had learned from raikoad men in McCook, re
quired from twenty-five to forty hours going over one division. Such
conditions, he explained, had never existed prior to the Hill manage
ment. Meanwhile, hostile sentiment, injurious to the raikoad, its em
ployees, and its customers, was spreading. Though these examples had
no direct connection with rate supervision, in Norris' judgment they
had much to do with prevailing sentiment on that question. He was
convinced that feeling against the raikoad had been brought about
by changes introduced by the Hill management. Moreover, these
changes explained why numerous Nebraska citizens were against the
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railroad and would continue to be so "without going into^a very deep
consideration of the merits of any particular controversy."
26
Early in 1906 Norris returned to Manderson his pass
on the Bur
lington system in Nebraska. Previously
in the 1905 campaign all parties
had included in their platforms strong statements denouncing,
as par
ticularly offensive, the granting of passes.
One Nebraska historian has
noted that this antipass sentiment "had its effect upon politicians
who
had hitherto resisted or disregarded it, and some of the principal
officials assumed the halo of righteousness by ostentatiously repudiat
ing the now disreputable tag of special privilege."
27
Norris was certainly affected by this sentiment, though he assumed
no righteous pose. He doubted if he had ever been
influenced in his
official conduct. "As a matter of fact/' he wrote, "my constituents have
been the beneficiaries of the free transportation I have had, more than
myself, as it has enabled me to give personal
attention to matters in
distant portions of my congressional district connected with my offi
cial duties, matters that I could not have attended to personally had
I been compelled to stand the entire expense of the trips."
Thus he
realized that the loss of a pass would add to his expenditures. By
returning his pass, Norris politely severed relations
with the Burlington
Railroad, some of whose officials, especially Manderson, had ad
vised and helped him in his political career and on whose payroll
he had been when he was a struggling young lawyer in Beaver
City.
28
Not only did Norris support most of the railroad bills presented
in
this session of Congress, he also introduced one limiting the hours of
service by railroad employees. Appearing before the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce he made several statements
about freight train schedules, the time consumed in shipments by
freight, and the long hours of service of railroad trainmen. After the
witness for the Burlington Railroad denied that there were freight
delays, Norris wrote several friends requesting further evidence he
could use in support of his measure. Most of his examples were derived
from conversation with merchants and railroad employees in McCook
and elsewhere, but he now desired more specific information, such as
detailed way-bills.
Nothing came of this measure because Congress was devoting most
of its time to the railroad rate question. But Norris continued to collect
the information he desired. Rarely, if ever, in his future congressional
career would he introduce and support a bill without first having ex
amined and mastered all the information he could find on it. Measures,
such as the one he introduced, Norris believed, at least had the effect
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of making the railroads improve their service to prevent further gov
ernment probing.
29
He was also in accord with the administration's request for legisla
tion calling for the careful inspection and supervision of packing
houses and food and drug products used in interstate commerce. Bills
to achieve these results were considered in June, 1906, and Norris was
certain they would pass before the session adjourned. He was not
certain, however, how effective they would be. And he was unhappy
that reports filed with the president, showing that proper inspection
was not taking place, had been given so much prominence. He be
lieved that as a result the packing industry had received a damaging
blow and that great harm would result for stock raisers.
Not that Norris was against the investigation and regulation of
packing house methods in the interest of public health. But he felt that
necessary reforms and improvements could have been made without
going into so many horrible details (since the packing business was
necessarily a "dirty business") which tended to affect adversely both
the domestic and foreign markets for meats. Furthermore, he hoped
that in the bill presented to Congress the cost of inspection would be
borne by the government and not by the packers, who could take this
item out of the price paid for the cattle, thereby affecting the stock
raiser, the farmer, and the consumer.30 Certainly Nebraska stockmen,
concerned about provisions for the cost of inspection, found Norris*
position in accord with their views. Indeed, no position that he took
during this significant session was markedly out of line with the views
of his constituents.
Norris reintroduced his resolution calling for a constitutional
amendment affecting the terms of the president., senators, and repre
sentatives. This time the amendment received editorial notice, and a
modified version of it (calling for a six-year presidential tenure) was
actually discussed by Norris in the closing days of the session. His
interest in improving the processes of government was receiving some
recognition, primarily because it was in accord with growing public
clamor for the direct election of senators.31
The tenor of Norris* remarks in this session of Congress, with the
exception of the Philippine tariff bill, was in support of administration
measures and in favor of the expansion of federal authority in instances
where the public interest was threatened. Thus he spoke in support of
the right of Congress to regulate life insurance companies: "Those
who have charge of insurance moneys are charged with a duty not
only to the State, but to all humanity." Since insurance companies, like
other powerful corporate interests, were nationwide in their activities,
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and since most state legislation had failed to prevent their mismanage
ment of other people's money, he thought national supervision
would
be better, both for the insured and for "all honest insurance com
panies." The companies then would have to comply with only
one set
of requirements instead of many sets (contradictory
state require
ments) which by their very nature encouraged unethical practices.
32
Despite his opposition to part of the president's program,
he re
garded himself during the first session of the Fifty-ninth Congress
as
an ardent supporter of Theodore Roosevelt Indeed, during this session
he had broken with the dominant corporate interest in Nebraska, the
Burlington Railroad, and had championed the curbing or supervision
of corporate wealth. The session revealed Norris as a Roosevelt Repub
lican also in his support of the expanding role of government Though
he always favored economy and denounced reckless expenditures, he
was willing to use the power of the central government, usually after
the states had shown themselves unable to solve a problem, to promote
the health and general well-being of the American people. There was
no theoretical basis for this belief; his approach was essentially a
pragmatic one based upon experience, knowledge, and understanding.
Since most of the opposition to the president's program came from
powerful, able,, conservative, and standpat titans led by Nelson W.
Aldrich and concentrated in the Senate, the House of Representatives
has received little attention in most discussions of Roosevelt's policies.
The growing tensions between elements in the Republican party were
not evident in the lower chamber because Speaker Cannon and the
president worked well together. The House of Representatives usually
quickly passed bills that die administration favored. Most of the fights
over Roosevelt's legislative program occurred in the Senate chamber,
George Norris, a respected younger member of the House of Repre
sentatives, was gaining stature through his handling of committee
assignments and his lucid and cogent remarks. He was a partisan Re
publican, but not an emotional or vitriolic one. He looked after the
interests of his constituents so well that early in the session he was
informed, "Your renomination and re-election is as good as done
now." 3S Finally, though his trip to Europe the previous summer had
been an
enlightening and rewarding experience, his horizon was
largely a national one. As Norris returned to Nebraska in 1906 he no
doubt mused about the prospect of increased expenditures owing to
the
necessity of campaigning without the benefit of a railroad pass.
Chapter 13
The Third Campaign
As EARLY as January, 1906, Norris believed that there would be "no
other candidates and possibly no opposition" to his renomination.
Indeed, he had hopes that he would be given the nomination by accla
mation, as was the case two years previously. And George Allen, who
would again manage the campaign, reported that if> after receiving the
nomination, Norris merely announced that he was for Roosevelt and
a square deal, his election would be assured, so strong was the ground
swell in Nebraska for the president and his policies. While some slight
opposition had manifested itself in the spring, neither Allen nor Norris
was unduly concerned about it.1
Upon his return from Washington in July, Norris examined the
developing situation from his office in McCook and attended the Red
Willow County convention as a visiting dignitary. Though the conven
tion unanimously chose delegates favoring his renomination, he played
a role in preventing the convention from committing delegates to any
candidate for governor or United States senator. He did this because
there were at least two candidates for governor in the congressional
district, and considerable talk of a third; if the convention supported
any of the candidates, its action could start a political fight that might
affect delegates to the congressional convention.
When the delegates from Beaver precinct voted for Norris as their
senatorial candidate, a spontaneous demonstration erupted in the hall
and Norris feared a
"stampede" in his favor. Though he never left his
seat throughout these proceedings, his friends among the delegates
labored hard to curb the demonstration. Norris thought the use of his
name in connection with the senatorial race would have an injurious
effect upon party harmony.
2
However, when the Furnas County Convention met on the first of
August, almost the same thing occurred. Merwin and other Norris
supporters had to convince delegates that he did not want anything but
the congressional nomination. While Norris did not deny that the
nomination for United States senator was an honor he would be very
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proud to receive, he recognized that he could not obtain the nomination.
Mentioning his name, therefore, might make him a partner in contro
versies in which he had no desire to participate.
3
As expected, Norris was unanimously chosen by the congressional
convention which met at Hastings in mid-August. In his acceptance
speech he came out strongly against the use of railroad passes and
declared that a pass, in effect, was a bribe. The opposition press
quickly pointed out that Norris as a judge and as a congressman had
carried a pass. One paper noted, "It was a bribe then, as much as it is
now, but only the Democrats and Populists said so." What the Repub
licans now called reform, the paper noted, was nothing but poison
when it emanated from the opposition. Although Norris did not tell
the delegates that he had returned his last pass, his position would
have been equally vulnerable even if he had informed them.
4
Roderick D. Sutherland, former congressman from the district
(1897-1901), received the fusion nomination as the Democratic and
Populist candidate. Sutherland, a Nuckolls County lawyer, was an able
man, but he was not an orator like Shallenberger. Indeed, surprisingly
so for a former Populist congressman, he was an unemotional and
colorless personality who seemingly would have a difficult time in
arousing the voters.
Before he knew who his opponent would be, Norris had written
to the clerk of the House of Representatives to obtain the record of
bills introduced and enacted by his predecessors. He did this to fore
stall criticism of his record in Congress by showing that his predeces
sors had done even less. Thus, when the campaign got under way,
Norris was able to prevent Sutherland from attacking him along these
lines.5
When a War Department employee from Nebraska wrote that "the
Union labor crowd" would probably oppose Norris' election in the
railroad towns of McCook, Grand Island, and Hastings, Norris replied
that he thought the "suspicion of opposition from Union Labor" was
correct. However, he had little fear it would affect the final result.
But if the need arose, Norris thought that Speaker Cannon would come
into the district once again on his behalf. And from an unexpected
quarter, the American Protective Tariff League, Norris received an
offer of help because of his opposition to the Philippine tariff bill. He
politely refused this offer, realizing that it would call the voters' at
tention to the fact that he had opposed an administration measure.6
Aware that this campaign would be more expensive than previous
ones because of the lack of railroad passes, George Allen and Ray
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McCarl made an effort to collect campaign contributions from inter
ested citizens. Norris, for his part, started the campaign in his usual
way, appearing at reunions, picnics, and fairs, delivering supposedly
nonpartisan speeches.
7
Early in September Allen had a conference in his office in Clay
Center with Sutherland prior to a fusion meeting at the courthouse
where William Jennings Bryan was scheduled to speak. Allen was in
formed that Sutherland did not want to begin the campaign before
the first of October. This suggestion, Allen claimed, would be amenable
to Norris. Allen and Sutherland also agreed to conduct a "clean" cam
paign and not indulge in personalities. Sutherland confided that had
he been at the convention he would have declined the nomination. He
left Allen with the distinct impression that, barring unexpected devel
opments, he did not think he could defeat Norris.
8
Meanwhile, from conversations and correspondence, Norris dis
cerned that most people were concerned about trusts and his attitude
toward them. This concern gave him an admirable way of explaining
his opposition to the Philippine tariff measure by stressing his hostility
to the sugar trust. He also stated his general position: "Any organiza
tion of whatever kind or nature, should be governed and controlled
to the end that it be prevented from stifling competition and ruining
or injuring other organizations or individuals in their efforts to conduct
legitimate businesses." Those who departed from this standard, he felt,
should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.
9
Sutherland started campaigning early in October, while Norris did
not begin until the week of October 8. Sutherland's audiences were not
large and the only reference to Norris in his speeches was to criticize
his vote on the Philippine tariff bill. His speeches were short, usually
thirty minutes or less. Allen reported that Sutherland had told a
gathering of Populists and Democrats at Hastings he could not afford
to let his law practice suffer, that he had reluctantly accepted the
nomination out of a sense of duty. Even with Bryan speaking on behalf
of Sutherland, enthusiasm seemed to be lacking among the fusion
groups.
10
From Monday, October 8, until election day, Norris campaigned
every day but Sundays. He traveled continually, speaking at a different
rally six evenings a week. McCarl in McCook supervised the over-all
arrangements, but it was up to the local leaders to hire the hall, adver
tise the meeting, and arrange to have local candidates and dignitaries
on the platform with Norris. McGarl advised them to have all of the
"boys in blue" on the platform and to see to it that Norris left the
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morning after the rally. Norris was expected to visit with
local editors
and officials, shake hands, and make himself accessible to all visitors
in a hotel room. 11
Norris, busy traveling and speaking, was fortunate in having the
services of both McCarl and Allen. Both were intensely devoted and
loyal to him^ and both performed their arduous jobs with no prodding
from him. By the end of the campaign neither McCarl, in his twenties,
nor Allen, probably in his sixties, was finding enough time to do all
his chores. All, including Norris, in his forties, were working long
hours with little time for food and sleep. None saw his family to any
great extent during this hectic period, the candidate least of
all. Since
Norris rarely exhibited sentiment or emotion, at times these men felt
he took them for granted. But they usually knew that he gave of him
self even more unstintingly than they gave of themselves. He inspired
loyalty and devotion by his actions as well as by his words.
Though Norris was unable to provide transportation to bring
absent voters home to vote, Allen reported that Democratic and Popu
list leaders, who had for years been attacking the railroads, were
providing transportation. Allen was sure this news, which he wanted to
release at the end of the campaign, would boomerang and cost the
opposition many votes. The vagaries of party politics had thus brought
"the great reform party and the old time railroad haters . . . into a
combination or agreement with the corporations." In his thirty-four
years in politics Allen had seen many odd combinations, but this
strange alliance between the railroads and "the wreck of the great fusion
party of reform" presented "the greatest mix-up of all/'
12
In the last week of the campaign Allen attended several Norris
meetings. The crowds were large and the speeches good. Norris' "fine
appearance on the rostrum and his fine honest look," coupled with his
earnest and
"straightforward way" of talking, carried conviction. His
delivery was clear and distinct; his language was simple and impres
sive, unburdened with rotund oratorical flourishes. Allen, who mingled
in the crowd trying to hear remarks about the speeches, concluded that
most men in the audience agreed that Norris was "an honest and sin
cere candidate as well as an able one." 13
Both McCarl and Allen expected the campaign to conclude without
a hitch. Both were surprised when Norris lost his temper at the Clay
Center meeting on November 2, and indulged in a tirade of personal
vituperation against a local editor who had long been attacking him.
The meeting started well enough, and, despite a heavy rain, the court
room was crowded. But soon Norris lost control and bellowed forth his
wrath and indignation at the hapless editor who was in the audience.14
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Editor Palmer of the Clay Center Sun was a disappointed candi
date for the Clay Center post office. When Norris concluded two or
three years previously that the good of the service and the wishes of
the party necessitated the appointment of another candidate, Palmer
went into a rage and had opposed Norris ever since. In Clay County
most people knew the reason for the paper's bitter opposition, and thus
were not drastically swayed. However, when its editorials appeared in
other newspapers, some damage did result because readers did not
know the source of the opposition.
Norris, though tempted, had never attacked Palmer personally,
believing it better to ignore the man than to lose dignity by a personal
denunciation.15 For this reason, his tirade was totally unexpected. He
claimed the editor had said that if he did not get the appointment as
postmaster he would continually criticize Norris. Palmer then inter
rupted and cried out that Norris' informant had Med. Norris lost his
temper. Overcome with anger, he left the rostrum, walked down the
aisle, shook his fist at Palmer, and thundered forth that he could prove
his statement. He then proceeded to give Palmer a severe tongue-lash
ing. This incident, of course, created a sensation. Some people expected
Norris to strike Palmer, but, after this castigation, Norris returned to
the platform and went on with his speech.
16
Allen, who considered Palmer "a drooling, drivelling, lecherous,
diabolical piece of polluted humanity . . . incapable of high morality
and decency," nevertheless, was sorry that Norris had given vent to his
emotions. Though prominent citizens felt that he was justified in attack
ing Palmer, Allen, with his eye on the over-all campaign, thought
Norris* energy was wasted "on so vile a creature," and was afraid that
Sutherland might try to capitalize on it. A Democratic committeeman,
introducing a speaker at a meeting the following night, assured the
audience that no one need fear any physical damage such as occurred
at Republican rallies.
17
For Allen, Norris' speech in Clay Center was the high spot of the
campaign. Allen was too busy to attend the Hastings rally on Novem
ber 3 or the campaign windup at McCook on election eve. The
McCook meeting, the climax of the campaign, took place in the opera
house, which had a seating capacity of over a thousand. Picture posters
were widely distributed and local leaders had been instructed to bring
delegations. A band had been hired and invitations were sent to all the
"old soldiers" to be present as guests of "the Judge" on the stage where
they occupied reserved seats. Speaking before a friendly audience,
Norris was in fine form, and the local candidates, some of whom were
hard pressed, were grateful for the support he gave them.
18
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The 1906 campaign registered the high-water mark
of the progres
sive movement in Nebraska. All parties had progressive platforms
and
several of the Republican candidates sounded
like old-time Populist
orators. Outside of the Second Congressional District, all major and
most minor Republican office seekers were elected.
In the Fifth Dis
trict, Morris defeated Sutherland by more than two thousand votes
which, though not as impressive as his 1904 victory,
was ample and
satisfactory. Since Republicans would dominate the
next state legisla
ture, a United States Senate seat for Norris Brown, who won the
preferential primary, was thereby
assured. George L. Sheldon defeated
Shallenberger for governor by almost thirteen thousand
votes. His
triumph insured a progressive administration
for the state during the
next two years.
19
After the results were known, the post-mortem discussions and
analyses began. Norris ran well ahead of his ticket throughout
the dis
trict, receiving 1,100 more votes than Governor-elect
Sheldon. Though
there were no basic issues involved in the congressional campaign,
Sutherland probably being more liberal than Norris, the advantages
were all with the incumbent. Norris had capitalized effectively on his
support of the Roosevelt policies, arguing that he would be in
a posi
tion to serve his constituents better as a. congressman in his third
consecutive term.20
Enjoyable as these analyses were, Norris had to interrupt them with
plans relating to his return to Washington and the convening of the
second session of the Fifty-ninth Congress early in December. A week
after the election he wrote to Speaker Cannon expressing an interest in
membership on the powerful Ways and Means Committee in the Six
tieth Congress, when several vacancies would occur. Norris made this
request because he had devoted "some time to the study of the tariff
question" and because he believed that the interests of the "Great West"
should be given consideration. More important, he was satisfied that
his ideas on the tariff question were in full accord with those of the
Speaker. Cannon, gratified that Norris was re-elected, replied that he
would "do the guessing on the organization of the House in the
Sixtieth Congress" some time shortly before that Congress assembled,
in the event that he should again be chosen Speaker.
21
Norris was on hand when the second session of the Fifty-ninth
Congress started on December 3, 1906. Though the session would
last only three months, and little was expected of it in the way of
legislation, he was active and busy throughout its entirety. He intro
duced a bill designed to provide more expeditious delivery of freight,
a bill that would prevent merchants along the Burlington route in
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Nebraska from having to wait unnecessarily long periods of time for
delivery of their goods. Norris thought his measure had a chance of
being enacted because the president had recommended such a law in
his annual message. Possibly as a threat to wrest concessions from the
Burlington, Norris also favored a reduction in the amount of compen
sation paid railroads for carrying the United States mails.
22
Each time Norris spoke during this short session, his remarks,
while relevant to the national scene, were particularly pertinent to
Nebraska and conditions in the Fifth Congressional District. He spoke
on one occasion in favor of improved pension legislation, particularly
for an amendment which would grant widows of Civil War veterans
a pension no matter what the cause of the soldier's death. He also
favored a graduated pension for soldiers, increasing with advanced age.
His position on this matter, of course, helped Norris to remain in the
good graces of most old soldiers and their families throughout Ne
braska. It also further increased Roosevelt's status with Union veterans
throughout the country,, since a graduated pension bill was enacted
into law.23
With growing commercial use of the automobile, road building
became a topic of absorbing interest, and Norris now gave it some
attention. During the first session he had supported a measure provid
ing for an appropriation to experiment with methods of road building.
Now he offered a similar amendment providing the United States
Geological Survey with $100,000 to investigate various structural ma
terials for use in government construction of roads, dams, and build
ings. Such an appropriation, he stated, would result in "cheaper and
better buildings, not only for the government, but for all our people."
It would save millions "in the construction of the Panama Canal and
in the Reclamation Service of the Great West, and, besides, make those
great undertakings more substantial and less liable to destruction and
decay." It would also provide information that could materially im
prove broad highways and country lanes. Nevertheless, Norris insisted
the actual improvement of roads must come to a great extent through
state appropriations. He did not consider federal construction of high
ways a necessary or wise expansion of governmental jurisdiction.
24
During this session a Senate bill, introduced in the House of Repre
sentatives by Norris,, was enacted into law. It divided Nebraska into
two judicial districts and called for the selection of an additional
federal judge. The creation of a new district would save money for
many Nebraska citizens involved in federal litigation by making the
trip to the federal district court at Omaha unnecessary. In 1907,
Norris* home town of McCook received the honor of being host to the
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first term of the newly created federal court for western Nebraska. The
enactment of the law also meant that eventually funds would be
appropriated for a federal building to house the sessions of the court.
25
With the final adjournment of the Fifty-ninth Congress on March
4, 1907, Norris, weary but satisfied with his work in Washington, re
turned to McCook facing no immediate political worries or problems.
At the end of the Fifty-ninth Congress, he had irrevocably committed
himself as a supporter of Roosevelt. In defining the policies of the
president, Norris stated his views about the necessity of expanding the
role of the federal government. He claimed that when he spoke of
Roosevelt's
"leading policies," he referred "to the enforcement of the
law against the rich as well as the poor, against the powerful as well
as the weak." He meant, also, "that the control and regulation of rail
roads and other corporations, and the prosecution of all criminal
offenders against the law of the United States" should be vigorously
pursued. Roosevelt's policy of "insisting upon honesty on the part of
all Government employees" received his enthusiastic approval.
26
Furthermore, by the end of the Fifty-ninth Congress Norris exhibited
the independence and lack of partisanship that were to be so charac
teristic of his later career. He had broken with the most powerful
corporate interest in Nebraska, the Burlington Railroad, which was
unable to reprimand him for his action, while his constituents ap
plauded his hostility to railroad inequities. He had refused to follow
the administration in supporting a tariff measure, albeit a minor one,
and this opposition did not noticeably lessen his standing among the
voters or with Speaker Cannon and the administration in Washington.
The coming years would furnish more dramatic and courageous
examples of these traits, but the first steps were taken during this
Congress.
Though Norris considered himself a devoted follower of Roosevelt
and most of his policies, it is to be doubted if he thought of himself as
an insurgent. Certainly he was satisfied with his lot in Congress, and
he realized that his improving seniority eventually would lead Speaker
Cannon to promote him to more important committee assignments.27
Possibly, too, he was aware of the fact that one of the
outstanding
speakers of the House of Representatives, Samuel J. Randall of
Pennsylvania, had started by serving on the Committee on Public
Buildings and Grounds. Certainly, as he returned to McCook in that
chilly and blustery March of 1907, Norris would have agreed that,
politically speaking, the best was yet to come.
Chapter 14
Seeds of Doubt
WITH almost nine months before the next Congress was to convene,
Norris now had time to enjoy his family and to look after personal and
political affairs in a leisurely way. He became interested in plans for
a YMCA building, chiefly to provide the many unmarried railroad
men in McCook with a place of residence and wholesome recreation.
The local citizenry hoped to raise between eight thousand and ten
thousand dollars for this project, and Norris hoped that the national
headquarters of the YMCA would provide the difference, so that his
home town, with a population of 4,000, could provide in this way for
its young men.
1
Norris also attended to his real estate interests in Beaver City, par
ticularly to the renting of a new hotel building he had recently ac
quired. Visiting Beaver City gave him an opportunity to chat with old
friends, some of whom insisted he deliver a lecture either about his
work in Washington or his trip to Europe as a member of the Inter
parliamentary Union.
2 These activities were pleasant and leisurely.
In April, Jonah K. Kalanianaole, Hawaiian delegate to the United
States Congress, extended an invitation on behalf of the territory of
Hawaii to become his guest as a member of a congressional party, and
Norris accepted with alacrity.
3
The group sailed from San Francisco on May Day with the os
tensible purpose of investigating conditions in the territory so that
Congress might have a better idea of its needs in matters of general
legislation. Actually Norris had a splendid vacation. Along with other
congressmen he was photographed at the summit of Mount Haleakala,
while Mr. and Mrs. L. A. Thurston of Honolulu extended to him the
hospitality of their home. Norris also spoke at a meeting arranged by
a native prince at a public square; no other member of the party
wanted to speak and he was drafted for the chore to avoid disappoint
ing the local citizenry.
4
He returned to McCook in June and quickly departed with his
family for a long summer vacation in Wisconsin. He enjoyed his leisure
117
u8 GEORGE W. NORRIS
and the L.U.N. reunion at Rainbow Lake, and no doubt also reflected
upon the significant work of the Thirtieth Nebraska Legislature.
Its
achievements represented and registered the high point
of the progres
sive movement in Nebraska. A statewide primary, a child labor act,
an anti-free-pass law, and other railroad regulatory measures were
among the major pieces of legislation recorded during this session.
The state emerged as one of the few that had taken measures, as an
editorial in the Omaha Bee stated, "to supplement the work of Con
gress under the direction of President Roosevelt to the end of relieving
the people of Nebraska of railroad domination in politics."
5
The new primary law meant that hereafter Norris would have to
be nominated by direct popular vote instead of by a nominating con
vention. While the primary law would relieve an incumbent candidate
in the good graces of his constituents of some political pressure, it also
meant that most candidates would have to engage in a grueling and
expensive primary before obtaining the privilege of representing their
party in the fall election.
Before that time occurred for Norris, he would have served in the
first session of the Sixtieth Congress, scheduled to convene early in
December. Rather than start the children in school in McCook and
then transfer them, the family decided to move to Washington for the
opening of the fall semester. Once they were settled in the capital city,
Norris planned to return to McCook to participate in the fall campaign.
Early in September, McCarl sent some of the family's belongings to
Washington. Norris rented suitable quarters at the Fairfax, a large
apartment house on Massachusetts Avenue, near fashionable -DuPont
Circle, while the McCook house was rented to a local doctor. 6
McCarl was delighted that Norris was not in Nebraska prior to the
September primaries because a bitter fight occurred between Judge
Orr, Norris' successor in the Fourteenth Judicial District, and Charles
E. Eldred, Morlan's law partner. By his absence, Norris avoided be
coming involved in the controversy.
According to the new primary law, state conventions were to be
held at Lincoln on the fourth Tuesday in September of each election
year for the purpose of adopting platforms and conducting the neces
sary business of the party organization. Though McCarl made great
efforts, all unknown to Norris, to have him chosen chairman when the
Republican convention met on September 24, they were not successful.
Norris appeared merely as a delegate from Red Willow County.7
Governor Sheldon presided over the convention. Though the
highest office involved in the coming state election was for Supreme
Court justice, the delegates adopted resolutions pertaining to national
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affairs and thereby enabled Norris to gauge public sentiment through
out the state. The convention, for example, favored legislation limiting
the use of injunctions and further controlling corporate activities.
Finally it endorsed William Howard Taft as the man most fitted to
continue the policies of President Roosevelt. Norris was whole
heartedly in accord with this position, believing that Taft came nearer
to representing these policies than any other person.
8
Unable to obtain for Norris the chairmanship of the convention,
McCarl next suggested him as chairman of the State Central Com
mittee. Again his efforts were unsuccessful. Both McCarl and Norris
thought it would be well for him to avoid campaigning in his own
district where he would have to support Judge Orr, thereby risking the
open enmity of Morlan and the numerous friends of Eldred, who was
defeated in the primary. Therefore Norris, in offering his services to
the state committee, stated that he preferred to speak in the northern
part of the state. The committee accepted his offer and Norris, for the
first time in his career, spoke in support of Republican candidates, out
side of his own political bailiwick. After the election, which resulted
in another impressive Republican victory, the secretary of the state
committee thanked Norris for his efforts and informed him that the
committee proposed to maintain its headquarters and begin prepara
tory work for the national campaign of 1908. Thus in 1907, prior to
his departure for the opening of the new Congress, Norris found him
self working in close harmony with the Republican organization in
Nebraska. He had served it well in the 1907 campaign; his services and
advice were sought by party leaders. Such a harmonious arrangement,
previously unknown to the representative from the Fifth Congressional
District, boded well for the coming national campaign when it was
generally assumed Bryan would make a third attempt to win the
presidency.
9
However, before Norris could concern himself with the 1908
campaign, his presence was required in Washington where the first
session of the Sixtieth Congress convened at noon on December 2,
1907. McCarl, to Norris' great regret, remained in McCook practicing
law and working as best he could by answering routine letters, send
ing out various government documents and copies of Norris' speeches,
and handling pension claims and other matters.
For matters that required personal attention Norris utilized the
services of an able young attorney with an historic name. James K.
Polk looked after correspondence requiring information from various
government departments. A part-time stenographer handled cor
respondence requiring a personal reply. It was not an entirely satis-
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factory arrangement but it was a workable one, chiefly
because Polk
was very competent. At best it was thought to be a temporary arrange
ment until McCarFs financial position improved. As possible compen
sation, Norris was delighted to learn that an office would be available
to him in the House Office Building which was to be officially opened
in January, 1908.
10
Once the session got under way, Norris learned that Speaker
Cannon had not seriously considered his request for membership on
the Ways and Means Committee. His committee assignments were
the same as those he had held in the previous Congress Public Build
ings and Grounds, Labor, and The Election of President, Vice Presi
dent, and Representatives in Congress. If he was disappointed, his
papers reveal no record of it. But he was beginning to give
much atten
tion to the rules and procedures through which the Speaker exercised
authority, and, before the session was concluded, Norris presented a
resolution designed to deprive the Speaker of some of his power. In
doing this he allied himself with a small but vigorous band of insur
gents in the House of Representatives.
At the beginning of the session, however, Norris was not concerned
with challenging the authority of the Speaker. The country was in the
midst of a financial panic and many citizens feared that repercussions
would be felt throughout the economy. Carefully following the course
of the panic, Norris concluded that remedial legislation was required
to prevent banks from speculating. He noticed in the press that
Governor Edward Hoch intended to ask the Kansas legislature to levy
an assessment on banks for the purpose of guaranteeing deposits. His
thoughts had been developing along similar lines, namely, levying an
assessment on deposits in national banks for the purpose of creating
a fund to pay off depositors in case of failure. In the previous Congress
he had talked to several members of the Banking and Currency Com
mittee and had concluded that such a measure stood little chance of
being favorably received. The Panic of 1907, however, convinced him
that he should again try to introduce a measure to protect depositors.
It was more pertinent at this time and, if the Banking and Currency
Committee would not consider it, at least Norris could air his views
on the floor of the House.11
He gave careful study to the proposition, obtained information
from many sources, and discussed it with banker friends in Nebraska.
His idea was to have the secretary of the treasury levy an assessment
upon all national banks, basing the assessment upon the average de
posits of each bank. The fund thereby obtained was to be used solely
for the purpose of paying off depositors of any national bank that
SEEDS OF DOUBT 121
failed. The bill also provided that when any bank had paid into the
fund an amount equal to a certain percentage of its average balances,
it should be relieved from any further assessment until the amount
paid in was less than the percentage of its balances. Thus each bank
in time would virtually have a paid-up insurance policy against pos
sible losses. 12
Since his object in preparing the bill was to create confidence in
national banks and to prevent runs on banks similar to those which
had occurred in New York and elsewhere, Norris readily accepted the
advice of bankers. He also suggested that Governor Sheldon of Ne
braska introduce a similar bill applying to state banks. He realized if
Congress enacted his bill and the states did not respond with similar
measures most state banks would probably become national banks,
since depositors would prefer to leave their money in an obviously
more secure banking institution. However, Norris thought most states
would follow the federal example as they had already done in the
case of pure food laws and railroad regulation.
13
He was quick to point out that his proposition was not a govern
ment guarantee of deposits, such as Bryan advocated and the New
Deal later enacted. He was opposed to such a scheme for reasons of
both practice and principle, but some legislation was necessary lest
the public be further cheated by dishonest men in the banking busi
ness. He noted that bank examiners and other officials were reluctant
to correct the practices of errant bankers by closing their banks be
cause of the injurious effect it would have upon money matters in
general and the panic it might induce among depositors who would
seek to remove funds from legitimate and honestly conducted banks
as well.
His bill, if enacted, would have prevented honest bankers from
being injured by the failure of another bank. And it could have led
bank examiners to insist on a stricter observance of the law without
fear of accelerating a panic by penalizing mismanaged banks operating
to the detriment of both the banking community and the public.
Finally, Norris concluded that if such a law had been on the statute
books, the Panic of 1907 would never have occurred. True, there might
have been a disturbance in New York, but, he asserted, banks through
out the country would have gone on the same as ever. Thus the legisla
tion he formally proposed to Congress in a long speech on January 7,
1908, would give depositors confidence and would bring relief not only
to them and to the men who borrowed but also to the banker himself.
In short, it would be a blessing to all concerned.
14
Norris, like individuals in and out of Congress, gave serious atten-
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tion to other aspects of the banking and currency situation
beside the
matter of protecting depositors. He favored a more "elastic" currency
if it could be achieved without injuring its stability. However, most of
the measures he had examined on this subject appeared to be injurious
because of the fear engendered in depositors by currency being issued
not on the basis of bonds but on the basis of a bank's total assets. Such
a currency, Norris felt, while undoubtedly putting
more money into
circulation, would cause a greater disturbance than prevailed in 1907
when in a future crisis banks reduced their assets. Thus he believed an
asset-based currency could not achieve a more
flexible monetary
system.
15
Another change Norris thought beneficial was to require
banks
to keep a larger amount of their reserve fund in
their own vaults,
thereby lessening the amount of funds they could lawfully deposit
in
other banks. Such an enactment would avoid bank failure due to ex
cessive speculation. He also thought a law preventing national banks
from loaning money on call at exorbitant interest rates would probably
do some good. But Norris believed that his bill, which would take
away from the depositor all fear that the bank would squander his
money, was the one that would not only relieve- the prevailing panic
situation but would also make its recurrence practically impossible.
At the same time it would bring out of hiding a large amount of
money that fearful citizens were afraid to deposit, or, as Norris stated
it: "Old stockings and old tin cans would be emptied, and yield up
their golden treasure, and the money of the country would assume its
legitimate and proper sphere in the channels of business and trade
throughout the land."
16
This session of Congress, as expected, witnessed a large number of
banking and currency measures. Norris, who was not a member of the
committee that would report such bills, did not expect his measure to
be seriously considered. But by presenting it early he at least hoped
other members might agree with some of his ideas and later incor
porate or add them to a bill that Congress would seriously consider.
This strategy failed and he was far from satisfied with the measure
that Congress finally agreed upon. The Aldrich-Vreeland Act provided
for emergency currency based on commercial paper, rather than cur
rency reform. Norris would have to wait until the Wilson administra
tion before Congress would enact a measure that provided for reform
rather than relief.17
Related to the problem of banking and currency reform was the
proposal to establish a postal savings bank system which, though dis-
cussed> was not acted upon during this session. The objections Norris
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raised to this proposition related to the question of how the govern
ment should use the money. He wanted the deposits to be utilized in
the localities where they were made; otherwise they might drain one
portion of the country to supply another. To avoid this situation,
Norris
hoped some plan could be devised so that these funds would be
deposited in and made available to local banks. Furthermore, the gov
ernment, by depositing these funds in local banks, would in effect be
guaranteeing the deposits and would help bring hoarded money
into
circulation. Since the clamor for a postal savings bank arose because
bank deposits were not secured, Norris pointed out that the bill he
had introduced to protect depositors provided the same thing in a more
direct and effective way. Indeed, he argued, if Congress passed "proper
currency regulation," the demand for postal savings banks would
cease. If not, the agitation would increase and postal savings banks
of some kind would have to be established.18
Though the bill to protect bank deposits consumed most of his
energy and attention at the outset of this session, Norris received much
correspondence criticizing the pension allotments in the McCumber
Act passed by the previous Congress. He therefore devoted some time
to this subject. He thought that the pensions granted should be more
liberal, but most of all he was concerned with the injustice of pensions
provided for the widows of old soldiers. Under the existing laws, a
widow, to obtain a pension of twelve dollars a month, had to show
that her husband died as the result of a disease or disability originating
in the service. This provision, he argued, was inconsistent, unreason
able, and unjust, because unless a widow could do this she only would
receive a pension of eight dollars a month or possibly nothing at all,
owing to a "peculiar wording" of pension laws enacted during the
Civil War period. Believing that widows of old soldiers should all get
twelve dollars a month, Norris unsuccessfully in the Fifty-ninth Con
gress had offered an amendment to the McCumber Bill Now in the
Sixtieth Congress he again presented a bill to remedy this situation.
And in April, 1908, the president signed a measure including more
liberal pensions for widows. Thus Nebraska veterans, already receiving
pensions or adjusted benefits through his efforts, knew that they had
in Norris a congressman who was ever alert to their interests.
19
Aside from speeches on banking and pensions, Norris did not
present any lengthy remarks for the consideration of colleagues or
constituents. Nevertheless, he was acutely interested in legislative
developments. In accord with his previous judicial experience was his
concern about unduly severe punishment. The opportunity to express
his views arose because the House of Representatives in January, 1908a
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considered a bill which codified all the criminal laws of the United
States. The code had last been revised in 1873. The new codification
to be accepted had to be presented as a bill and voted upon.
At one
point in the reading, Norris commented that too severe
a penalty some
times defeated conviction, as juries would be inclined, if the offense
were not very grave and the penalty too severe, to find the
defendant
not guilty. He believed that greater discretion should be
left to the
court deciding a case and that specific punishments should be made
more flexible.20
Many Democrats who did not take this work as seriously as Norris
began to offer amendments for the purpose of making political
speeches. Amendments were presented, speeches were made, and then
the amendments were usually voted down, since the Republican party
controlled the Congress. The object of the Democrats was to put the
Republicans in the position of voting against amendments which ap
peared to be just and fair. And indeed most of them were just and
fair, but they were in most instances already covered by law or con
tained in different portions of the bill being considered. Since the codi
fication was being presented more as a matter of form than anything
else, Norris became disturbed at the clever tactics of the opposition.
These tactics, beside being dilatory, gave the Democrats an opportunity
to develop a possible campaign issue.
21
On the morning of January 21, 1908, the discussion disclosed that
apparently most of the Democrats were opposed to lawyers and
bankers serving in Congress. Considerable talk was also devoted to the
use of free passes and the possibility of amending the Hepburn Act
to provide for them. These developments, which consumed most of the
morning without any discussion of the codification bill, seemed utterly
ridiculous to Norris, and he proceeded to make them appear so to his
fellow congressmen. When he obtained the floor to speak, he said he
was impressed with the remarks of Champ Clark, the Democratic
leader in the House of Representatives, who had presented an example
of a man who sold his bank stock before coming to Congress. Clark
commended this as conduct worthy of emulation. Norris agreed. He
then went Clark one better by claiming a member ought not to be a
farmer, because Congress might consider agricultural subjects, or a
merchant, because he might have to legislate on the tariff or other
matters
affecting his business. The final result would be that Congress
would be comprised of individuals "who have no occupation whatever,
who have no means of gaining a livelihood." To achieve this logical
conclusion from Clark's premise, Norris introduced the following
amendment:
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And any member of Congress who shall engage in the practice
of law, or who shall deliver Chautauqua lectures for pay, or who
shall engage in farming or manufacturing, or who shall have any
occupation whatever, or who shall patronize any national bank by
depositing any money therein, or who shall patronize any railroad
company by riding thereon, or who shall purchase any material of
or sell any material to any corporation shall be hanged by the neck
until dead and thereafter be prohibited from holding any office of
profit or trust under the Government of the United States.
22
Another topic which generated much discussion was curbing the
use of injunctions. The administration, favoring moderate legislation,
did not endorse or present a particular measure. Norris was in favor of
a law that would prevent the abuse of injunctions, but he would not
support any measure to abolish their use. While he was willing to
admit that federal judges often had been reckless and careless in grant
ing injunctions, he believed courts should retain authority to issue them
in certain cases without notice; namely, where irreparable damage
would result if time was taken to give notice. Norris' position would
not appeal to those leaders of organized labor who wanted to abolish
the writ, nor would it suit those businessmen who saw much good in
government by injunction.
23 His interest in the topic lasted throughout
his career, and in later years he would achieve one of his most notable
legislative victories in curbing the misuse of injunctions.
Norris supported the president in his desire to continue the Inland
Waterways Commission. Norris favored the idea of developing the
waterways of the nation, particularly those in the Mississippi Valley.
An overall plan to develop these waterways, of course, would benefit
Nebraska, but the entire country would benefit from the reduction
in freight rates that would follow such development. Thus Norris and
other proponents of inland waterways were aware that such a program,
beside aiding conservation, would tend to reduce railroad power and
influence in mid-America by providing the railroad with water compe
tition.24
Though he was interested in more liberal legislation and cham
pioned the president's suggestions whenever possible, like Roosevelt,
Norris knew prior to a presidential election there would be no signifi
cant changes tending to engender controversy.
25
Moreover,. Norris,
who had no plans of voluntarily retiring from Congress, had to con
sider measures with an eye toward the coming election. In regard to
his position on legislative matters, all but the most partisan Democrats
would have found much to approve in his record. Too many voters,
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however, required more tangible notice of his service
before they
would pass favorable Judgment on his work. Thus McCarl was kept
busy distributing government documents and seeds, and Norris an
swered numerous requests for all kinds of relevant and irrelevant
information about government services.
To aid and impress constituents even more, Norris made arrange
ments with the Department of Agriculture to have an expert lecture
before farm organizations and other groups. He also sought through
his work on the Committee of Public Buildings and Grounds to secure
larger local appropriations. Though his membership on the committee
insured the fact that the district would be included in every bill
reported to Congress, he still could not satisfy all communities.
Furthermore, he had to meet charges of favoritism toward McCook
which, through his efforts, eventually obtained a courthouse as well as
a post office.
26
While Norris continued as a consistent supporter of the retiring
president, the most important development of this session as far as he
was concerned was his announced hostility to the rules by which
Speaker Cannon exercised his authority. Prior to the Sixtieth Congress,
when a band of insurgents for the first time in a sustained and open
way criticized both the Speaker and his power, Norris never revealed
himself as a critic of the rules by which Cannon administered the
House of Representatives. Indeed he had prided himself on his friend
ship with Cannon and, throughout the long struggle, retained re
spect for the Speaker as a person of knowledge and ability. When
Congressman E. A. Hayes of California wrote prior to the convening
of Congress in September, 1907, he was not sure where Norris stood
on this topic. In reply, Norris openly and definitely committed himself
to insurgency for the first time. He favored a change whereby the
Committee on Rules would be expanded and elected by the House
instead of appointed by the Speaker.
Though many members were in favor of such a change, Norris
doubted whether it would receive strong support because the caucus
at which such a change could be made took place just before the
beginning of a new Congress, and the many new members would prob
ably follow the leadership of those in positions of power and seniority.
Thus any change not favored by these new men was usually doomed
to failure, and Norris, though he promised to vote for a rules change,
did not think it would occur in the immediate future. It was the caucus
system that was the basis of the Speakers power. Though Norris later
was instrumental in depriving the Speaker of his authority to choose
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the Rules Committee, he realized that this reform to be meaningful
would have to be followed by the destruction of the party caucus.
27
Norris and the insurgents conducted no prolonged battle during
the first session of the Sixtieth Congress. The Panic of 1907 and the
coming national election precluded any open party strife. However,
Norris courageously let it be known precisely what he intended to do,
if the opportunity ever arose. On May 16, 1908, he introduced a resolu
tion providing that all standing committees be appointed by the Com
mittee on Rules. According to this resolution (H.R. 417), a new rules
committee consisting of fifteen members would be selected by the
membership from candidates representing different geographical
groups. The Norris resolution was sent to the Committee on Rules to
be disposed of by its chairman, Joseph Cannon.
28
( Norris later produced
this same resolution from his pocket and sent it to the desk to be read,
thus precipitating the historic struggle which deprived the Speaker of
his membership on the Committee on Rules.) Norris, in effect, on May
16, 1908, warned Cannon to be on guard.
Thus when the first session of the Sixtieth Congress came to an
end on May 30, 1908, his position was widely known. Norris knew
that to a great extent public opinion in Nebraska and other western
states was opposed to Speaker Cannon. He received widespread sup
port for his resolution, and soon claimed, "It is on account of such
friends more than on account of any personal wish that I feel like stay
ing in the fight."
Of course, he had no other alternative, since his resolution heaped
upon him the displeasure of the Speaker and most of the party leaders
in the House of Representatives. It put him "out of the shadow of
approval" and in many ways it promised to make his work and life
in Congress most disagreeable. It meant that almost all the "favors
and courtesies" extended to other congressmen would be denied to
him. The die was cast when he presented this resolution. Norris now
would have to place principles above party as long as he remained
in political life. It was this resolution of May 16, 1908, more than any
other single event that made Norris into an insurgent Republican^ one
who would challenge a fundamental pillar of party control, and
eventually the outstanding independent in American political history.
However, his immediate job was a difficult one; namely, to educate
the people who applauded him for the position he took to an under
standing that he no longer could perform all the services he once did
for them. He had to see that his constituents, who generally thought
in terms of personalities and not of principles, did not forget the
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principle involved and condemn him for being unable to obtain
patronage and favors. Indeed, his continuance in public life depended
upon the ability of his constituents to understand this situation.
29
Though Norris was well aware of the implications of his position,
his constituents seemingly were satisfied with it. Instead of defending
his action, Norris, in the coming campaign, would have to explain why
he had not opposed Cannon earlier, and why he had been so friendly
to him.30 But, before the campaign got under way, Norris hoped to rest
and regain his energy by traveling to Europe as a delegate to the
Berlin meeting of the Interparliamentary Union.
Returning to Nebraska from Washington in July, he was soon
engulfed in the rising tide of party politics. Before he became com
pletely involved, he lectured before Chautauquas and other assemblies.
In most instances he talked about the work of the Interparliamentary
Union and used an address he hoped to deliver before pacifist confer
ences at Lake Mohonk, New York, and Greensboro, North Carolina,
later in the summer. Though he was interested in the work of the
Interparliamentary Union and pacifist groups, and though he was
strongly urged to attend the conference in Berlin on September 10,
Norris did not go because the expensive trip would have consumed
at least four weeks of valuable campaign time.31 His reasoning was
wise because the 1908 campaign for re-election to a fourth term in the
House of Representatives was to be one of the most difficult of his
entire career.
Chapter 15
Victor by Twenty-Two Votes
THE 1908 campaign was not only one of the most difficult in the
career of George Norris, but also one of the most significant in terms
of his growing insurgency and political independence. It made dra
matically evident to him the fact that while it was important to oppose
the Democrats, it was equally important to maintain only a minimum
of coordination with the Republican organization. In effect he was
fought on two fronts in this campaign by the Democrats and by his
own party. At the outset only the first enemy was apparent.
Nebraska Republicans in September, 1907, endorsed William
Howard Taft to carry on the policies of President Roosevelt. At the
state convention at Omaha on March 12, 1908, Nebraska became the
first state to declare for Taft. And as early as November, 1907, Norris
agreed with his fellow Republicans in this choice. He did this first
in an interview published in the Lincoln Journal, then in correspond
ence, then in his participation on the executive committee of the
Nebraska Taft League.
1
In the Fifth Congressional District by January, 1908, there was a
movement to elect Norris a delegate to the Republican National Con
vention. But he refused to allow his name to be considered, claiming
he did not believe the honors should all go to one man as long as other
worthy, able, and competent individuals were available. "Members of
Congress/' he believed, "should not undertake to dictate in these
matters and should under no circumstances use the power of their
position to control conventions."
2
Moreover, he had his own campaign
to consider.
George Allen, whom Norris, before his break with Cannon, had
successfully recommended for the postmastership of Clay Center,
could not serve as campaign manager. The heavy responsibilities of
campaign manager fell on the capable but inexperienced shoulders of
J. R. McCarl, who reported early in 1908 that few individuals openly
sought Norris' place on the Republican ticket. On the other hand,
there were persistent rumors that the Democrats would nominate Fred
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Ashton, a state senator from Grand Island, as Ms opponent
Ashton
had the reputation of being an unscrupulous campaigner.
And scuttle
butt indicated that Norris, who preferred to conduct a campaign
in
which issues and principles predominated, might
be in for an espe
cially tough fight, as would all the Republican
candidates, since it was
an open secret that Bryan would be the
Democratic standard-bearer.3
However, politics did not really generate
much excitement until
Congress adjourned and the major national conventions met,
the
Republicans in Chicago on June 17 and
the Democrats at Denver on
July 7. Norris remained in Washington
while Republican delegates
chose Taft and James S. Sherman of New York as their standard-
bearers. He returned to McCook early in July and shortly thereafter
filed an application to have his name placed
on the official primary
ballot as a Republican candidate for the office of representative
in
Congress from the Fifth Nebraska Congressional
District.
To help candidates, the Republican State
Central Committee
worked out a plan by which it hoped, more than ever before, to
coordinate the campaign and simplify financial arrangements. Con
tributions to the state committee would be utilized equally by con
gressional committees. Republican postmasters would not
have to
make separate contributions to each of these committees as had been
the case in the past. But they now were requested to contribute 3 per
cent of one year's salary instead of the usual 2 per cent. This arrange
ment had been worked out before Norris returned to Nebraska. Find
ing that other Republican congressmen already had agreed to it, he
had little alternative but to accept it as well.
4
Though Norris was on the best of terms with the Republican State
Central Committee, he nevertheless refused to participate in its affairs.
He preferred the role of the lone political operator, even though he
had recently cooperated more than ever before with the Republican
organization in Nebraska. Since his days on the bench, Norris refused
to participate in party squabbles or selection of officials. He held
himself aloof but was always prepared to support the ticket once
nominations had been made. He never tried to build a political ma
chine, and this fact applied to his entire political career. No postmaster
or any other officeholder he had recommended was ever called upon
for any kind of support.
5
After the September primaries the party slates were completed and
Norris learned that Ashton would be his opponent. Beside Bryan's
popularity in Nebraska, Norris had an additional handicap. The
Democratic candidate for governor, A. C. Shallenberger, resided in the
Fifth Congressional District, where the popularity of both Bryan and
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Shallenberger undoubtedly would help Ashton. Furthermore, both
congressional candidates realized that many former Populist voters
who had supported Theodore Roosevelt would probably vote for
Bryan. Since the platforms of the major parties contained many pro
gressive planks, both candidates undoubtedly knew that while Roose
velt could outshine Bryan as a personality if not as a liberal, Taft
could not on either score. Thus even though Ashton was a poor public
speaker, he had a chance to unseat Norris on election day.
Norris had further reason to be concerned. Friends said Ashton
was tricky and unscrupulous, and these warnings convinced him it
might be impolitic to leave the country at this time to attend the Berlin
meeting of the Interparliamentary Union. Finally there were many
political squabbles, including one pertaining to prohibition, that
threatened to upset the harmony that previously prevailed within the
Republican organization. Thus before the campaign got under way
Norris knew that he would have a hard fight, though nobody realized
just how hard it would be,6
Early in September Norris was in touch with the National Republi
can Congressional Committee in New York to get prominent speakers
to appear in the district He was convinced that the Democrats would
make every effort to carry it, since it was not as strongly Republican
as most of the other Nebraska districts. Yet knowing all of this, he still
did not see any particularly distressing obstacles in his path. Since he
believed that despite promised support from Bryan and Shallenberger,
Ashton could be defeated, Norris arranged to spend almost half his
campaign time outside of his district. Complacency was supplemented
by a desire to play a role in the national campaign, indicative of his
rising status as a member of Congress.7
Both United States senators from Nebraska were intending to
speak on his behalf, and Governor Charles Evans Hughes of New
York, touring the country for Taft, would speak at Hastings and pos
sibly at McCook before the end of September. Norris himself refused
all opportunities to speak in his own district prior to October in hopes
of receiving and on the false grounds that he had received speaking
assignments from the state committee. No such assignments were given
him, however, and as September came to a close, Norris had done no
campaigning and much explaining to those whose requests he had
turned down.8
In response to inquiries at this time he felt called upon to explain
his views on the House rules and the Speaker. Moreover, he learned
that his opponents were criticizing him as a "Cannon man." Therefore
he came out in opposition to the re-election of Cannon as Speaker,
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claiming that Cannon had used "the power of his high position to pre
vent the consideration of legislation asked for by the people and de
sired by a large body of the membership of the House of Representa
tives." His most serious objection, Norris explained in a published
statement, was to the Speaker's opposition to any change in the rules
which would modify or lessen his arbitrary power. In other words, he
believed the Speaker "ought to be the servant of the House, doing its
will, rather than the master controlling its action." Preventing discus
sion and throttling legislation should not be within his power. How
ever, Norris realized that Cannon was not unique in the exertion of
arbitrary power. He made it clear that his conflict was not so much
with the Speaker as with the rules, not so much with Cannon as with
the system.
Certainly, Norris agreed, stringent rules were necessary in a body
as large as the House of Representatives, and the Speaker ought to be
the presiding officer. But in his power to appoint chairmen of standing
committees and in his dominance of the powerful Committee on Rules,
which determined the order of business and procedure, the Speaker
exercised arbitrary authority. Norris explained that his resolution
would make the Speaker merely "the dignified presiding officer of the
greatest representative parliamentary body on earth."
10
This statement represented the extent of Norris' campaign thus far.
The state committee, handling all financial arrangements, had not sent
him any funds while his opponent seemed to have unlimited means at
his disposal This discrepancy was soon noticed in the enthusiasm of
some newspapers whose support had been purchased by the Demo
crats. While Ashton was attacking him in the press and in his speeches,
Norris, without funds, was bound by an arrangement which was sup
posed to allow him to speak in Nebraska outside of his district but
which actually kept him at home in McCook. And he had promised to
campaign in Kansas early in October. Therefore it would not be until
the second week In October that he could begin campaigning in the
Fifth Congressional District.
11
Nonis was so discouraged that he contemplated withdrawing from
the contest. He actually drafted a withdrawal letter but was prevented
from
mailing It by some devoted friends. While he would have en
joyed nothing more than campaigning and attacking the opposition, he
believed that he could not fight the Democratic party, the Republican
organization in Nebraska, and the lethargy of many local Republicans.
If he were to be re-elected, he would need assistance and cooperation,
and if neither was forthcoming, he intended to withdraw from the
campaign.
12
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In early October he revealed that the treasurer of his campaign
committee had not received any funds, nor had he been notified of
contributions collected in the district. Thus no posters, leaflets, or
advertisements for Norris had yet appeared. Finally, he was dismayed
to learn, after his arrival in Kansas, where he was to speak on behalf
of Republican candidates, that he had been chosen for the signal
honor of traveling with Taft during his campaign trip through Ne
braska, Norris learned of this decision from newspapers in Kansas.
It seemed to him that the announcement had been given to the press
even though the state committee knew that such an arrangement
could not be carried out since he was speaking in Kansas at the time
Taft toured Nebraska.13
While Norris was campaigning in Kansas, McCarl was desperately
trying to raise funds from people who had not contributed to the
Republican campaign chest. He spent part of a day at party head
quarters in Lincoln where he heard the depressing news that the state
committee had already used all of the money collected from the Fifth
Congressional District. Indeed, the only good news McCarl learned
in Lincoln was that Congressman Willis C. Hawley of Oregon and
possibly Governor Sheldon would speak in the district.
Though McCarl was disheartened with this situation, he was
equally determined to see it through and go into debt, if necessary,
to get Norris re-elected. He wisely decided not to make the matter
public knowledge, lest he jeopardize all chances of a reconciliation
with the state committee and further damage Republican prospects in
the campaign.
14
McCarl kept loyal Republicans supplied with information about
Norris' record in Congress to aid in refuting Democratic charges that
he was not a loyal supporter of Roosevelt and was friendly with
Speaker Cannon. Rut rather than devote his energies to refuting mis
representations about Norris, McCarl began to investigate Ashton's
record as a member of the Nebraska legislature. Among other items,
he found that Ashton opposed all antiliquor legislation and this fact,
he knew, would prove helpful in an area where prohibition had many
supporters. Ashton's opposition to the primary law might also be of
interest to many voters.15
On October 12, 1908, Norris at long last opened his campaign
with a well attended evening meeting at Orleans in Harlan County.
Thereafter he spoke once or twice on all days but Sundays. Once he
was speaking, meeting the people, defending his record, and attacking
that of his opponent, his discouragement disappeared. There was little
time to lean back in an office chair, plant his feet on the top of the desk,
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and between puffs of the Inevitable cigar discuss
the political situation.
The cigars were always with him, but the
leisure moments were few
and were usually confined to an editor's or lawyer's
office or a hotel
lobby.
16
With Noiris continually speaking, with Senator Albert J. Beveridge
of Indiana and both United States senators from Nebraska as well as
Governor Sheldon all appearing in the district and endorsing Norris,
McCarl soon felt better about the course of the campaign. Since the
campaign treasury was almost empty, he used his
own money to have
posters and handbills prepared for distribution.
He drafted for publica
tion in all Republican papers a statement entitled "Ashton Legislative
Record," pinpointing Ashton's opposition to many of the recently
enacted progressive reforms of the Nebraska legislature. It
also pro
vided documentation of the charge that Ashton was an agent and
lobbyist for brewers.
17
McCarl was working seventeen and eighteen hours a day directing
the campaign; he also was overdrawing his account at the First Na
tional Bank of McCook which fortunately continued to honor his
checks. He was discouraged about the early course of the campaign
and doubted if Norris, owing to his long absence from the district,
could cover it adequately* Though in mid-October he felt he was fight-
Ing a losing battle, his friendship for Norris was "the saving clause in
this measure." On his account McCarl could not think of quitting and
was determined, despite handicaps, to battle right down to election
day.
18
As the campaign moved toward its climax, the congressional can
didates became briefly involved with the national effort. Because
Nebraska was Bryan's home state, he was relentless in his attempt to
carry It on election day. Both parties made determined efforts to appeal
to the voters, but the Democrats made the greater effort, and Bryan
devoted more time to the state than Taft. Without Roosevelt to ap
peal to Nebraska voters, many of them decided to leave the Republican
fold and return to the candidate whom they had supported in 1896 if
not in 1900. Rising Bryan sentiment made the role of Republican
candidates exceedingly difficult because their opponents had the op
portunity of being pushed to victory on the strength of Bryan's vote-
getting appeal. This was particularly true in the Fifth Congressional
District where Bryan personally endorsed Ashton. The effect of Bryan's
appeal for a straight party vote would be of the utmost importance
because it affected Norris* chances. 19
But Norris continually made a good impression, and Ashton a cor
respondingly poor impression. Optimism began to return to the Norris
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headquarters. Everyone involved exerted himself to the utmost; promi
nent Republicans appeared in the district; and the Republican press
gave increased support. McCarl faced the outcome with greater confi
dence. Victory, however, was not yet assured, and Morris' worries grew
to include personal anxiety when he learned that his middle daughter,
Marian, was ill with diphtheria, and that the family was quarantined.
20
Reports confirmed what McCarl and Norris both already knew
that the race would be very close and would probably be decided only
after all the ballots had been counted. One further bit of perplexing
news was the appearance of a third party in Hall County where Ashton
resided, called the County Option League. While this group would
take votes from both parties, it was hard to tell which candidate would
suffer most.21
To the very end of the campaign Norris stressed his record as a
follower of Roosevelt in Congress. His speeches carried conviction,
and his honest, forthright presentation created a favorable impression
even among Democrats. The impression was more marked when con
trasted with his opponent's campaign. Ashton delivered few speeches
arid personally canvassed for votes on the streets, in the saloons, and
elsewhere. He cast aspersions on Norris* honesty and character and
misrepresented his record as a congressman. At the same time, the
liquor interests supporting Ashton were exerting great efforts to defeat
both Norris and Governor Sheldon, Their agents circulated among tem
perance people the report that both men were "whiskey men"; in the
saloons the agents reversed themselves and argued that Norris and
Sheldon were temperance men.
22
In the last week of the campaign the Democrats made a tremen
dous effort for Bryan. McCarl meanwhile planned to make the Hastings
rally scheduled for Tuesday, October 27, the great event of the cam
paign. The businessmen of McCook, who put up the four-hundred-
dollar guarantee required by the Burlington officials, sold enough
tickets to cover their investment in a special train. At least one hundred
and fifty voters from McCook expected to make the trip. At each town
along the line> a band and a speaker would greet the train, though
the engineer agreed to stop whenever anyone wanted to get aboard.
The "Norris Special" was scheduled to arrive in Hastings between
three and four o'clock in the afternoon and would depart at ten-thirty
in the evening.
23
While these plans were being made, the State Central Committee
unexpectedly sent a check for over four hundred dollars to McCarl
and smaller amounts to all but one of the county chairmen in the dis
trict. These funds helped them to provide transportation and meet
136 GEORGE W. NORRIS
other expenses to insure a full Republican turnout on election day.
McCarl claimed the check "saved our lives out in the Fifth [District]."
He now predicted victory by a majority of over three thousand votes.
Favorable reports of the impact of Norris* speeches and of the rise in
Morris sentiment aided by the success of the "Norris Special," helped
him arrive at this conclusion.24
By the end of October the work of McCarl and Norris was virtually
concluded. There remained only the election eve rally at McCook for
Norris. Shortly after midnight on election night, McCarl was expected
to inform the Republican National Committee of the results. He
planned to be at work tabulating the votes all night or at least until
Norris* victory was assured. As it turned out, both the candidate and
his manager waited much longer than election night before the official
result was known.25
Though the election of 1908 represented another Republican vic
tory on the national scene, Taft did not do as well as Roosevelt in
I904 ? while Bryan did much better than Alton B. Parker. Though
Bryan had only 162 electoral votes to 321 for Taft, one historian has
noted, "There was a national vote cast for Bryan, and it was urban
as well as rural; it was Eastern, Western, Southern and Northern." 2G
Nebraska gave its electoral vote to its adopted son who carried the
state by over four thousand votes. In the Fifth Congressional District
Bryan carried ten of eighteen counties, including Red Willow, Norris'
home county. He lost populous Hall County, where Ashton resided,
by eleven votes. The Democrats also managed to defeat Sheldon,
whom Norris claimed "was as good a Governor as Nebraska ever had."
Three Democratic congressmen were elected, while Republican incum
bents E. H. Hinshaw in the Fourth District and M. P. Kinkaid in the
Sixth, both of whom, incidentally, were opposed to Speaker Cannon,
were
clearly re-elected. The results in the Fifth Congressional District
were so close and the returns so
confusing that no one knew who was
elected until the last ballot was
officially counted.
27
Since the vote was so close, McCarl insisted that each committee-
man be on hand for the official count to see that no "honest mistakes"
occurred. The results revealed that Norris had defeated Ashton by
twenty-two votes, 20,649 to 20,627. While Ashton carried his home
county by fifty-three votes, Norris ran ahead of his ticket in this
county. The committeeman from Hall County complained, "The Rail
roads simply overwhelmed us"; not a single Republican was elected in
Hall County in 1908. In view of the outstanding Democratic triumphin the counties
comprising the Fifth Congressional District, Norris'
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scant victory stood out as a signal achievement against a very dark
background.
28
On November 8, five days after the election, Norris obtained a set
of official figures that assured his return to Congress. With a slim mar
gin between defeat and victory there was a distinct possibility that
Ashton would contest it. Norris requested that the Nebraska secretary
of state notify him immediately of any suspicious returns so that he
might commence proper action against the canvassing board of the
county where these returns originated. He made this request because
of rumors that his opponent, aided by "an unlimited checkbook/' might
try to bribe a county clerk to make an intentional error when filing the
vote.29
Norris viewed his election as a triumph over "a checkbook" and
over malice. Though his majority was small and he had to meet a large
portion of the expenses himself, Norris was nonetheless gratified by
his victory. He was disappointed by the defeat of J. F. Boyd in the
Third Congressional District and of Governor Sheldon. Above all
Norris regretted the defeat of William P. Hepburn in Iowa, the leader
of the small band of Republicans in the House of Representatives who
were challenging the rules by which Speaker Cannon exercised his
power.
30
On the evening of November 12, a victory celebration was held in
McCook. And on November 13, 1908, the secretary of state notified
Norris that he very much doubted if Ashton would undertake to con
test the election. But all through November Norris and McCarl anti
cipated a contest and prepared themselves accordingly. It was only
when he received a certificate of election in January, 1909, that Norris
finally was convinced that Ashton would not initiate a contest.31
That the 1908 campaign was one of the most difficult in the career
of George Norris there is no doubt. That it played an important role
in the development of his insurgency and political independence is
equally certain. He was in the process of showing his independence of
party machinery in the House of Representatives when his campaign
experience convinced him of the wisdom of running campaigns with
a minimum of coordination with the Republican organization. Here
after he would tend more and more to pursue his own course and, if
anything, he would complain about party interference. With the
burden of a mismanaged Republican organization in Nebraska, with
the hostility of Speaker Cannon in Congress, with little money to con
duct his campaign while the opposition seemingly had unlimited funds,
with few friendly newspapers supporting him, and with the liability
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of a late start in speaking, Norris was able to eke out a twenty-two vote
plurality, while the Democrats with Bryan as their standard-bearer won
a singular victory in Nebraska if not on the national scene.
Norris* growing independence of party organization was a major
element in his insurgency. It developed gradually and logically out of
his experience and was molded by no single incident. The fact that he
represented a political '"burnt-over** district which, since his arrival in
the late 1830's, had strongly supported all shades of political opinion
from respectable Republicanism to belligerent Bryanism may have
made his position somewhat easier. But basic to the success of the role
he was to enact was the personality, courage, and integrity of the man
himself. Unassuming, modest but straightforward, presenting facts and
issues sometimes for hours on end, avoiding personalities, diatribes,
and emotionalism, relying on the friendship of a small band of friends,
and without a political machine to aid him, Norris was able to gain
and hold the respect of voters. Whereas many Populists and Demo
crats added emotional fervor to the issues they raised, Norris presented
reason and logic with the probity of a country judge turned politician.
That he succeeded in his insurgency throughout a long career attests
not only to his ability but also to the highmindedness of the constitu
ents whose interests he represented. The second session of the Sixtieth
and the entire Sixty-first Congress witnessed the eruption of insurgency
in a way that brought Norris and his cohorts to the attention of a
nationwide audience and, despite his narrow victory, made his con
stituents proud of his performance.
Chapter 16
Insurgency
PREPABING to return to Washington for the second session of the
Sixtieth Congress, Norris expected to participate in a fight against the
rules of the House of Representatives. He, of course, was eager to do
battle, but he was saddened by the fact that William P. Hepburn of
Iowa, a long-time opponent of the rules, would be ending his distin
guished career with this short or lameduck session. Hepburn was one
of four Republican incumbents, generally inimical to the House rules,
who were defeated for re-election in 1908.1 Though the ranks of the
insurgents would be increased as a result of the election, none had
Hepburn's prestige and seniority and few had his general over-all
ability.
As usual during a short session, Mrs. Norris and the children re
mained at home when Norris left for Washington on December 2.
McCarl also remained in McCook to practice law and to manage af
fairs in the district. Norris again sought the services of Attorney Polk
and hoped to hire a stenographer to handle his correspondence and
possibly to serve as a receptionist in his office in the new House Office
Building. During the Christmas holiday recess he intended to vacation
on the Isle of Pines off the southern coast of Cuba. Norris expected to
be busy during this short session, and the vacation would provide an
opportunity to recover from the rigors of an arduous campaign.
2
However, no sooner had he arrived in Washington and unpacked
his bags than he hurriedly made arrangements to return to McCook.
His youngest child, Gertrude, had fallen ill and the doctor had diag
nosed her illness as diphtheria. She was given antitoxin and put to bed.
The family feared her heart might be affected. By returning to Mc
Cook and spending the period of quarantine with his family, he could
help with the task of amusing two healthy girls while Mrs. Norris at
tended a convalescing one. On December 9, 1908, two days after the
session started, he was granted an indefinite leave of absence.
3
Arriving home and entering quarantine, he found Gertrude well on
the road to recovery. On December 21 the quarantine was lifted. For
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the second time In less than two months the house was fumigated and
almost everything had to be moved out and back. Though Gertrudes
case was a mild one, two periods of quarantine with less
than a month's
interval between them must have been a trying experience for Mrs.
Norris and the children. Morris decided to remain at home until after
the Christmas holidays, canceling his plans for a trip
to the Isle of
Pines.4
Thus Norris was not on hand when, on the evening of December
11, 1908, a small band of insurgent Republicans gathered in the Inter
state and Foreign Commerce Committee room for the purpose
of
planning a fight for more democratic procedure
in the House of Rep
resentatives. Hepburn presided over the meeting and was authorized
to choose a committee of five, with himself as chairman, to propose
possible changes. It was suggested that
the rule of recognition be re
vised, that the committees on Elections and Rules be made elective,
and that membership on the latter committee be increased.
5
Four days later, a resolution was proposed that a special committee
report not later than February 1, 1909, any changes
in the existing rules
that might seem desirable. Though the resolution was not considered,
the vote on the point of order not to consider it was 149 to 136,
indi
cating the possibility that the insurgents and the Democrats by voting
together might eventually control the House.
6 However, until that day
arrived, the insurgents would have to be satisfied with bringing their
fight to the attention of the public by harassing the Speaker and con
demning his arbitrary power.
In January when Congress reconvened Norris was present to lend
aid and support to his fellow insurgents, banded together for the first
time in their battle against the House rules. As a solution to the problem
of making the House truly representative, the insurgent group ac
cepted Norris' plan for the Committee on Rules to be selected by the
members on the basis of geographical groups and for the committee in
turn to choose members of all the standing committees. Norris, Hep
burn, John M. Nelson of Wisconsin, and others in the group agreed
that a change of speakers or a change of political parties would not
lessen the power of the Speaker. Only a change in the rules would re
move the source of his power and solve the problem. Norris succinctly
stated this position when he argued, "The rule that gives the Speaker
power to appoint all the Standing committees of the House, which
practically control all of the legislation of the House," was the rule
that was most obnoxious to those who thought that the Speaker had
too much power.
7
He conceded, of course, that rules were necessary and that most of
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them served a useful purpose. He was opposed to unlimited debate
in a body of almost four hundred members and he accepted without
qualification the "Reed rules."
8
However, notwithstanding the fact that
most of the rules were the result of wisdom and experience, in "one or
two particulars" they were not only wrong but vicious and ought to be
changed. He mentioned the power of the Speaker to appoint all stand
ing committees and noted his "most serious objection to the rules of
the House." The most objectionable and vicious of all was the fact
that there was
"practically no provision within the rules themselves"
for amendment or change except by the consent of the Speaker.
Here, as Norris and his fellow insurgents knew, was the core of
their dilemma. Any resolution to change the rules would be referred to
the Committee on Rules, of which the Speaker was chairman and
dominant figure and chose or approved its membership. Once the
members adopted at the beginning of a Congress the previous rules,
Norris claimed, they "tied the hands of the House absolutely as far as
any change" was concerned. They made it virtually impossible during
the course of that particular Congress to amend the rules without the
consent of the Speaker.
Knowing that a rules change would not be reported out of commit
tee, Norris nevertheless proceeded to discuss his resolution9 which
offered a solution that the insurgents believed would equitably solve
the problem without undermining the political balance of the House
by forcing insurgent Republicans into an uneasy alliance with the
Democratic minority. His resolution called for a new committee on
rules that would not only be representative of the entire membership
but would also be subject to the will of the majority.
Representative James Mann of Illinois immediately perceived the
weakest point in Norris' resolution when he noted that it gave the
fifteen members of the committee the authority to delegate to a sub
committee of its members, not less than three in number, "the power to
report special rules to the House of Representatives for the transaction
of business." This subcommittee within limits would have all the au
thority of the full committee. Mann wanted to know why the power
of the House, which Norris thought was being absorbed through the
rules by the Speaker, would not likewise be absorbed by this sub
committee.
Norris replied that this would not occur because the committee
provided for in the resolution derived its authority from and was re
sponsible to the entire House rather than the Speaker. It was more
likely, he believed, that fifteen members, elected by the geographical
division prescribed in his resolution, would better represent the ideas
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and purposes of the House than would the members of
the Rules Com
mittee chosen by the Speaker. But Mann did not see it that way. In one
case fifteen members would confer power on a subcommittee of three,
while under the prevailing rules, a majority of the dominant party,
assembled in caucus, conferred power on the Speaker. Though Norris
suggested the only possible answer
to Mann's question, his antagonist
was not convinced of its validity. In his response Norris also made
clear that he was not implying that Speaker Cannon usurped any au
thority or power. Indeed, throughout this long
and sometimes bitter
struggle, Norris always insisted, as did some
of the other Republican
insurgents, that he was opposed to the system and did
not intend to
cast aspersions on Cannon or anyone else. Finally Norris, apparently
impressed by Mann's criticism, stated that he held no brief
for his plan.
If another plan could achieve the same results he was willing to accept
it, provided it was offered in good faith and not simply for the purpose
of causing delay and confusion.
10
However, Norris' remarks did not comprise the major assault upon
the rules during this session. This honor was reserved for Hepburn as
his farewell address after twenty-two years of distinguished service
in Congress. But before Hepburn delivered his speech the insurgents
made some important decisions. On January 27, 1909, Hepburn an
nounced their acceptance of Norris* resolution and of another expedi
ent designed to secure greater freedom in the consideration of meas
ures.
This expedient proposed to set aside each Tuesday, except during
the last six days of a session, when no business except that on the
House Calendar and the Calendar of the Committee of the Whole
House on the State of the Union would be in order.11 On "Calendar
Tuesday" all committees would be called in regular order and each
committee could call up any bill on either calendar. Motions to ad
journ, recess, or rise were not in order before 4:45 P.M. Furthermore,
on Calendar Tuesday general debate on a measure in the Committee
of the Whole could be closed at any time after the expiration of forty
minutes. And, finally, proceedings under this rule, which if enacted
would have markedly curtailed the power of the Speaker only one day
a week, could be suspended for the day by a two-thirds vote.
12
On February 9, 1909, a resolution to amend the rules embodying
these proposals was introduced by twenty-nine Republican members,
including all of Nebraska's Republican congressmen. The resolution
(H.R. 551) was sent to the Committee on Rules for Cannon, its chair
man, to consider.13 While none of the insurgents seriously expected
anything except publicity to come from the resolution, few realized
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the opportunity it presented the Speaker. By accepting the idea of
Calendar Tuesday he could make a concession to his critics and, un
doubtedly, split the ranks of the insurgents. Calendar Tuesday, of
course, would not seriously damage the Speaker's power and would
not in the least alter the rules of the House, the source of his power.
Indeed some moderate insurgents, like Augustus P. Garner of Massa
chusetts, probably would have been amenable to fighting for only
Calendar Tuesday.
14
On February 18, 1909, Hepburn delivered the major speech of the
session against the rules. It was entirely fitting that he should have
done this. Though he was the leader of the Republican caucus and
chairman of a powerful committee, Hepburn had been attacking the
rules longer than any other person in Congress, long before the other
insurgents were elected to the House of Representatives. A polished
orator and a dangerous opponent in debate, Hepburn used his talents
of biting satire, keen wit, and scathing ridicule to chalenge the arbi
trary power of the Speaker. In his speech Hepburn gave voice to the
basic dilemma of the insurgents and predicted the fate of their resolu
tion: "Oh, it is easy to get into the Committee on Rules, but by what
hoist and by what petard would we get out of the Committee on
Rules?" 15
Speaker Cannon must have been thankful and the insurgents sad
that this speech was Hepburn's last as a member of Congress. Though
the February resolution of the twenty-nine insurgents was never re
ported to the House, on March 1, 1909, within four days of the end of
the Sixtieth Congress an amendment was presented and adopted call
ing for a "Calendar Wednesday" when no business but the calling of
the committees would be in order. Cannon thus made the most of his
opportunity to split the ranks of the insurgents by offering a mild con
cession as an amendment to the rules.
Norris was furious at Cannon's use of the resolution to harm the
insurgent cause, and gave vent to his wrath:
Mr. Speaker, I believe that this proposed rule is the most useless,
perhaps harmless, and worse than worthless proposition that has
ever emanated, especially coming at this particular late day, from
the Committee on Rules. It is, in my judgment, the most comical
parliamentary joke that ever came down the legislative pike. In
its application it is a homeopathic dose of nothingness.
16
He argued that since the rule provided it should not be in effect
during the last two weeks of Congress, the members of the House were
at this late date placed in "the foolish and ridiculous position" of ac-
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ceptlne a rale that would not have any effect
in the Congress in which
it was adopted. He called it "a sop to
the people of the country to
deceive them in their demand that this House shall modify its
rules
so that it shall be really a representative body
instead of a one-man
machine." 1T
Periodically in the last years of
the nineteenth century, isolated mem
bers of the House of Representatives had spoken against
the rules but
never in the past had the opposition assumed
the proportions of an
organized movement Now, however,
in the last months of Theodore
Roosevelt's administration it was rapidly increasing and assuming na
tional proportions. Speaker Cannon,
colorful and gruff, quickly became
in many newspapers and magazines and
in the public mind an over
bearing, bearded, cigar-smoking ruler
who tyrannized the House of
Representatives. While Republican insurgents
in Congress and a plank
in the Democratic platform of 1908 criticized the rules, many
of the
journalistic articles attacked the man.
Thus the House rules and the
Speaker by the end of 1908 became a subject
of national attention, and
"Cannonism" a system that insurgents sought to
eradicate. Though
Norris, as a result of his service in Congress, came to
favor changes in
the rules, he nevertheless maintained respect for Cannon and the posi
tion he held. Most citizens, however, were more concerned with the
man than with the source of his power.
18 Meanwhile, pressed and
harassed on all sides by members of his own party and by the Demo
cratic opposition, by the press and by increasing public clamor,
"Uncle
Joe" began to utilize the tremendous power the rules gave
him to fight
and perhaps punish his antagonists. Indeed, he had not spoken
to
Norris since he introduced his resolution in May, 1908.
19
It should be noted at this point that during the Roosevelt adminis
tration, Speaker Cannon and the rules were never a major obstacle to
the president in advancing his legislative program. Most of Roosevelt's
difficulties were with the Senate, and, in most instances, the House
quickly passed the bills the administration desired. Roosevelt, though
he might not have liked or admired Cannon, worked well with him,
consulted with him frequently, wrote him often, and listened to his
advice about the tenor of opinion in the House of Representatives. In
short, harmonious relations prevailed between the president and the
Speaker throughout most of the Roosevelt administration. As a result,
Norris saw nothing incongruous about supporting Roosevelt and ad
miring Cannon. But the ill will evident in the Sixtieth Congress car
ried over into the Taft administration, when the president, who did
not like the Speaker, found it difficult to cooperate and work with him,
partly because Taft exerted much less effort than his predecessor, and
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partly because Cannon, now thoroughly aroused and angered, was
much less inclined to cooperate.20
Thus as the Sixtieth Congress came to an end, the fight against
Cannonism had come out into the open and, of course, would be con
tinued in the next Congress. Though this struggle was the most signifi
cant aspect of Norris' service in the short session, he concerned him
self with other matters as well. The most important of these was the
tariff issue, since the incoming president had announced his intention
of calling Congress into special session to revise it. Important, too, was
the growing sentiment for a postal savings system, while many mer
chants were concerned lest a parcel post system be established. They
claimed the establishment of such a system would enable the large
mail-order firms to drive retail merchants in small towns out of busi
ness.21
Norris pointed out that a parcel post system was already in exist
ence and that those who favored it really desired the Post Office De
partment to carry larger packages at lower rates than the law provided.
Believing that express company charges were exorbitant and unjust,
he was inclined to favor a reduction in the postal laws so that rates
would take into consideration not only size and weight, but distance
as well. If this were done, retail merchants in small towns would not
suffer unduly from mail-order competition, and both merchant and
farmer would benefit from the competition thus forced upon the ex
press companies.
22
Like many of his constituents, Norris was interested in the concept
of a postal savings bank. A plank in the Republican platform of 1908
favored the enactment of such legislation. However, he did not intend
to support any measure that would siphon funds from the area of de
posit to a large city. He believed that deposits in a postal savings bank
should not be granted special tax exemptions. In this respect, his views
differed from the bill introduced by Senator Thomas H. Carter of
Montana, a bill which granted postal savings bank deposits exemption
from taxation and levy on execution.
23
While both a parcel post and a postal savings measure would be
enacted during the Taft administration, it was the tariff that received
immediate attention once the new administration got under way.
Norris believed that the tariff ought to be removed from wood and
all of its products, and that the rates on grain ought to be retained at
their prevailing high level to protect farmers and millers from foreign,
particularly Canadian, competition. He realized, however, that a new
tariff law would have to be the result of compromise and would con
tain many items he would not favor.
24
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But discussions of these issues were merely skirmishes for battles
to come. The attack against the Speaker dominated the short session
as far as the House of Representatives was concerned. Meanwhile most
Republicans looked forward to Taft's inauguration
on March 4, 1909.
While feelings were mixed, few if any were indifferent about the
de
parture of Roosevelt from the White House. Most congressmen,
whether Democratic or Republican, were unhappy about the prospect
of foregoing their deserved vacations for the dubious privilege
of re
maining in Washington, possibly throughout the summer,
to prepare a
tariff which under any circumstance was bound to create acrimony and
discord. Norris, in February, wrote to the president-elect requesting
the special session at least a week later than the tentatively scheduled
date of March 10, thereby allowing the western members of Congress
to return home for a few days and still be back in time for the begin
ning of the session. Ordinarily, Norris knew, it did not make much dif
ference if some members were not present at the start of a session, but
the desire of the insurgents to challenge the rules made it necessary for
al to be present at the outset when the fight would take placed
5
Taft,
though he did not acknowledge Norris' letter, complied by calling the
special session to convene on March 15.
Norris left Washington on March 4, before the new president took
the oath of office. He was not sufficiently impressed with the grandeur
of inauguration ceremonies to go out of his way to witness one. He
was back in Washington shortly before Congress convened ready to
participate in the rules fight.
26
Norris, of course, knew that a large majority of the Republican
caucus favored Cannon's re-election as Speaker. It would be impossible
to defeat him, but the insurgents believed there was "a fair chance"
of amending the rules at this time. And Norris intended to battle for
reform "until the last ditch shall have been reached." If beaten, he
knew there would be no hope for favors and consideration during this
Congress.
27
On March 15, as soon as the session started, parliamentary maneu
vering began over adopting the rules of the previous session. Once
these rules were adopted, virtually all hope of modifying them would
be ended. Norris dramatically pointed up the issue, and incidentally
noted that the new administration would be a far cry from the previous
one:
Mr. Speaker, there will be no change in the rules that will be
satisfactory or produce satisfactory results either to the House
or to the country that does not take away from the Speaker the
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right to serve on the Committee on Rules and the right to ap
point all the standing committees of this House. ... It is to be
regretted, Mr. Speaker, that we were not left to settle this ques
tion without any outside influences. During the vacation Mem
bers of this House have been worked upon by the various depart
ments of this Government, especially what are known as the
"insurgent" part of the House; Senators, Cabinet members, and,
I regret to say, the President, have all been working in behalf of
the Speaker and his machine; so that we have had a combination
of the Senate, the Cabinet, the Executive, and the "knights of the
Iron Duke," all combined in an assault upon that little band of
insurgents.
28
Unfurling their banner, the insurgents were risking their political
lives. Newspapers claimed that if defeated they would be punished by
loss of important places on committees and by loss of executive patron
age. Norris' response to this challenge was as follows:
If we are to be punished for standing for a principle which we
believe to be right, then let the lash be unfurled. Do your worst.
We will not be intimidated. We will not surrender. I would rather
go down to my political grave with a clear conscience than ride
in the chariot of victory, a congressional stool pigeon, the slave,
the servant, and the vassal of any man, whether he be the owner
and manager of a legislative menagerie or the ruler of a great
nation.29
Lest he be pushed too far in opposition to the chief executive,
Norris clarified his position by proclaiming his confidence in Taft The
real power in government, he said, was being exerted not by the presi
dent but by the "Iron Duke** who, "sitting upon his throne, crowned
with the power given him by the rules, reaches out his mighty hand
and forces even the Chief Executive to do his bidding." For Norris, at
last, the struggle had degenerated to the level of personalities. He also
predicted, "We insurgents may have the life crushed out of us by the
machine, but the cause is right, and in the end it must prevail."
30
Despite insurgent opposition, the previous rules were modified to
improve the functioning of the House while not hampering the Speak
er's control of the Committee on Rules or his power to appoint stand
ing committees. This modification, which received some Democratic
support, was the result of an arrangement made by the Speaker with
Democratic Representative John J. Fitzgerald and other Democratic
members, whereby the Speaker promised to support a higher duty on
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petroleum products in the impending tariff bill in return for enough
Democratic votes to prevent the insurgents in alliance with Champ
Clark from further amending the rules. The rules that were adopted,
under this compact, provided for a unanimous consent calendar
which eliminated the daily procession to the Speaker s office to obtain
permission to consider bills meeting with general approval. Calendar
Wednesday was strengthened by changing the requirement for setting
it aside from a majority to a two-thirds vote, and finally a recommittal
motion was permitted after the previous question had been moved on
any bill Such a motion was not in order before this.
31
'
Thus defeated, the lonely insurgents knew that before the special
session was concluded they could expect the wrath of the Speaker to
manifest itself in lowly committee assignments. They had supported
amendments offered by Champ Clark to amend the rules, amendments
that would have deprived the Speaker of most of his authority. But
because of the defection of Democratic members these amendments
were defeated. The only positive achievement they could discern was
in the form of national press coverage which publicized their struggle
to a large audience. Norris, for the first time, came to the attention of
a national audience and many citizens, no doubt, admired his per
spicacity in analyzing the issues and his courage in antagonizing the
Speaker and possibly the president.
32
Incidentally, despite his attack on the Speaker's power and his cam
paign promise to vote against Cannon, Norris voted for him and re
ceived, at the same time, two votes for Speaker.
33
By voting for Can
non, Norris could remain within the Republican organization and re
tain a vote and a voice to change the rules. If he disregarded the party
caucus and voted against Cannon, Norris was aware that Cannon still
would be re-elected and his own standing would become even more
precarious. He had argued that if there was no possibility of defeating
the Speaker the insurgents should vote for his re-election.
34 Norris re
mained throughout this fight one of the more moderate insurgents who
managed to separate growing hostility to Cannon from a primary de
sire to modify the rules.
Once the fight to amend the rules was lost the House settled down
to the urgent business of the special session preparing a new tariff
law, though an undercurrent of hostility prevailed.
35 A measure was
introduced in the House by Sereno Payne on March 17, 1909. The bill,
providing for generally lower rates, met with more approval than most
observers had expected. The insurgents presented no organized oppo
sition to it. Norris, believing that an unduly high tariff encouraged
trusts and monopolies, favored some reduction, though the loss of tariff
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revenue would have to be balanced either by increased taxation or
curtailment of expenditures. He preferred eliminating extravagant ap
propriations, especially for the navy. He had voted against such appro
priations since he had been in Congress, but "the country seemed to
demand the upbuilding of a big navy, and the President was very
enthusiastic in his demands for the same." Therefore he realized that
any reduction of rates would have to be balanced by increased taxa
tion.36
Norris succeeded in adding a significant amendment to the tariff bill.
The subcommittee which prepared the measure unanimously placed
petroleum and petroleum products on the free list. At the insistence
of Speaker Cannon, the chairman called a meeting of the subcommittee
to reconsider this decision. After bitter debate, in which the Speaker
insisted that Republican members abide by party principles and prom
ises, the committee by a partisan vote agreed to put a tariff of 25 per
cent on petroleum and petroleum products.
37
Before Norris was elected to Congress, the tariff on petroleum and
its products had figured in a congressional campaign in the Fifth Dis
trict. Consequently, he was very much interested in this particular
portion of the tariff. The bill was considered under a special rule
which made it impossible to place an item, by means of amendment,
on the free list. Therefore, on April 7, 1909, Norris presented a motion
to reduce the 25 per cent duty on petroleum and its products to a
nominal 1 per cent. After some debate in which Speaker Cannon took
the floor to speak against it, Norris* motion prevailed, whereupon
Payne, sponsor of the measure in the House of Representatives, in
formed the members that the duty as amended would not pay the
cost of collection. He requested unanimous consent that petroleum
and its products be placed on the free list.
38
Norris' action in reducing this important schedule of the tariff won
immediate approval from his constituents. McCarl wrote from McCook
that he had not been able to find a man, "Democrat or Republican or
indifferent/* who was not pleased with his "victory on the oil proposi
tion." Most newspapers were generous in their praise of Norris, whose
popularity was on the rise after the low point of the 1908 election.
39
One of the things that pleased Norris most with the tariff bill that
passed the House on April 9, 1909, was the fact that it followed a sug
gestion in Taft's inaugural message and provided for an inheritance
tax as a means of balancing the loss of income from the generally low
ered rates of the Payne bill. He had always favored an inheritance tax.
While in theory an income tax was generally conceded to be the most
equitable tax, as a matter of practice Norris thought it the most diffi-
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cult to collect because it offered too many opportunities for evasion
by dishonest citizens. On the other hand a graduated inheritance tax
posed no such difficulty. Ideally it could be collected from the bequests
received by the beneficiaries so that the larger the amount received,
the larger the rate of taxation; however, the plank in the tariff measure
merely taxed the sum left by the deceased. Despite this mild objection
to the inheritance feature of the bill, Norris was delighted and was
certain it would bring in considerable revenue.
40
The debate on the tariff in the Senate was one of the notable events
in the history of that distinguished body, lasting well on into the sum
mer. The House, having passed the measure on April 9, had little im
portant business to conduct until the Senate reached some agreement.
Thus many House members, having little to do in the capital city, re
quested leaves of absence because of important business. Norris ob
tained such a leave on April 12, 1909,
41 and chose to conduct his im
portant business in the Panama Canal Zone. He returned to Washing
ton on May 2 to find Senate debate raging, as a handful of Republican
members subjected the tariff to what some of its supporters, no doubt,
considered an agonizing reappraisal.
42
On May 14, Norris decided to go home until the Senate debate was
concluded. In McCook he relaxed with his family, kept abreast with
his correspondence, and avoided all public commitments, including
Fourth of July addresses, because of the need to return to Washington
as soon as the Senate passed the tariff bill. By July 7 he was back in
Washington and glad to be where the heat was less intense than it had
been in Nebraska.43
By a vote of forty-five to thirty-four on July 8, the Senate passed its
version of the tariff bill with ten Republican members, including both
Nebraska senators, voting against it. The next day on the floor of the
House, Norris followed the lead of La Follette by characterizing the
bill as a revision upward. Norris argued that unless the upward revi
sion of rates in many schedules was rejected, specifying particularly
gloves and hosiery, the Republican party would not be true to its
pledges. He quoted speeches by Taft to illustrate the party's pledge to
reduce tariff schedules and suggested a resolution whereby the House
would concur in those Senate amendments which reduced the tariff
and would go into conference on the balance. Unless the members
voted for this resolution, Norris warned they would not have another
chance to discuss the bill. When it returned from conference commit
tee, it would probably contain several hundred items. Members would
not get a separate vote but would be required "to accept all or refect
alT 44 -
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By adopting his proposition, the House could dispose of all Senate
amendments where rates were reduced. In doing this, the members
would have an opportunity to express themselves on every one of them.
Whereas if the measure was sent immediately to conference committee
the members would lose control over the bill, because the Speaker
would choose conferees sympathetic to his high tariff views.
45 How
ever, as Norris no doubt expected, his proposal failed. It received
insurgent support on the Republican side of the House.
The conference committee remained in session until early August
trying to adjust all items where Senate and House measures provided
for different rates. The president attempted to convince it of the neces
sity of reduced rates on gloves and hosiery, while also demanding free
iron ore, coal, hides, oil, and a lower duty on lumber.
46
Norris, remain
ing in Washington during these deliberations, feared the conferees
would eliminate the inheritance tax provided in the House bill and
substitute the Senate provision for a corporation tax. Since the presi
dent now advocated this latter proposal which, Norris thought, was
prepared by the attorney general, he knew that a corporation rather
than an inheritance tax would be included in the law ultimately en
acted by Congress. He also knew that House members would vote for
or against the bill with no chance to consider particular items.
47
At the end of July, by the narrow margin of 191-186, the House
defeated a recommittal motion, with Norris and most insurgent mem
bers voting with the minority. On the final vote to accept the confer
ence committee report, Norris and some of the moderate insurgents
were included among the 195 members who voted in the affirmative.
Prior to these votes six progressive Republican senators appeared on
the House floor in an effort to convince members that the measure
should be sent back to conference committee.48 Failing in their efforts,
the senators continued their battle in the Senate chamber* but when
the roll was called on August 5, 1909, the conference report carried by
a vote of 47-31 with only six Republican senators voting against it.
This time both Nebraska senators voted with the majority. Thus after
bitter debate in both houses, but especially in the Senate, the Payne-
Aldrich tariff bill was sent to President Taft for approval, which was
quickly given on August 5, 1909, before the special session of the Sixty-
first Congress formally adjourned.
In summing up his attitude toward the Payne-Aldrich tariff Norris
said he fought the bill from start to finish in most of its essential fea
tures. However, he admitted the law had much in its favor. Though
he had voted against many schedules and for every parliamentary
proposition that would have kept the conference report in committee,
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he still voted for the bill. He did this because the Payne-Aldrich tariff
was "infinitely better than the Dingley law/' since it was molded "on
the right principle." It raised the tariff on luxuries and lowered it on
necessities; "not enough," he admitted, "but it was a step in the right
direction." According to Norris, the true principle of a tariff was that It
should represent the differences between the cost of production at
home and abroad. The Payne-Aldrich tariff did not do this, but, Nor-
ris believed, it approached this goal much better than did the Dingley
tariff.49
On the day before the special session came to an end when the
House was considering an "urgent deficiency bill," Norris spoke against
an item which granted an automobile for the vice-president and the
Speaker. It presented him with an opportunity for indirect and face
tiously amusing criticism of the Speaker: "If we should buy this auto
mobile for the Speaker and he should become adept and an expert in
the management of it, as he undoubtedly would in a short time, his
natural inclination to run over people when assisted by an automobile
would make it dangerous for everybody in the community/' However,
it was the Speaker who had the final word at this time. On the last
day of the session committee assignments for the regular session of
the Sixty-first Congress were announced. Norris now fully felt Can
non's power when he found himself downgraded to membership on
the insignificant committees on Coinage, Weights, and Measures, and
on Private Land Claims, committees which he claimed were "dead and
committees in name only/*
50
Returning to Nebraska, Norris believed that many of his constitu
ents sympathized with his position and resented the actions of the
Speaker. He knew, too, that his ability to be of service to his constitu
ents had been and would remain severely curtailed as long as Cannon
was Speaker. However, his position and that of his fellow insurgents
was not yet clarified because no one knew for certain whether Taft
intended to continue the policies of his predecessor or whether he
would move into the more conservative camp dominated by the able
and powerful senator from Rhode Island, Nelson Aldrich. Norris there
fore resolved to bring his case before his constituents, lest opponents
take advantage of his weakened position. Thus, instead of a vacation
for what remained of the summer, he sought a way to present his
position to the public and, if possible, to increase his income.
Chapter 17
The Eve of Conflict
WHEN Norris returned to Nebraska in August, 1909, the prevailing
sentiment in that state had become more progressive in response to
national developments such as the insurgency revolt, to reform move
ments in other states such as Wisconsin, and to clamoring for further
measures to protect citizens against banks and bosses. The legislature,
controlled by the Democrats for the first time since statehood, enacted
under Governor A. C. Shallenberger more liberal legislation than un
der Republican Governor George L. Sheldon. A bank guarantee law
designed to protect depositors, an idea Norris had suggested in Con
gress, was the most important piece of new legislation. Other measures
changed the primary from a closed to an open election,
1
provided for
the election of educational officers and judges on a nonpartisan ticket,
and established the
"Oregon Pledge Law," requiring legislative can
didates to state that if elected they would vote for the candidate for
United States senator receiving the highest preferential vote. But the
most important sign of increased progressivism to Norris was the wide
spread approval by Nebraskans of his course of action in Congress.
Indeed, rumor had it that he would seek the senatorial nomination in
1910 in place of Senator E. J. Burkett, who was regarded as too con
servative.2
Norris was noncommittal regarding this nomination. He preferred to
wait until party opposition to Burkett clearly crystallized and other
candidates came forward. He claimed too that he was not particularly
anxious to be a candidate for the Senate. Life in Washington presented
"too many disappointments and too much opposition of a disagreeable
and often of a dishonorable kind." 3
The Norrises had planned to spend their summer traveling to the
Pacific coast to visit relatives of Mrs. Norris. The special session of
Congress, however, had forced them to abandon this idea. Instead,
Norris made arrangements for several Chautauqua lectures beginning
in September. Most of the talks were to be presented under the auspices
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of the University of Nebraska's extension lecture program for very
modest fees.4
Norris spoke on three topics: peace, the Panama Canal,
and Cannon-
ism, with the last subject proving to be the most popular. His lecture,
"The Dream of Peace," was an able presentation favoring the settle
ment of international disputes by a court of arbitration. Though most
of the talks were delivered in churches, Norris' pacifism did not have
a religious base or orientation. It emanated primarily from his experi
ence as an American delegate to the Interparliamentary Union con
ference at Brussels in 1905. "Ever since then/' he wrote in 1908, "I
have been greatly interested in the subject." And the more he examined
it, the more convinced he became that "the greatest disgrace of the
present civilized age is that war is in any case and under any condi
tion a possibility."
5
He suggested that if the United States and England took the lead
and settled all disputes by arbitration, "AH the world would doubtless
follow in their footsteps." He favored a vast network of separate trea
ties rather than a single treaty to which all nations would agree. And
he thought the men appointed as arbitrators should be granted a long
term so that they could make a careful study of international law and
the administration of international justice. Then, too, with long terms
jurors could rise above national prejudice and decide questions purely
on their merits. Thus when a controversy arose the machinery to cope
with it would be immediately available.
6
Norris also coupled these lectures with a plea for a smaller navy,
claiming the reason the peace forces in America were divided was that
they could not agree on naval policy. While he favored curtailing
naval expenditures,
7
other peace advocates held that the best way to
obtain peace was to be prepared for war. Accepting the necessity of
maintaining an army and a navy and claiming that from 60 to 70 per
cent of the nation's revenues were spent for war or the preparation for
war, Norris, nevertheless, hoped that these expenditures could be cur
tailed as the civilized world began "to shake off the shackles of bar
barism." Since war was a frightful reminder of the "barbarous ages"
he considered it a disgrace "to the present civilized age" that any na
tion think of waging war with any other civilized nation, "when the
difficulty could so easily be settled by arbitration." 8
In his lecture on the Panama Canal, Norris hoped to communicate
some knowledge of what the government was doing there so that his
constituents could comprehend, for example, some of the difficulties
encountered by the engineers in charge of the project. Though audi-
THE EVE OF CONFLICT 155
ences listened attentively to the address, none received it enthusi
astically.
At the end of the second lecture when the audience was about to
be dismissed, somebody called out: "Before you go, Mr. Norris, tell us
about the Cannon fight; that's what we want to know about." Where
upon Norris, unprepared for another lecture the same evening, talked
for an hour and aroused the first real enthusiasm of the evening. Thus
it quickly developed that the lecture "Cannonism and the Remedy"
was the most popular of the three.
9
In these talks, during the question period when the audience re
verted to politics, Norris replied that it was too early to say anything
definite about his senatorial candidacy, though he did claim that he
could not afford to make the race. In doing this he presented a basic
criticism of the direct primary system.
10 In the formal lecture he dis
cussed the rules, the tariff fight, and the injustice of Speaker Cannon
in depriving insurgents of their standing on committees, in refusing
to recognize them in the House chamber or to speak to them in the
corridors. Obviously, there was no need to prepare this lecture; it was
delivered extemporaneously. Its structure varied with each delivery
but its contents remained the same. When the series ended, Norris,
evaluating his experience on the platform, said his audiences were of
but one opinion on the matter; namely, "They are all insurgents."
n
With lecturing concluded, he made plans to return to Washington
for the second session of the Sixty-first Congress, which was to open on
December 6. Mrs. Norris and the children had left McCook in mid-
September so that the girls might enter Washington schools at the
beginning of the school year. The family rented quarters in the North
East section of the city. McCarl again remained in McCook, devoting
whatever time he could to acting as Norris* secretary. And Norris, on
his part, renewed arrangements with Polk, the Washington attorney
who had proven so helpful, and hired a stenographer for his office,
Room 214 of the House Office Building.
12
Since rules for this Congress were already in effect, there was no
open fight when the second session got under way. The situation con
tinued as in the previous session: the House of Representatives con
ducted its business in its usual way, while an undercurrent of insurgent
discontent revealed members who sought an opportunity to force the
issue of the rules to a vote. Rumors were rampant and Norris learned
that Cannon thought a fight should be made against every insurgent
seeking re-election. While many Republicans hoped for an insurgent
victory, Norris knew that few would dare to vote with them. On the
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other hand, he realized that there were many Democrats who would
have liked to see the insurgents defeated but who would not dare to
vote against them.
13
Thus it was in an atmosphere of anxiety and tension that he pre
pared to examine and execute the nation's business. His removal to
what were for all intents and purposes nonexistent committees meant
that he would have more time to investigate issues. While prohibition
was not a significant issue before the Congress, the people of Nebraska
considered it of great political importance. Norris was very cautious
and refused to consider it from any but a legal point of view: He said
that while prohibition was a state and local issue, the federal govern
ment had done much to regulate and curtail abuses in the interstate
shipment of liquor.
14
On the equally explosive issue of woman suffrage, Norris took a
somewhat stronger position. He claimed that suffrage was a state func
tion, and that Nebraska, or any other state, could provide for universal
suffrage. He admitted that he was not opposed to woman suffrage if
the state desired it. But he would not champion the cause until he
became convinced that women desired the franchise.15
Of more immediate importance were the issues of taxes and postal
rates. Businessmen, particularly in Lincoln and Omaha, were con
cerned about the corporation tax, while those in the Fifth Congres
sional District, along with many of Norris' rural constituents, were con
cerned about postal rates. Norris, seeing no possibility of repealing the
controversial tax, focused his attention on the postal situation. He be
lieved that the administration had not considered both sides of the
proposition. For example, the president claimed that it cost the govern
ment nine cents per pound to transport second class mail, especially
magazines. To Norris such information indicated not that rates should
be increased but that the government was paying too much for carry
ing the mail He noted that express companies, competing for busi
ness, were still profitably carrying second, third, and fourth class mail
for less than a penny a pound, primarily on short hauls. In most in
stances they left the unprofitable long hauls to the government. There
fore, he argued, "If the express companies can carry mail for less than
a cent a pound, we ought not to pay the railroads nine cents per pound
for
carrying it"
1Q
The Post Office Department, he suggested, could profitably carry
most mail under a zone system charging more for long than for short
hauls. The express companies operated on such a basis and the gov
ernment would do well to foUow their example. Thus the solution
necessitated no increase in postage on newspapers and magazines but
THE EVE OF CONFLICT 157
required reduction of the amount paid to railroads for carrying this
mail. Furthermore, as Norris understood it, the government had a
monopoly on mail matters. If its power were enforced, express com
panies could be prohibited from carrying second class mail, thereby
securing to the government the benefit of profitable short hauls. Un
less he could be convinced of the error of his reasoning, Norris an
nounced that he intended to vote against any postal rate increase.
17
Along with postal matters, Norris also gave careful consideration to
legislation pertaining to land and internal improvements. Homestead
ers called attention to financial difficulties in the North Platte irriga
tion project. The project, which incidentally was not in Norris* district,
benefited from the Pathfinder Dam in Wyoming, constructed under
the terms of the Reclamation Act. The settlers had originally been told
that water
rights would cost them no more than thirty-five dollars per
acre. The price had since been raised to forty-five dollars per acre
plus maintenance, and the inhabitants now found it impossible to meet
their payments, support their families, and maintain adequate school
facilities. Having traveled over this country, Norris was convinced
that the law needed amendment. The financial burden would defeat
the government's purpose, making it difficult if not impossible for the
farmers to get their lands into full production and meet their payments
too. 18
Norris believed that the settlers should be relieved of their payment
obligations for the first two years, allowing them to direct all their
efforts toward cultivating the land. Once the land was workable, pay
ments would begin. Nonis wanted to amend the Reclamation Act to
improve its usefulness, since he regarded it "as one of the most whole
some laws that was ever passed, for the West and, in fact, for the en
tire country/'
19
Despite this praise, Norris criticized section nine, which provided
that money allocated for reclamation be equalized every ten years
among the public land states in proportion to the funds different states
had furnished by the sale of public lands. This section "was the worst
feature of the act" and accounted for projects that had been com
menced without due consideration. He did not believe that public
lands belonged to any particular state or that money from their sale
should go back to the particular localities from which it originated.
Such beliefs, he thought, could "make a failure of the reclamation bus
iness." Officials ought to be permitted to use the money where it would
yield the best returns, thus benefiting all who desired to settle in the
West and removing almost all political considerations.
20
Along with irrigation, dry farming represented another technique
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for developing portions of the West. Both
methods offered opportuni
ties for the utilization of millions of acres that heretofore had been
considered useless for agricultural purposes. Hardy W. Campbell
first
developed the technique of dry farming
and had demonstrated it
throughout the West. Campbell's work, however,
was done outside of
government service, and Norris wanted to
increase the Department of
Agriculture's appropriation bill so that
it could encourage his method.
21
Norris also offered an amendment granting twenty-five thousand
dollars to encourage experimentation with artesian wells
for irrigation
purposes in localities where farmers could not
obtain sufficient water
from streams. He did not expect the government to irrigate the land,
but once artesian wells were shown to be feasible, people could then
bore their own. He considered such an expenditure a valid use of
public funds, one that would eventually enable large
areas to raise
crops and support prosperous farming communities.
22 Norris' concern
with agriculture was not limited to Nebraska. His remarks evinced
his
knowledge of the arid regions which, if intelligently worked along
lines suggested during the Roosevelt administration, could fruitfully
develop the vast inland empire of the United States.
When Norris showed his interest in the conservation of natural
resources, he moved from issues of local and regional interest to a
burning national question which was before the public in the form of
a controversy between Chief Forester Gifford Pinchot and Secretary
of the Interior Richard Ballinger. In the House of Representatives the
controversy appeared as another phase of the struggle of the insurgents
against the power of the Speaker.
Louis R. Glavis, a special agent in the land office in Seattle, dramat
ically charged that the secretary had connived with the Cunningham
coal group, portrayed as a front for a Morgan-Guggenheim syndicate,
to validate withdrawals from the public domain of choice Alaska coal
lands. Pinchot backed Glavis in these assertions while Ballinger denied
that he had been dishonest. Taft, in September, 1909, exonerated Bal
linger and fired Glavis. And when Senator Jonathan P. Dolliver of
Iowa, in January, 1910, read a letter on the Senate floor by Pinchot in
defense of Glavis, Taft followed suit by removing Pinchot as chief
forester. This row already had prompted Gilbert M. Hitchcock, a
Nebraska Democrat, to introduce a resolution in the House of Repre
sentatives on December 6, 1909, providing for a committee to investi
gate the conduct of the General Land Office in the Department of the
Interior. On December 21, Senator Frank P. Flint of California re
quested that the president transmit to Congress the information upon
which he had acted in exonerating Ballinger of the Glavis charges.
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On the same day Wesley L. Jones of Washington read on the Senate
floor a letter from the secretary of the interior, in which Baltinger
"courted the widest and fullest inquiry by Congress." He requested
that the investigation include not only the General Land Office but the
Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Forestry as well. Norris
agreed with Ballinger on this point and said that he would 'do all in
his power to bring about a fair, honest, and searching investigation of
the matter. But he was not certain that such an inquiry was possible,
chiefly because the Speaker was not anxious to see too probing an
investigation.
23
After the Christmas recess Senator Jones offered a resolution pro
viding for an investigation of the Department of the Interior by a
joint committee of twelve members, half of whom were to be chosen
by the vice president and half by the Speaker. On January 7, 1910,
when the House of Representatives considered this proposition, Nor
ris called for a broad, inclusive investigation which would have "the
confidence and the faith of the American people." To bring this about,
he suggested that the committee "ought to be elected by the House of
Representatives and not appointed by the Speaker." He then offered
an amendment "that the committee will be elected by the House of
Representatives from the members of that body." The combined votes
of the Democratic members and the Republican insurgents carried the
resolution and thereby insured a fuller and fairer hearing than other
wise would have been possible. At the same time Cannon was admin
istered a stinging and severe rebuff, his first in the battle against the
insurgents.
24
Cannon suffered defeat because one of his staunchest lieutenants,
John Dalzell of Pennsylvania, made the mistake of yielding two min
utes of his allotted time to Norris, who had been unable to gain rec
ognition from the chair. The Rules Committee had previously agreed
that the Senate resolution should be debated for six hours, three hours
on each side. Any member who spoke would have a right to make a
motion to amend, but all such motions would be voted on at the close
of the debate. At that time, Norris and twenty-five other insurgents
joined forces with the Democrats to carry the amendment with three
votes to spare. More than thirty of Cannon's reliable Republicans were
absent.25 Thus Cannon suffered his first defeat and undoubtedly real
ized that in Norris he had a foe whose understanding of parliamentary
procedure and maneuvering rivaled his own. From this incident it
should have become evident to Cannon that he would have to main
tain eternal vigilance to prevent the insurgents from receiving another
opportunity to gain the upper hand.
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Norris' motion evoked a great consternation. Since the amendment
provided no method by which the House
could vote, it was decided
to delay the choice of members on the investigating
committee. The
Republican machine and the Democrats
each held caucuses, while the
insurgents, who were now well organized, met
at the spacious resi
dence of Congressman William C. Lovering
of Massachusetts. Here
they decided to insist on naming at least one
member of the committee.
The Democrats would name two and the regular Republicans the re
maining three members. They also decided
that neither Payne nor
Dalzell, Cannon's chief aides, should be allowed to sit on this com
mittee. They were able to insist upon this arrangement only
because
the Democrats in their caucus accepted it, while Speaker Cannon
undoubtedly did not want to force the issue and risk another rebuff.
26
Norris, though unanimously tendered the insurgent position on
the committee, refused on the ground that critics would say he intro
duced the amendment to promote his own advantage. He suggested
that Edmond H. Madison of Kansas be selected, and to this the group
agreed. With Madison's appointment the twelve-man committee was
not evenly divided; administration supporters chosen by the vice presi
dent and the Republican caucus in the House of Representatives still
dominated it. But Madison's presence assured Glavis and Pinchot of
at least one sympathetic member who would insist that their side be
given a full hearing. Therefore, as a result of his amendment, Norris
claimed, "A real investigation was had.'*
During the investigation, the attorneys for Pinchot and Glavis,
though unable to prove their clients' assertions, were at least able to
demonstrate that Ballinger had no enthusiasm for and little sympathy
with the cause of conservation. Louis D. Brandeis impeached the in
tegrity of the administration by showing that crucial documents
offered as evidence against Glavis' charges had been predated. As a
result of these and other findings, the investigation, launched as a ges
ture to political expediency, proved to be a considerable burden to the
Republican party in the next presidential election.
27
Since Taft thought the charges leveled against his secretary of the
interior were unjust, and since he regarded Pinchot "as a good deal of
a radical and a good deal of a crank,"
28 he was none too happy about
Norris* amendment. To Taft, Norris and the insurgents were committed
to the cause of Pinchot and would be incapable of coming to a just
verdict based on evidence if that evidence in any way threatened the
policies and the friends of the previous administration.
On the other hand, Norris and his fellow insurgents believed that
Taft had allied himself with the Republican old guard and was under-
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mining the Roosevelt policies. Even worse, the president had sided
with the Speaker in this controversy and with the cause against which
the insurgents had been fighting. As a long-time, bitter foe of con
servation, Cannon, in the eyes of the insurgents, had now won the ad
ministration to his point of view. The president, the insurgents were
now convinced, would have to be regarded as a traitor to the Roosevelt
policies and another bulwark in the system of privilege they were at
tacking. Taft's treatment of the insurgents, too, reassured them that
they were correct in their evaluation.
On January 6, 1910, the day Dolliver read the Senate Pinchot's
letter endorsing the Glavis position, Norris wrote the president:
There was published in the newpapers of January 5 an Asso
ciated Press dispatch to the effect that you had decided to deprive
the
"Insurgents" in Congress of all executive patronage. The article
referred to purported to come direct from the White House and
inasmuch as it had remained unchallenged and undisputed I feel
warranted in assuming that it is true and has your approval. I am
likewise led to this conclusion because the recent recommenda
tions from
"insurgent" Republican Congressmen have not received
the favorable consideration by the heads of Departments formerly
accorded.29
He explained to the chief executive what the insurgent members of
the House were striving to do. He insisted that they had never made
any attempt to influence votes "upon any proposition other than the
rules of the House/' and that they were loyal Republicans who be
lieved in carrying out in good faith the pledges of the party. Moreover,
he claimed the insurgents had taken "no stand against the present ad
ministration" even though the president at the outset of his term of
office took a stand against them in their effort to change the rules.
30
The president, of course, had the legal right to deprive any member of
patronage if he so desired, but Norris thought that if a reason was
given for this action, "common fairness and justice'* demanded that
the correct one be presented; namely, that the insurgents opposed the
rules, and not, as had been suggested, that they were unworthy mem
bers of the Republican party.
31
Previously, in December, 1909, as the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy
moved toward a climax with the convening of Congress, Taft decided
to use the patronage weapon against insurgent Republicans on the
grounds that they were doing everything to bring the Democratic
party into power. The president apparently took this position at the
insistence of Cannon and other party leaders.
32
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When Taft responded to Norris on January 10, 1910, the day he
dropped Pinchot from government service, he convinced Norris that
he was being punished for his fight against the rules. Taft claimed
Norris* letter contained "such misstatements that I must answer it." He
denied Noms* charge that he had made any statement to the press and
averred that he had taken no part in the fight over the House rules.
Then he presented a forthright statement of his position:
What I declined to do was to join those who differed from a
majority of the Republican Party and stayed out of the caucus,
when as leader of the party I am dependent upon party actions
to secure the legislation that has been promised. It did not then
seem to me, as it does not now seem to me, that as titular leader
of the party I should take sides with fifteen or twenty who refused
to abide by the majority votes of the party, but that I should
stand by whatever the party decides under the majority rule,
whatever my views as to the wisdom of the rules, which are
peculiarly a matter for settlement in the House itself. It has been
a custom for a Republican administration to honor the recom
mendations of Republican Congressmen and Senators with re
spect to local appointments, subject, however, to the condition
that the candidates recommended should be fit fqr the place. This
custom has grown up with a view to securing a party solidarity in
acting upon party questions. The only indication that I have given
has been that with respect to legislation which I have recom
mended, there should be party action to discharge the promise
of the party platform, and that those who feel no obligation in
respect to it can not complain if their recommendations are not
given customary weight.
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The president, by refusing to accept Norris* thesis that the insur
gents were loyal Republicans who were only challenging the rules,
placed them in the position of opposing the Republican party. This
created a dilemma for the insurgents, but they were too far committed
to turn back or stop in their fight against Cannonism. The Ballinger-
Pinchot controversy seemingly offered them a way out. They were
loyal Republicans, loyal to the policies and principles of Theodore
Roosevelt, while Taft, Cannon, and the old guard were destroying the
very things that had made Roosevelt and the party so popular with the
American people. Thus by 1910 the insurgency movement in the House
of Representatives had become part of the conflict between progres
sive and standpat Republicans that was to tear the party asunder.
Norris, however, refused to accept Taffs statement as final. He felt
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that the president, by stating in effect that he had taken no part in the
fight over the rules of the House, had impeached his integrity. Norris
thought it only fair, since he first made the statement, that he should
present the evidence upon which it was based; namely, claims by in
surgents that Taft labored to convince them to support the Speaker in
his effort to adopt the old rules. "If you were taking no part in the
fight/' Norris wrote, "then you were most woefully misrepresented by
some of your closest advisors/'
34
Norris then listed all the measures wherein he had supported the
president, while noting that the Speaker and his followers were op
posed to practically all of them. He claimed that Cannon had made
committee assignments so as to "prevent the enactment of many, if not
all, of these measures." Thus Norris attempted to answer the charge
that the insurgents were not good Republicans and, by presenting evi
dence that they supported many more planks than did the followers of
Cannon, he implied that the insurgents had reason to complain that
their patronage recommendations were being ignored. He wisely con
cluded that he was in no way "piqued or grieved" that executive pa
tronage had been taken away from him. Whether it was returned or
not he intended to do all in his power to help his party redeem in good
faith the pledges it had made to the country.35
Taft, unwilling to accept Norris' premise that he was a loyal Re
publican while administration men were violating party pledges, im
mediately responded. He claimed that his only interference in the rules
fight in March, 1909, was to try to effect a compromise by suggesting
to all congressmen who came to see him that majority rule must pre
vail if the legislative burdens assumed by the party in its platform were
to be enacted. To Norris and the other insurgents, this statement was
a validation of the charge that the president had used Ms power
against them. Taft implied that he was withholding patronage from the
insurgents because they chose to ignore the obligations of the Repub
lican platform. He wanted only to prevent them from placing oppo
nents of the administration in federal offices, thereby making it easier
for the Democratic party to reassert itself. However, as of the date of
this letter, January 11, 1910, Taft had withdrawn patronage from only
four insurgents: William Gary and Irvine Lenroot, both of Wisconsin,
Clarence B. Miller of Minnesota, and Norris. Soon others found that
their recommendations were ignored.
36
The insurgents, of course, had reason to be bitter and to complain
about their shabby treatment by the president. During the tariff fight,
when old guard Republicans saddled Taft with what in many respects
he considered an unsatisfactory arrangement, he never once threatened
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to use the patronage weapon against them.
37
By exerting it against the
insurgents, Taft neither strengthened the Republican party nor gained
support of his legislative program since, as Norris pointed out, the
insurgents were already giving him more support than the regular Re
publicans on most issues.
Once news of Tart's action reached the home districts of the affected
members, public sentiment, already critical of the administration, be
came even more hostile. The president's action, based on the premise
that the insurgents with their patronage were aiding the Democratic
part}
7
, helped only to widen the growing breach in the Republican
party and to convince the insurgents of Taffs betrayal of his prede
cessor's policies. It was a singular example of inept leadership which,
against his own inclinations, forced Taft into a firm alliance with the
old guard in the Republican party.
Thus, by January, 1910, the stage was set for the notable, dramatic,
and historic battle that culminated the insurgency revolt against the
power of the Speaker. Norris and his cohorts, deprived of their pa
tronage and committee standing, ignored by their colleagues in the
House of Representatives, branded as disloyal Republicans and avowed
enemies of the administration, had everything to gain and nothing to
lose by finding a legislative lever to open a wedge in the House rules.
Norris, as a result of his resolution calling for the election of mem
bers to the Ballinger-Pinchot investigating committee, had emerged as
the insurgent leader.
38 He had revealed himself as a skilful parlia
mentarian, equal or almost equal in knowledge and ability to Cannon
himself. Though his position in Congress and his life in Washington
were now unpleasant, he did not intend to deviate from his course
under any circumstances. Letters from constituents approved his stand
and helped convince him that popular support would continue even
if patronage would not. A friend, sounding public sentiment, wrote:
Yesterday I was on the Street, and I sidled up to a group of men,
who were talking about the Administration, and they agreed
among themselves that they expected Taft would quit the office,
as much a hated and despised man as ever Grover Cleveland was.
I don't know how all this is going to end. Something will have to
be done. People are not sticking by Party so closely as they were a
few years ago, there is not nearly so much politics as in former
years, people are wondering now, where they are at, and how they
are going to remedy the wrong that has its grip on the country
today. Unless the insurgent movement wins out, there will be a
Democratic President next time. Probably people are not always
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going to stand for half a dozen men to rule. My business takes me
in Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Kansas, and as a matter of fact
there don't seem to be any parties any more among the common
class, it is any thing now to clean up the machine.
39
Another more succinctly stated, "The West is warm over the fight
you are having and satisfaction is expressed everywhere with the stand
you have taken." Both the Omaha Bee and the Nebraska State Journal
were giving space and attention to Norris, claiming along with other
papers that Taft was rapidly losing whatever popularity he had in the
West. McCarl was convinced that loss of patronage would make Nor
ris more popular than ever with the voters in the Fifth Congressional
District and would improve his chances for the senatorial nomination.
McCarl felt that no
"standpatter" would have a chance against Norris
in the 1910 primary, either congressional or senatorial, and that no
Democrat, not even Fred Ashton, would be eager to oppose him in the
election.40
Thus Norris, heartened by public approval of his position, was con
vinced that the fight the insurgents were making was just and was
based on sound principle. He was more than ever determined to con
tinue it, regardless of the outcome. With patience and fortitude he
awaited an opportunity to drive a wedge into the procedural block
that Cannon and his chief lieutenants were utilizing to prevent the in
surgent Republicans and the Democrats from administering him an
other defeat similar to the one already experienced in the Ballinger-
Pinchot controversy. Norris hoped that it might come soon. If not, he
would still be satisfied that he had helped to sow the seeds that would
allow others to
"reap an effective harvest for free and untrammelled
representation in the House."
41 As it turned out, an opportunity was
not long in forthcoming.
Chapter 18
Insurgency Revolt: Part I
ON THE EVE of the conflict, the House of Representatives had 391
members. Each of these gentlemen was usually assigned a place on any
two of the fifty-six standing committees of the House by the Speaker,
who, at the same time, chose the chairman of each of these committees.
The Speaker also had the power to refer bills to committees where he
knew they would be reported as he desired. As chairman of the all-
powerful, five-man Rules Committee, he could make anything in or out
of order at any time. In the Speaker's chair, Joseph G. Cannon usually
refused to recognize anyone unless the member first stated his purpose.
Consequently most members visited the Speaker's room beforehand
and requested recognition rather than undergo the embarrassment of
having their requests to speak denied and noted in the Congressional
Record*
Committee assignments, as Noms and the other insurgents well
knew, could make or break a member's reputation by placing him in
the foreground on important issues or by relegating him to an insig
nificant position in the congressional hierarchy. The Speaker thus could
curb the ambition as well as the ability and usefulness of any member.
The insurgents, besides being demoted in their committee assignments,
knew that no bill they filed would be seriously considered and that
recognition from the Speaker would not be easily forthcoming. This
knowledge, of course, did not silence them. When the House resolved
itself into the Committee of the Whole for purposes of debate and
amendment, all members were granted some time for speechmaking or
questioning if they so desired.
1
The insurgents, as has already been noted, had no desire to repeal
the
strictly parliamentary rules of the House. They realized that rules
were necessary in a large legislative body and were in accord with
most of them. Their desire was to make the Speaker a presiding officer
with no extraneous powers. Under the prevailing rules the Speaker was
all-powerful and was responsible, once duly chosen and installed, to no
one for the remainder of the Congress, while he had it within his power
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to promote or destroy the careers of members who met with his favor
or displeasure. As a journalist, referring to the insurgents' goal, put it:
They would take the Speaker's purely political power: to ob
struct, impair or control legislation: to thwart the will of the
majority: to limit genuine debate: to pack important committees
with the representatives of Big Business: to control the ambition,
ability, and usefulness of members of Congress: to make him the
sole political judge of what laws may be enacted and what meas
ures shall be defeated.2
Until the opportunity to bring about this change presented itself,
the insurgents by themselves could do little in terms of introducing or
even improving bills. However, aided by the Democrats, they were able
to take advantage of any slips Cannon and his lieutenants made. And,
on their own, since they first organized in December, 1908, they ex
erted tremendous efforts to educate the public in the righteousness of
their cause. Their nuisance value was a growing source of embarrass
ment to both Cannon and the Taft administration and a boon to the
coalescing progressive cause.
Sentiment against the Speaker and his power was growing through
out the country, especially in the Middle West. In February, 1909.
Success Magazine asked its subscribers, "Do you believe that the rules
of the House should place in the hands of the Speaker the power of
determining the membership of the Committees?" Within three weeks,
11,134 readers voted "No" and 364, "Yes." To the question, "Do you
believe that Joseph G. Cannon should be elected Speaker of the House
of Representatives?" 10,825 voted "No" and 539 voted "Yes."
3 On a
state-wide basis, T. A. McNeal, a columnist for the Topeka Daily
Capital, published in January, 1910, the results of a poll he had con
ducted among Kansas Republicans. To the question, "Are you opposed
to the rule of Cannon in the House and Aldrich in the Senate?" 1,579
answered "Yes" and 81, "No." 4
By organizing, the insurgents were able to make themselves an
effective group, though their membership fluctuated between twenty-
five and thirty and complete unanimity was rare among them. After
Hepburn's retirement at the end of the Sixtieth Congress, Augustus
Gardner of Massachusetts served as chairman of the group. John M.
Nelson of Wisconsin acted as secretary and his office was utilized as a
meeting place. With Edmond H. Madison of Kansas they functioned as
a committee on strategy
5 which ably directed the insurgent forces in
the first major conflict over the rules. However, by 1910, Norris had
emerged as the outstanding figure among the insurgents.
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As an indication of his rising prominence, Morris in 1910 published
several articles in La Follettes Magazine explaining the insurgents'
position, accomplishments, and desires for the future.
6 His interviews
and correspondence with members of the press increased substantially.
In his letters, he explained the insurgent position and occasionally at
tempted to correct misconceptions that appeared in articles. Letters in
the latter category were usually not for publication, while those in the
former were. In his correspondence with journalists, Morris revealed
more fully the workings of the House. He explained that there was not
as much
"log rolling" in Congress as there was subservience to the
Speaker's will. Deals were made, Morris knew, but as a rule they had
the approval of the Speaker, if, in fact, they did not originate with him.
Furthermore, he understood that reform usually came slowly and in
the way of compromise, and that many who had been most active in a
fight might not be on the scene when victory was won.7 Actually, in
the case of the insurgents, most of them were on hand when victory
was achieved, and all of them must have known that it was, at best, a
partial triumph.
Since the term
"progressive" was coming into widespread use, Mor
ris made some effort early in 1910 to distinguish between an insurgent
and a progressive as they affected politics. The insurgency movement,
he claimed, arose in the House when some Republicans demanded a
change in the rules; its primary aim was to change these rules and to
curb the Speaker's power. Progressives, on the other hand, sought more
widespread reform; they wanted to curb not only machine rule in the
political arena, but corporation control in the social and economic
realm as well. While many of the insurgents were progressives as far
as other reforms were concerned, some were standpatters on all but
the rules issue. There was no attempt to organize Republican dissi
dents
"along any line except that of taking away from the Speaker
some of his extraordinary power." Morris summarized the insurgent
position as follows:
We want the House to have an opportunity for itself to pass on
the questions and we therefore desire to take away from the
Speaker the power given to him by the Rules of the House which
prevent the House from participating in legislative action. We
want the House to be representative of the people and each individ
ual member to have his ideas presented and passed on, and at the
same time to be required to assume his share of the responsibility.
8
To his constituents, Morris explained that he was not discouraged,
though he was convinced that Taft would be unable to carry out the
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Roosevelt policies. Indeed, Norris believed that the president had allied
himself with Speaker Cannon and Senator Aldrich against these pol
icies. Yet despite overwhelming opposition, he knew that the insurgents
had been making "some impression on the machine." Referring to the
power of the Speaker, Norris, in mid-January, 1910, said, "It is going
to pieces, there is no doubt about that/' But he envisioned its collapse
in the next Congress as a result of the 1910 elections.9
Throughout February Norris and the insurgents busied themselves
with legislative matters. Then in March the insurgents, allied with the
Democratic members, found an opportunity to inflict a petty personal
humiliation on the Speaker; they amended an appropriation bill to
deprive both the Speaker and the vice president of a fifteen-thousand-
dollar allowance for automobiles.10 However, appropriations had noth
ing to do with the matter that soon thereafter provided an entering
wedge and precipitated a revolution in the House. It started inno
cently enough with a discussion of the census.
Democratic Congressman Adolph J. Sabath of Illinois, a member
of the Committee on the Census, introduced a resolution, not fifty
words in length, providing that in the approaching census enumerators
ascertain the mother tongue of all persons born abroad, thereby pro
viding more adequate information about the languages and the national
origins of the American people. On the next day, Wednesday, March
16, Speaker Cannon recognized Edgar D. Crurnpacker of Indiana,
chairman of the Committee on the Census, for the purpose of present
ing this minor resolution as an amendment to the census bill. While
there was no opposition to the amendment, Crumpacker's proposal
brought forth a storm of criticism because it violated the sanctity of
Calendar Wednesday which Cannon had conceded to the insurgents
a year before in the first major battle over the rules. Many members
felt that the introduction of the Sabath resolution at this time created
a dangerous precedent and impaired the value of the one day when
members did not have to seek the Speaker's permission to gain recog
nition.
Democratic Representative John J. Fitzgerald of New York, who
had suggested Calendar Wednesday to Cannon as a compromise
measure in the 1909 fracas, was vigorous in his protest and raised a
point of order. Cannon, after listening to the debate in which, inci
dentally, the insurgents rarely participated, ruled that the census
amendment was in order "under a higher law than the rule of the
House, or, for that matter, higher than a statutory law under the Con
stitution." It was a privileged question under the Constitution (Article
I, Section 2) and as such claimed precedence over all House proce-
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dures. The Speaker's decision, however, was reversed by the members
a rare occurrence in the House by a vote of 163 to 112.
11
Crampacker, like Cannon, thought the resolution was privileged.
Somewhat piqued
12 over the refusal of the House to consider it on
Calendar Wednesday, he reintroduced it the next day, St. Patrick's
Day, March 17, 1910. When a point of order was again made, Speaker
Cannon, rather than suffer another humiliation, shrewdly referred the
question to the members for decision. The House, by a vote of 201 to
72, overwhelmingly decided that the resolution was privileged and in
order, indicating that it was less concerned with the constitutional
question than with the desire to preserve the integrity of Calendar
Wednesday. Incidentally, Norris and other insurgents voted against
the proposition that the census amendment presented a question of
high constitutional privilege.
13
Before the vote was taken, Norris engaged in a discussion with
Marlin E. Olmsted of Pennsylvania in which Norris inquired if a com
mittee report was necessary for a constitutionally privileged motion.
He asked asked whether any member could come in with a bill that
had not even been printed and take up the time of the House on the
ground that it was a matter privileged by the Constitution. Olmsted,
a Cannon supporter, adroitly parried Norris* probing by implying that
the Speaker, and not a mere member, could answer such questions. 14
Here then was the opportunity the insurgents had been awaiting,
though it is doubtful if any but Norris realized it at the time.
Once the vote was taken which declared the amendment privileged,
the House proceeded to adopt the amendment. Norris thereupon
sought the floor, stating, "Mr. Speaker, I have a privileged resolution."
At about three o'clock in the afternoon on his third effort to gain the
Speaker's attention, he was recognized. The revolution was under way:
MR. NORMS: Mr. Speaker, I present a resolution made privileged
by the Constitution.
THE SPEAKER: If it is a resolution made privileged by the Consti
tution, the gentleman will present it.
15
Amid general laughter, Norris pulled from his pocket a creased
and crumbled piece of paper which he sent to the desk for the clerk to
read. The smiling, deferential grin on the Speaker's face quickly gave
way to a look of grim determination as the clerk read the resolution,
similar to the one Norris had presented in the Sixtieth Congress (May
16, 1908) . It called for a Committee on Rules
consisting of fifteen mem
bers, geographically distributed, nine of whom should be members of
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the majority party. The Speaker could not be eligible for membership
on the committee which would choose its own chairman.
Cannon's chief lieutenant, John Dalzell, immediately made the point
that this resolution was not in order, that it was not privileged. Norris,
citing the census amendment, insisted his resolution was privileged
under the Constitution and thereby entitled to consideration. Article
I, Section 5 o the Constitution wherein it is stated that "each House
may determine the rules of its proceedings" provided the basis for the
claim that the resolution was privileged. He said the Constitution
granted him a right to introduce this resolution, that under the recent
decision of the House on the census amendment it must be in order.16
Norris crystallized his position when he said:
When the House went on record that the census proposition was
in order, it was not in accordance with my individual view. I did
not believe it was privileged. But this must follow, as a logical
result, it seems to me, in that case that the privileged nature of the
resolution did not depend on its being reported by a committee
or considered by a committee, but it was privileged, if privileged
at all, because the Constitution made it so.
No committee consideration, no committee report, would add
or take away from its privileged nature. I am not responsible for
the position in which the House has placed itself; but to be con
sistent, it seems to me this resolution would have to be held priv
ileged the same as the others.
11
Cannon, having been overruled the previous day by insurgent and
Democratic votes, fully understood his precarious position. Ninety-
nine members had not answered when the roll was recorded shortly af
ter noon, and the Speaker realized that the absent regular Republican
members would have to be present to vote on any ruling if he were
not to suffer further defeat. Yet, if the entire membership of the House
were on hand, Cannon knew that the insurgent Republicans and their
Democratic allies could probably defeat him. The only chance he had
and it was a long one was to delay making a decision until absent
Republican members could be urged to return and he could seek ample
precedents for deciding, despite the census decision,
that Norris' res
olution was not in order.
Thus the House settled down to a long period of discussion and
debate. In one of the very rare instances in the history of the House,
every member said what he wanted to say and took as long as he
wanted in saying it. The debate on the merits of the question before
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the House was presumably for the benefit of the Speaker, to provide
him with information necessary for his ruling. But Cannon was rarely
in the Speaker's chair. Since the Democrats and the insurgents refused
to countenance any adjournment until the Speaker made a ruling, and
since there was no power to compel him to rule, the group supporting
the Norris resolution prepared to spend the night in session and to
maintain their forces on the floor to prevent any sudden recess for lack
of a quorum. Norris personally had no objection to an adjournment,
though he went along with the members who wanted the Speaker to
make a ruling beforehand. 18
Partners to both sides of this controversy stated their positions in
speeches of varying ability and eloquence. Norris, having had his say
at the outset, said little. Frequently the House chamber reverberated
with applause and cheers or cries of "Rule, Rule," as the members,
realizing it would be many hours before a ruling was forthcoming,
gave vent to their partisanship while the Speaker, the central figure in
the debate, could in effect do little to exercise authority and curb the
more boisterous members. One of the more dramatic incidents occurred
when Henry Allen Cooper of Wisconsin called upon a number of in
surgent Republicans to testify to the punishment they had received in
the way of unfavorable committee appointments. Speaker Cannon had
been out of the chamber at the outset of Cooper's speech. Upon his
return he stood on the lower steps of the Speaker's platform, resting
his arm upon the clerk's desk. From this vantage point, raised slightly
above the crowd of members who were milling in front of him, he
glared down into the face of the "insurging" Cooper.19
Cooper had just mentioned the case of Augustus Gardner of Mas
sachusetts. He shouted that Gardner had voted for the present Speaker,
but because Gardner had voted against the rules he was deposed from
his place as chairman of the Committee on Industrial Arts and Exposi
tions. Suddenly the Speaker sprang into action and interrupted Cooper.
He asked Gardner to come forth and explain why he did not retain
his chairmanship. Gardner, called to the floor from an adjoining lobby,
came forth and explained, while Cannon smiled, that he had retired
voluntarily because he wanted to be free to speak and act as he pleased
on insurgent matters.
However, Cannon did not have much time to enjoy this victory be
cause Cooper then called upon Charles W. Fowler of New Jersey,
Victor Murdock of Kansas, and Norris, each of whom related to the
House how they were punished for opposing the autocratic rule of the
Speaker and his organization. As Cooper called each of these gentle
men, they were pushed through the crowd up to the open space before
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the dais to speak, while Cannon, leaning against the clerk's desk, "rigid
in every line of his body," turned occasionally to Vice-President Sher
man who, along with many senators, had appeared on the floor of the
House.20
Once Cooper had concluded his remarks, Cannon resumed the
Speaker's chair and explained he would rule on the point of order only
after due consideration of precedents. After the House again refused
to adjourn or recess, the Democrats amid great excitement continually
shouted, "Rule, Rule." But Cannon, once the shouting started, merely
smiled, kissed the tips of his fingers towards the Democrats, bowed
politely, and then recognized J. Warren Keifer of Ohio who spoke at
length in support of the Speaker, despite much disorder and many in
terruptions \vhich now characterized these proceedings more and
more.21
As evening turned to night and night to dawn, Cannon still refused
to make a ruling on the Norris resolution. The wordy battle raged on,
but fewer members appeared on the floor to participate. The Speaker
sought a few hours' sleep in his office, while other members did the
same at their desks, in their offices, or in the adjoining lobbies. There
were so few members on the floor during the exhausting night session
that the sergeant-at-arms and several deputies were ordered to seek
members absent without leave and bring them before the bar of the
House.
Continually the Democrats and the small insurgent group voted
against any recess or adjournment despite efforts by Republican mem
bers to achieve one or the other.22 Indeed, at times in the early morning
hours of March 18, the House of Representatives did not appear to be
in session, as the following entry in the Record indicates:
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE: The House will be in order. Gentle
men will understand the impropriety of singing on the floor, even
though the House is not at this moment transacting aoy business.
The House is not in recess.
CHORUS: "There'll be a hot time in the old town tonight."
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE: That was last night, not tonight,
(laughter). The House will be in order.
23
In a more serious vein, Norris at 5:20 A.M. proposed an adjourn
ment until noon. He felt that the group, having exemplified its princi
ple, was now wearing itself out needlessly. Ollie M. James, a Kentucky
Democrat, replied that "for the people's rule of the Congress of the
United States" he was willing to lose a night's sleep. He protested
against any concession to personal comfort which would tend to de-
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tract from the impressiveness of the object lesson they were giving the
American people of devotion to the public business.
24
At 6 A.M. Speaker Cannon returned to the House chamber. He
appeared slightly worried. His voice was not the least bit husky, and
the early morning hours were spent discussing whether less than a
quorum had the power to issue warrants empowering the sergeant-at-
arms and his deputies to bring in absent members. During this dis
cussion some members snoozed in their seats; some read the morning
papers; others gathered in small groups. Though nothing of conse
quence occurred during the morning hours on the floor, the official re
porters who had been at their posts since noon the previous day noted
that thus far they had taken down 146,000 words, more than three
times the daily average.
25
Throughout the proceedings on March 17, the galleries were filled
with an appreciative audience that overflowed into the corridors.
During the evening the entrance to the House was flanked by auto
mobiles. While the audience had thinned out in the early morning
hours of March 18, galleries once again reached capacity long before
mid-morning. Men and women prominent in the life of the nation's
capital as well as members of the families of the participants below
were on hand.26
Meanwhile, behind the scenes, three distinct compromise efforts
were made by the regular Republicans, and all were humiliatingly
rejected by the insurgent Republicans and Democrats. The first con
ference was held in Gardner's office. The proposition submitted by the
Cannon delegates called for a ten-man Rules Committee, consisting of
six Republicans and four Democrats. Nothing was said about keeping
the Speaker off the committee, though the regulars said they were
willing to make a gentleman's agreement that the Speaker would not
seek membership. The conference came to nought. The radical insur
gents insisted that the Speaker specifically be excluded from the com
mittee, though their more moderate colleagues were willing to accept
a compromise which would have postponed the operation of the elim
ination provision until after Cannon's tenure as Speaker had expired.
The only point to which all factions agreed at this first conference was
that the committee should consist of ten men.27
No sooner had the delegates filed into the House chamber than the
regulars requested another conference. This time they suggested a
fifteen-man Rules Committee, but again said nothing about the Speak
er's membership. This conference, like the first, failed to reach any
understanding and for the same reason. The insurgents and the Demo-
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crats were in accord that the Speaker must be removed from the
Committee on Rules.28
It now appeared that further negotiation was futile. Norris asserted
that a majority of between ten and fifteen votes would carry his ruling.
**We will beat them. There is no doubt of the result unless there is some
legerdemain." This prediction was endorsed by Champ Clark, the
Democratic leader. Roth men felt, indeed all participants and observers
knew, that Cannon would soon be compelled to face the issue he had
been dodging for almost twenty-four hours in the vain hope that
enough votes could be mustered to save him from humiliating defeat.
29
When the Speaker ascended to his desk just before noon he was
greeted with jeering cries of "Rule, Rule, Rule." Cannon smiled grimly
at his Democratic tormentors and announced that he would be pre
pared to rule in the near future. The delay in ruling was due to a
desperate effort by Cannon's lieutenants to secure some sort of com
promise. The Speaker's position was becoming even more precarious,
not only because the Democrats and insurgent Republicans were hold
ing their ground, but because many Republicans representing close
districts, particularly in the West, were flooded with telegrams demand
ing that they vote against Cannon for a liberalization of the rules. This
knowledge and the realization that several of his supporters would be
compelled to break ranks undoubtedly forced Cannon to seek a
compromise.
30
Thus, sometime before noon, the regulars sought another confer
ence, their final effort at compromise. This time they announced their
willingness to accept the Norris resolution, provided the sentence ex
cluding the Speaker from membership on the committee be removed.
This of course was not acceptable to Norris, Gardner, Irvine Lenroot
of Wisconsin, and E. A. Hayes of California, the insurgent delegates.
While this conference was in session, on the floor of the House of
Representatives, W. E. Martin of South Dakota moved for a recess
until 4 P.M. Champ Clark demanded a roll call and the conference
came to an abrupt end as the participants returned to the floor to vote.
On this vote the regulars defeated the insurgent and Democratic co
alition by a vote of 160 to 152, and the House recessed for two hours,
at the end of which time it was hoped the Speaker would make his
ruling.
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As soon as the recess was announced, the Democrats went into
caucus and reiterated their decision to oust the Speaker from the Com
mittee on Rules, though they decided to modify the structure of the
committee from that proposed in the Norris resolution. They consulted
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with Congressmen Dalzell, Walter I. Smith of Iowa, and John W.
Dwight of New York, all prominent Cannon aides, as to possible con
cessions to which the Speaker might agree. The aides, however, refused
to give any information as to the Speaker's intentions.
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Norris, interviewed at the start of the two-hour recess, said the de
lay in proceeding had no significance. He appeared worn and haggard,
his unshaven face was lined and pale. Yet his voice was clear and calm
and exuded confidence as he said, "If the regulars will consent to take
the Speaker off the Committee on Rules we will settle this matter in
short order after the recess." Both sides, he added, were already in
agreement upon an enlarged committee. However, during the recess
as during the earlier efforts at compromise, no side was willing to
yield on its position on the Speaker's place in relation to the commit
tee; compromise was impossible on this point. The insurgents at a
caucus during the recess reaffirmed their position. All groups realized
that the outcome would be decided on the floor.33
When the House reconvened at 4 P.M., the Speaker said he was
ready to rale. James A. Tawney of Minnesota offered a motion to post
pone the business before the House until the next day, March 19. After
brief discussion the motion was carried 163-151 with the insurgent-
Democratic coalition again in the minority.
34 After twenty-six hours in
continuous session, everyone concerned looked forward to the oppor
tunity for a night's sleep and a chance to freshen up before the final
ordeal on the morrow.
On Saturday, March 19, the House of Representatives met at noon
with more than 350 of its 391 members on hand and the galleries filled
to
capacity. As Speaker Cannon entered the chamber and ascended to
the dais, a great burst of applause and cheers arose from the Repub
lican side of the aisle and from the galleries. Cannon, with an air of
deep concern, gazed about the chamber and brought down his gavel
with a loud bang that reverberated througout the room. Reverend
Henry N. Conden offered a brief prayer. Upon its conclusion, con
versation began again, though most members remained in their seats
as the clerk read the Journal of the previous day's proceedings. As the
session started, people lined the corridors and stairways, in hope of
witnessing the conclusion of this historic struggle.
35
Cannon announced his readiness to rule on the point of order,
after the clerk again read the Norris resolution. The Speaker read his
ruling in a deliberate voice that could be heard distinctly by every
one. When Cannon proclaimed the point of order against the Norris
resolution, there was tremendous applause which soon gave way to
table-pounding on the Republican side. Insurgent Republicans and
INSURGENCY REVOLT: PART I 177
Democrats remained silent. Every seat in the press gallery was oc
cupied, while on the floor below senators were sitting or standing in
the rear.36
Before order was fully restored, Norris was on his feet shouting,
"Mr. Speaker, I appeal from the decision; and on that I move the
previous question." Dalzell immediately followed with a move to lay
the appeal on the table. This was rejected by a vote of 182 to 164,
whereupon Norris again moved the previous question on the appeal.
His motion prevailed by a vote of 183 to 160. The House was now
ready to decide on the Speaker's ruling. The decision on this crucial
question was another defeat for Cannon by a 182-162 vote. The Norris
resolution (H.R. 502) \vas now pending before the House.
During these roll calls confusion reigned. A motion to adjourn was
shouted down so vigorously that no roll call was taken. When the
results of each vote were made known the opponents of the rules
shouted and pounded. As the shouts over the defeat of DalzelFs at
tempt to table Norris' appeal pervaded the chamber, Cannon stood
motionless in his place. His set features wrere silhouetted against the
American flag behind his chair. With his opponents before him shout
ing, stamping, pounding, and applauding, Cannon presented a picture
of a doughty old warrior, magnificent in defeat.
37
During these roll calls Clark was busily preparing an amendment
incorporating the suggestions of the Democratic caucus of the previous
day. At the same time Gardner and Norris consulted with each other.
It soon became known that the insurgents and Democrats had agreed
to an amendment to the Norris resolution. It would provide for a ten-
man Rules Committee consisting of six Republicans and four Demo
crats, with representatives of each party selected by caucuses and
elected by the House. In addition, the insurgents agreed to participate
in the Republican caucus and abide by its results as to the choice of
members.38 Though many insurgents were unhappy about this amend
ment, they had no alternative but to accept it if their fight were to
accomplish anything at this time.
With his resolution pending before the House, Norris sought an
agreement dividing the time for debate. Suggestions and counter-
suggestions relating to the course that should be followed and the
parliamentary status that would apply to the consideration of the
resolution added to the confusion. Unable to reach any agreement and
with the Speaker requesting "regular order," Norris announced that
while he preferred his original resolution many of his associates fa
vored a substitute measure. Therefore he sent to the clerk's desk the
following amendment as a substitute for his original resolution:
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There shall be a Committee on Rules, elected by the House,
consisting of 10 Members, 6 of whom shall be Members of the
majority party and 4 of whom shall be Members of the minority
party. The Speaker shall not be a member of the committee, and
the committee shall elect its own chairman from its own mem
bers.
Resolved further, That within ten days after the adoption of
this resolution there shall be an election of this committee and
immediately upon its election the present Committee on Rules
shall be dissolved.39
Representative James Mann of Illinois attempted to get Norris off
the floor on the ground that his right to that privilege had expired,
but the Speaker affirmed Noms' right to hold the floor and suggested
that his resolution was in order. Norris held the floor for about an
hour, yielding to such members, including a few regulars, as desired
to be placed on record.
Champ Clark requested the floor and amid a storm of applause
proclaimed that this was not "a fight against the Honorable Joseph
G. Cannon personally," but against a system. Clark was followed
by several other speakers including Lenroot, Gronna, and Victor
Murdock. In concluding the debate Norris forcefully disavowed any
personal feeling in his efforts for the revision of the rules, stating
that
"those of us who favor this rule represent a principle here far beyond
the personality of any man or any set of men." He denied the charge
that the insurgents were anti-Republican, concluding, amidst derisive
laughter and applause, that "from every hamlet, from every fireside,
and from every farm of Republican constituents today there are going
up prayers and hopes that this resolution to change the rules of the
House will be successful here today/
7 40
The amendment was approved by a vote of 193 to 153, and the
insurgent revolution was then doubly consummated by the passage of
the Norris resolution as amended by a vote of 191 to 156. During these
roll calls the Speaker stood in his place, gavel in hand, presenting a
countenance that gave no indication of his feelings. He was under
the constant scrutiny of two thousand visitors as well as of all the
people on the floor below. Earlier he chatted with a clerk and was
seen laughing heartily. After the results were announced, Norris moved
to reconsider the vote by which his resolution was adopted and to lay
that motion on the table. Without objection, it was so ordered; the
substitute amendment now prevailed as the adopted resolution.
41
Here, as far as Norris was concerned, the insurgency revolt should
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have ended. The Speaker had been removed from the Committee on
Rules. While this was not all Norris desired, a break in the Speaker's
power had been made and further reforms at the convening of the
next session of Congress would certainly be easier to obtain. Therefore
Norris, upon the acceptance of his amendment, moved to adjourn. But
this revolution in the procedures of the House, like all revolutions,
would not proceed merely as far as its original movers desired. It soon
got out of hand. From a fight for principle it degenerated to a squab
ble over personalities, presenting dramatic scenes which made those of
the previous days pale by comparison. Norris, the more moderate in
surgents and Democrats, would be swept aside as the extreme radicals
among them gave vent to their passions, with some encouragement
from die Speaker.
Chapter 19
Insurgency Revolt: Part II
IN THE CONFUSION that followed Norris* motion to adjourn, Cannon
spoke in a calm voice. "The Speaker," he said, as if asking a favor,
"asks the indulgence of the House for not exceeding three minutes to
make a statement." Norris announced his willingness to withhold the
motion and the chamber became silent. Cannon then began a speech
that was one of the most remarkable and dramatic, if not the most
impetuous, ever delivered before the House. He reiterated his belief
in party rule and announced that his party, despite the fact that the
country believed it had a majority of forty-four members in the House,
was no longer in control. The Democratic minority, aided by "the
efforts of the so-called insurgents," was now in the majority. The
fact that he was not in harmony with the actual majority was evidenced
by the vote to create a new Committee on Rules.
Two courses were open for Cannon. One was to resign and permit
the new majority to choose a Speaker in accord with its aims and pur
poses. The other was to allow "the combination" to declare the office
vacant and elect a new Speaker, Cannon did not choose to follow the
first course because he did not want to endanger the passage of legis
lation necessary "to redeem Republican pledges and fulfill Republican
promises." More important, however, was the fact that he regarded a
resignation as "a confession of weakness or mistake or an apology for
past actions." Since he believed he had construed the rules as he
found them and as they had been construed "by previous Speakers
from Thomas B. Reed's incumbency down to the present time," he
therefore saw no need or reason to
resign.
Then Cannon threw down the gauntlet to the opposition and an
nounced that since there was "no coherent Republican majority in the
House of Representatives, therefore, the real majority ought to have
the courage of its convictions and logically meet the situation that
confronts it." Reaffirming his belief in party rule, he announced Ms
willingness, as a matter of the highest privilege under the Constitu-
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tion, to entertain a motion to vacate his office and elect a new Speaker
in accord with the wishes of the "Democratic and insurgent Members
who, by the last vote, evidently constitute a majority of this House."
What occurred next was described in the Congressional Record as
"loud and long-continued" applause on the Republican side; great con
fusion in the Hall/* 1
Amid the demonstration, J. Swager Sherley of Kentucky hurried to
converse with Oscar W. Underwood of Alabama, while Albert S.
Burleson of Texas arose waving a piece of paper and demanding recog
nition. Rushing to the Speaker's desk, Sherley shouted for adjourn
ment. Burleson shouted that his resolution should be read and Imme
diately voted upon. Other members shouted and the Speaker called
for order. He said there were matters that could take precedence over
a motion to adjourn and requested that the Burleson resolution be
read. This resolution, accepting Cannon's challenge, provided simply
"that the office of Speaker of the House of Representatives is hereby
declared to be vacant, and the House of Representatives shall at once
proceed to the election of a Speaker."
2
Up to this point Norris had remained quietly in his place at the
rear of the chamber. Now he rose, proceeded to the open space before
the Speaker's chair, and doggedly refused to give way to the Demo
crats and insurgent Republicans who came forth to offer advice. He
insisted it was only out of courtesy to the Speaker that he had with
held his motion to adjourn which should now be the business of the
House. Cannon acknowledged the validity of Norris' remarks and
called for a voice vote on the motion to adjourn. The "ayes" and
"noes" of the members all registered at the same time and only in
creased the tumult, but Cannon decided the "noes" had it and that the
House had refused to adjourn.
3
However, Norris refused to be downed so easily. Claiming that he
had never heard the announcement on the vote owing to the con
fusion, he demanded a roll call vote, whereupon Cannon requested
that all in favor of such a vote rise and be counted. Only fourteen
members, including Norris, stood. Thus the House declined to adjourn.
The insurgent Republicans were now caught between rapidly
solidifying party lines. The Republicans were determined to vindicate
Cannon, while the Democrats, with misgivings on the part of some,
rallied behind the Burleson resolution to remove the Speaker. Under
these circumstances, the insurgent ranks split asunder. The more
moderate among them, following Norris, continued to Insist their bat
tle was against the rules per se and not against Cannon, the Repub-
182 GEORGE W. NORRIS
lican party, or its legislative program. On the other hand, nine in
surgents, including four from Wisconsin and two
from Minnesota,
joined with the Democrats in the effort to depose Cannon.
4
Before the crucial vote, Cannon surrendered the chair to Sereno
Payne amid loud applause on the Republican side. He nodded and
smiled to his colleagues as he went to his office to await
the result
During this interlude Norris was busily conferring with insurgent
members, requesting and even. begging some to vote against the
Burleson resolution. All but nine of the insurgents cast their votes
against the resolution. For the first time throughout
the conflict most
of the insurgents voted in unison with their Republican colleagues.
When the 192-155 vote against the Rurleson resolution was an
nounced, almost all the Republicans arose and yelled themselves
hoarse. Some wept. Payne, after surrendering the chair to Speaker
Cannon amid a scene of wild enthusiasm, moved to adjourn and at
5:30 P.M., March 19, the House officially adjourned. Most Republicans,
however, remained in the chamber to serenade the Speaker with the
strains of "For he's a jolly good fellow." As they sang, Speaker Cannon
stepped down from the dais. Nodding and smiling, he held a recep
tion, shaking hands and receiving the good wishes of his loyal sup
porters.
5
As a result of the revolution of March 19, 1910, Norris became a
figure of national prominence. His name was intimately connected
with the proceedings in the House, his picture appeared in newspa
pers throughout the country, and his views were sought by reporters.
In the public mind he was the personification of the insurgency move
ment The press, which had been instrumental in supporting the
insurgent cause, now presented Norris as the insurgent David who
slew the tyrannical Goliath known as Cannon. As one editorial put
it:
Mr. Norris has been the real parliamentary leader at almost
every crisis when the insurgents have won a point or gained a
real victory. He has proved himself able, from the outside of the
citadel, to discover weaknesses in the entrenchments of the or
ganization, which the organization itself did not suspect. In the
present fight a fight, by the way, which was opened exactly one
year from the date when Cannon and Tammanyism won their
disastrous victory of March, 1909 he has again proved his title of
the Rupert of insurgency.
6
Interviewed after Congress adjourned, Norris claimed "a great
victory for the insurgents and the people." It would now be possible
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for the majority of the House to "work its will" on matters affecting
the nation's business. He still thought, however, that his original resolu
tion "was far superior to the one which was adopted by the House."
7
He realized that while the overthrow of Cannon represented a great
victory for democratic control of the House, "it did not place the
power where it would be exercised in the most practical and demo
cratic way." Chairmen and members of standing committees, instead
of being chosen by the Speaker, would be chosen in party caucus
where the Speaker still exercised a powerful voice and the insurgents
little or none. But Norris was aware then and later that compromise
was necessary to achieve partial reform which would make further
progress easier.
8
Speaking for the insurgents, Norris said they did not expect con
sideration when the Republican caucus met within the prescribed
ten-day period to select members of the new Rules Committee, The
insurgents did not intend to ask for representation on the committee
nor would they take action to modify the rules any further at this ses
sion. He claimed, however, that at the beginning of the next Congress
they would make a fight to deprive the Speaker of the power to ap
point standing committees.
9
When the new Committee on Rules was presented on March 25,
it was accepted unanimously. Not an insurgent Republican or an in
dependent Democrat appeared on the roster of its members; all were
appointed in party caucus, and with the exception of Cannon all former
members of the five-man committee were on the new ten-man com
mittee.10 On the surface it appeared as if a committee controlled by
the Speaker were merely doubled in size and controlled by the
Speaker's closest political friends with John Dalzell acting as chair
man. However, a revolution had occurred; a spirit of independence
had been manifested in the House and a minority of members had
dealt a severe blow at the source of the Speaker's tremendous power.
This new spirit was displayed throughout the remainder of the Sixty-
first Congress though no further radical departures from established
procedure were made. While most of the insurgents quickly entered
the progressive camp, others, like Hamilton Fish of New York, Butler
Ames and A. P. Gardner of Massachusetts, and Andrew J. Volstead of
Minnesota, returned to the regular Republican ranks. With the revolu
tion against the rules thus consummated, the members returned to
consider more mundane matters.
Six weeks after the event, Norris tried to evaluate its meaning:
"There is a freedom of action that has never existed before since I
have been a Member of Congress/' While the upheaval was far from
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a complete victory over the machine, it allowed
for more independ
ence of action than anything that had occurred for many years. Norris
admitted that the personnel of the new committee was
not satisfactory,
but, he explained, a small handful of insurgents
in a party caucus
could not control committee membership.
To the charge that the reorganized Committee on Rules
was still
in effect controlled by Cannon, Norris replied that it was not a matter
of much consequence to practical legislation. He insisted the commit
tee would not dare to present any rule that curtailed individual action
or gave the machine control over particular legislation.
"The day of
such domination," he claimed, "is absolutely over, and the Speaker
with all of his power, is not able to push such a rule through
the
Housed Ideally, he observed, his function should be similar to that of
the policeman' on the corner: "There is no danger
of the store being
robbed, so long as he is there."
n
The rules fight added to Norris' strain and tension. He was worn
out, but could not rest because he had to be on hand while the House
considered important railroad legislation. By May he was so exhausted
that he contemplated going to a sanitarium to recuperate.
12 He be
came depressed, regarding himself as something of a failure, at least
financially, and feeling that he had been unable to provide adequately
for his family. He found his existence lonely, and because of his
precarious party position, unpleasant. He disliked life in Washington
and would have welcomed a chance to leave. But he had no intention
of quitting under pressure, of "showing the white feather." If the
Nebraska voters chose to retire him, he would not regret their deci
sion; nevertheless, he intended to seek their approval in the coming
election. 13
Though the rest of the session was anticlimactic, Norris soon took a
keen interest in legislative matters and claimed that the new situation
resulted in improved legislation. As an illustration of the more relaxed
atmosphere, less than a week after the revolution Norris obtained the
floor and humorously twitted colleagues who refused to follow a com
mittee's recommendation on a bill before the House. The members
enjoyed his bantering remarks and when his time expired, it was ex
tended by unanimous consent for five minutes. He reproached the
regular Republicans who refused to follow the committee for their in
surgency. He appealed "to these young men/' saying amid laughter
and applause, "For God's sake, boys, get back on the reservation be
fore it is everlastingly and eternally too late."
14
Given this new
spirit, Norris hoped a bill providing for publicity of
campaign expenses might merit serious consideration. This matter had
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long interested him and had become urgent during the 1908 cam
paign when his opponents unscrupulously spent large amounts of
money. In the previous Congress in April, 1908, Norris had prepared
a report to accompany the first bill ever reported on this subject. The
bill, proposed by Samuel W. McCall, a conservative Republican from
Massachusetts, was referred to the Committee on Elections of Presi
dent, Vice President, and Members of Congress which held extensive
hearings. Roosevelt, Taft, Bryan, and many members of both houses
had urged Congress to take action. After long debate the committee
unanimously supported the bill and Norris was selected to prepare
the report. All these efforts came to nought because of the Speaker's
opposition. Later in the session, because of public pressure, a some
what modified version of the same bill was again introduced. With
the help of the Speaker, who suspended the rules to prevent amend
ments, it was passed, but it died in the Senate because of Democratic
opposition.
15
Early in the Sixty-first Congress McCall reintroduced the bill. It
was sent to the same committee, which again reported favorably on
it. Norris, no longer a committee member, inserted a copy of his
original report in the Record. The bill, he remarked, would go a long
way toward purifying elections. Political machines, operating under
cover of secrecy and dominated by bosses, interfered with freedom of
action by public officials and made exceedingly difficult, if not im
possible, legislation demanded by the people. These machines could
not exist, "at least to any harmful extent," if they were not supported
by secret contributions from individuals desiring to profit from the
conduct of the public servants they influenced. The "searchlight of
publicity," he thought, would soon put these machines out of business
and drive the political boss into oblivion.
Norris' opinions on this matter revealed traits characteristic of
many progressives. He had a simple solution to a complicated prob
lem which he saw in moralistic terms. He was optimistic but did not
think the bill would solve the problem completely. It was merely "a
step in the right direction" which deserved the hearty support of
those who desired "to give the people themselves the greatest possible
amount of participation in governmental affairs."
16
The bill was passed by the House and soon thereafter, with slight
modifications, by the Senate. On the last day of the session Norris
urged his colleagues to reject the conference report because the provi
sion calling for the publication of expenses prior to an election had
been removed from the House bill. By rejecting the report, he argued,
the bill itself would not be lost, as there would still be another session
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of the Congress, The bill would not lose its place on the calendar,
and might well become a better law. Congressmen, however, were in
no mood to accept this reasoning; the report was accepted and before
the day was out the emasculated bill was signed into law by President
TaftX
While Norris was not entirely in accord with this measure, he knew
that it received consideration only because of changed conditions in
the House. The new environment was also responsible for railroad
legislation with which he was in hearty agreement. In January, 1910,
at the request of the administration, Congressman James Mann in
troduced a bill enlarging the rate-making power of the Interstate
Commerce Commission and creating a commerce court to handle ap
peals from commission rulings. Included in the measure was a clause
allowing railroads to acquire competing lines.
The House, when it considered the bill in April and May, modified
it along progressive lines, favoring competition by removing the
provision allowing mergers of competing roads and by accepting
amendments for physical valuation and equitable charges to obviate
long and short haul discrimination. The House also approved a provi
sion bringing telephone and telegraph companies under the jurisdic
tion of the ICC. These amendments were carried by the Democrats
and the progressive Republicans who were recruited from the ranks of
the former insurgents. Norris, while not playing a major role in the
passage of this bill, nevertheless favored these and other strengthening
amendments. He believed the Mann-Elkins Act to be the most pro
gressive railroad measure enacted during the decade, though it at
tracted less discussion and publicity than the Hepburn Act of 1906. 18
Norris was pleased with the way the House amended the bill. Be
fore the curtailment of die Speaker's power, the bill would have passed
in its original form. Now, according to Norris, it was "the longest step
in the
right direction that has ever been taken at one time/' This step
had been achieved because interested members, including many in
surgents, had devoted at least three weeks, working day and night, to
the bill. After the House version of the bill went to the Senate, Norris
revealed how effective their efforts had been. He wrote:
Some of these most valuable amendments to this bill were of
fered by the so-called Regulars, but as a matter of fact were pre
pared by some of the Insurgents at secret sessions. Wherever we
could find any record in favor of a particular amendment that we
believed ought to be adopted, we secured its introduction by
such member, if possible, and some of these members have of-
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fered these amendments without the knowledge that the amend
ment itself was prepared and worked out by a meeting of some
of the so-called insurgents.
19
The fight for improved railroad legislation further convinced Nor-
ris that the real friends of progressive legislation in the House were the
insurgent Republicans. They were able to achieve this success only by
cooperating with Democratic members. Though the Republican party
took credit for the Mann-Elkins Act and other legislative achieve
ments, none of the progressive measures, said Norris, would have
been enacted in their final form "had it not been for the victory which
we obtained over the machine in the House, by which the atmosphere
was entirely changed and the secret, unexplainable, but yet positive
control of the Speaker and his machine was partially destroyed."
20
On June 17, at the unanimous suggestion of the Committee on
Rules, a motion was adopted, providing a calendar on which members
might register motions to discharge committees from further considera
tion of bills which had not been reported. Known as the "Discharge
Calendar/' it provided means by which a bill could be forced out of
committee. Up to this time the only way to discharge a committee was
to move to suspend the rules; such a motion could be made only on
the first and third Mondays in every month. Norris supported this
resolution, believing it another step in the direction of curtailing the
Speaker's power. He added what may be considered a peroration on
the insurgency revolt and its significance:
But for that victory we would not have this opportunity of an
other advance presented us to-day. We all know there is a change
of atmosphere in this House. There is more individual freedom
and less coercion. There is more individual liberty and less
machine control. The result is better legislation, better laws, bet
ter government. This result has been brought about, this freedom
has been obtained by the unequal, desperate, and sometimes dis
couraging fight made upon the rules by the hated and despised
insurgents. With malice toward none, without ill will or feeling
against any man, without patronage or political favor, opposed,
abused and misrepresented by members of their own party, they
have steadfastly stood for a fundamental principle of representa
tive government that was being violated in this House, and by
virtue of such violation the rights of the people were being neg
lected and sacrificed.
The good results of their bitter struggle have been apparent
for some time. Machine control in the House of Representatives is
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disappearing. There is still room for improvement, but the action
of the Committee on Rules to-day indicates that the House will
yet be its own master; and when that time comes about, the in
surgent will receive his reward. He gets considerable consolation
out of this condition here to-day, and it affords me no small
degree of satisfaction on this occasion to welcome to the insurgent
ranks practically the unanimous membership of the House. We
give you the glad hand of fellowship, and although your coming
is rather late, and it may be your action is moved in some degree
by fear of what might happen if you did not come, yet we receive
you with open arms and promise to kill the fattened calf in your
behalf.21
Thus Norris considered himself a spokesman for the insurgents
and was so regarded by friend and foe in and out of Congress. His
sudden fame must have been a bit overwhelming; it taxed his physical
stamina and burdened him with further responsibilities. Though the
possibilities for self-aggrandizement did not impress him, he soon
began to meet a wider range of people and to emerge as a prominent
progressive on the national scene. His battle against the House rules
soon expanded into a concern for issues affecting progressive politics.
In May, 1910, he spoke at a dinner of New Jersey progressives in
Newark. During the same month a California progressive requested
literature and information that could be used to help the movement in
that state. Samuel Gompers invited him to a conference early in June,
while Pinchot asked Norris to visit him. In short, before he returned to
Nebraska to campaign for re-election, Norris was entering the progres
sive fold. During the campaign he moved into their camp and there
after emerged in the upper echelons of the progressive ranks.
22
Chapter 20
Entering the Progressive Fold
EMERGING as a national figure in 1910, Norris presented a picture of a
stockily built man of medium stature with a mass of black hair flecked
with grey and a closely clipped reddish brown mustache. His appear
ance literally bespoke action. He walked briskly, talked tersely and to
the point. His chin projected aggressively and his mouth shut in a
thin fine line. His left eyebrow drooped deceptively, a result of the
old hunting accident, but the sharpness of his eyes belied any impli
cation of listlessness. He dressed simply, if not carelessly, usually in
brown or black, and his coat generally fitted badly over a pair of
muscular shoulders.
Norris gave the impression of energy personified. He had a queer
trick of pursing up his mouth to emphasize points he wished to make.
However, in personal appearance he still looked like a country lawyer.
Simple in tastes, quiet in dress, he had little to distinguish him out
wardly from other small-town business and professional men. His
favorite exercise was mowing the lawn and his favorite diversion was
reading Dickens' novels.
Whatever fame he had achieved was primarily the result of play
ing the parliamentary game against almost impossible odds. As a
master strategist, he had helped to undermine boss rule in the House.
Since believers in good government were engaged in similar struggles
throughout the country, Norris and the insurgents conveniently served
as a symbol of what a small intrepid group could accomplish. To a
generation of Americans most of whom believed that the problems
and evils in American life were not of a fundamental nature, Norris
and his fellow insurgents showed that the cure lay in the readjustment
of the mechanisms. While the reformers in the Senate stressed tariff
changes, railroad regulation, and similar social and economic issues,
the House insurgents, as previously noted, were split as soon as the
question arose of removing Cannon from the Speaker's chair. Norris
realized that the relaxation of the House rules provided freer debate.
A change in the rules was not a panacea but merely an initial step,
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necessary to the full and free confrontation of important social and
economic problems.
Despite his sudden prominence Norris remained noticeably unaf
fected. He did not speak frequently, but when he arose from his seat
in the southeast section of die House chamber in the "Cherokee
Strip/' a Republican pocket amid the abandoned society of Democrats,
members listened attentively. Though he appeared to be an average
man, and though his actions were not as enthusiastic and emotional as
Victor MurdocFs, no one doubted that he was a legislator of superior
ability.
When not on the floor, Norris spent most of his time in his office, a
cigar in his mouth and his heels on the desk. It was there that he
pondered the question whether to be a candidate for a fifth term or to
seek the Republican senatorial nomination from incumbent E. J.
Burkett. From his arrival in Washington in December, 1909, to his
departure at the end of June, 1910, Norris was besieged with requests
to become a candidate in the senatorial primary. In the beginning he
was noncommittal, though he did ask friends to sound out sentiment
and keep him abreast of it. He soon learned that Burkett was regarded
by progressive Republicans as a mere opportunist, "slippery and slimy
Elmer/' and that unless the party nominated a progressive candidate,
almost any prominent Democrat, such as Bryan or Congressman Hitch
cock, "could wipe the earth with Elmer/' 1
The appearance of Burkett clubs which passed resolutions criticiz
ing the insurgent movement angered Norris in February almost to the
point of committing himself as a senatorial candidate. "If my in
surgency is to be a test of my Republicanism," he was quoted as say
ing, "then I think the sooner we know where we stand the better."
Since the primary law permitted voters to express their preference for
United States senator, Norris thought seriously of entering the race,
though personally, he confessed, he preferred to stay out of the fight.
2
While he continued to express distaste for life in Washington, he
also insisted that he could not retire or pursue a course that would
show any indication of backing down or of cowardice. If he decided
for a Senate seat, he intended to delay announcing his decision to
keep the primary campaign as short and as inexpensive as possible.
This indecision kept the political picture in Nebraska in a state of
constant confusion, while Norris, exhausted, depressed, lonely, and
ill, mulled the matter over in big mind.3
By June, Norris still had not announced his decision, but he had
been talking the matter over with his
"insurgent brethren." Almost
without exception they urged him to be a candidate for the House and
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not the Senate. He also discussed the problem with people outside of
Congress, among them Gifford Pinchot. Their advice was practically
the same. While all of his confidants invariably said they would have
liked to see him in the Senate, they also claimed that because of his
role in the rules fight he should remain in the House at least one more
term. His district, they said, would be watched by the entire country.
When the issue was presented as a challenge to ascertain whether peo
ple approved of the insurgents* course, Norris decided it was his duty
to seek a fifth term as a
representative.
4
He arrived at this decision in Washington in mid-June, less than
two weeks before Congress adjourned. Once it was made, he decided
to speak for progressive candidates in some western states before
returning to Nebraska and his own campaign. Leaving Washington,
Norris felt certain that he would be re-elected in November. The
promise of the coming campaign restored- his mental outlook and al
leviated his mood of depression. Though physically exhausted and
desperately in need of a vacation, Norris nevertheless felt that he
could thrive on campaigning, especially since he had an important
issue to present.
5
Believing that the welfare and success of the Republican party
depended upon progressive members, he was determined to do Ms
part by campaigning for such candidates. He also believed that an
organization should be established with this purpose in mind. Thus,
after speaking in New York State and elsewhere in the East, early in
July Norris departed on a speaking trip through Kansas, Colorado,
and Wyoming, and his secretary thought he might also campaign in
Oklahoma, Washington, and North Dakota.
6
On July 12, 1910, Norris' youngest daughter, Gertrude, was quaran
tined for scarlet fever. Her serious illness cut short his speaking trip.
He returned to McCook to be with his family and to get a brief rest
before launching his own campaign. McCarl was anxious to get Mm
home, and wanted Norris to visit with friends, editors, and politicians
throughout the district before campaigning began early in the fall
Since Norris was the only Republican candidate to enter the con
gressional primary, no campaign would be necessary until Septem
ber.7
As Republican county conventions chose delegates for the state
convention, many also passed resolutions endorsing Norris and Ms
role in attacking Cannonism. Because of the quarantine period, Nor
ris did not expect to attend the state convention at Lincoln at the
end
of July, though he was anxious for it to adopt a resolution condemning
Cannonism.8
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Progressive Republicans feared that there would be an effort to
make the state convention "stand pat" and that Burkett and his fol
lowers would try to prevent an endorsement of Morris' work in Can-
gress. Thus progressive hopes soared when on the afternoon of July
25 it was announced that the danger period was just about over and
that Morris would be temporarily released from quarantine. Monday
evening he boarded the train with the Red Willow County delegation
for the convention which would convene the next morning in Lin
coln.9
At the convention he was defeated by Senator Morris Brown for
the position of permanent chairman. The conservative Republican
press claimed this setback as a great victory for their cause. Since
Morris arrived only a short time before the convention convened and
made no serious effort to obtain the post, his defeat was no indication
that the delegates were conservative. When John L. Webster, the at
torney for the Omaha Street Railway Company and a standpatter, was
placed at the head of the Platform Committee, progressive delegates
thought that machine control would prevent any endorsement of
Morris* work. But Morris himself prevented this from happening. By
passing the Platform Committee, he secured recognition from the
unsuspecting chairman, Morris Brown, and introduced from the floor
a resolution condemning Cannonism and at the same time pledging
Nebraska Republicans to the support of the insurgent cause. This
resolution, which caught Burkett, Rosewater (editor of the Omaha
Bee), and other standpat leaders offguard, was passed by an over
whelming majority and clearly indicated the temper of most Nebraska
Republicans.
10
As soon as he returned from Lincoln, Morris went back into
quarantine for more than two weeks. McCarl returned to his cam
paign preparations and noted with some dismay the increased out-of-
state mail. He knew that the National Republican Congressional
Committee would not aid Morris with funds and that the state com
mittee would supply little or no aid. Therefore he requested office
holders in the district to send contributions direct to the congressional
committee.11
Morris had been too busy with his own affairs to follow Theodore
Roosevelt's activities as he prepared for his western trip. On August
23, the day Roosevelt started his trip, Samuel Merwin, the editor of
Success Magazine in New York, wrote to Morris:
I suppose you know by this time about what is coming from
T. R. in his western speeches. Have you seen a copy of his
ENTERING THE PROGRESSIVE FOLD 193
Osawatomie speech? Confidentially, I read it through last week.
While it is sometimes hard to tell from a manuscript just how it
is going to sound when it is uttered and started around in the
papers, it read to me like one of the most terrific progressive in
surgent broadsides we have had so far. Apparently T. R. forced
by circumstances as well as by his own temperament into the
ranks of the progressives is going about it with his characteristic
vigor to try and take the lead on the right side.
12
Norris, however, did not take notice of Roosevelt's famous speech.
Nor did he attend the Roosevelt speech in Omaha several days later;
Norris, who had been invited to attend, was speaking in Wisconsin
on behalf of La Follette and other progressive candidates whom he
had promised to help "in the event the battle became too strong."
13
Almost all of Norris" speeches during the campaign were on Can-
nonism, a subject of great interest to his audience. It was an ideal
topic because it could be presented as a nonpartisan discussion or ex
planation or, with very little effort, as a partisan campaign speech.
Though John M. Nelson, an insurgent colleague, later criticized Nor
ris on the grounds that he "placed himself decidedly in the front seat"
and did not mention Nelson's own role in the fight, Norris' speeches
and those of other prominent progressives were eminently successful
in achieving their main goal that of assisting La Follette, He was
renominated in the September primary by a majority of over 102,000
votes.14
Norris left Wisconsin on September 3 to speak at a rally in Min
neapolis on September 5. From there he went on to Nebraska. En
route he was injured slightly in a railroad accident. Though he was
hardly up to it, he left McCook on September 14, to begin his own
intensive campaign. Norris now refused all out-of-state speaking re
quests, including one from Hiram W. Johnson, the progressive Repub
lican candidate for governor of California. He remained in Nebraska
busily campaigning until election day.
15
Following his usual pattern, Norris generally traveled alone to
meetings, stayed at the local hotel, and conferred with local leaders
and citizens. McCarl remained in McCook, directing and coordinating
the over-all campaign. Toward the end of September he wrote, "Con
ditions are splendid all over the district." He felt certain that disgrun
tled and disappointed Republicans would still vote for party can
didates and that some Democrats would be likely to cross party lines
and vote for Norris. In this campaign there was none of the anxiety
and distress so prevalent in 1908.
16
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The 1910 campaign in Nebraska was complicated by the liquor
issue which disturbed many voters and which Norris avoided in his
speeches. When Governor Shallenberger in 1909 signed a law requir
ing all saloons to close at 8 P.M., he lost all
chance of renomination.
James C. Dahlman, the colorful ex-cowboy mayor
of Omaha and a
strong opponent of liquor legislation, obtained
the Democratic nomina
tion and campaigned by promising the voters free beer on the Capitol
grounds at the time of inauguration. His opponent
Chester H. Aldrich
supported the Republican plank calling for county option.
The Anti-
Saloon League gave its support to Aldrich,
while Bryan refused to
support Dahlman because of his "wet" position. Bryan,
a temperance
man, favored county option and campaigned for the entire Democratic
ticket, except the nominee for governor. The fact that many voters
planned to split their tickets because of the liquor question probably
benefited Norris by giving him many Democratic votes.
17
Norris' meetings were well attended and his speeches well re
ceived. As McCarl noted, "When given an opportunity to get the facts
before the people, he usually leaves with more friends than he had
prior to his talk." Norris worked hard at campaigning, speaking twice
a day for several weeks towards the end of October. But this time he
had significant help. While Senator A. B. Cummins of Iowa spoke on
three consecutive days at Hastings, Holdrege, and McCook, Con
gressmen Madison and Murdock from Kansas each devoted two full
days to speaking at various points throughout the district.
18
The major criticism hurled against Norris by R. D. Sutherland, also
his opponent in 1906, and other Democratic speakers was the fact that
he did not vote for the Burleson resolution to unseat Speaker Cannon.
Norris, of course, always discussed this matter and explained his posi
tion. According to McCarl, once this had been done, the voters in
variably approved his course. The Omaha Daily News aided consider
ably by publishing an editorial explaining his position on the Burleson
resolution.19
On the other hand, James A. Tawney, who was in Nebraska in
October, saw an account of one of Norris* speeches and was shocked
to read that Norris had said Burleson presented a motion to depose
the Speaker "after a conference with Representative Tawney, one of
Cannon's chief supporters." Tawney claimed that this statement was
"absolutely and unqualifiedly false" and hoped that he would correct
the impression created by this misstatement of fact. Tawney's letter
indicates that Norris may have been embellishing speeches to drama
tize his position.
20
To prevent Irish-American citizens from voting the straight Demo-
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cratic ticket merely to support Dahlman's "wet" position, McCarl
asked former Congressman J. J. McCarthy to speak in the district at
the close of the campaign. McCarthy gladly accepted.
21
Norris maintained his stamina and voice throughout the entire
campaign. A week before its ending he spoke for almost two hours at
a small town in Nuckolls County, and those who attended, Democrats
and Republicans alike, said it was the best talk they had ever heard.
Then on November 3, five days before election, the Nebraska news
papers printed a strong endorsement of Norris from Senator La Fol-
lette, thus undermining Sutherland's charges that Norris was not a true
progressive like La Follette. And Congressman Murdock informed
Norris that his name had been mentioned in at least eighty-six of the
ninety-one speeches he had delivered since leaving Washington. By
continuing to fight to change "the vicious system of personal control"
in the House, the insurgency revolt, said Murdock, would become "not
a passing incident in politics, but epochal in the history of American
legislation."
22
Norris returned to McCook on November 7, election eve, and
closed his campaign in the Masonic Temple Theater that evening.
Norris received a great ovation from the capacity crowd and was
visibly affected by the tribute paid him. A visitor claimed that Nor-
ris* speech was equal, if not superior, to any given by Senator
Beveridge. Norris had now done his part of the job; it remained for
the voters to do theirs.23
The results of the 1910 election in Nebraska gave neither party
a decisive victory. Aldrich was elected governor and Republican can
didates won all available executive offices. Hitchcock, however, de
feated Burkett by almost twenty thousand votes in the preference
vote for United States senator, and the Democrats also won a majority
in both houses of the state legislature and elected their congressional
candidates from three districts. Republican candidates were successful
in the fourth, fifth, and sixth congressional districts. Norris rolled up
a substantial majority in the Fifth District, defeating Sutherland by
slightly more than four thousand votes. He carried all but three of the
eighteen counties in the district.
24
In McCook, where almost one thousand votes were cast, less than
two hundred were registered against Norris. He was elated with his
victory since it showed that his constituents approved his course in
Congress, but was cautioned against any celebration because there
were "too many Republican funerals in the country to make any
demonstration." 25 In the House the Democrats won a majority of
sixty-three seats, while reducing the Republican majority in the Senate
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from twenty-eight to eight. The Democrats also elected governors
in
many traditionally Republican states including
New York, Connec
ticut, Massachusetts, Maine, and New Jersey, where Woodrow Wilson
embarked on his political career. Only in the West, where
the progres
sive movement was rampant, ad the Republican parry hold its own.
Despite the one outstanding progressive
defeat that of Albert J.
Beveridge Miles Poindexter of Washington, John
D. Works of Cali
fornia, and Norris' former Washington neighbor and colleague, Asle
J. Gronria of North Dakota all entered the
Senate and enabled the
progressive membership of that body to hold the
balance of power.
Though Republican leaders expected to suffer reverses
in 1910, no
one was prepared for the magnitude of the defeat. Only
two of the
numerous candidates endorsed by Roosevelt were elected to office.
Indeed, only the Democratic party could obtain solace from
the results
of the 1910 elections.
After the election Norris admitted to intimates that he regretted his
decision not to enter the senatorial race. He did not comment upon his
future course, but was pleased with suggestions that he enter the next
senatorial race.26
Since the lame duck session of the Sixty-first Congress was sched
uled to convene early in December, Norris was able to spend little
time in Nebraska before returning to Washington. His congressional
career, which at the outset of 1910 seemed doomed to frustration and
oblivion, now seemed to have vast potential as a result of the in
surgency revolt and his re-election. Members in the coming session
would greet a new, optimistic Norris a national figure, interested in
a wide range of reforms, whose advice and services were sought by
progressives throughout the country. The election of 1910 had demon
strated the progressive temper of the citizens of Nebraska and other
western states. Victory assured Norris that the voters approved his
course and would support him in demanding further reforms. Victory
convinced him that with the assistance of a few devoted, hard-working
men he could handily defeat a Democratic opponent and surmount
opposition in his own party despite his inadequate funds. It also as
sured him more than ever of his ability to win the senatorial seat.
Thus when he left McCook, Norris was much more than the repre
sentative of Nebraska's Fifth Congressional District. He was a symbol,
soon to become a spokesman as well, for progressive-minded citizens
throughout the United States.
Chapter 21
The Insurgent as Progressive
LESS THAN a month after the election, Norris was in Washington for
the short session of the Sixty-first Congress. Any hopes he may have
had for a leisurely session were quickly shattered. The breach in the
Republican party was already too large to permit any easy reconcilia
tion of the opposing factions, and during this session further issues and
events would widen the gap. Believing that he would return to Mc-
Cook in March, Norris did not bring his family and took a room at
the Y.M.C.A. His secretary again remained in McCook tending to Ms
law practice and intending to keep Norris informed of political devel
opments, real estate matters, and investment possibilities. When the
House was in session, Norris usually spent the forenoon in his office,
the afternoon in the House, and the evenings working in his office or
relaxing in the Y.M.C.A. swimming pool.
1
The House convened at noon on December 5, 1910. A week later
Norris spoke on a measure providing for an inheritance tax in the
District of Columbia. He proclaimed an inheritance tax the fairest
way to raise revenue and stated that it could prevent the amassing
of large fortunes which most progressives "admitted to be detrimental
to good government if kept up for several generations."
2
Throughout
his long career Norris took advantage of every opportunity to speak in
favor of an inheritance tax, gaining acceptance of his views only once,
during the Wilson administration.
Though deprived of his patronage by the president, Norris thought
he foresaw a reconciliation when early in the session he suggested that
Taft appoint a Nebraska jurist to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court.
Norris sent information about several Nebraska candidates, but all
attempts at harmony between the two men ended when Taft ap
pointed a conservative, Willis Van Devanter of Wyoming, to
fill the
post
3
Norris continued to expound his views on judicial matters. On
January 25, 1911, the House was considering
an amendment that
sought to raise the salary of federal circuit judges from $7,000 to
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$855GO. Norris opposed the measure, arguing that the increase
would
elevate judges to a higher station in society, encouraging
them "to
forget human rights and human liberties." He believed that
the present
salary was sufficient to enable a judge to be independent of any in
terest or financial consideration. Norris summarized his views, derived
from his own experience as a judge, as follows:
Our judges should be absolutely independent of every outside
influence and of everything which might have a tendency to in
any way interfere with their official duties. They are the most
important public officials of our Government. They should
be
absolutely free and unbiased, so that they can weigh the evidence
and decide litigation alike between the rich and the poor, the
high and the low. They should never be so far removed from
the
people from the common, struggling citizens
that they will
forget the just and fair rights of any litigant. The judges' salaries
should be sufficient to keep them from want, from privation, from
hardship, and to give them all the necessities and all of the reason
able luxuries of life. The salary should never be so high as to
attract any man on account of its money consideration alone. The
best judge, as well as the best citizen, is the man who realizes that
money alone can not bring satisfaction or happiness; that the
rights of property, while the same should be protected according
to the
spirit of the law, should never be permitted to outweigh
or to cover up the rights of the individual. Men whose life work
and whose life study have been in the direction of an under
standing of the law and the principles of equity and justice, and
who follow such lines because they love it and not for the money
there is in it, are the men in whose hands the scales of justice
should be placed.
4
So persuasive was Norris and so economy-minded was the House
that the amendment was defeated. But his interest in the federal
judiciary did not end with these remarks. When the president con
sidered Walter I. Smith, one of the staunchest regulars in the House,
to succeed Van Devanter on the Circuit Court of Appeals, E. H. Madi
son of Kansas suggested Norris as a suitable candidate.
5 Madison
talked with Taft and asked McCarl to send recommendations show
ing that Norris had been fair and fearless on the Nebraska bench,
meting out justice to litigants regardless of their financial or social
condition. Madison received a large number of recommendations,
including one from the entire Supreme Court of Nebraska, but, as was
expected, the president nonetheless named Smith to the post.
6
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Throughout these hurried negotiations, Norris did nothing to en
courage Ms candidacy. His friends suggested his name because they
did not wish to have another conservative on the federal bench, and
because they did not want the administration to have the excuse once
again that no progressive candidates were available. Norris' candidacy
was an effort on the part of the progressives to dramatize an issue, suc
cinctly stated by Senator Cummins, who wrote; "Why send progres
sive men to Congress to enact progressive measures, when the Interests
may rely upon the Federal Bench to give them relief when those
progressive measures come before the courts for judicial construc
tion?" 7
Reactions to the judgeship issue varied. Some were sorry Norris was
not appointed, while others rejoiced because he could now run for
senator. Many felt that the progressives' purpose in suggesting his
name was to counter the president's nominee with a better one from
their wing of the party, thus challenging Taffs announced intention
of treating equally all groups within the Republican party.
8
Norris was a passive and silent judicial candidate in part because
he was involved in another skirmish with the standpat element in the
House. On January 5, he introduced two resolutions amending the
House rules. One proposed a revolutionary reform by making the
proceedings and votes of every committee of the House available to
the public, thereby preventing committees from evading responsibility
by tiirottling bills. The other was designed to remedy a defect in the
"motion to discharge" rule, thereby preventing the clogging of the
calendar. Both bills were sent to the Committee on Rules, though
neither was presented on the floor.
9
Several days later, on January 9, the insurgent position seemingly
received a setback, when Charles E. Fuller, a regular Republican from
Illinois, presented an amendment to one of the rules. When challenged
that the resolution was not in order, he claimed for it the constitu
tional privilege that had been previously accorded the Norris resolu
tion. Speaker Cannon in effect repeated his ruling of March 19, 1910,
that the resolution was not in order. In this instance he was sustained
by a rousing 235-53 vote, with all of the insurgents, none of whom
participated in the discussion, voting with the minority
and most of the
Democrats not voting, though Oscar Underwood, who played a promi
nent role in the insurgency revolt, voted with the majority to sustain
the Speaker.
10
While Cannon and his supporters claimed that this vote was a
vindication of their position, Norris prepared a statement
which
claimed that none of the rules enacted in 1910 had been abrogated.
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Though the 235-53 vote was indeed a setback, he vowed that the
fight "tor progressive American principles in legislation" would con
tinue. The attacks on the rules during this short session, he thought,
were inspired by a small group of the "old guard" with a view to dis
crediting the accomplishments of 1910. He claimed that the Demo
crats, who supported Cannon in this ruling, were playing politics.
11
If Cannon experienced vindication early in January, by mid-
January he experienced further defeat. The fight developed from an
attempt to utilize a rule that gave the House the power at specific
times to discharge a committee from further consideration of a bill.
The insurgents and Democrats believed that this ruling, which had
been enacted in the second session of the sitting Congress, was iron
clad that, as soon as the consideration of bills by unanimous consent
had been concluded on every first and third Monday of the month, the
House was then bound to consider motions to discharge committees
from the custody of specific bills. Cannon declared that the rule did
not make it mandatory for the House to take up such motions, but
simply made them in order if the House wanted to consider them.
When the vote was taken on January 16 on the appeal from Cannon's
decision, twenty-two insurgents and all but one of the Democrats
present voted against the Speaker. The attempt to sidetrack discharge
motions was rejected by a vote of 145-126.
12
Since the rules received much attention during this short session,
Norris took the opportunity on the first anniversary of the start of the
insurgency revolt, Saint Patrick's Day, to prepare a strong statement.
Claiming that the victory did more to make the House a truly repre
sentative body than any other incident in the history of Congress, he
asserted that it was "a fight between representative government and
machine control, a conflict between the people and the Special Inter
ests." He noted that now there was growing sentiment "for more pub
licity in governmental affairs and for a higher standard of efficiency
in public officials." The growing acceptance of the initiative and
referendum, the widespread demand for direct election of delegates
to national conventions and of United States senators, were indications
that the
"great progressive movement" was surging forward and
would continue until the reins of government were restored to the
people. He also decried partisanship by asserting that "patriotic public
service" was more to be desired than
"party solidarity." This anniver
sary statement was one of the earliest public pronouncements of his
growing awareness that he was more a progressive than a Repub
lican.13
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Along with other prominent progressive Republicans, Norris
helped to form the National Progressive Republican League, in Jan
uary, 1911, with the avowed object of promoting popular government
and progressive legislation. As an indication of his new status, Norris
was chosen first vice president of the organization, which was headed
by Senator Jonathan Bourne of Oregon and had among its members
Senator Brown and Governor Aldrich of Nebraska. At the outset the
league unofficially served as a rallying point for opposition to President
Taft and his standpat supporters in Congress.
14
Nebraskans reacted favorably to the creation of this organization
and to Norris' official position in it. His prominence continued to grow
in progressive Republican circles. He was chosen to deliver a eulogy
in Congress honoring the memory of the later Senator Dolliver. Thus
in the last session of the Sixty-first Congress, he continued to be the
outstanding progressive leader in the House.
15
Norris devoted much time and energy to legislative problems.
Since the session would be the last during Taft's term in which the
Republicans would control Congress, the administration made greater
efforts than usual to enact its legislative program.
Important to Nebraskans was proposed legislation to establish a
parcel post system. Many opposed the plan because they thought
"it would foster the development of an enormous trust, create an op
pressive monopoly, destroy the propeiity of all country towns,
se
riously injure tens of thousands of jobbers and country merchants,
drain the rural communities of their capital and population, aggravate
the evils of centralized wealth and congested cities, and benefit no
one but the great retail mail order houses in the big cities, and the
express companies." The farmer's local market, they argued, would be
destroyed, and with it would go his educational, social, and religious
benefits as well. Realty values would decline and further taxation
would be thrown upon already overburdened shoulders. Retail mail
order houses would benefit enormously, but country merchants and
farmers would face financial ruin as well as loss of their way of life.
16
Agitation against parcel post mounted rapidly during the short
ses
sion and reached a climax in the following Congress when a parcel
post measure was enacted into law.
Norris kept the criticisms in mind,
but argued that if the system took distance into account
most of the
difficulties could be obviated. If the charge were in proportion to cost
and took into account the weight of the parcel and the distance it
traveled, he thought the doom of the farmers and rural merchants
would not materialize. Furthermore, a fair parcel post system would
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lower exorbitant rates charged by express companies which, accord
ing to a report of the ICC made an average profit of 50 per cent of all
invested capital in 1909.
1T
In this session, as in the past, Norris voted against the annual addi
tion of two battleships for the navy. The custom of adding two ships
per year was inaugurated by Roosevelt to keep the navy at fighting
strength and to provide for the scrapping of obsolete vessels. While
Norris believed in a moderate naval increase, he thought it more urgent
that the government devote its attention and funds to agreements for
arbitration treaties. He thought the time was ripe for the United States
to propose to other civilized nations an agreement to arbitrate all fu
ture difficulties. Both progressives and standpatters were divided on
these issues and there had never been any concrete attempt to unite
them.18
Concerning military affairs, Norris favored the national guard
rather than a large standing army, though he never gave the matter
very careful scrutiny.
19 He became more involved with military mat
ters and took stronger stands on them as conditions in Mexico dete
riorated during the last months of the Diaz regime. Norris insisted on
strict neutrality, denying that the president had any legal right to use
the army or his official position to influence Mexican affairs. "The fact
that the armies in the field are destroying property such as railroads,
mines, etc., in which citizens of our country have a financial interest,"
Norris explained, "ought to have no effect whatever upon the course
our Government should take." He maintained that since the destruc
tion of property was a legitimate method of warfare, citizens invest
ing in foreign countries always took the risk of war and must abide by
its results. The private citizen, not the government, was involved.20
The major piece of business before this session was the reciprocity
agreement with Canada which was sent to Congress on January 26,
1911. In negotiating it was agreed that reciprocity would be effected
by concurrent legislation in both countries instead of by a treaty. The
proposed legislation would admit nearly all agricultural products
except wool without duty. A few minerals, as well as iron and steel
plates and wire, were also on the free list, while innumerable manu
factured items would move across the border at reduced rates which
would be identical in either direction. Generally speaking, the free
list included raw materials imported by the United States. The sched
ule provided American publishers with cheaper newsprint by calling
for free paper and wood pulp, and thereby assured a base of popular
support for the arrangement
21
Norris opposed this measure because he considered it unfair to
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the farmer's interests. It removed
agricultural tariff protection without
reducing the farmer's costs. Free trade for the farmer and not for
the manufacturer seemed to Norris to be another example of dis
crimination against the rural regions. He could not see why America
should not be protected from Canada as well as from any other coun
try. A rate that assured the difference in the production cost of the
article imported, with perhaps a small profit to die American producer,
ought to be applied to all articles subject to tariff legislation, regard
less of country of origin.
22
At the outset Norris was alone in his opposition to Canadian
reciprocity. The Nebraska newspapers, and all of Nebraska's congres
sional delegates except Norris, were in favor of it. It was pushed
through the House on February 14, by gag-rule tactics, with no op
portunity to offer amendments, little chance to comment, and, unlike
the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, with Democratic support. Norris protested,
wishing to send the measure back to committee with instructions
to put on the free list some of the farmer's necessities. His protest was
to no avail; the bill easily passed the House by a vote of 221-93.
Among the former insurgent members, eighteen favored it and nine,
including Norris, opposed it. The measure carried because of Demo
cratic support. The majority of Republicans voting on the measure
opposed it.
23
Unable to express his opposition on the floor, Norris had his
lengthy remarks inserted in the Appendix to the Congressional Record.
Since the House had already agreed to a bill providing for a perma
nent nonpartisan tariff commission which would determine the dif
ference in cost of similar articles produced at home and abroad, he
thought the commission could aid in determining rates that would be
applicable to all nations alike.
As an agrarian, he insisted that danger to American institutions
would surely come if legislation helped to decrease rural population
and drive more people into already overcrowded cities. Indicating his
connection with nineteenth-century rural America, a bond he had in
common with many progressives, Norris added:
But it is also in the city that we have the slum and the breeding
places of anarchy, ignorance, and crime. It is there we have the
mob. It is in the city that we have the machine politician and the
political boss, where, by organization and machine control, the
elective franchise is seriously interfered with. On the other hand,
upon the farms are located the conservative, patriotic, and think
ing voters of our country. Uninfluenced by the machine control or
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the political boss, they are the balance wheel in our form of gov
ernment. In time of danger and in time of war we lean with
confidence and pride upon the strong arm and the willing and
patriotic heart of the American farmer,
24
He could not comprehend why the United States should surrender
markets for the advantage and development of the Canadian economy
at the expense of the American farmer. He suggested that "the in
stigators of this plan" might have framed it as a punishment to that
portion of the country whose Republican representatives had the
courage to protest the high schedules in the prevailing Payne-Aldrich
Tariff.25
He ordered 25,000 copies of this speech from the Government
Printing Office and had them sent to McCook for distribution. The
job of informing Nebraska's farmers would be difficult, since all the
large daily papers, sympathetic to either free trade or free newsprint,
favored the measure. Yet the fact that Norris stood alone would
make it easier for him to expound his position because voters would
want to know what prompted his opposition.26
Nebraska farmers, however, would have ample time to obtain an
understanding of the reciprocity agreement. While the measure
quickly passed the House, it immediately ran into trouble in the upper
chamber where standpat qualms and progressive opposition grew
rapidly, provoking a swell of senatorial oratory that did not abate in
time for a vote to be taken before the session ended on March 4.
Taft, to save reciprocity, was forced to call a special session and to
hope that the Democrats would continue their support of the measure.
The president's inability to obtain its passage during the third session
of the Sixty-first Congress assured opponents of the measure an op
portunity to educate their rural constituents to its inequities.
Because the short session presented a major legislative issue that
had not been resolved, members of Congress looked forward to a sum
mer of fervid debate in hot, humid Washington. The debate on
reciprocity pushed Norris further into the progressive camp, led him
to despise intense partisanship, and convinced him that reconciliation
with the Taft administration was impossible.
Comic relief to the serious doings of Congress was provided for
Norris by the condemnation and censure he received from the Society
for the Protection of Poodle Dogs in the District of Columbia. On
February 5 he delivered an impromptu address before an audience of
young men in the Washington Y.M.C.A. He reflected on his blissful
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domestic condition and advised his audience in favor of marriage. He
claimed "To be a husband and a father is the noblest ambition of
every male human being/' Following Theodore Roosevelt, he believed
that young men who wanted to do good for their country and human
ity must marry and raise children. "Of all the joys that life can give,"
he said, "the baby is the best." 27 He observed, however, that many
wealthy people were raising more poodle dogs than children, and
related the following incident with irony and humor.
Walking along Connecticut Avenue one day he saw a well-dressed
woman come out of a luxurious mansion and enter a
carriage. In her
arms she carried a beautiful poodle, "all decked out in ribbons, trin
kets and flowers/1' Norris pitied this wealthy woman who, he supposed,
was childless and therefore wasted her affection on a poodle. But
soon the door of the mansion opened again and a maid emerged wheel
ing a baby carriage. Norris assumed from the baby's clothes that it
was the child of the woman who had just departed. First he felt sorry
for the child, but upon reflection he shifted his sympathy to the
poodle because under the circumstances the baby seemed to be in the
best company. Poodles, he believed, should never replace children.
"Too often in America today rich women care nothing for their off
spring, but would rather bestow their foolish affection on pets that
amount to nothing." Few wealthy mothers, Norris concluded, gave
their first and best thought to their children.
28
This address aroused an immediate and violent response from
wealthy women and poodle-lovers all over the country. Washington's
leading matrons unanimously condemned Norris and defended their
pets. The male president of the Washington Kennel Club stepped into
the breach and praised socially prominent women and their lap dogs,
declaring, "If more men would attend to their children as they should,
we would not hear so much of this talk of the American home being
ruined/' To protect himself Norris contemplated moving out of
Washington and taking other precautions to escape the crowd of
women and dogs pursuing him.
29
As humorous as this incident may seem, it shows that Norris* re
marks were seldom without purpose. In this case he was condemning
conspicuous wealth, a social phenomenon at odds with his progressive
views and rural values. Later efforts along these lines would usually
be more political and pertinent in their application. However, whether
the tenor of Norris' statements was serious or humorous, he seldom
failed to inform his listeners.
When Congress adjourned on March 4, 1911, he quickly returned
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to McCook and his family. All plans for an extended vacation had
to be shelved when Taft announced his intention of calling the new
Congress into special session to consider the unresolved Canadian
reciprocity agreement. Hopes for a brief vacation, as well, were dis
sipated shortly after his return to Nebraska.
Chapter 22
Widening the Breach
THE Sixty-second Congress, Norris* last as a member of the House,
was called into a special session on April 4, 1911, by President Taft
The new Congress would convene exactly one month after the old one
had expired, giving Norris about three weeks in McCook. Instead of
resting, he worked ten and twelve hours a day on a matter he planned
to introduce in the coming session. McCarl thought he looked "like
thunder, worse if anything than he did at the close of the [1910] cam
paign/* Home cooking and the pleasure of his family's company
brought some improvement, but Norris was not well. Friends were
worried that the special session would "get him" if he did not pay
more attention to his health.1
Though he would not openly admit it, Norris too was concerned.
After his return to Washington, he confided to a doctor that he had
begun to realize he was on the verge of a nervous breakdown as a
result of four years of overwork without an extended vacation and
under intense political pressure.
2
His worries about his health and his eagerness to participate in the
burgeoning progressive movement created mixed feelings about
spending the entire summer in Washington. He thought the Demo
crats, rather than accept reciprocity, would attempt a revision of the
tariff to embarrass the administration still further. Moreover, he was
not sure whether the Democrats expected to appoint all the House
committees and proceed with general legislation or whether the work
of the special session would be confined exclusively to the reciprocity
measure. He planned for the former but hoped for the latter. Prior to
his return to Washington he had a severe attack of lumbago which
forced him to relinquish the few engagements he had made while in
Nebraska.3
Fortunately Norris recovered rapidly and was able to leave Mc
Cook at the end of March in time to attend a meeting of progressive
Republicans called by John M. Nelson for the afternoon of April 3.
The term
"insurgent" had been replaced by "progressive" in Nelson's
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invitation, and soon fell into disuse as the latter term was felt to be
more inclusive. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss and, if pos
sible, agree upon some plan of action with reference to the caucus, the
choice of a minority leader, committee assignments, and other mat
ters.4
When the first session of the Sixty-second Congress convened on
Tuesday, April 4, the small band of progressive Republican members
were determined to continue the fight for improved parliamentary
procedures and better legislation. During this Congress the Demo
crats had a majority in the House, and Champ Clark replaced Can
non as Speaker. At their initial meeting the progessive Republicans
decided not to oppose the candidacy of James R. Mann for minority
leader. Norris had the highest regard for Mann even though he had
been a devoted Cannon supporter in the rules fight. One of the hardest
workers and best parliamentarians in the House, Mann was always
scrupulously fair, though he rarely displayed any inclination to be
lenient during partisan controversy.
5
The Senate, however, was still controlled by the Republicans.
Though its progressive ranks were seriously depleted by the defeat of
Beveridge and the death of Dolliver, a new group included Asle J.
Gronna and Miles Poindexter, former insurgent members of the
House, and John D. Works. William S. Kenyon of Iowa, replacing
Dolliver, joined their ranks several weeks later. With each chamber
of Congress controlled by a different party, the last two years of the
Taft administration would be characterized more than the first two
by jockeying for political effect, to create and define issues for the
1912 campaign. Throughout the turmoil, the struggle between progres
sive and conservative Republicanism continued. Given these condi
tions, it is surprising that this Congress enacted as much nonpartisan
but progressive legislation as it did.
6
Norris noted with satisfaction some marked changes in the organi
zation of the House. For the first time the rules provided that the
Committee on Ways and Means be elected and endowed with the
power to appoint other committees. Representatives were assigned to
only one important committee, thereby obviating the fear that mem
bers of the Ways and Means Committee would appoint themselves
chairmen of powerful committees. As in the past the minority leader
was to assign places to minority members. The committees, when
finally determined, were "elected" by receiving the formal approval of
a caucus and then of the House. These new rules, though they still
left something to be desired, represented a long step toward the
greater freedom the former insurgents desired.7
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One morning shortly after Congress convened, Norris was invited
to the minority leader's office, where Mann frankly asked him what
committee assignments he wanted. The question and the change in
procedure greatly surprised Norris and, before he could answer, he
was offered a place on the Judiciary Committee. Norris readily as
sented. From his recent oblivion as far as committee assignments were
concerned, Norris now found himself on a prominent committee at the
suggestion of a Cannon lieutenant.
8
At the start of the session, during consideration of the rules, Norris
suggested several further changes. He stated that the members should
be free to offer amendments and vote on them rather than being sub
ject to caucus control and the need to vote accordingly. While he
still favored a fifteen-member Committee on Rules, he realized that
caucus control was a more limiting evil and had to be eliminated be
fore any further significant rules changes could be made. Control by
caucus, though better than control by the Speaker, still prevented the
free selection of all committee members by the Ways and Means
Committee as the rules now7 provided. Norris felt that the time was
not far distant "when the progressive, patriotic sentiment of the
American people will drive the caucus and the political boss and the
political machine out of business."
9
Norris also favored an amendment making committee business and
records public. Such publication would prevent suspicion and rumor
from being reported as fact. When secrecy was necessary, he believed
committee members should say their work was of such a nature as
ought to remain private.
10
Norris read with considerable interest the reports of Governor
Woodrow Wilson's speech before the National League of Democratic
Clubs at Indianapolis criticizing the secrecy that surrounded the work
of the standing committees. Committee secrecy, Norris wrote Wilson,
was one of the best ways for the machine politician to kill legislation
demanded by the people. The blame, he suggested, was formerly with
his party, but now that the Democrats controlled the House, it was
equally divided between both parties.
11
The purpose of the changes that Norris suggested was to increase
the power and freedom of individual members at the expense of both
the Speaker and the party organization. Curbing caucus control and
committee secrecy, limiting the Speaker's power, and abolishing gag
rules prohibiting members from offering amendments would help to
achieve this purpose without destroying the ability of the House to
function. Norris was aware, however, that partisanship would prevent
these changes from being realized. Though the Democrats had
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criticized the previous rules, they now accepted and imposed most
of them, seemingly forgetting their earlier statements about arbitrary
rules and procedures. As long as men blindly followed leadership they
did not believe to be honest or pursued purposes they did not think
would accomplish good, individual freedom would be unobtainable in
the House. Norris hoped that political parties, an integral part of
American political life, would improve in caliber by attracting progres
sive and honest men who could unite in favor of good legislation.
12
Another suggestion Norris put forth in his attempt to encourage
greater individual responsibility, was a limit or
decrease in House
membership. Certainly an increase in membership would necessitate
the surrender of rights and prerogatives to some smaller governing
body. Indeed, it was the present size of the body which enabled the
caucus, secret committee hearings, and arbitrary rulings by the
Speaker to flourish without serious opposition. Reducing the size of
the House, Norris argued, would not affect the basis of representation
because the influence of each state would remain proportionally the
same; but the gain in improved procedures would be immeasurable.
13
Early in the session Norris turned his attention to the proposed
amendment to the Constitution calling for direct election of United
States senators. He favored it. While further rules changes would
grant individual representatives greater freedom and responsibility,
direct election of senators would insure broader democracy by plac
ing greater control of government in the hands of the people. It would
allow state legislatures to devote more time to lawmaking and would
enable the voter to cast his ballot for candidates who represented his
ideas on state-wide issues without considering the candidates* choice
for senator. Furthermore, direct election would make it more difficult
for organized wealth or political bosses to dictate the selection of
particular candidates. The fact that the Senate had recently con
sidered the fraudulent election of William Lorimer of Illinois and
had welcomed him nonetheless, gave added weight to arguments
for the amendment.14
In the hope of bringing about the rejection of the amendment,
opponents combined it with one that took from Congress the right
to control congressional elections. Norris favored separating the
proposition, but so effective were the dilatory tactics that it took an
other year and the approaching presidential campaign before Con
gress in May, 1912, approved the Seventeenth Amendment.
15
A further procedural matter that Congress considered during this
special session was the admission to the union of the last contiguous
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territories of the United States, Arizona, and New Mexico. This issue
was fraught with political significance, reflecting the breach between
progressives and conservatives in both parties. Norris favored the ad
mission of both territories, though he had some qualms because the
Arizona constitution included the provision that recall apply to the
judiciary. He believed this to be dangerous, but since the proposed
constitution had been made by representatives of the people in ac
cordance with their wishes, he considered it his duty to approve it.
In defending the initiative and referendum clauses in these con
stitutions, he used arguments similar to those he had presented in
supporting the direct election of senators. These provisions, while not
insuring good government, would promote political understanding and
responsibility. If properly used, he predicted, initiative, referendum,
and recall would be tools to promote better legislation, help restore
government to the people, and insure its resting upon the consent of
the governed.
10
Once procedural matters were disposed of, the House turned its
attention to a reconsideration of the major piece of business before it,
the Canadian Reciprocity Agreement. Norris' position, clearly defined
in the previous Congress, remained unchanged. On April 21, 1911, be
fore the House adopted the measure by a vote of 268-89, he tried to
send the bill back to committee with instructions to amend it.1T Reci
procity was debated for seven weeks on the floor o the Senate begin
ning in mid-June until its final passage on July 22.
Meanwhile the Democrats in the House, anxious to appeal to
midwestern farmers in the 1912 election, had Oscar Underwood, chair
man of the Ways and Means Committee, introduce the fanner's free
list bill which passed the chamber a month later. Norris supported the
bill because it offered some relief to the farmer, providing for free
lumber, free boots and shoes, and many other items which the farmer
bought. He hoped it would rectify some of the inequities of the
reciprocity agreement.
18
Norris also tried to get Underwood to consider revising the sugar
schedule. Failing in this, he called for an inquiry into the operations of
the sugar trust. When these efforts came to nought, he supported an
other measure proposing a drastic downward revision of the tariff on
wool. World production of wool had not been equal to the demand for
several years, and Norris felt that there was no good reason for a
high wool tariff. However, as was the case with the farmer's free list
bill, these Underwood tariff measures were promptly vetoed by
Taft.19
GEORGE W, NORRIS
In the last days of the special session, Norris regaled
his colleagues
with a pointed but humorous narrative of the recently approved
reciprocity measure:
In my judgment, when true history is written and this much-
abused and much beloved child called "Reciprocity" is properly
labeled, it will be found that she is a sort of a cross, having both
Republican and Democratic blood circulating
in her veins. It
will be found that she had a Republican father and a Democratic
mother, and this brings us at once to the consideration of the
question of her legitimacy. I have heard of
no marriage ceremony
concerning her parents, and if this unfortunate child
is able to
establish the legitimacy of her birth it will be necessary for her
to prove a common-law marriage.
At the ceremony of her birth, the doctor having charge of
affairs was furnished by the interested railroads, the nurse was
provided by the Beef Trust, and her swaddling clothes were pur
chased by the brewers. To compensate the infant for the uncer
tainty of her parentage, and also to deceive farmers of the coun
try, who were robbed of the honest and just protection which is
rightfully theirs, the high-sounding and beautiful name of "Reci
procity" was given to the child. A name usually indicates the na
ture of the thing named, but in this instance the beauty of the
name was intended to conceal the real nature of the child and to
cover up the sin of its parents.
20
In this vein he criticized everyone who supported the agreement.
In Washington, both parties vied for the credit, but in Nebraska and
throughout the Mississippi Valley the measure was truly
an orphan
child, disowned and ignored. In the 1911 conventions in Nebraska,
reciprocity was not mentioned by the Republicans or endorsed by the
Democrats.21 But Norris had no intention of ignoring the issue when
he returned to Nebraska and considered his political future.
Shortly after the House passed the measure, Norris delivered the
most ambitious speech he had ever made. It concerned an issue which
affected not only his constituents but citizens throughout the country,
and represented a congressman's venture in muckraking at a time
when journalists were tiring of such probes, Norris' sources, though
not all verifiable, were extensive, and included information from the
Library of Congress and the Bureau of Statistics. He attacked a greedy
and unscrupulous trust, a monopoly on an international scale that
included a foreign government among its directors and extorted its
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levies from victims throughout the world. In a carefully prepared
speech on April 26, Norris attacked the coffee trust.22
The immediate purpose of his speech was to expose this powerful
trust with the ultimate hope of securing remedial legislation to curb
its activities in the United States. He introduced his subject by com
menting on the worldwide tendency toward combination. Competi
tion when throttled inevitably led to monopoly which "if unrestrained
and uncontrolled" always resulted in "an unfair and an unequal dis
tribution of the products of labor and of wealth." Whereas most com
binations that attracted public attention affected comparatively few
people, this particular combination levied its tribute in pennies but
counted its contributions by the millions and was a "daily uninvited
guest" in homes, whether mansions or hovels, throughout the world.
23
The coffee trust began with the 1906 attempt by Sao Paulo, one of
the states of the Brazilian government, to assume control of the world's
supply of coffee. The state bought all the coffee produced within its
border and held it from sale until the price rose. After two years,
however, it became evident that the undertaking was too great for
the state, and a new and more gigantic plan was undertaken. Sao
Paulo issued bonds amounting to $75,000,000, guaranteed by the
government of Brazil. With the proceeds the state purchased Brazilian
coffee and held it off the market. The bonds were handled by English,
French, German, Dutch, and American bankers; J. P. Morgan and
Company, the National City Bank, and the First National Bank to
gether took $10,000,000 worth.
24
A committee of seven men, one chosen by the Brazilian govern
ment and six by the bankers, supervised and controlled the disposal
of the coffee purchased. The coffee was shipped to representatives of
these financial concerns and stored to be sold in such quantities and
at such prices as agreed upon by the supervising group. As a guaran
tee for the payment of the bonds and interest, the Brazilian govern
ment agreed to levy an export tax on coffee and to remit the proceeds
weekly to the financial backers. The government also agreed to enact
a law prohibiting the planting of additional coffee trees and to prevent
as far as possible an increase in the supply. Thus ample provision was
made for the control of the coffee market until 1919, the year the
bonds were to mature. Since it takes six or seven years for a coffee
tree to reach its full bearing capacity, no great increase in the coffee
supply from other countries was expected to threaten the arrange
ment.25
Norris next noted that coffee had already more than doubled in
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price. World consumption had averaged for the previous four years
about 17,900,000 bags, while world production for the same period
had averaged over 18,600,000 bags. Thus in the face of continual over
production, prices had steadily and regularly advanced. During this
same period Brazil annually produced more than 14,000,000 bags of
coffee. It exported to the United States about 23,000,000 bags during
the period from 1907 to 1911, while American coffee imports from all
other countries during these years were a little over 5,000,000 bags.
20
The basic question Norris raised with his description of the coffee
trust was what could be done about this international plan for the
valorization of coffee. American law was not applicable to Brazil, nor
could European bankers be brought into American courts. The Ameri
can participants could be punished only if they violated American
laws. However, Norris was convinced that by a change in tariff laws,
indirect action at least could be taken against the government of Brazil
and its states.
Norris* remedy was twofold. He suggested first that American
corporations involved in the agreement be prosecuted for violations of
the Sherman Act. He suggested, second, that Section 2 of the Payne-
Aldrich Tariff Act, providing for raising rates against nations which
discriminated against the United States, be amended to include in
stances where a government became a party to an arrangement de
signed to increase prices to American consumers. However, if this
suggested amendment did not bring relief, Norris then was willing to
consider another scheme whereby all coffee entered free o duty
until the amount
slightly exceeded our domestic consumption. If at
that point a high duty were imposed only on Brazilian coffee, Norris
was certain that Brazil would be compelled to come to terms. Thus
the amount of coffee consumed by the American people and not the
manipulation of a special committee would more nearly determine the
domestic price.
27
Unless some such action were taken Norris thought similar steps to
control the supply and price of rubber soon would be undertaken. He
concluded with a brief statement of the role of the United States, as he
envisioned it, in its dealing with other nations:
As a Nation and as a people we are in possession and control of
the natural resources and are occupying a situation that, by de
manding and asserting only what is right and fair, we will be able
to secure justice to our people without doing any injury to the
people of any other nation. To this we are entitled, and we should
be content with nothing less. With a spirit of entire friendliness
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toward the balance of the world we should demand and exact
common justice to our own people. We should apply the doctrine
of the Golden Rule to all the people of the earth and at the same
time should insist that the rule work both ways. We should give
justice to all others and should demand that the recipients of our
favor repay us in kind.
28
Unfortunately this speech, the most ambitious thus far in his con
gressional career, attracted relatively little attention. There was no
congressional investigation and the Department of Justice took no
steps to invoke the Sherman Act against the American banking firms.
The department assigned a special attorney to investigate the matter,
but nothing came of it No sensational exposure appeared in the public
press, and only the coffee merchants commended the speech and gave
it some publicity. The results were unimpressive and the speech did
not appear to be worth the effort.
29
The study and the speech, however, were important in increasing
Norris' knowledge and in helping him formulate his views. He was
more than ever convinced that competition was the best way of con
ducting business and that government action would be necessary to
preserve competition and obtain fair play for American consumers.
He envisioned the international scene as an extension of the domestic.
The problems and their remedies, he believed, were basically similar;
only the scale was larger. In either case that of domestic corporation
or international monopoly the American government had the re
sponsibility of protecting its citizens.
By the end of the first session of the Sixty-second Congress Norris
was regarded as the progressive leader in the House. While concerned
with the interests of his constituents and battling for more democratic
procedure in the House, he devoted his attention to issues of broader
interest as well. His remarks in Congress now commanded the atten
tion of most of his colleagues. But politics, with the Democrats con
trolling the House and seeking to define issues for the 1912 campaign,
prevented his suggestions from receiving serious consideration during
this special session. While the Democrats were attempting to consoli
date 1910 election gains in preparation for the coming presidential
campaign, progressive Republicans were also weighing chances of
capturing the Republican party and nominating one of their leaders
for the presidency. Norris was an active participant in
these delibera
tions, but his most important concern was his own political future and
the senatorial election of 1912.
Chapter 23
La Follette for President
WHEN not devoting time to congressional matters during the spring
months in Washington, Norris turned his attention to
Nebraska and
his political future. He brought mailing lists up to
date and sought
suitable lists in other congressional districts. He sent the people on
these lists copies of one of several of his speeches
"The Caucus and
the Rules/' "The Valorization of Coffee/' or his views on Canadian
reciprocity. The tariff speech was the most popular, but
Norris thought
it advisable to circulate as well copies of his speech calling for the
direct election of senators. 1
By this time Norris was certain that Taft could not win Nebraska
in 1912; only a progressive candidate stood a chance to hold
the state
in the Republican electoral vote column. Though he had doubts as to
the possibility of preventing Taft's renomination, he was encouraged
by reports indicating rising sentiment against the president. Like other
former Taft supporters, he had lost faith in the president's claim of
following the Roosevelt policies. His sympathies and associations, Nor
ris argued, had been with wealthy people despite the fact that the
president was a comparatively poor man: "He has never yet known
what it is to work or to be dependent upon the sweat of his OWTI
face for support." Though Taft had lost the support of "the Cannon
and Aldrich machine" on the Canadian Reciprocity Agreement, Norris
believed he would make no effort at reconciliation with the progres
sive members of his party. Norris thought, too, that the president had
"a personal dislike, if not a personal hatred" of him, because Taft
thought, with some justification, that Norris was one of the individuals
responsible for much of his discomfort.
2
On Sunday, April 30, 1911, Norris and other prominent progressive
Republicans in and out of Congress attended a conference in Senator
Bourne's office in the Capitol. At this lengthy meeting all agreed that
Taft could not be re-elected in 1912, though they conceded that the
president probably had, through his control of the federal patronage,
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sufficient strength to bring about his renomination. As to the question
whether to try to nominate anyone else, all agreed it would be better
to make the effort and fail than to make no attempt at all. They agreed,
too, that the fight should be made in the name of Theodore Roosevelt,
but were promptly informed by Gilson Gardner, a friend of Roosevelt
and Washington correspondent of the Scripps papers, that under no
circumstances would the former president consent to the use of his
name. Senator Cummins then said, "There is but one man who should
be considered as the Progressive candidate, and that is Senator La
Follette." Once again everyone agreed. Norris promised to do all in
his power to further the Wisconsin senator's cause in Nebraska. La
Follette, after further discussion, consented to make the attempt, pro
vided funds could be found to support his efforts.3
When the Progressive Republican League of Nebraska invited
Norris to attend a meeting at Omaha at the end of May, he suggested
that if Nebraska emphatically endorsed the candidacy of a progressive
Republican her voice would have great influence in the selection of
delegates from other states. But he quickly learned that all was not
well among Nebraska Republican leaders and that the friction be
tween them involved him. Victor Rosewater, editor of the Omaha
Bee, whom Norris had never regarded as a political friend, claimed
he favored Norris for the Senate in 1912. Rosewater had engaged in a
bitter patronage quarrel with Senator Norris Brown and now sup
ported Norris as a means of evening the score. Norris was thus pressed
to announce his intentions.4
Until this time he had been noncommittal, but by mid-June he was
more specific about his plans. He expected "in due time" to announce
his candidacy, even though 1912 looked like a Democratic year. Norris
thought that he could get the nomination but would be defeated by a
Democratic landslide in the election. Meanwhile, until an opportune
time arose to announce his candidacy, he championed the cause of
La Follette and, in this way, kept his name before the voters as the
outstanding progressive Republican in the state.
5
In the midst of these political developments Norris celebrated
his fiftieth birthday, an event which caused him to do some serious
reflecting on his past, present, and future. He felt that he was now
"going down the other side of the hill." In one respect, the financial
one, he considered himself a failure. Though he had no desire for
wealth and did not believe money to be "the chief object in life," he
was disturbed about his inability to provide for his old age. On the
positive side, outweighing his financial worries, were his accomplish-
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ments and the knowledge that they were appreciated. "The greatest
happiness that can come to a man/' he said, "is
a consciousness of
having done his duty fully and fearlessly."
6
During the special session he had supplemented
his income by
occasionally delivering speeches. Unwilling to be away from Washing
ton for any length of time, he limited his engagements
to nearby areas.
He delivered the commencement address at the Rockville High School
in Maryland, spoke for the National Progressive League
in Pennsyl
vania and Maryland, and addressed the Winter Chautauqua
at
Binghamton, New York, and the Boston City Club. His topic at most
of these lectures was Cannonism, and audiences were disappointed
when he spoke on anything else.
7
Despite his unwillingness to leave Washington, progressive Repub
lican politicians in Nebraska urged him to return for the state con
vention in July, announce his candidacy for the Senate, and assume
a prominent position in the Nebraska progressive movement.
But
Norris, using the pressure of legislative duties and lack of funds as an
excuse, preferred to watch the fluid political situation from his vantage
point on the Potomac. There he could benefit from any feuding that
might occur among Nebraska Republicans and at the same time main
tain a statesman-like posture that would impress the average voter.
8
As county conventions chose delegates for the state convention,
efforts were made to place Norris supporters on prominent commit
tees. While sentiment for Taft or Norris Brown was not particularly
strong, McCarl was worried lest the organization choose a "stand
patter" or a "crazy" progressive as temporary chairman. The Repub
lican press was trying to portray all progressives as this latter type
as radicals. Norris was concerned lest the convention endorse reci
procity and the Taft administration. If it began to take this direction,
he intended to go to Lincoln and asked to be placed on the Red Wil
low County delegation so that he could gain admission on the conven
tion floor if necessary.
9
Norris* request, however, arrived too late for McCarl to get him on
the delegation. The Red Willow County convention on July 19, follow
ing the lead of several other conventions, had endorsed La Follette for
president and Norris for the Senate.
10
Delegates at the state conven
tion, fearful of an open split in the party, refused to pass any resolu
tion endorsing Taft and his policies. While Norris sentiment was
evident, many delegates thought he had done enough for La Follette
and too little for himself. All expected an announcement of his senato
rial candidacy at any moment. Summing up the convention for his
chief, McCarl wrote;
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No one seemed to think you had been Injured. Everybody
seemed to think that you got through fine, considering the fact
that you had endorsed La Follette. However, this came from the
Taft men. Many of them like you and will do you some good
next April. All in all, I am satisfied with conditions at this time.
If we can only improve them and not let them get worse.
11
The sentiment shown at the convention helped Norris resolve his
decision. He first informed friends he would announce his candidacy
after Congress adjourned, but then changed his plans and made the
announcement late in July. His evaluation of the forthcoming presi
dential race was substantially correct:
It looks as though it is going to be a Democratic year, and
unless Taft can be defeated for the nomination and assuming
also, that Woodrow Wilson, or some other progressive Democrat
is nominated, Nebraska will surely go Democratic by an over
whelming majority, and will very likely carry everything with it
on the ticket. I hardly expect La Follette to be nominated. The
chances are all in favor of the renomination of Taft, but I think
it will pay to make the fight anyway.12
Thus when the special session of the Sixty-second Congress ended
on August 22, Norris was committed to the cause of La Follette and
to a long and arduous campaign for the senatorial nomination. In a
sense he had been campaigning since March, 1910, when he force
fully came to the attention of all Nebraska voters. From what he had
been able to discern, he believed that sentiment in the state was more
united behind his candidacy than behind that of any other candidate
for major political office in 1912. On leaving Washington he asserted
that he would win the primary by a great majority, but added that
the party could avoid disaster only by preventing Taffs renomina
tion.13
His first talk was scheduled for Sioux City, Iowa, on September 4.
Next he was to speak at the State Fair in Lincoln, following Secretary
of Agriculture James Wilson. The secretary, it was announced, would
defend the Canadian Reciprocity Agreement and show that duty-free
farm products and protected manufactured goods were designed to
benefit Nebraska farmers. Norris had hoped the issue would remain
in the background until after the 1911 election since it had no place in
a campaign for justices of the Supreme Court and members of the
Board of Regents. But once Wilson had said he would speak, Norris
agreed to present the other side.
14
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Thus on September 6, before several thousand people,
he scath
ingly denounced reciprocity. The speech was similar
to others he had
delivered on the subject, but familiarity with the topic made it all the
more effective. His remarks were frequently interrupted by loud
bursts of applause. From this time on until the
end of October he
spoke throughout Nebraska chiefly on the subject
of Canadian reci
procity.
15
Oii September 21, Canadian voters turned out of
office the govern
ment of Sir Wilfred Laurier, responsible for negotiating the reciprocity
agreement. The victorious Conservative party abrogated
the measure,
and President Taft found that his efforts were in vain, his prestige at
low ebb, and his party irreparably divided. Norris thought that,
despite the defeat of the measure in Canada, voters
would still re
member with displeasure those who had favored it, Senator Norris
Brown among them.
Norris tried to show that free trade in agricultural products was
detrimental to the American farmer and that tariffs on such items
raised their value. He used wheat as an example and compared its
price in different parts of the United States, Canada, and in Liverpool.
Farmers, he claimed, were selling wheat on the domestic market and
not on the world market; the price outside of the United States was not
the American price plus the cost of transportation, but was lower than
this total and sometimes lower than the American price itself. As
conclusive evidence of the relationship between the presence of tariffs
and higher market value, he cited the fact that the day after Canada
rejected reciprocity, the price of wheat rose from three to seven cents
in every market in the United States. It went down a little in Win
nipeg and remained stationary in Liverpool. Through these speeches
Norris introduced many a Nebraska farmer to the complexities of
tariff legislation and nurtured seeds of hostility toward the Taft ad
ministration and the reciprocity measure.
16
Early in October, Taft appeared in Nebraska on a western tour to
arouse sentiment in favor of arbitration of international disputes. On
October 1, he spoke in Omaha and Norris was among the guests
seated on the stage. The next day a reception was held for Taft in
Lincoln, but Norris was not invited to attend this meeting or to travel
on the president's train. In order not to seem piqued, Norris sent a
note claiming he had other business requiring his attention. The note
did not prevent the circulation of reports that he purposely snubbed
the president but, having attended the Omaha meeting, Norris felt
he had done all that political etiquette required.
17
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Norris' absence at the reception in Lincoln merely heightened
the chilly welcome Taft received. Three bands, two hundred Civil
War veterans, and six automobiles took part in the procession, and
crowds lined the streets. But, an ardent La Follette supporter noted,
there was a minimum of applause during the parade and after Taft's
speech. The only burst of applause came when the president men
tioned Bryan and his support of arbitration treaties. Gilson Gardner
reported that 75 per cent of the Nebraska Republicans were for La
Follette.18
Striving to arouse progressive sentiment, Norris worked under a
heavy handicap. He lived in the less populous western part of the
state, and had never campaigned in Omaha or in other prominent
eastern towns. Another drawback was the fact that progressive senti
ment in Nebraska was not yet as vigorous as in Kansas and Iowa, and
Nebraska Republicans were more opposed to Taft than they were in
favor of La Follette. Norris claimed that "the great common people
of Nebraska" were not as progressive as the rank and file he had met
in the East. "In all my travels/* he explained, "through Pennsylvania
and other eastern states, I found that when Republicans were opposed
to Taft, they were invariably for La Follette."
19
On October 16, the Conference of Progressive Republicans con
vened in Chicago with delegates from thirty states. The resolutions
adopted declared that the progressive movement was a struggle on
behalf of the people to wrest control of government from representa
tives of special privilege. To achieve this end they aimed to nominate
and elect men who would truly represent popular will and carry out
the progressive policies pledged by the Republican party. Favoring
a presidential primary law or any other scheme by which the people
would gain the right to express their choice, the conference en
thusiastically endorsed La Toilette's candidacy. The meeting, accord
ing to Senator Moses Clapp of Minnesota, "was a most unqualified
success."
20
Although speaking engagements prevented Norris from attending
the conference, he did offer some suggestions. He put forth a plan ask
ing supporters for one-dollar subscriptions; this method would im
prove finances, show voters that funds for the "people's campaign"
were coming from the people themselves, and encourage supporters to
work for the success of the cause. Norris also suggested the writing
and circulating of a pamphlet that would explain La Follette's views
and combat the lack of publicity for him in the press. Norris was
confident that La Follette could win the Nebraska primary by a
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large majority and was gaining admiration and affection for "the
little
fighting Senator" to whom, he felt, "the progress and
advancement
of liberty and justice" already owed so much.
21
Between speeches, he participated in the state campaign,
advocat
ing the election of candidates without regard to partisan politics.
He
argued that no man's vote in 1911 should be controlled by his views on
the presidential nominee. Most of these so-called non-partisan
cam
paign speeches, delivered in the southern part of the state,
were in
answer to those made by Bryan requesting support for all Democratic
candidates. Bryan had argued that progressive Republicans could help
La Follette's cause by voting the Democratic ticket in 1911. A few
voters challenged Bryan to commit himself to La Follette if the
Democratic convention in 1912 nominated a conservative candidate.
Bryan refused to make such a commitment, though some people
claimed his remarks tended in that direction. While Norris was relax
ing his political partisanship with every passing year, Bryan was un
relenting in his.
22
At the end of October, Norris returned to McCook for a brief rest.
He spent part of November speaking in Idaho, Oregon, Washington,
and Montana. Though he would have preferred to speak about other
subjects, he was resigned to spending the month discussing Can-
nonism. He knew from previous experience it would be futile to dis
cuss anything else. Whenever possible, he tried to deliver speeches on
behalf of La FoUette.23
With little respite since Congress had adjourned, Norris was busy
speaking and making himself known to large numbers of people who
knew him only through reputation. He had done little campaigning
on his own behalf, preferring to criticize the Taft administration and
support the progressive program and principles of the Wisconsin
senator. As Congress gathered in December, 1911, Norris seemed
willing to have his destiny determined by La Follette's success or
failure in Nebraska.
In this campaign as in later ones, Norris made no great effort to
appeal personally to Omaha voters, though he did not ignore the popu
lation center of the state. He preferred to campaign actively in the
farm areas and smaller towns, seeking the rural vote and leaving
Omaha to the machine politicians. In this way he was able to main
tain freedom from compromises and commitments and to pursue his
campaign with a minimum of political interference. But as Congress
convened, Norris, though not forgetting politics completely, became
absorbed with pressing congressional business and left McCarl in
McCook to manage the primary campaign.
Chapter 24
Business as Usual
THE SECOND SESSION of the Sixty-second Congress, in an atmosphere
of mounting political intensity, convened at noon on Monday, Decem
ber 4, 1911. George Norris, though involved in a fight for the Nebraska
senatorial nomination, nevertheless managed to participate fully in
the ordinary business of the session. He fought old fights and initiated
new issues. Throughout this long session, he continued to reveal him
self as one of the ablest men in the House, a devoted public servant
fighting for improved legislation and a chance to further the cause of
popular government.
At the outset of the session Norris indirectly lent his name to the
cause of prohibition by attending a banquet sponsored by the National
Anti-Saloon League. He was the only Nebraska legislator present,
among more than fifty representatives and senators. As a teetotaler, he
had occasionally given money and legal advice to the cause, but was
never active in the league and had tried to avoid prohibition as a
political issue.
1
The fight against the coffee trust, initiated in the previous session,
was continued at this time. Correspondence with coffee importers
further convinced Norris that it was necessary to introduce a bill pro
viding for the free admission of coffee from all countries whose output
was not controlled or manipulated by the valorization scheme. The
bill would also call for the free admission of Brazilian coffee to a point
a little beyond the limit of domestic consumption. Such a plan, in his
judgment, would force Brazil to reject the valorization scheme. On
June 17, 1912, the House accepted Nonis' views, passed this measure,
and sent it to the Senate. Though Norris called Senator Cummins*
attention to the bill, no action was taken by the upper chamber.
2
Soon after the House settled down to business, Norris, as in the
previous session, engaged in sharp skirmishes over the rules. The
Democrats, now in control, appeared to be as arbitrary and partisan
in interpreting them as the Republicans under Speaker Cannon. On
January 11, the insurgents, led by Norris, attempted to upset the
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power of Republican leader James R. Mann to name
all Republican
candidates for places on House committees. They attempted
to set
aside the nomination of Philip B. Campbell of Kansas, a regular, to
succeed the late E. H. Madison on the Committee on Rules, and to
substitute another progressive Kansan, Victor Murdock.
Opposed by both Democratic and Republican leaders, the in
surgents were beaten on the floor by a vote of 167 to
107. Of the 107
votes cast in favor of Murdock, 26 were Republican and 81 Demo
cratic. All the votes against the proposed substitution were cast by
Republicans. Norris had nominated Murdock, but Oscar W. Under
wood, the Democratic leader, exhorted the members of his party to
uphold Mann, whom the Republican caucus had authorized to select
committee members.3
Norris* statements attacked both the caucus method of selecting
committees and the right of either party to prevent nominations from
the floor. Since the pertinent rule (Rule X) provided that committee
members be elected by the House, Norris claimed the right to substi
tute another name for the one proposed by the minority leader. While
not criticizing Mann's appointments, he claimed that caucus approval
was not the proper way of selecting committee members.
4
Minority
sentiment, he felt, should be registered by nominations from the floor,
and a Republican with views similar to Madison's should be chosen to
replace him. Though defeated, Norris at least had the opportunity to
state his case. Progressive membership on the Committee on Rules was
reduced to one, Irvine Lenroot of Wisconsin.5
In an introduction to a pamphlet published in 1912, Norris argued
that the chief evil of Democratic management in the House was
caucus control. By this means the freedom of individual action, par
tially gained in 1910, had been nullified and the political machine
firmly re-established. The caucus, an unofficial instrument by which a
majority was controlled by a minority, perpetuated machine rule in
the House even though Cannonism, the term that the insurgents had
found so convenient as a symbol, was no longer in vogue.
To Norris, the primary difference between progressive Repub
licans and progressive Democrats was their attitude toward the
caucus. Republican progressives, as a fundamental tenet, opposed
caucus rule and machine control; they paid allegiance to no political
boss and accepted individual rather than caucus responsibility. Demo
cratic progressives were not yet ready to declare their independence
of caucus rule, a species of "parliamentary slavery" inconsistent with
free
representative government. Norris concluded, as he had in March,
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1910, that the defeat of Cannon did not overthrow the system of ma
chine rule. He wrote:
The members of the House of Representatives, coming directly
from the people, should be absolutely free to follow the dictates
of conscience in every official action. There should be no caucus
on matters of legislation. There can be no real freedom as long as
the people's representatives, with gagged lips and shackled hands,
continue to worship at the shrine of King Caucus.
6
On February 3, Norris led a fight against a rules change which he
thought would restore power to the Speaker. Representative Robert
Lee Henry of Texas introduced a motion amending the discharge
rule. It was claimed that the operation of this rule, instead of prevent
ing the "killing" of bills in committees, "had resulted in a congestion
of business on discharge days," the first and third Mondays in each
month. Henry's amendment, which was adopted after long debate by
a vote of 150 to 130, virtually repealed Rule XXVII which the Demo
crats led by Champ Clark had fought so hard to pass in June, 1910J
Norris considered the motion a step backward, "a surrender of the
rights of the individual member and a wonderful increase of the
Speaker's power." The prevailing rule provided that the motion to
discharge committees would have precedence over a motion to sus
pend the rules. The Henry amendment reversed the procedure. Since
the Speaker had supreme power of recognition in motions to suspend
the rules, he could if he desired recognize friends who would move
to suspend the rules on the days discharge motions were to be con
sidered. Norris complained that if the proposed motion carried, it
would have the same effect as writing the following sentence in place
of the existing rule: "This rule shall have no effect and be of no
validity except in cases where the Speaker wants it to be."
8
Two years after Norris' famous rules fight of 1910, he issued no
statements and was interviewed by no reporters. Indeed, his experi
ences under Democratic control of the House revealed that the fun
damental fight to make every member a free individual, uncoerced
and uncontrolled by political machinery, was still being fought. Open
votes, uncontrolled by a caucus or a powerful member, were still im
possible to obtain. Recognizing that much remained to be done,
he
nevertheless would have admitted that much beneficial legislation had
been accomplished since March, 1910.
9
Though these two incidents, that of the caucus in January
and the
Henry amendment in February, gave Norris his chief opportunity
to
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challenge the House rules under Democratic control,
he criticized
them at other times as well. On February 24, while the House was
considering a report calling for an investigation
of the "Money Trust/'
he found another chance to challenge caucus control. The Democratic
majority acting through a party caucus seemed determined that the
Banking and Currency Committee should be instructed by a harmless
resolution, granting it no additional power or authority,
to conduct
an investigation. Norris demanded a strong resolution. He appealed
to Democratic members who favored a comprehensive investigation
to reject the dictum of their caucus and help strengthen the resolu
tion. Norris used humor and verse to convince members of the need
for a thorough study, and eventually was successful. The investigation
was completed in 1913 by a subcommittee led by Representative
Arsene Pujo of Louisiana.
10
In July Norris spoke out against a ruling which made it impossible
to offer and vote upon amendments to the bill the House was con
sidering. Such a rule destroyed the legislative process. 'What is the
use of debating a bill," he queried, "if you have decided in advance
by a rule that it shall not be amended?" He claimed that the ruling
resulted in poorer legislation and deprived members of a legitimate
function of their legislative prerogatives. The operation of the House
under Speaker Champ Clark still left much to be desired by Norris
and his progressive colleagues. But with a presidential campaign
getting under way and with Norris seeking a senate seat, no concerted
effort was made to challenge Speaker Clark's domination.
11
Though critical of their rulings, Norris agreed with the Democrats
when they considered revising the sugar schedule. While Nebraska
was not yet a major sugar-producing area, its farmers, in an effort to
diversify production, were raising considerable quantities of sugar
beets, especially in western irrigated areas, and a large sugar beet
factory was in operation at Grand Island. Since the sugar schedule was
one of the most complex in the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, Norris first
sought detailed information as to conditions in the industry. He dis
cussed the matter with Republican members who favored lower rates
and proposed to introduce several amendments if the Democrats did
not present a satisfactory measure.
12
Though favoring a reduction in the sugar schedule, he still con
sidered himself a firm believer in the protection principle. He believed
that a tariff should measure the difference between the cost of an
article at home and abroad. "The true protectionists," he affirmed,
"are just as anxious that the tariff should not be too high as they are
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that it should not be too low." If it were too low, it would flood the
American market with products of other countries where the standard
of living was lower. These products in turn would either lower Ameri
can standards or drive out of business the American producers of such
articles. If, on the other hand, the tariff were placed much above the
cost of production, as was the case with most items in the Payne-
Aldrich Act, it would enable American producers to combine and
raise their prices to exorbitant levels. The tariff in such cases would
keep out the foreign product and encourage domestic monopoly as
well. Such combinations could not exist if a tariff were prepared in
accord with the suggestion that once domestic prices were raised
beyond the difference in the cost of production, the foreign article
would reduce the price. Thus Norris, a believer in a protective tariff,
could argue in favor of lower rates,
13
He was also a firm believer in a nonpartisan tariff board. How
ever, he considered the board provided in the Payne-Aldrich Tariff a
temporary and makeshift affair. He found no fault with the personnel
of the board, but rather with the limitations of its powers. Moreover
he believed that a nonpartisan tariff board should report to Congress
rather than to the president; it should report particularly to the
House, which was charged by the Constitution with the initiative in
all tariff legislation. Norris also favored House approval of presidential
appointees to this board. While he was not sure exactly how these
appointments should be made and how long appointees should serve,
he was certain that no American tariff had ever been properly con
sidered.14
Thus, in March, 1912, when he voted for a free sugar bill, Norris
had to explain this departure from his protectionist views. Free sugar
virtually would have eliminated the American beet sugar industry
which was serving as something of a brake on tfye practices of the
"Sugar Trust." This monopoly controlled the nations' sugar supply,
except that made from beets, and at the time was making large pur
chases of stock in various sugar beet companies. Since the American
Sugar Refining Company (the trust) was the sole refiner,
it favored
free sugar as a means of lowering the cost of its raw
material a re
duction that would not be fully passed on to the consumer.
15
Yet, despite inroads by the trust into the sugar beet industry,
Norris believed that sugar beet factories (there were seventy-one in
the nation at that time) were preventing a complete monopoly of the
sugar trade. Therefore he favored a small duty
on beet sugar or a
small bounty to the producers to keep them in existence "and
to save
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the American people from the evils that will come from an arbitrary
and tyrannical control of the price of sugar by this great monopoly."
This protection would save the nation from complete dependence
upon foreign sugar in time of crisis. Norris incorporated these views
into an amendment providing for a small bounty extending over a
ten-year period.
16
He also protested the Dutch Standard Color Test in the sugar
schedule. He called it iniquitous, infamous, indefensible, and wicked.
This provision kept out of the American market a cheaper grade of
sugar which was of as good quality as refined sugar but lacked only
the color. Since the invention of the polariscope, which provided a
scientific method of testing sugar, Norris claimed there was no possible
excuse for
retaining in the law the Dutch Standard Color Test. Its
removal would provide another way of lowering the price to the con
sumer.17
After presenting his views on the sugar schedule, he then charged
that the free sugar bill was proposed by men who did not expect to
see it enacted into law. It was a politicians* maneuver in a great politi
cal game. Since all tariff measures had to originate in the House, he
intended to vote for free sugar even if his amendment were not ac
cepted. In that event the Senate might properly amend the bill and
the conference committee could further relieve the consumer. Thus
on March 17, he voted for free sugar. However, no action was taken
by the Senate during this session of Congress.18
Important as this matter was, Norris nevertheless devoted most of
his energies to legislation reorganizing the Post Office Department.
Since 1910 he had been given no voice in the naming of postmasters
nor was he consulted in the distribution of other patronage plums in
Nebraska. With personal experience to guide him, he now engaged in
a concerted effort to take the post office out of politics. As an individ
ual who had received campaign funds from postmasters, he knew
that these men were expected to make political contributions and that
the public saw little or nothing wrong with it. By prohibiting em
ployee contributions, the ordinary voter might be encouraged to par
ticipate more directly in politics. Thus, early in January, 1912, Norris
introduced a bill which proposed to put almost everybody connected
with the Post Office Department, except the postmaster general,
under the classified civil service. The measure was sent to the Com
mittee on Reform in the Civil Service where the Democrats had to
decide its fate.19
Soon after introducing the bill, he explained, "The machine politi
cians in both parties are opposed to it bitterly, and some men who
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claim to be for it in the open will be secretly trying to knife it."
Though confident that this type of legislation was bound to come, he
was under no illusion that it would be enacted at this time. Public
sentiment had yet to be fully aroused. When Norris claimed many
congressmen secretly favored such a law, he knew that few would
support it until their constituents demanded it. Furthermore, because
the Democrats had high hopes of winning the presidency, many
would oppose the measure in that they wanted to reward loyal party
workers.20
After considerable discussion and investigation, Norris decided to
introduce another bill to avoid the constitutional objections which
might be raised against his original one. If the Post Office Department
were to be removed entirely from the influence of partisan politics,
the postmaster general should also be selected without regard to par
tisanship. Norris contemplated providing a ten-year term for the post
master general.
21
To arouse public sentiment, Norris prepared several articles, the
most important of which appeared in the March, 1912, issue of the
Editorial Review under the title, 'Why Not Take the Post Office
Department Out of Politics?" While he did not mention the bill, he in
cluded many of its points in the article, wherein he argued that the
Post Office Department ought to be a great business corporation in
stead of a great political machine. After the article appeared he wrote
to Roosevelt suggesting that the former president write a signed
editorial for the Outlook upon the question of the Post Office Depart
ment in politics. Roosevelt readily agreed and promised to use as his
text the bill Norris had introduced. Thus while Taft was using the
department to build political strength for his renomination, Norris
and Roosevelt were trying to arouse sentiment to place it under civil
service.22
Believing in progress, Norris was optimistic that eventually effec
tive reform could be achieved. But idealist and optimist that he was,
he had been too long in politics not to be a realist as well. He ex
plained the inevitable march of progress as follows:
The world is progressing and the combined efforts of special
interests, political bosses, and political machines cannot stop the
march of progress. It will take die crystallization of a public senti
ment to bring this about, but public sentiment is stronger, as his
tory shows, than the political bosses and political machines, and
eventually they must give way. They usually give way one step
at a time. They have done this in the Post Office Department.
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The last step however, will be taken just as soon
as there is such a
demand from the people that the political boss is
unable to resist
it longer, then he will get onto the
band wagon and try to claim
some of the credit The people are more powerful than the
politician. He controls for a while, but if
the people make the right
kind of an effort they can always win. They will
win this fight. It
is only a question of whether it will
come soon or whether it will
come a year from now. That will depend
more upon the people
themselves than upon anything else.
23
Though the House actually considered
Norris' bill, he knew it
would not be enacted by the Sixty-second Congress. But he
also knew
that much profitable discussion had been engendered
and that some
favorable sentiment had been aroused. In July he spoke extensively
in favor of making the postmaster general a nonpolitical appointee.
Capitalizing on the extraconstitutional aspect
of the cabinet, he noted
that there was no law requiring a cabinet member to be a political
adviser. He called for a ten-year term for the postmaster general,
divorced from partisan political considerations,
who could devote his at
tention and ability to the business management of the department.
24
Indirectly related to Norris' bill was
the measure providing for a
parcel post system which reorganized the delivery
of packages on the
basis of size, weight, and distance under the auspices
of the Post Of
fice Department. Legislation calling for
a parcel post system had been
enacted by the first session of the Sixty-second Congress in 1911,
but
before service could begin, appropriations and decisions regarding
rates and zones had to be made. In consultation with David J.
Lewis, a Maryland Democrat and an expert on the subject, Norris
concluded that it would be proper for the government to condemn
the property of express companies and take over their business,
rather
than merely compete with them. Whatever profits honestly existed
in
the express business, he claimed, ought to go to
the railroad and its
stockholders. Whatever extravagance existed in express rates ought to
go to the shippers in the form of reasonable rates. In any event, proper
reduction of rates, whether the merchandise were carried by express
companies or by the post office, would redound to the public's benefit.
However, when the time came to vote on the proposition to have
government take over the express companies, all the Democrats,
in
cluding Lewis, who had previously favored such a measure, voted
against it. Norris explained their defection on the ground that Demo
cratic leaders had quietly given them to understand that it would be
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to the best interests of their party to postpone action until after the
election.25
While matters
relating to postal affairs were his chief legislative
concern, Norris did not ignore other issues. He was not greatly con
cerned, for example, with the issue of immigration, but admitted that
he favored restrictive legislation. Because of his agrarian bias, he was
concerned that the majority of recent immigrants were settling in cities
and avoiding rural areas. He singled out the Italians, who generally
made their way to urban areas despite efforts to scatter them. For
the same reason, he felt that a great many immigrants from southern
Europe were not desirable and that educational restrictions did not
provide a proper method for excluding them. On the other hand,
"Germans, English and Norwegians" made excellent citizens because
many of them were willing to till the soil. Thus Norris viewed im
migration as he viewed many items of legislation as a factor tending
to further the imbalance between urban and rural America.26
In this session Norris was responsible for one item which was re
gional in nature, but which helped immensely in his senatorial cam
paign. He introduced a bill limiting the right of way of the Union
Pacific Railroad to one hundred feet on each side of its tracks, two
hundred feet wide in all, except in such places where the railroad
had actually used the entire four hundred feet it claimed under a
recent interpretation of its charter. The railroad, contending for the
four-hundred-foot right of way, had threatened proceedings against
landowners whose property fell within this limit on the grounds that
the owners had either usurped or not properly purchased railroad
land. Thousands of farmers and businessmen in Nebraska, Colorado,
and other western states were threatened with loss of part of their
property if the railroad's interpretation prevailed. In cities such as
Grand Island the railroad would be entitled to take in the street run
ning parallel to its tracks. In some instances, streets on each side of
the railroad could be included in the four-hundred-foot right of way.
27
Norris' bill was sent to the Judiciary Committee, and hearings
began early in April. N. H. Loomis of Omaha, chief attorney of the
Union Pacific Railroad, testified against the bill, while representatives
of citizens in Greeley, Colorado, spoke in favor of it. Loomis had
sought a compromise with Norris but, failing in this attempt, concen
trated his efforts on Brown and Hitchcock, Nebraska's senators,
neither of whom testified in favor of Norris' bill.
Early in June the measure passed the House and was soon pending
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Norris consulted with
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members of the subcommittee assigned to examine the bill and tes
tified at a hearing. During most of this period, Loomis remained in
Washington, trying to prevent favorable reports on the measure first
by the House and then by the Senate Judiciary committees. Norris
and Loomis both knew that opposition would fade if the bill reached a
stage where a record vote could be obtained. But the Union Pacific,
Norris claimed, was pulling every string to prevent such a vote from
being taken. Norris sought as much publicity as possible, claiming
that the support of Nebraska's newspapers would assure passage of
the measure.28
Late in June the bill was passed by the Senate and signed into law
by the president. To contest the measure, the Union Pacific would
now have to go to court and prove the bill a violation of its charter
rights. Towns along the railroad's route applauded Norris' role in
championing this legislation, while railroad officials bitterly con
demned it. Soon the bill became a controversial issue in Norris' cam
paign for a Senate seat.
29
While the right-of-way measure affected only a limited number
of voters in Nebraska and other western states, it sought to provide, as
did all the bills he introduced, a "square and honest deal" in
political and governmental affairs. Affecting a broader popular base
and capitalizing on the interest aroused in an exciting election year,
Norris introduced two measures calling for a presidential primary.
Neither of them was enacted, but they did serve to arouse further
interest in this more direct way of choosing candidates.
30
Though many citizens were outraged by the trampling under foot
of the rank and file desires by the "well regulated and well oiled"
machine at the Republican convention in Chicago in mid-June, the
Democrats, anxious to capitalize on these proceedings, did not allow
the primary bills to get before the House. Norris, equally anxious,
sought support of his bills among the leading progressive contenders
for the presidency. Roosevelt, victim of the Republican machine at
Chicago, announced he was heartily in favor of such legislation and
promised to do all in his power to help the movement. Woodrow Wil
son, who previously had expressed an interest in such legislation, did
not respond. Norris claimed that a word from Wilson to the Demo
cratic leaders in the House would have done much to insure the pas
sage of some legislation on this subject31
While the legislative achievements of this session of Congress were
sparse because of party deadlock (each chamber was controlled by a
different party) and the unfolding presidential campaign, important
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issues concerning large segments of the population were discussed. A
few such measures were enacted during the last year of the Taft ad
ministration; others, under a Democratic Congress during the first
Wilson administration. Agricultural legislation, of great concern to
Norris, came in this latter category, but was easier to achieve because
the path had been cleared for it during the Sixty-second Congress. On
March 29, 1912, Norris introduced a joint resolution to provide for
the appointment of a Farmers' National Cooperative Credit Com
mission, and two months later, on May 29, he appeared at a hearing
before the House Committee on Agriculture. In the interim, two simi
lar resolutions had been introduced, one by Representative A. F. Lever
of South Carolina, the other by Norris' friend and former colleague,
Senator Gronna.
Norris said before the committee that as an agrarian he believed
that land was the best security available and the foundation of all
prosperity. He sought ways of making life on the farm and in the
country more attractive while preventing the further decline of rural
population. He desired information about ways and means of extend
ing credit to farmers, enabling them to use their land as security.
The need for easier credit was evident to all who examined agri
cultural conditions. Farmers could not borrow from national banks
using land as security. At other banks they usually could not borrow
at as low a rate as the merchant because their security was not liquid.
Thus the farmer was compelled to sell his crop almost immediately
after harvesting it, when the market price was at its lowest. In many
instances the crops were bought by speculators who held them until
the price went up. Norris and others hoped to provide the farmer with
ample credit facilities so that he would not be forced to sell Ms crop
at such an inopportune moment. The report of the Country Life
Commission in 1908 and the resolutions of 1912 emphasized the need
for farm credit and the growing sentiment in its favor.
Though critical of many investigatory commissions, Norris noted
that Congress had sent a group of bankers to Europe to investigate
the monetary situation, and called for a similar investigation dealing
with agricultural matters. Such a study would secure much important
information about existing credit institutions, enabling legislators to
write satisfactory bills applying the knowledge of European credit
systems to the American scene.
32
Some of the members of the Committee on Agriculture were con
vinced that farm credit was a state issue and that Congress should not
provide for such a commission. Norris countered by saying
that since
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the matter was of interest to all the states, the federal government
ought to bear the expense of getting the basic general
information.
Furthermore, he concluded:
We have spent thousands of dollars for the investigations of
the Monetary Commission, why not spend a few dollars to make
an investigation for the benefit of the farmer,
who is the real
source of all prosperity? Make him prosperous and happy and
the whole country will prosper and the whole world will be
happy. I ask for the farmer nothing but what has been granted
to
the bankernothing unfair, nothing in the world but a square
deal.33
Congress took no action during this session, but shortly
thereafter
sent not one but two special commissions to Europe to investigate
rural credit conditions. The result was the enactment of the Federal
Farm Loan Act in 1916.
Busy as he was with both legislative and political developments
during this long and wearing second session of Congress, Norris
delivered eulogies in memory of two recently deceased colleagues,
both of whom had been staunch allies in the fight against Cannonism.
James P. Latta, a Democrat, had been a member of the Nebraska con
gressional delegation, while Edmond Madison had been "the nearest
and the dearest" friend Norris had in Congress. His eloquent tribute to
Madison's memory was his most painful undertaking since his arrival in
Washington. As Norris said of Madison, so one could say of Norris as
he concluded his service in the House:
His country was his idol, his conscience was his master, and
humanity was his God. He never hesitated to defend what he
believed to be right, and he always denounced evil wherever he
found it.34
Several days after Norris delivered this eulogy, the Nebraska
primary election was held. The primary and the complex and diffi
cult campaign which was to follow hovered over him and influenced
many of his congressional decisions during the long period from
December, 1911, to the end of the following August.
Chapter 25
La Follette vs. Roosevelt
NOBBIS remained in Washington while McCarl, finding it impossible to
live in Washington on the $1,500 salary provided for congressmen's
secretaries, stayed in McCook to organize and conduct the primary
campaign. This arrangement cost Norris several hundred dollars each
year for extra clerical help during especially busy periods.
1 At first it
was complicated and cumbersome, but eventually it worked fairly
well. In 1912 it proved a boon to Norris because it kept him out of
the state and out of the bitter factional strife which ruined the chances
of many hopeful candidates.
McCarl was well suited for his position. As a member of the execu
tive committee of the Progressive League of Nebraska, he had a voice
in policy determination. He knew the Nebraska political scene well
and had directed two of Norris* previous campaigns. Able, hard-work
ing, and pleasant, McCarl was liked and trusted by most political
leaders. Norris had complete faith in McCarl's honesty, thoroughness,
and efficiency.
This primary campaign, it was quickly decided, would be con
ducted apart from other campaigns. Norris refused, as always, to buy
the support of any newspaper. He kept out of all statewide primary
contests, claiming he would endorse the Republican nominees. He was
committed, however, to the candidacy of La Follette, and intended
to further his cause in Nebraska.2
At the end of 1911, the progressive Republicans in Nebraska were
beginning to expand their activities. They supported La Follette and
quickly endorsed Norris. While there was very little Taft sentiment in
titie state, La Follette leaders were worried lest the politicians support
ing the administration promote a boom for Roosevelt to split the
progressive forces. If this occurred, Taft might capture the Nebraska
delegation. The situation was complicated by the fact that while the
voters would express their presidential preference in the April primary,
the law specifically did not commit the convention delegates to vote
for the winning presidential candidate. La Follette leaders were
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anxious to get their campaign underway and hoped
that Norris could
persuade the Wisconsin senator to visit
Nebraska early in 1912.
3
During this period Norris was sure that Roosevelt
was not a
candidate and that he was in sympathy with the La Follette move
ment. Norris was afraid, however, that some Taft people, realizing
that the president's cause was hopeless
in Nebraska, might organize
under a Roosevelt banner "simply for the purpose of getting into the
convention," where they would then support Taft. Thus Norris sug
gested that in every congressional
district La Follette supporters seek
to wrest control of the party organization from the standpatters.
4
Unfortunately for La Follette supporters, the complications
Norris
and others feared actually occurred. On the morning of December
22, 1911, a petition was filed in the
office of the secretary of state
placing Roosevelt's name on the ticket, thereby causing
a further
split
in Republican forces. The petition was filed by John O.
Yeiser of
Omaha, a member of the Advisory State Board of Pardons and an
associate of Victor Rosewater, standpat National Committeeman from
Nebraska. Under Nebraska law, no one could decline such a nomina
tion, although the petition could be withdrawn. Roosevelt could have
avoided the issue by requesting that his name not be placed on the
petition.
5
Norris still believing that the former president was not a can
didate, wrote him explaining the situation. He asked Roosevelt either
to avow his candidacy or to demand that his name not be printed on
the official primary ballot. He concluded that if conditions arose mak
ing it necessary and expedient for the convention to nominate Roose
velt, "and if in such an emergency you could be prevailed upon to
permit the use of your name as a candidate, all La Follette delegates
would be then, as they are now, your enthusiastic supporters."
6
On January 2, 1912, Roosevelt answered, saying, "No man has been
authorized by me to put my name on any ballot, or to get up any peti
tion in my interest, or to take any action on my behalf." Previously
he had written to Yeiser that he did not wish to be a candidate and
would not speak on his own behalf. However, Roosevelt made it clear
that while he was not a candidate, he had said nothing about what he
would do if tendered the nomination. He also refused to request the
withdrawal of his name from the primary ballot on the grounds that
such a withdrawal would probably hurt La Follette's candidacy far
more than it would TafYs. Thus Roosevelt would neither authorize
the use of his name nor request its withdrawal.
7
Answering Roosevelt's letter, Norris noted, "If nothing is done to
meet the predicament with which we are confronted in Nebraska, the
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result, I fear, will be that the state and others similarly situated, will
be carried by the Taft delegates, on account of the division in our
ranks." To prevent this, he thought Roosevelt should either ask his
friends to support La Follette delegates or request that his name not
go on the ballot. If the nomination were then offered to Roosevelt be
cause La Follette could not obtain it, all La Follette delegates would
enthusiastically support the former president. In this way, Norris ex
plained, progressive Republicans could campaign with united ranks
and insure progressive delegations from states where primary laws
were operative.
8
Despite these developments, progressive Republican leaders were
still optimistic. F. P. Corrick, secretary of the La Follette League
(formerly the Progressive League), made an arrangement whereby
both factions united on a common slate of delegates and agreed to
endorse R. B. Howell over Rosewater for national committeeman.
Thus anti-Taft men could support a set of progressive delegates who,
if elected in the primary, would vote at the convention for the presi
dential candidate receiving a plurality of the Nebraska primary votes.
This arrangement, while not satisfactory to the La Follette leaders
who did most of the arduous organizational work, at least prevented
chaos from dominating the progressive camp. It also assured Repub
lican voters who were progressive in their sentiments that Taft men
would not represent Nebraska at the national convention.
Since Roosevelt did not issue a statement taking himself out of the
Nebraska primary, Norris concluded that he wanted the nomination.
Men who had spoken with the former president said he was "very
emphatic and pronounced" against the renomination of Taft and
did not want to eliminate himself for fear that he might be the only
man who could beat Taft. Norris did not think it "square" for Roose
velt to allow the use of his name in Nebraska, and he hoped no quar
reling would develop between Roosevelt and La Follette followers.
He intended to continue supporting La Follette, and hoped to avoid
controversy by stressing opposition to Taft rather than differences be
tween the progressive factions.
10
Meanwhile, Norris' application as a candidate for the Senate
reached the secretary of state on January 19. At the time McCarl was
spending three days in Lincoln "with good results." Visitors were on
hand for a meeting of Taft men and a gathering of farmers. The Taft
men chose a full set of convention delegates, presidential electors, and
a candidate, Rosewater, for national committeeman. According to
McCarl, most farmers favorably recalled Norris' position on reciprocity
and Cannonism. Local politicians reported Norris sentiment. Every-
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where Norris and Governor Aldrich were recognized as the progres
sive leaders.
McCarl also reported overwhelming Roosevelt sentiment;
"It's my
judgment that if he is a candidate he will secure the delegation from
Nebraska, hands down." A La Follette manager reported Roosevelt
sentiment in the towns, but the farmers were for La Follette. If Roose
velt were not a candidate, almost everyone agreed, La Follette would
have most of his votes. The uncertainty as to the former president's
intentions was making it difficult to organize a following for La Fol
lette. 11
Aldrich's position, too, was uncertain. Ostensibly
he was for La
Follette, but, according to rumors, he had been "coquetting with the
Taft fellows" to win their endorsement and thereby avoid a primary
fight. Norris was concerned that the governor
did nothing to silence
Yeiser in his attempts to get a Roosevelt slate of delegates on the
ticket instead of an accepted slate of progressive Republican dele
gates.
12
Norris did very little on his own behalf during the primary cam
paign. Most of his correspondence concerned the over-all political
situation and his support of La Follette. However, he assured friends
that he was in the senatorial primary in good faith and wanted to be
nominated and elected. Though rumor had it otherwise, Norris in
sisted he had not agreed with Senator Brown to remain in Washington
throughout the primary campaign. The senator, like Norris, preferred
to tend to his congressional duties. Brown relied on the Republican
organization to push his candidacy. His bitter feud with Rosewater,
however, indicated that harmony among the regular Republicans did
not prevail when offices other than the presidency were at stake.
13
At the end of January, in an effort to thwart the Roosevelt move
ment in Nebraska and restore harmony among progressive Repub
licans, Norris wrote a long letter to Yeiser calling on him to support La
Follette. He insisted that he would be for Roosevelt only if and when
La Follette were unable to obtain the nomination at the Chicago
convention. If the delegates pledged themselves in this way, followers
of both men could work in harmony for the progressive cause. Norris,
in effect, told Yeiser that the proper thing for Roosevelt men to do was
to support La Follette, lest they insure a Taft delegation to the Repub
lican convention.14
Yeiser's reply indicated that harmony would not be easily restored.
He informed Norris that he ought to get aboard the Roosevelt band
wagon, lest the Roosevelt followers find it necessary to choose a sena
torial candidate committed to their man. Norris was led to believe
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that Yeiser was motivated by the desire to attend the Chicago con
vention as a delegate at large and was using Roosevelt's candidacy as
a way of doing so. 15
The letters of Morris and Yeiser were published and stimulated
much discussion throughout the state. Norris supporters began to feel
that while fidelity and constancy to La Follette were noble qualities,
caution and recognition of rising Roosevelt sentiment also had their
value. In spite of Yeiser rather than because of him, Nebraska senti
ment was crystallizing around Roosevelt, who was predicted to win
the preference vote. La Follette did not appeal to large numbers of
rank and file voters because it was believed that his progressivism
was too radical. While most Americans favored reform and progress,
few wanted it in "trainload lots." Therefore they found Roosevelt a
more acceptable candidate, more respectable and moderate than La
Follette. Such views were prevalent among a growing number of
Nebraska Republicans, but Norris learned that in his congressional
district voters were more in accord with his views. A Republican con
ference in Hastings on January 27 strongly endorsed both La Follette
and Norris.16
Despite growing Roosevelt support, Norris had no intention of
leaving La Follette and he so informed Yeiser early in February. He
reiterated the view that the fight for La Follette was in no sense a
fight against Roosevelt. Although Norris knew that Yeiser could make
good his threat to enter another candidate in the senatorial primary
against him, he refused to allow such tactics to affect his actions; "I
can afford to be defeated, but I can not afford to be driven by a
threat" 17
Thus stood the situation between the two progressive Republican
factions early in February when Louis Brandeis gave the La Follette
League a boost by stumping the state. Launching his tour in Fremont,
Brandeis spoke once or twice a day in favor of La Follette's candidacy.
He also praised Norris for his work in Congress. A La Follette sup
porter reported that he made a "great impression." His speeches re
ceived wide press coverage. Shortly thereafter, Republican meetings
at York and Fremont, where the Boston lawyer had spoken, adopted
resolutions endorsing Norris for the Senate.
18
Meanwhile, in Washington, Norris was calling for harmony be
tween the Roosevelt and La Follette factions. R. B. Howell of Omaha,
a candidate for national committeeman in the primary election, called
on Norris after conferring with Roosevelt and likewise spoke for har
mony among Nebraska progressives. Norris, thinking it useless to write
any more letters to Yeiser, now wrote to Governor Aldrich requesting
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him to provide leadership and prevent any split in the progessive
ranks.
On February 7, after a conference between Yeiser and Frank Harrison,
a representative of the La FoUette League,
it was announced that
there would be one primary ticket for La Follette and Roosevelt
forces. While Norris was not directly instrumental in establishing
party harmony, his numerous letters paved the way
for it.19
Though Yeiser now was eliminated as a candidate for delegate-at-
large, the Roosevelt forces won
much by this announcement. At the
time it was made Republicans in five of the state's six congressional
districts had already named La Follette men as their delegates. The
La Follette League, which had done the basic political spadework,
agreed to give Roosevelt the chance of capitalizing
on their efforts.
The reported collapse of La Follette at the annual banquet of the
Periodical Publishers' Association at Philadelphia on February 2 and
the subsequent loss of many of his prominent supporters undoubtedly
prompted the conference between Yeiser and Harrison. Uneasy
Nebraska supporters of the Wisconsin senator welcomed its result
since it gave tibem a chance to support Roosevelt without appearing
disloyal to La Follette and the progressive cause. An uneasy harmony
was restored to the ranks of Nebraska progressive Republicans,
though Roosevelt officially was still not a candidate.
20
Norris reported that La Follette's breakdown had resulted in the
cancellation of his meetings. He also reported that many La Follette
men had now decided to come out openly for Roosevelt. Representa
tive Lenroot had told Norris that La Follette's collapse would prob
ably make it necessary for the senator to withdraw from the contest.
While Norris understood that La Follette was in "a serious physical
condition," he did not endorse Roosevelt. In his correspondence he
still supported the Wisconsin senator, though he often repeated that
he was not opposed to Roosevelt, who, according to Norris, was
anxious for him to win the senatorial nomination.21
On February 12, progressive Republicans met in Lincoln to perfect
their primary ticket. Norris received "a very cordial endorsement for
Senator." Nevertheless, this was a tense and exciting meeting because
Governor Aldrich, representing the Roosevelt forces, took a strong
position against endorsing La Follette, while C. O. Whedon, a vice
president of the La Follette League, was equally insistent upon an
outright endorsement. After a strenuous session a set of resolutions
satisfactory to both camps and a slate of progressive delegates were
presented and unanimously accepted.
This meeting was significant because it put an end to controversy
among progressives on all levels but that of presidential preference.
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Both Roosevelt and La Follette would appear on the ballot, but the
rest of the ticket would include only one name for each office. The
sixteen delegates sent to the Chicago convention would vote for the
candidate who won the preference vote. Controversy and animosity,
however, continued over the matter of plurality versus majority. It had
yet to be decided whether a clear plurality would have to be achieved
by one of the three presidential candidates or whether the combined
Roosevelt-La Follette vote would be sufficient to send the common
slate of progressive delegates (fourteen of whom were devoted La
Follette men ) to the nominating convention.
22
In McCook, McCarl reported the situation to be "up in the air," as
it was in other areas as well. Everybody seemed to be awaiting Roose
velt's speech in Columbus, Ohio, where it was believed he would ac
cept the invitation of eight Republican governors, Aldrich among
them, and announce his candidacy. McCarl thought that if Roosevelt
accepted, he would probably defeat both La Follette and Taft in
Nebraska. La Follette alone could defeat Taft in Nebraska, but Roose
velt alone could score a much more impressive primary victory one
which would aid other progressive candidates as well because he
could command not only La Follette supporters but many Taft men
as well. Norris' candidacy would benefit more with Roosevelt on the
ticket as the lone progressive Republican presidential aspirant.
23
Norris, however, was certain that both Roosevelt and La Follette
would run in the Nebraska primary, and that further efforts to get
either candidate to withdraw were worthless. There was no statute
specifically requiring elected delegates to support the victorious pri
mary candidate, but popular opinion on this matter was so strong that
all delegate candidates quickly pledged themselves to abide by the
popular vote. Thus, if one of the progressive candidates did not get
more primary votes than Taft the president would receive the Ne
braska votes at the convention.24
Since Norris' name was endorsed by both progressive factions,
his candidacy would not unduly suffer because of factional discord.
If both Roosevelt and La Follette remained on the ticket, however,
McCarl assured Norris, "Things will be in a bad shape." There was
growing sentiment because no arrangement could be made whereby
one candidate would withdraw, that both must be selfish and consider
themselves more important than the progressive movement. If no
withdrawal arrangement were forthcoming, observers felt that Ne
braska progressive leaders should endorse one of
the candidates, prob
ably Roosevelt since he was more popular, in a final effort to
stave
off a Taft victory.
25
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Bowing to the mounting pressure of public opinion and the exam
ple of prominent progressives, Norris began to shift his position on
La Follette shortly before the former president officially announced
his candidacy on February 21. Norris still favored La Follette, but
recognized the practical necessity of backing Roosevelt to narrow
the issue to a fight between "the Taft men and the progressive men."
If La Follette would do likewise, Norris believed he would prove
himself "the greatest man in the country/" and 'Invincible four years
from now." 26
Meanwhile the La Follette League in Nebraska, rent asunder by
the same forces that impelled Norris to endorse Roosevelt, was del
uged with letters urging it to boost Roosevelt. R. B. Howell, who never
had shown any open preference for Roosevelt over La Follette, an
nounced his shift and thought the league ought to do likewise. By the
end of February, Nebraska progressives were stampeding to Roose
velt, and J. J. McCarthy, the president of the La Follette League,
thought it impossible to check them. F. P. Corrick, the secretary of the
organization, shifted to Roosevelt believing that the former president's
candidacy would insure a progressive victory in Nebraska. But Frank
A. Harrison, a diehard La Follette leader, remained loyal to the Wis
consin senator though he was not optimistic.
27
By the end of February the first phase of the Nebraska primary
had come to an end. Though there were two progressive Republican
presidential candidates, it was evident that Roosevelt was the more
popular. The thorny problem of progressive delegates and the way
they would vote at Chicago had been solved. As a senatorial can
didate, Norris was scheduled to appear on both the La Follette and
Roosevelt ballots, with hopes of getting votes from Taft men as well.
Though animosity and bitterness remained, the issue had become
more clearly defined. Much of the confusion was dispelled when
Roosevelt announced, in Columbus, Ohio, "My hat is in the ring/'
Now with less than two months before the April 19 primary, Nor
ris, who was busy in Washington with legislative chores, had to
perfect an organization and get his record before the voters. At the
same time he had to avoid further involvement in the Roosevelt-La
Follette controversy, lest diehard supporters of either candidate dis
charge their anger against him by voting for his opponent.
Chapter 26
Primary Victory
Wrm the perplexing questions of Republican presidential candidates
and convention delegates clarified by the end of February, Norris
could now pay more attention to the senatorial primary campaign.
Remaining in Washington, he watched unfolding events with great
interest because of the embittered feelings aroused by the La Follette-
Roosevelt controversy.
McCarl reported conditions in Nebraska to be considerably im
proved. He had returned to McCook early in March from a trip
throughout northern Nebraska, where he found men in all walks of
life favoring Norris' candidacy. Particularly encouraging was the sup
port businessmen were giving Norris. McCarl had contacted men in
the southern and western counties, but had done very little as yet in
the populous northeastern part of the state.
1
Norris' chances were also improved by the support of Joseph Pol-
car, editor of the Omaha Daily News. Norris suggested that Polcar
alert readers to possible confusion that might arise between the names
Norris Brown and George Norris, differentiating between the two
men. He wanted Polcar to stress the fact that while Brown stood for
machine control, Norris believed in "absolute independence/* Norris
thought that such stress would create a better impression of
the work
he was doing in Congress and the odds against which he fought. But
unless Brown indulged in a personal attack, Norris had no desire to
make an all-out fight against his opponent.
2
By early March, F. P. Corrick of the La Follette League
had de
cided that the movement was more important than the man. He tried
to maintain a neutral posture and to devote his energies to obtaining
funds from all interested groups. His enemies, however, thought he
was convinced that Roosevelt would be nominated and therefore did
not want to fight lest he lose his chance for patronage.
3
Norris agreed with Corrick. In North Dakota,
where the first
primary of the presidential campaign
was scheduled for March 19,
supporters of Roosevelt
and La Follette were rumored to be very
243
244 GEORGE W. NORRIS
bitter toward one another. In Washington, leaders on both sides
deprecated this feeling but seemed unwilling to compromise
to any
degree. To avoid a similar occurrence in Nebraska,
Norris argued that
progressive leaders ought "to take the bull by its horns"
and do what
was best for the cause, regardless of die wishes of either
faction. Since
both factions were supposedly striving for the same thing,
he thought
it foolish that their ranks should be split by a conflict over personali
ties. Frank A. Harrison disagreed with Norris' position, claiming that
there were "a whole lot of La Follette men who would not vote for
the Colonel under any circumstances." La Follette's name, he argued,
should remain on the ticket until the outcome of the North Dakota
primary presented a means of further evaluating his strength.
4
Further confusion occurred on March 12, when Corrick received
a telegram from La Follette announcing that he could
not consent to
any combination on the delegate slate or to the printing
of the name
of'anv other candidate upon petitions or ballots in connection with
his own. Corrick burned this telegram, intending to go through with
"the compromise ticket business." He explained the Nebraska situation
to the Wisconsin senator, noting the steps already taken toward the
goal of electing a delegation that would assist in writing a progressive
platform at the Republican National Convention, and concluding with
a statement that he thought it unwise for any presidential candidate
to interfere or attempt to defeat that purpose. Norris agreed that no
candidate had the right to dictate what course progressives should
take in any given locality.
5
While he admired La Follette, Norris was grieved at the course
he was pursuing. Norris believed that the principal object was to
prevent the renomination of Taft by placing a progressive Republican
at the head of the ticket, and he had no further intention of sup
porting a person who was no longer the most available or the most
popular candidate. Convinced that he was battling for a principle,
Norris wanted to do everything possible to insure its triumph without
destroying a candidate's chances by factional strife.
6
Meanwhile, Norris* campaign was proceeding satisfactorily. There
was strong Norris sentiment throughout the state, though McCarl was
worried that the newspapers were not paying him sufficient attention.
The difficulty, of course, was that extensive interest in the presidential
controversy overshadowed the senatorial race. McCarl suggested
that Norris improve his newspaper coverage by returning to Ne
braska for five or six days before the primary election on April 19. By
campaigning in Nebraska, he would compel the newspapers to present
his record. By appearing in Omaha, preferably with Roosevelt, Norris
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could solve the difficult and as yet untackled problem of appealing
to voters In the most populous community in the state. His candidacy
thus would be well publicized shortly before the voters made their
decision in the primary election.
7
Despite McCaiTs pleading, Norris thought it unwise to return to
Nebraska, where he would be in the middle of the La Follette-Roose-
velt controversy, and thought he could better serve his cause by re
maining in Washington. At this time North Dakota voters went to the
polls in the first primary election of the campaign. Out of 49,264 votes
cast in the Republican primary, La Follette received 28,620, Roosevelt
19,101, and Taft, 1,543. The results created a sensation in Nebraska.
Harrison was beseiged by well-wishers assuring him that if La Follette
spoke in Nebraska the Roosevelt boom would be "busted." Many ob
servers now believed that La Follette had a good chance of winning
the Nebraska primary election.8
By the end of March the bitterness that Norris feared became evi
dent in the Nebraska campaign. W. L. Houser, La Follette's campaign
manager, delivered a vitriolic speech against Roosevelt. Houser at
tacked Governor Aldrich in an attempt to force him to request Roose
velt's withdrawal in Nebraska. Norris feared that the La Follette men,
who seemed desperate and more anxious to fight Roosevelt than Taft,
might attack him. To Norris, some of La Follette's supporters now
seemed
"insanely mad" and determined to undermine the progressive
cause.9
In the Wisconsin primary on April 2, the La Follette ticket carried
the state by almost three to one over Taft. With no Roosevelt slate in
the field, the former president received only 628 votes. Fresh from this
victory, La Follette made plans for a vigorous campaign in Nebraska,
starting with an evening rally in Lincoln on April 5. McCarl wanted
Norris to announce that he would return to Nebraska to help elect
progressive Republican delegates. But Norris, convinced that his views
on this matter were correct, and convinced that his nomination was
fairly sure, did not respond to this suggestion, but remained in Wash
ington continuing his campaign through correspondence.
10
Norris believed his nomination to be assured because he thought
the great majority of Republicans to be either for Roosevelt or La Fol
lette. He was convinced that the support for Taft and Brown came
from the "old wheel-horses of the party," prominent men in many
communities. A stranger observing the political situation in many
Nebraska towns might readily conclude that everybody was for the
administration ticket, but closer observation, Norris believed, would
reveal deep and bitter resentment toward the Taft administration. In
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his own case, Norris surmised that while the voters did not actively
dislike his opponent, they wholeheartedly approved Norris' own ag
gressive stand on important issues. The fact that some postmasters
appointed by the regular Republican organization offered to con
tribute to his campaign convinced Norris he could capture the votes of
Taft supporters as well. Because he was against reciprocity while
Brown favored it, Norris was virtually assured of the farm vote.
11
La Follette conducted an arduous four-day campaign in the state
beginning on April 5. To the relief of Norris and other worried ob
servers, he did not stoop to personalities but discussed issues. Indeed,
he endorsed Norris in all of his speeches except that in Omaha, where
he erroneously supported Brown until he was told of his mistake. La
Follette canvassed the state with six other speakers, including his
daughter, Fola. No one launched a personal attack on Roosevelt.
12
As reports of La Follette's tour reached Norris, his anxiety about
bitter factionalism in the progressive camp eased considerably. La
Follette was well received in Nebraska. Traveling by automobile over
dusty country roads, he spoke in the open air and had to contend
with wind and dust. But he spoke well and, though somewhat hoarse,
made a good impression. In Sutton, in the Fifth Congressional District,
he gave Norris a strong recommendation, whereupon the audience
cheered and threw hats in the air. If similar sentiment existed through
out the state, a friend assured him, "you would go in a whooping/'
13
As the primary campaign moved toward its climax, McCarl stepped
up his activities by taking frequent trips. While most of the reports
he received claimed that Norris' prospects were good even in Omaha,
he did not know whether to believe them completely. He explained
his dilemma:
Well, I have been having a hell of a time. Possibly you have
an idea it isn't a job to try to perfect a sort of a working organiza
tion in about seventy-five counties in which you don't know a
total of fifty people. Well, that's been my job and I have been
working at it for many long, weary days, but I believe I am get
ting things in rather good shape, hope so anyway.
14
Norris had begun to worry about the effects upon his candidacy
of the Roosevelt-La Follette controversy. La Follette had repeatedly
endorsed him, but Norris knew he would lose a great deal if Roosevelt
ignored him when he spoke in the state. If, on the other hand, Roose
velt also endorsed Norris, his senatorial nomination would be assured.
With Roosevelt scheduled to speak- on April 17 and 18, just before the
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primary, tension mounted. The day before the former president was to
appear, Norris received an urgent telegram from Aldrich requesting
him to issue a statement
calling upon La Follette men to support
Roosevelt in order to prevent a division of the progressive forces and
a Taft victory. Norris wired back, "Such advice should be given by
state Progressive League not by me." 15
Governor Aldrich was concerned about a story in the Sunday
State Journal of April 14, reporting that Norris had advised Nebraska
Republicans to vote for La Follette "first, last and all the time." Norris
issued a flat denial and so informed R. B. Howell, who was traveling
with Roosevelt. Whether Roosevelt learned of this denial is not known,
but the former president did not endorse Norris when he spoke in
Nebraska.16
Norris did not expect Roosevelt to speak in his behalf. He did not
think it right to ask him to take any part in local elections. If Roose
velt chose to endorse him, he would be more than pleased, but under
no circumstances would he request such support. Norris would not
publicly endorse either of the progressive presidential candidates for
fear of losing some of his own supporters. He believed that a vote for
La Follette in Nebraska might be construed as half a vote for Taft, but
thought that most progressives would vote for Roosevelt.
17
Friday, April 19, saw 133,603 voters go to the polls in Nebraska to
cast their primary ballots. The total number of males of voting age in
1912 was 364,132. The percentage of those voting at this primary was
36.69 which compared with 28.38 per cent at the first primary in 1907.
Though the returns came in slowly, it was soon evident that Roose
velt would win by an overwhelming majority. He received 46,795
votes to 16,786 for La Follette and 13,341 for Taft. Thus all sixteen of
the state's Republican delegates would support his candidacy at the
Chicago convention. Norris' majority was not as impressive as the
former president's. He defeated Brown by more than five thousand
votes, 38,893 to 33,156, while Aldrich and Howell, progressive Repub
licans, defeated their more conservative opponents for governor and
national committeeman by more substantial majorities. In the Demo
cratic primary Champ Clark won the Nebraska delegation, while
Norris' first congressional opponent, former Governor Shallenberger,
was designated to be his opponent in the senatorial campaign.
18
Messages of congratulation poured in upon McCarl in McCook
and Norris in Washington. Norris was delighted to learn that he had
acquired a substantial lead long before returns from distant western
counties, which he was almost certain to carry, began to arrive at
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party headquarters in Lincoln. He carried Douglas County, in which
Omaha is located, by a small majority, though it had been predicted
that Brown would carry it by a 2-to-l majority.
19
While others were happy or sad depending on the fate of their
favorite candidates, McCarl and Norris had little time for emotion.
McCarl immediately started preparations for the coming campaign,
while Norris was still involved with congressional duties. But he too
was looking ahead, particularly to the Republican convention in Chi
cago, where he predicted a fierce fight to nominate Roosevelt. Now
that the former president had won so impressive a primary victory,
Norris openly endorsed his candidacy as representing the desire of
the overwhelming majority of Nebraska voters.
20
The La Follette supporters in Nebraska, more than any other
group, had reason for bitterness and recrimination. They had started
a movement which others would now direct and control, Frank Harri
son offered no excuses; they were overwhelmed by the Roosevelt
bandwagon. He did point out, however, that La Follette had done
very well in communities where he had spoken, and that railroad work
ers had stood by his candidacy. He also claimed that "Aldrich men
knifed Norris all over the state," and that consequently the senatorial
race had been much closer than
originally anticipated. But Harrison
observed the result was
"good enough for Norris" who had straddled
the presidential issue.
21
Thus Norris, though his majority was the smallest among can
didates seeking state-wide Republican nomination, successfully crossed
the first hurdle in his race for a seat in the Senate. While Senator
Brown had been generally consistent as a progressive, his friendship
for President Taft was the weak spot in his armor. At various times he
had resolved doubts by standing with the president. He had not been
slavish about it, and more often than not he had voted with the pro
gressives. But on the Payne-Aldrich Tariff and the Canadian Reci
procity Agreement, issues which aroused much antipathy in Nebraska,
Brown had supported the president on the final vote.
On the other hand, Norris, as a congressman, was regarded as
one of the staunchest fighters for the progressive cause. He was one
of the prominent victims of the administration's attempt to ruin the
progressives politically by withdrawing patronage. He had been the
leader of the fight against Cannon and machine rule in the House, a
firm friend of the farmer, and a leading figure in the fight against reci
procity with Canada.22 Voters in Nebraska knew and understood this.
In the primary they chose Norris despite the fact that he was per-
PRIMARY VICTORY 249
sonally unknown in the larger communities of the state. Undoubtedly
the deciding factor was Brown's friendship with Taft and Norris' op
position to the administration; Nebraska Republicans in 1912 wanted
nobody suspected of friendship toward the Taft administration.
Chapter 27
Preliminaries
PBOGBESSIVE REPUBLICANS emerged from the Nebraska primary in a
most advantageous position. Nearly all of their candidates had been
elected, and their leaders now assumed a more dominant position in
the party hierarchy. Much depended upon the outcome of the Repub
lican National Convention in June. If Taft were nominated, F. P. Cor-
rick, who had directed the over-all progressive primary campaign,
assured Norris that they would have to "hustle good and plenty to
elect anything on the Republican State Ticket/' Governor Aldrich
would have a difficult campaign no matter who was nominated for the
presidency because he had antagonized citizens representing all shades
of political opinion through inept moves and hasty decisions. Norris,
still busy in Washington with legislative duties, had made no serious
blunder during the primary campaign, and was the strongest can
didate on the entire Republican ticket, though his plurality was not as
large as the governor's.
1
A week after his primary victory Norris, by way of a diversion from
politics, spoke at a large meeting in Washington celebrating the an
niversary of Odd Fellowship in America. He had been working under
strain and pressure and now rheumatism added to his general feeling
of misery. He needed a rest, but at the same time he had every inten
tion of plunging into the campaign and working hard to the very end.
If Roosevelt were nominated, Norris predicted a relatively easy tri
umph in Nebraska. But regardless of the nominee, he believed that
"the progressive spirit of the age" would require voters to lay aside
"the political partisan yoke" and consider measures and men without
regard to party politics. Such a condition would mean better legisla
tion, since it would leave officeholders free to vote according to the
dictates of their consciences. A free individual, acting in accord with
a higher moral law, could only insure greater happiness and progress
for a democratic people. Norris believed this end could be achieved
in the coming election when voters would have an opportunity to over-
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throw political bosses and machine rule, and he was determined to
play an active role in this effort.
2
Observers in Nebraska felt that Norris' popularity would have to
carry the rest of the ticket if Taft were nominated, and that Norris*
name would attract Democratic votes as well. But as Roosevelt won
more and more primary elections, Norris was inclined to believe that
die former president would be nominated and would lead the ticket
to victory in Nebraska. Norris reported that every member of the
House from Massachusetts, which Taft had barely won, was absent
from Washington for a week or ten days before that primary. They
were all Taft supporters. One of them told Norris that if the delega
tion had not returned to campaign, Roosevelt would have carried
practically every district in the state.
3
With the decisive defeat of Taft in the Ohio primary in mid-May,
some politicians and most public opinion began to concede that Roose
velt would win the nomination. After the New Jersey primary, the vic
torious Roosevelt began to admit that he was "reasonably sure" of
becoming his party's standard-bearer. Similar optimism was rampant
in Nebraska. On May 22, behind closed doors in Lincoln, the Repub
lican delegates and their alternates to the national convention decided
to support Taft and then La Follette only if Roosevelt were unable
to obtain the nomination.4
In Washington, Norris refused to prepare statements on the issues
of the campaign until the platforms were formulated. He did state,
however, that in his opinion the most important issue would be an en
largement of the rights of citizens to participate in governmental af
fairs the overthrow on the national scene of political machines and
boss rule. To achieve this goal he endorsed the widely discussed
devices of the initiative, referendum, and recall, the direct election of
United States senators, and the direct nomination of presidential can
didates. To Norris, the issues of the campaign were projections on the
national scene of his experience in the House.
5
The unwillingness of the Republican machine to yield power be
came fully evident to Norris and other progressives when they found
it impossible to obtain tickets to the national convention. Norris soon
concluded that Taft managers intended to steal the nomination by
excluding Roosevelt and La Follette supporters from the galleries,
by pressuring delegates, and by obtaining control of key convention
committees. He believed Taft men would prefer to retain control of
the party machinery rather than to win at the polls. He fully expected
them to decide arbitrarily against Roosevelt delegates in disputed
contests through their control of committees. Concerned as he was.
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over this situation, Norris could do nothing to prevent it. Since he
had chosen not to be a delegate, he did not plan to go to Chicago,
in
tending instead to stay in Washington.
6
Two days before the convention convened, Norris told
a reporter
he thought the Republican platform should contain
a permanent, non-
partisan tariff commission, supplemental antitrust legislation,
a work
men s compensation law applying to interstate railroads,
the placing of
the post office on a business basis,
a presidential primary law, new
rules determining representation in national conventions
on the basis
of voting strength and prohibiting federal officials from
the control
and management of political campaigns, the short ballot, and, finally,
the initiative, referendum, and recall. Most of these planks were in ac
cord with the wishes of progressive Republican delegates assembling
in Chicago.
7
On June 17, the Nebraska delegation at its first caucus in Chicago
censured Victor Rosewater, acting chairman of the National Commit
tee and a devoted Taft supporter. Rosewater found that the delegates
would abide by none of his arrangements. The way they treated him,
however, was only a preview of the bitterness and ill will that was to
characterize relations between progressive and conservative delegates
throughout the convention.
8
As the convention got under way, Norris anxiously read accounts
of the Republican organization's rejection of the claims of the vast
majority of the Roosevelt delegates for contested seats. When he
learned that Roosevelt men had bolted the Committee on Resolutions
and that a movement was under way for a separate convention, he
made hurried plans to leave for Chicago. He sent the following
nightletter to F. P. Corrick:
Opposed to organization of new party. The progressive are the
true Republicans. Fight to purge the roll. If defeated by stolen
votes . . . organize and nominate candidate without leaving hall.
We already have control of party and candidates in progressive
states. We must not give this up. We are the Republicans and en
titled to the designation on official ballot.
9
When Norris arrived in Chicago, Roosevelt already had received
assurances of financial support for a new party. The former president
had prepared a message which was read by Henry J. Allen of Kansas
shortly after the delegates assembled on Saturday, June 22. Roosevelt
chronicled the outrageous frauds of the convention and asked delegates
not to participate any longer in its deliberations. That afternoon it was
announced that a new party would be formed that night at Orchestra
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Hall. Hiram Johnson opened the evening meeting with a rousing
speech and Roosevelt announced, amid tumultuous roars of approval,
that he would accept the nomination of a new party if it were made
by a new convention regularly called and honestly elected. Earlier,
when Norris was introduced to the audience, another round of cheers
went up, and he ascended the platform and probably remained there
throughout the remainder of the proceedings.
10
Returning thereafter to Washington, Norris felt that the exciting
events in Chicago insured a Democratic victory in Nebraska. While he
was confused about the campaign and his own political future, he was
certain that under no circumstances could he be induced to support
Taft after "the fraudulent, dishonest and illegal methods by which he
received his pretended nomination/* Norris had no intention of sanc
tioning what he considered the unseating of honestly elected delegates
by men who had not "a scintilla of an honest or rightful claim to the
seats." He drafted a statement, soon released to the press and later
expanded into a speech delivered on the House floor, which reviewed
the situation in detail. "Democratic Tammany/' claimed Norris, "in
her worst guise had never more arbitrarily and unlawfully trampled
the
rights of the individual voter under foot than was done by these
political manipulators and bosses, most of whom had already been
repudiated in their own states and in their own communities by the
rank and file of the Republican party."
n
To Norris, Roosevelt had been nominated at Orchestra Hall early
in the morning of June 23, and a new convention and a third party
were unnecessary. Roosevelt had been nominated without opposition
in one of the most enthusiastic meetings he had ever attended, and
Norris intended to support him as the only lawfully nominated Repub
lican candidate for president.
Full formalities were ignored, Norris explained, because most
delegates had been in Chicago for a week and could not remain any
longer. The Orchestra Hall delegates, unanimous in their support of
Roosevelt, were eager to endorse him and depart as quickly as pos
sible. Thus they passed a resolution, which Norris claimed the news
papers never published, stating that they constituted a majority of
the legally elected Republican delegates of the National Republican
Convention, and acting on behalf of the Republicans of the nation,
had nominated Roosevelt as the Republican candidate for president.
12
On this basis Norris opposed the creation of a third party, espe
cially in Nebraska where progressives had nominated almost all of the
candidates and had complete control of the situation. He feared that
if a third party were organized, some progressive candidates might
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withdraw from the Republican ticket, giving Taft men control of
the party in Nebraska. Norris, who had no desire to leave the Repub
lican party, hoped that if a new party were started it would
endorse
all of the candidates already nominated in progressive Republican
states like Nebraska.13
Norris* condemnation of machine tactics in securing Taft's nomina
tion "created something of a sensation" in Nebraska. Upon learning
the details of the Chicago convention, Nebraskans were more en
thusiastic than ever for Roosevelt and looked forward to progressive
Republicans dominating the state convention. The Nebraska delega
tion to the Chicago convention also issued a series of statements chal
lenging the outrage perpetrated on the people by the fraudulently con
stituted convention. Like Norris' speech, these releases analyzed the
contests in disputed states. All concluded that a majority of lawfully
elected delegates were for Roosevelt and that enough votes were
stolen from him to give Taft the nomination. Norris endorsed these
statements and planned to plunge into the fight to capture control of
the forthcoming state convention.
14
Norris had no intention of leaving the party and no desire to con
ceal and cover the fraud and manipulation that had taken place within
it. He thought it his duty to expose it and to repudiate the nominee
whose title to the nomination depended upon illegal and fraudulent
action. To summarize his feelings in this matter, he used a phrase
made memorable by Abraham Lincoln:
I am not bound to win, but I am bound to be true. I am not
bound to succeed, but I am bound to live up to what light I have.
I must stand with anybody who stands right, stand with him
while he is right and part from him when he goes wrong.
15
He believed too that Roosevelt had no reason for leaving the
party, that he should have accepted without qualification the nomina
tion tendered him, and that he should not attempt to organize a third
party. Progressives, Norris contended, should simply recognize the
Orchestra Hall meeting and go ahead with the fight. While such a
step could no longer be taken on the national level, it could be
taken on the state level, and he urged supporters to send progressive
delegates to the Republican State Convention in Lincoln to extirpate
machine control in Nebraska. He intended to support Roosevelt with
out joining the new party. If the Taft element in Nebraska claimed he
was not a Republican and nominated somebody in his place, Norris
admitted his cause would be hopeless. The fate of Norris and of the
progressive movement in Nebraska thus depended on which faction
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gained control of the convention scheduled to meet on July 30 to
adopt a party platform.16
Norris was displeased about the role of Senator La Follette, who
had remained in Washington throughout the national convention. La
Follette had refused to let his delegates support Governor Francis E.
McGovern of Wisconsin for temporary chairman and, while Norris
knew the senator had been treated shabbily, he considered this ac
tion a serious mistake.17 La Follette seemed to prefer the defeat of
the progressive cause to victory with Roosevelt as standardbearer.
When it became apparent he could not win, La Follette should have
given up his individual ambitions for the progressive movement
While he still admired La Follette, Norris nevertheless was critical of
his behavior during the primary campaigns and especially during the
national convention.18
Nebraskans soon supported Norris' repudiation of Taft Letters,
resolutions, editorials all announced that voters agreed with or at least
admired his straightforward declaration. His statement, released after
his return to Washington from the convention, was the first of its kind.
Governor Aldrich followed with one of his own. But McCarl warned
Norris that since his position was stronger than the governor's, he
should not work too closely with Aldrich in the campaign.
19
McCarl realized, however, that control of the state convention was
more important than the question of Norris' relationship with Aldrich.
If the convention were standpat and favored Taft, it would no doubt
condemn Norris, Aldrich, and others who had corne out against Taft.
On the other hand, if the progressive faction could control the conven
tion, the rest of the campaign would be relatively easy. A platform in
accord with Norris' views would be adopted and no third party ticket
then would appear on the ballot. To bring about this desired result,
McCarl proposed to see "the right fellows in person
9*
to make sure that
their counties chose progressive delegates to county conventions,
thereby insuring a state convention favorable to the progressive
cause.20
Meanwhile Norris prepared a statement stressing the importance of
a progressive platform and the election of progressive delegates to the
state convention. Such a platform would show that the rank and file
of the party in Nebraska were in favor of progressive principles and
were opposed to the methods used "to steal the presidential nomina
tion" for Taft.21
It had been rumored that Norris might act as temporary or per
manent chairman of the state convention and make a speech, but
several friends warned him against such action. Any address would
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have to endorse other progressive candidates and thus would lose him
Democratic and independent votes. While many Democrats might
vote for Norris, few would vote for Aldrich or other progressive Re
publican candidates. Since Norris was the only Republican in the state
with a chance of being elected, these friends felt it would be political
suicide to aid candidates who had been more or less indifferent to his
success in the past. All agreed, however, that the chances that progres
sives would control the convention were good.
22
So persistent were rumors that the standpatters, if they controlled
the convention, would ask Norris to withdraw from the ticket, that he
wrote a letter to the chairman of the State Republican Committee,
John L. Kennedy. In it he stated that if his course in refusing to recog
nize Taft as his party's nominee were unsatisfactory to the Repub
licans who nominated him, he would withdraw. If his candidacy de
pended on supporting Taft, given the fraudulent methods used in
obtaining his nomination, he would return to private life. But Ken
nedy claimed that Norris had been properly nominated and that no
state committeeman had questioned his right to a place on the ticket.
Norris* proposal, however, coming on the eve of the state convention,
dramatically presented his views and took the initiative away from
the regular Republicans.
23
The Red Willow County convention meeting in McCook on July
20 chose Norris as a member of its delegation and reiterated his views
in a resolution which was unanimously adopted. Other counties also
chose progressive delegates, and several conventions denounced Taft
and the Chicago convention. A large majority of the counties compris
ing the Fifth Congressional District endorsed Norris* position. Mean
while, Norris, who was expected to attend the state convention and
perhaps to serve as temporary chairman and keynote speaker, an
nounced at the last moment that pressure of congressional business
would prevent his return. By remaining in Washington he would lose
few, if any, votes from Democrats who intended to support him, and
progressives would support him whether he attended or not. Taft men,
unless they voted Democratic or forced him off the ticket, would have
no alternative but to vote for him on election day. Thus Norris
strengthened his position by staying in Washington during the con
vention.24
Another factor which may have helped him decide not to attend
the convention was that he expected a bitter battle to take place there.
Previously, behind the scenes, he had indirectly tried to prevent such
a battle from developing. In Omaha the county committee, controlled
by Rosewater, had met on July 16 and called for the convening of the
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Douglas County Convention on July 20. To be sure that they would
control this convention, the committee appointed a group of their
own members to select delegates to the convention and a committee to
select their own successors. Norris, learning of these procedures from
Rosewater's Omaha Bee, considered them brazen political skuldug
gery. He wrote to Howell, asking him to take the lead in calling for a
genuine county convention. He also requested that Roosevelt write to
Howell and urge him to take the lead in challenging Rosewater*s
manipulation of the Douglas County committee. But Roosevelt was of
no help in this matter. While he agreed with Norris" sentiments, his so
lution was "to come out straight for the third ticket" rather than to
submit to such infamy.
25
Thus at the state convention Taft men controlled the Douglas
County delegation, the largest single delegation. Nine or ten counties
had contested delegations, and in every instance both sets of delegates
were on hand. Indications did not point to a harmonious gathering.
The night before the convention was to get under way, leaders of the
Taft and Roosevelt groups met together in a futile effort to resolve their
differences. Norris sent a telegram which was indicative of the temper
of most of the delegates. He insisted, "Any compromise is an uncon
ditional surrender." At the same time he knew, despite bitter feeling
between contending factions, that the progressive Republicans were in
control.26
McCarl played an important role at the convention, helping to
organize progressives to combat any unforeseen tactics by Taft men.
At a conference, the Taft leaders boldly demanded that Roosevelt
electors get off the Republican ticket. Norris was informed, "They
wanted the party name and the party machinery." Rebuffed at this in
formal meeting, the Taft men received a further blow the next day,
July .31, when the Executive Committee, headed by Aldrich, decided
most of the contested cases in favor of progressive delegates, thereby
insuring their control of the convention by a large majority. Once
these decisions were announced many of the regular Republican dele
gates, with the Douglas County delegation in the lead, reversed
the
procedure of the Chicago convention and walked out, bitterly
com
plaining of what they called Governor Aldrich's "steam roller"
tac
tics.27
The real trouble came when Rosewater found himself unable to
control John L. Kennedy, a Taft supporter and a member of the Execu
tive Committee hearing the contested cases. Kennedy, deciding the
cases on their merits, was compelled in most instances to support dele
gates favorable to Roosevelt. Rosewater,
furious over Kennedy s be-
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havior, decided to "bust the convention/' and, largely through Ken
nedy's courageous stand, the progressive group gained control. This
was not the opinion of all observers. None of the newspapers, accord
ing to McCarl, reported the facts fairly. But from his vantage point
as a prominent delegate, McCarl saw Kennedy as the real hero of the
state convention and Rosewater as the villain.28
The platform enthusiastically adopted by the convention was
short but vague as to the test of Republicanism. It made no mention
of Taft, his administration, the Chicago convention, and used no
vindictive language reflecting the division of the party. At the same
time, the Taft delegates, who had walked out of the state convention,
were holding a meeting and claiming that they were the only true
Republicans. They intended to obtain a court order validating their
contention. Rosewater moved that the state central committee be
given the power to fill all vacancies on the Republican ticket with can
didates who supported Taft.29
Norris was warned not to attend the Progressive convention in
Chicago and to stay away from the new party altogether. The third
party, if and when it was organized in the state, could endorse his
candidacy, but Norris* job was to remain in the Republican party and
keep the control which progressive elements had firmly established
as a result of the state convention. As McCarl explained it, 'We can be
Republicans without supporting Taft and that's what we are." Though
there was disappointment in Lincoln because Norris was not present
at the convention, there was also strong sentiment for him. The pre
liminaries, as far as Norris was concerned, were over. It was now his
responsibility, as soon as Congress adjourned, to take his candidacy to
the people of Nebraska.30
Chapter 28
Campaigning
THROUGHOUT Nebraska people discussed whether Norris should at
tend and play a prominent role in the Progressive party convention
to be held in Chicago early in August. However, he still saw no reason
to leave the Republican party. He would abide by a recall election if
voters demanded one and, if recalled, would get off the Republican
ticket. He made this announcement to illustrate dramatically his belief
in the recall and to make it difficult if not impossible for the regular
Republicans to read him out of the party. With progressive Repub
licans fully in control of the party organization in Nebraska, Norris
still tended to his congressional duties in Washington.
1
The question of selecting a new chairman of the state committee
was an important one and threatened to disrupt progressive Repub
lican leaders. F. P. Corrick, who had ably guided the destinies of the
Progressive Republican League, thought the job should be his, but he
was quickly opposed. On August 13, the Republican State Committee
chose Judge Ambrose Epperson as chairman. He regarded Norris* elec
tion as one of the most important items of business facing the commit
tee. McCarl, though satisfied with Epperson, felt that Corrick deserved
the post and, having been treated unjustly, would now direct the third
party campaign in Nebraska. If Corrick remained angry, McCarl feared
he might place a Progressive party candidate against Aldrich, who was
largely responsible for Epperson's choice, and thus further jeopardize
Republican chances.
2
Norris intended to leave no doubt as to his stand on national
issues. He would support Roosevelt and denounce the political rob
bery that was perpetrated at Chicago. He was disturbed and puzzled
by reports that Roosevelt electors in Nebraska would probably with
draw from the Republican ticket Since they had been chosen at the
April primary and their course in supporting Roosevelt
had been vin
dicated by the state convention, he could not understand why they
would not continue to support Roosevelt on the Republican ticket.
The only reasonable explanation was that the progressive Republicans
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intended to trade electoral votes for state votes: Roosevelt electors
would appear only on the Progressive ticket, state candidates
would
appear on both tickets, and organization men
could then substitute a
list of Taft electors to replace the Roosevelt men.
Norris announced
that he would play no part in such a compromise.
3
He received several letters indicating that Aldrich favored such
an arrangement, but though Norris stood to benefit by it,
he refused
to be swayed. He firmly believed that some form of harmony
could
be maintained within Republican ranks, avoiding the need to bring
additional Progressive candidates into the field.
4
McCarl, after attending several meetings in Lincoln, confirmed
this impression. The executive committees of both the Republican and
Progressive state organizations had met in separate rooms of the same
hotel while the Republican candidates or their representatives were
meeting with the Republican State Committee. McCaii, who repre
sented Norris, reported that a state convention of the third party
would be held in Lincoln on September 3. At this time the matter of
endorsement of the state Republican ticket would be officially decided
upon, though the Progressive Executive Committee had already ap
proved the arrangement. It was the sentiment of this meeting that if
the state-wide candidates would agree not to show any inconsistency to
the Progressive party by advocating Taft's election in their speeches,
all such candidates would be endorsed in the interest of harmony and
victory in November.5
Furthermore, the Republican Executive Committee, McCarl in
formed Norris, had taken "the proper attitude/' They intended to
support Norris and the entire state ticket, including the presidential
electors. If any elector wanted to withdraw to be placed on the third
party ticket, this would be considered a personal matter beyond the
committee's jurisdiction. Most members of the committee thought the
electors would do so, since leaders in the Roosevelt headquarters in
Chicago had indicated that they wished them to. McCarl regarded
this position as sensible, but thought it should not be publicly dis
cussed. Few voters actually understood that the politicians wished to
give the Taft men a chance to vote for Taft electors to prevent many
of them from voting for Wilson and possibly Shallenberger as well.
Though Norris disagreed with this scheme, McCarl thought there
was wisdom in it. Since the decision for the Roosevelt electors to
withdraw had been made in Chicago in the best interests of Roosevelt's
candidacy, McCarl felt that Norris should be less concerned with this
decision than with the fact that Taft voters and third party voters as
well would be able to support his candidacy,
6
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Shortly after Congress adjourned on August 26, Norris announced
that he intended to return to Nebraska on or about September 10,
stopping first in Chicago for a conference with Senator Joseph Dixon
of Montana, Roosevelt's campaign manager, and other Progressive
party leaders. His delay in returning to Nebraska was wise politically
because it allowed him to be absent when the Progressive state con
vention opened and gave him time to prepare campaign material.
The Progressive state convention met on September 3 to organize
formally the new party by nominating a set of electors who would
support Roosevelt and Hiram Johnson. This convention chose Corrick
as chairman of its state committee, endorsed six of the eight electors
nominated at the April primary on the Republican ticket the Roose
velt men and added two new men to complete the list. All other
Republican nominees chosen at the April primary \vere endorsed by
the Progressive convention, making it possible for their names to ap
pear on the ballot in November under both the Republican and
Progressive labels. Thus Norris was officially endorsed by two parties,
and the arrangements between the parties had been worked out with
out involving him in bitterness and acrimony."
On September 9, before returning to McCook, Norris stopped
in Lincoln to speak and to visit with leaders of the state committees. To
reporters he repeated that he supported Roosevelt and believed Taft
unfairly nominated. Norris made great efforts to clarify his position
because the campaign, he maintained, would be a crusade for political
and civic righteousness, a national manifestation similar to the fight
against Cannonism.
8
Meanwhile, McCarFs job was to supervise Norris' campaign in
cooperation with the Republican and Progressive state
committees. He
also collected information about the less honorable aspects of Shallen-
berger's record in order to be prepared in the event Shallenberger's
campaign degenerated to the level of that of Fred Ashton's,
Norris'
opponent in 1908, and to satisfy a request from
the Republican State
Committee for a file on all Democratic candidates.
9
Norris launched his campaign with a nonpolitical speech before
some three thousand Odd Fellows assembled outside Omaha for their
annual picnic. Governor Aldrich and several
others delivered
^wel
coming remarks before Norris started his speech
on
"Fraternity." No
sooner did he begin than it started to rain. He continued
his speech
anyway, although only a few members of
tibe audience stayed to hear
him out10 Afterwards Norris spent a day or two in Omaha and Lin
coln discussing politics with Progressive
and Republican party leaders.
He was to deliver his first political speech in Lincoln on September
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20, and thereafter was scheduled for two speeches almost every day
for the rest of the campaign. But at the last minute,
Norris changed
his plans for the Lincoln meeting because Roosevelt expected
him to
spend that day on board his campaign train. Roosevelt, coming
east
from Denver over the Burlington route, spoke at Minden, Hastings,
Lincoln, and Omaha, and Norris appeared on the platform with the
former president during these addresses. In Omaha,
Roosevelt spoke
before an audience of 7,500 enthusiasts who waved handkerchiefs and
cheered wildly when he appeared. Norris accompanied Roosevelt to
the platform and addressed the crowd briefly after
the former presi
dent had spoken. In this dramatic way Norris began his grueling
campaign.
11
The next day he started a one-week tour of the western part of the
state to get "in good working order" before appearing in the eastern
counties. Nine formal meetings were scheduled. He returned to Lin
coln on September 29 to spend two days in the First Congressional
District. Thereafter he was scheduled to spend a few days early in
October speaking in the south central part of the state before em
barking on a tour of northeastern Nebraska. He agreed to devote
most of his time to the more populous eastern end of the state where
he was less well known, and to appear before as many people there
as possible. Automobile transportation helped him carry out this
plan.
12
By the end of September McCarl thought that Norris might have
to speak three or four times a day. He was encouraged by the interest
aroused in Norris* first meetings in the eastern end of the state, an
interest not matched in the western part of Nebraska where voters
already knew their candidate. McCarl wanted Norris to be continually
on the move, returning to certain areas, if necessary, to speak again.
By going back to a locality he could defend himself against rumors,
opposing local politicians who thought there was no danger of a "re
turn engagement." Furthermore, if Norris moved continually, his op
ponents would be unable to trace or evaluate fully the change of sen
timent following his meetings.
13
Early in their campaigns both Norris and Shallenberger spoke
before attentive audiences in Merrick County in east central Nebraska.
As was his custom, Norris made no attempt whatever at oratory,
preferring to let the facts make their own impression. Favorable com
ments from listeners suggested that this type of address, though it
lasted over an hour, was eminently successful.
14
Several days later Shallenberger spoke in another community in
Merrick County, addressing about two hundred people, primarily
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businessmen or town loafers. Very few fanners were present, chiefly
because this was an afternoon meeting. Shallenberger criticized Norris'
record in the Cannon fight because he had not voted to unseat Cannon
and had opposed the creation of a tariff commission. He was ap
plauded only when he referred to Bryan and the Baltimore conven
tion. At the conclusion, as apparently was his custom, Shallenberger
included a peroration to the flag. The speech was reported to be unim
pressive; at least one prominent Democrat in the audience predicted
that Norris would win the election, a prediction repeated elsewhere
by Democrats after Norris spoke in their communities. Observers felt
that if voters deserted their traditional tickets, Roosevelt might win
Nebraska's electoral vote; otherwise, Wilson would win. In no case
would Taft carry the state. Democratic support for Norris, therefore,
would be beneficial to the Progressive party.
15
McCarl was delighted with these reports of Norris sentiment and
by a report that at one place Norris was in such demand that he was
forced to make a speech to the crowd outside before they would let
him enter the hall. McCarl's optimism grew when he learned that
Corrick and Epperson were working harmoniously and effectively to
gether. As a result, he decided to let the combined Speakers' Bureau
of both parties arrange Norris' speaking dates for the rest of the cam
paign subject, of course, to McCarFs approval.
16
By early October Norris' itinerary for the remainder of the cam
paign was completed. At no time was he scheduled for less than two
meetings a day, and on a few days five meetings had been arranged;
this schedule, of course, did not include the many brief speeches and
unscheduled appearances he would make en route. Sundays would
provide him with all the rest he would obtain till after the election.
This busy itinerary, however, had one serious flaw. Norris had
found that he was unable to give an effective short talk; he could make
a point or two, but would be unable to discuss his record or say much
of recent developments. Consequently, voters who did not know him
sometimes received an unfavorable impression. McCarl suggested that
when Norris was scheduled to make a number of brief stops, he have
someone accompany him to give a short general talk before introduc
ing him. This arrangement would keep Norris out of petty
controversies
in which local candidates, who might otherwise introduce him, were
involved. Harry Sackett, a young and prominent Progressive
from
Beatrice, assumed this responsibility and proved eminently satisfac
tory.
17
On October 5 and 6, Wilson spoke in Omaha and Lincoln and
was the guest of Bryan at his home, Fairview. Bryan
introduced Wil-
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son at the auditorium in Lincoln and at the close of his address the
enthusiastic audience called for Bryan to speak as well. He refused,
however, merely motioning the audience to disperse. The appearance
of Wilson in Nebraska was not only a tribute to Bryan but a move
seemingly well calculated to throw the Roosevelt supporters into the
depths of suspense and anxiety. McCarl, for example, confessed:
I am a little afraid of the Wilson boom, afraid of too many
straight Wilson votes this fall. I am in hopes his visit won't set
everybody crazy.
18
Norris was much too busy to take notice of Wilson's speeches in
Nebraska. To avoid possible rancor, he contributed one hundred and
fifty dollars to aid the Progressive cause, matching a previous contribu
tion to the Republican campaign chest. Speaking several times a day,
shaking hands and talking with people in every community on his
route, by and large he enjoyed the campaign.
19
Years later Norris related an amusing anecdote, supposedly illus
trating the evil of partisanship, that occurred during this campaign. A
minister, who had come some distance to hear him speak, claimed to
have followed his record with pleasure and admiration and to be
much in favor of his election. The following conversation took place
between the two men:
"Mr. Norris, I am so anxious to have you succeed that every
night before I retire, on my bended knees I ask God to see that
you are elected to the Senate. Why, I sometimes get so anxious
to see you elected that I almost feel as if I ought to vote for you
myself.'*
"My friend/' said Norris, "if you feel that way about it, why
don't you vote for me?"
"Oh," he replied, "I could not do that. I am a Democrat."
^
The opposition, meanwhile, had a difficult time seriously challeng
ing or embarrassing Norris. To aid Shallenberger, the Lincoln Daily
Star, a Democratic paper, dredged up the story of the 1895 disputed
judicial election between Norris and Welty. Another possible threat
was that Secretary of State Addison Wait would prepare the ballot in
such a way as to create confusion among the voters. The presidential
electors* names were arranged with the six Roosevelt Republicans
appearing first under the name "Republican-Progressive." After all the
other names on the ballot appeared those of the two regularly chosen
Republican electors in the primary as Republican. These were fol
lowed by six names bearing no party label but only the words "by
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petition." These names had been filed as Taft electors, but this fact
was not clearly established on the ballot. Once news of this arrange
ment became known, attention quickly turned away from actual cam
paigning to the perplexing question of which electors favored Taft
and which favored Roosevelt. Protests were made, and Democrats
hoped that animosity between Taft and Roosevelt supporters would
burst forth once more into the open.
21
On October 16, the Republican State Central Committee brought
a petition for a writ of mandamus in the district court of Lancaster
County to compel the secretary of state to remove the heading "Re
publican-Progressive" from the ballot. The names under this heading
would appear as Progressives while the Republican ticket would bear
the names of the two regularly chosen electors plus the six names
filed by petition. On October 19, the judges of the district court
granted the writ of mandamus. Thus the eight Taft electors would go
on the ballot as Republicans, while the names of the six Roosevelt
Republican electors chosen in the primary would appear under the
Progressive party designation.
22
The matter did not rest here. Wait, a Roosevelt supporter, ap
pealed the decision to the Supreme Court on October 22. At noon on
October 24, only hours before the deadline for certification of the
ballot, the Supreme Court of Nebraska unanimously affirmed the ac
tion of the district court, thereby assuring the Taft electors a place on
the ballot and finally solving this complex and thorny problem. Now
there was a chance that voters favoring Taft would vote the entire
Republican ticket, whereas previously it was feared that many would
scratch the Democratic ticket on election day.
23
When the matter of the ballot was settled there remained for
McCarl only his concern about Norris' campaign. Though Norris was
covering a large portion of the state, he could not speak at even half
the places from which requests had been received. Before mid-Octo
ber nearly two hundred different Nebraska communities had re
quested his appearance and fourteen states had clamored for a day or
two of his time. Norris had no intention of campaigning outside the
state, and would be unable to speak to voters in most of these com
munities.
To offset this factor McCarl had prepared a two-column plate
with a cut of Norris and a statement of some of the things he had
accomplished and was working for. He sent this plate to editors
throughout Nebraska and distributed copies of Norris* speeches
and
other campaign literature. By mid-October, only one Republican
country editor had told McCarl that he would not use the plate. Most
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Taft papers had agreed to publish it. This widespread acceptance,
plus the fact that the Democrats had to go back to 1895 to find any
thing to criticize, pleased McCarl.
2*
The outlook was further brightened by a telephone conversation
between McCarl and John L. Kennedy. Kennedy said that Norris
would receive a fine hearing in Omaha, that an address would climax
the good work being done there for the entire Republican ticket and
particularly for Norris. Kennedy reassured McCarl regarding a rumor
of railroad opposition, claiming that most railroad officials, while
personally opposed to Norris, thought he would be easily elected and
would not work against him.
25
Though all reports about Norris' meetings were good, no relaxation
was contemplated. Norris was so tired that on Sundays, even when
feasible, he did not return home to spend the day with his family, but
rested instead in the community where he had last spoken. Until
McCarl reported his conversation with Kennedy, Norris had been
reluctant to attempt a meeting by himself in Omaha for fear he might
not receive a satisfactory hearing; a poor meeting, coming at the end
of the campaign, could hurt his chances. But now he began to recon
sider. His speeches, however, did not change. While their content
varied from town to town, all were crammed full of facts and devoid
of oratorical flourishes or partisan criticism. They appealed to the in
telligence rather than to the emotions of his hearers, and received a
favorable reception.
26
Besides Kennedy's comments, Norris heard further favorable reports
about the situation in Omaha. Travelers told of growing sentiment,
and the Omaha Daily News in October published two editorials, both
well received, endorsing Norris. R. B. Howell, attempting to sense the
political situation, secured a number of straw votes at strategic points
throughout the city. His conclusion was that Norris could carry Doug
las County, though Roosevelt*s prospects did not seem "overly bright."
With these observations in mind, McCarl prepared twenty-five hun
dred personal letters to be mailed to Omaha residents on the Wednes
day or Thursday before election, while Norris planned to spend
November 1, the Friday before the election, speaking in Omaha and
South Omaha.27
At times, the effects of the tiring campaign showed on Norris. In
the privacy of his hotel room and elsewhere, among friends, he some
times became irritable, cursed, and complained about being driven too
hard. But the public and most politicians rarely saw this side of his
personality. By the end of October he looked haggard and tired but
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was well pleased with the course of his campaign and felt assured of
success on election day.
28
Norris concluded his campaign in the eastern end of the state on
the first day of November. At noon he spoke before a luncheon
meeting of the Omaha Commercial Club and spent the rest of the day
in Omaha and South Omaha. Kennedy introduced him to the mem
bers of the Commercial Club. "Because we disagree on president,"
said Kennedy, "is not to me a sufficient reason why I should withhold
from him my support." Indeed, Kennedy s help, climaxed at this meet
ing, had been invaluable throughout the campaign.29
McCarl had yet to finish his work. He arranged for Norris to spend
the last days of the campaign in the Fifth Congressional District.
There were numerous meetings scheduled, including one at Hastings
on Saturday evening, November 2, and a final homecoming rally in
McCook on election eve. The Chicago Tribune summed up the feel
ing of many voters just before election day by predicting that while
the state might enter the Democratic fold, "It is more than likely that
Representative George W. Norris will be the next United States Sena
tor from Nebraska." 30
Though the election of 1912 was infinitely more exciting than that
of 1908, seventeen thousand more votes were cast in Nebraska in the
earlier campaign. Slightly less than two hundred and fifty thousand
Nebraska citizens went to the polls in 1912. Wilson easily carried the
state, running more than thirty thousand votes ahead of Roosevelt.
But the combined Roosevelt and Taft votes surpassed Wilson's 109,109
votes. For governor, Aldrich was defeated by his Democratic opponent
John H. Morehead by almost four thousand votes. This race was so
close that Aldrich refused to admit defeat until several days after the
election. All otter state officers on the Republican and Progressive
tickets were elected by pluralities of ten thousand to fifteen thousand,
an indication of Aldrich's alienation of many voters. Control of the
state legislature was divided. The Democrats would dominate the
next session of the lower house, electing fifty-six members to forty-four
for the Progressive and Republican parties. In the state senate the
Progressive and Republican members won a three-man majority, elect
ing eighteen members to the Democrat's fifteen. In the congressional
races there was an even split, Democrats electing candidates in the
three eastern districts, while Progressive and Republican candidates,
including Silas R. Barton, Norris' successor in the Fifth District,
won
the remaining three districts. Finally, in the preference race for the
United States Senate seat to be vacated by incumbent Norris Brown,
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George Norris handily defeated Shallenberger. Norris received 126,022
votes to Shallenberger's 111,946.
31
Norris was deeply gratified by the outcome. His exuberance, how
ever, was tempered by the knowledge that his triumph was a notable
exception to a general pattern of Progressive and Republican defeat
throughout the nation. He was pleased that he carried Douglas
County which went for Wilson by more than two thousand votes.
Friction over prohibition between Shallenberger and James C. Dahl-
man, Democratic Mayor of Omaha, helped Norris' vote in the state's
largest city. Democratic strife, while beneficial to Norris, nevertheless
did not harm Wilson, who benefited immeasurably from Republican
factionalism. Despite ballot adjudication, Wilson's vote was increased
by conservative Taft supporters who resented the liberal group con
trolling the state party organization and its close cooperation with
the Progressive State Committee. Others, fearful of a Roosevelt victory
in Nebraska, voted for Wilson. Democratic managers did all in their
power to encourage these resentments and fears. Despite Wilson's
impressive victory, Shallenberger, though defeated by Norris, polled
better than twenty-five hundred more votes than the head of his ticket,
and Morehead, with 124,000 votes, polled almost fifteen thousand more
votes than Wilson. Norris was the leading vote getter in Nebraska in
1912; his 126,022 votes were surpassed by no other candidate.
32
Both Republican and Progressive leaders were delighted with Nor
ris' victory. Harry Sackett noted that it had an effect "upon the young
men of the State in leading them to follow their honest and conscien
tious convictions in all matters pertaining to the public welfare as well
as in business matters." Thus Norris' work in opposing Cannonism
had born fruit by 1912. Nebraska voters accepted and even admired
his independence and lack of partisanship. As one o his admirers,
possibly summing up the views of the electorate, wrote, "We all ex
pect him to just be honest with himself and square with the people of
Nebraska." By 1912 Norris had been able to do just that. He had been
able to throw off the yoke of partisanship and yet to obtain improved
legislation benefiting his constituents.
33
Norris quickly regained his physical strength and by mid-Novem
ber was feeling fine, though still deluged with correspondence and
office work. He could not take an extended vacation, however, because
the third session of the Sixty-second Congress was scheduled to con
vene early in December. This forthcoming short session, his last as a
member of the House, promised to be an active one. It was also a ses
sion which cast Norris in a different role from any he had previously
experienced in Congress.
Chapter 29
Senator-Elect
THE THIRD SESSION of the Sixty-second Congress convened on Monday,
December 2, 1912 at noon with Senator-elect George Norris on hand
to complete his service as a member of the House. He had resumed
bachelor quarters at the Y.M.C.A. and plunged into congressional
duties. For the first part of the session his time and energies were
devoted to the impeachment trial of Judge Robert W. Archibald of the
United States Commerce Court.
On July 11, 1912, the House had voted 223 to 1 to impeach the
judge.
1
Norris, as a member of the Judiciary Committee, had been
appointed one of the House managers to prosecute him before the
Senate convened as a court of impeachment. The trial committee
usually consisted of five members. This time, however, the chairman
had appointed and the House approved a seven-member committee so
that Norris and John W. Davis of West Virginia, both of whom were
among the ablest lawyers in Congress, but neither of whom had been
on the Judiciary Committee long enough to warrant the appointment,
could serve. From December 2, 1912, until Archbald's fate was de
cided on January 13, 1913, Norris appeared in the Senate chamber
every day that Congress was in session, an experience which in
troduced him to a body wherein he would play a significant role for
the next thirty years.
This impeachment trial was the ninth in the history of the federal
government. In essence, the charges against Archbald were that he
had engaged in business deals with litigants before his court and had
sought favors from them to an extent that violated the canons of good
behavior and constituted high crimes and misdemeanors. He had been
appointed by William McKinley in 1901 as a district judge. In 1911
he had been promoted by President Taft and confirmed by the Senate
as an additional circuit judge, designated to serve on the United
States Commerce Court which had been created under the Mann-
Elkins Act of 1910. Thirteen articles of impeachment were prepared
with the last serving as a summary article. They called attention to
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eleven distinct acts of misconduct and misbehavior. Five of the
charges had occurred during his district judgeship, the remainder
during his circuit judgeship. From the beginning many senators were
dubious about convicting a person of charges that had occurred while
serving in a previous position, different from the one he held at the
time of the trial.2
Of the six counts against Archbald as a circuit judge, five had to do
with transactions between himself and officers of railroads or their
subsidiaries in the Pennsylvania anthracite coal region, and one per
tained to correspondence between Archbald and counsel for a railroad
company with reference to a pending case. In no instance was he
involved in the expenditure or investment of money, but in each in
stance he and his friends gained or stood a chance of gaining hand
some profits. Archbald did not actively seek such activity, but was
usually approached by a third party who requested him to take up a
matter with a railroad company or one of its subsidiaries. No railroad
could afford to incur the displeasure of a judge of the Commerce
Court, which concentrated on litigation pertaining to rates and facili
ties offered by railroads engaged in interstate commerce. Hence it was
argued that Judge Archbald by his conduct had undermined public
confidence in his honesty and had cast suspicion upon his judicial
integrity.
As a House manager in these proceedings Norris played a minor
role. He questioned witnesses only occasionally, but at the conclusion
of the proceedings he delivered an effective summary argument. Repre
senting Judge Archbald, as his chief counsel, was Colonel A. S.
Worthington, a capable lawyer whom Norris would encounter in later
years as a lobbyist for public utility corporations. Appearing every day
in the Senate Chamber, Norris, as a former prosecuting attorney and
judge, keenly followed the trial. But he had further reason, a more
personal and individual one, for his great interest in the outcome.
During the Judiciary Committee's investigation of Judge Arch-
bald, Norris met and befriended William P. Boland, owner and presi
dent of the Marian Coal Company of Scranton, Pennsylvania. Boland,
associated with anthracite mining all his life, was being ruined by rail
road rate practices, and was convinced that Archbald was trying to
take advantage of his plight for his own benefit. Norris listened with
interest to Boland's story. It seemed that in the summer and fall of
1909, the Marian Coal Company was defendant in a case pending
before Judge Archibald's court. Archbald, a district judge at this time,
had drawn a note for five hundred dollars payable to himself and
then agreed to allow the note to be presented to either Boland or
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his brother for the purpose of having it discounted. At the time Arch-
bald's note was presented to the Bolands, the Marian Coal Company
was a litigant in his court. In spite of this inducement to accept the
note, William Boland refused. Archbald soon found someone else to
accept it but, as of the end of 1912, this person had not yet been paid.
Then just prior to Archibald's service on the Commerce Court,
the Marian Coal Company had filed before the Interstate Commerce
Commission a complaint against the Delaware, Lackawanna & West
ern Railroad Company and five other interstate railroad companies,
charging discrimination in rates and excessive fees for the transporta
tion of coal. While the case was pending, Boland employed an at
torney, George M. Watson, to settle the matter by selling to the
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company two-thirds of
the stock of the Marian Coal Company. If the case were not settled
out of court, any party to the dispute had the option under the Mann-
Elkins Act of appealing the decision of the Interstate Commerce
Commission to the United States Commerce Court which had just
welcomed Judge Archbald as a new member.
Judge Archbald, knowing of the general plight of the Marian Coal
Company, and informed of further details by Watson, had agreed for
a consideration to assist Watson in the sale of Marian Coal Company
stock to the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company.
Archbald interfered in this matter without the consent of the Boland
brothers; Watson had merely raised the price to include the fee Judge
Archbald would receive.
William Boland, distraught over his business situation, became
frantic when he learned of Archibald's interference in his affairs. He
denounced the judge and began to collect evidence he thought would
reveal Archbald's culpability. Most people in Scranton, however,
thought his suit before the ICC was affected by his impending finan
cial collapse and dismissed his accusations; others thought him a crank
casting aspersions on judicial integrity. Norris, however, took him
seriously. He had listened sympathetically in the Judiciary Committee
hearings, during long walks, and in other conversations to Roland's tale
of personal woe and judicial disgrace. He had even advised Boland
how to prepare his case before the ICC. Boland's story eventually be
came the basis of the second and eighth articles of impeachment,
both of which the Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, rejected.
3
In his summary argument requesting the conviction and removal
of Robert W. Archbald from judicial office, Norris did not discuss the
facts as they had been developed in the case. Rather he came to the
core of the problem and discussed the constitutional issues involved.
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ArchbalcTs lawyers had claimed that while he may have been guilty of
misbehavior in office, he was not guilty of any offense which could
properly be the subject of prosecution in a criminal court. They force
fully argued that a man may be impeached only for offenses which are
criminal in their nature and could legally be the subject of prosecu
tion by indictment.
Norris rejected this position and proceeded to demonstrate, citing
the Constitution and several commentaries, that a federal judge could
be impeached, convicted, and removed from office "for any act from
treason down to conduct that tends to bring the judiciary into dis
grace, disrespect or disrepute." Furthermore, holding that an official
with a fixed tenure of office should not be impeached and removed
for misdemeanors that were not indictable offenses was entirely dif
ferent from holding that a judge, who usually enjoyed a lifetime
tenure, should not be impeached and removed. Norris claimed that the
framers of the Constitution had this distinction in mind when they
wrote the section which applies exclusively to the judiciary and which
provides that judges shall hold their offices during good behavior. If
this were not so, he stated, Congress and the country could not get
relief from a judge who had dragged "the judicial ermine down into
disgrace" but who at the same time had been careful not to commit
any criminal offense. Judge Archbald, Norris admitted, had not com
mitted any criminal offense. But by secretly engaging in private agree
ments with attorneys on one side of a case, and by continually and
carefully asking favors of litigants in his court, he was guilty of mis
behavior and was perverting the ends of justice. Unless his interpreta
tion of the Constitution were accepted, such conduct could continue
unabated and the whole judicial system would be undermined. The
government, he concluded, could not perform its function unless
courts were above reproach and judges above suspicion.4
On January 13, 1913, the Senate voted on the articles of impeach
ment
against Judge Archbald. While he was adjudged not guilty of
eight charges, he was found guilty on five counts, including article
thirteen, the summary article. It was the judgment of the Senate that
Archbald be removed from office and "forever disqualified to hold and
enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit under the United States/
7 5
This trial was the most important piece of congressional business
in which Norris engaged during this short session. Once the verdict
was announced, he returned to the House and resumed an active in
terest in legislative matters pending before that chamber. At the time,
evidence was being collected in cases involving violations of the Sher-
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man Antitrust Act. The method of acquiring this information, how
ever, was being challenged and highly publicized.
The evidence was being taken by referees or masters traveling to
many localities throughout the country. In 1912, in the case of the
United States v. The United Shoe Machinery Company of New Jersey
et al, pending in a district court, the defendants objected to the taking
of testimony by the master in public, and the question was submitted
to the court. After an exhaustive hearing and the filing of briefs, the
court issued an order excluding the public from such proceedings. Ac
cording to Norris, who consulted Attorney General Wickersham on the
matter, this was the first time that the question had been raised. If the
decision of the court stood and Congress did not take immediate ac
tion, Norris believed that in all suits arising under the Sherman Anti
trust Act the government would be asked to take evidence in private.
He was convinced that such secrecy was not only contrary "to the
fundamental idea of our jurisprudence," but would often result in a
denial of justice. Throughout his career he opposed secrecy in public
affairs, whether in party caucuses or conferences of diplomats. In this
particular instance, he thought secret hearings would surround the
courts with "a mystery of doubt" and bring them into disrepute. He
realized that there would have to be exceptions to this general pro
scription, but, he argued, "If our courts are to retain the confidence
and respect of the country generally their official conduct must be
entirely free from any suspicion of star-chamber proceedings/'
6
On March 2, just before the end of the session, he had die satisfac
tion of voting with the majority for a bill prohibiting testimony from
being taken in secret in suits arising under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Norris himself had introduced this measure at the request of the at
torney general. It had previously passed the Senate and was signed
into law by President Taft on March 3, his last full day in office. Thus
Norris, as he ended his service in the House, was cooperating closely
with the Taft administration, an administration which had fought him
and which he in turn had attacked throughout most of its stormy
course.
Other bills to improve the effectiveness of the antitrust law or to
deal more directly with the problem of monopoly were also under
consideration, but Norris' measure was the only one upon which Con
gress acted. Norris desired further legislation along these lines, favor
ing, for example, certain patent-law changes that would lesson the
power of patent monopolies. He wanted to amend the law so that a
person would lose his patent if he did not begin manufacturing his
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article within a reasonable time. Thus, improvements on patented
items could not be kept off the market and out of public reach.
Morris
believed that the patentee should have the exclusive right
to manu
facture an article, but that the public should have the benefit of the
patent on reasonable terms. Under existing law,
as construed by the
Supreme Court, the owner of a patent
could attach conditions to
the use of items produced under it, Morris, bearing in mind the recent
Supreme Court decision wherein the United Shoe Machinery
Com
pany was allowed to control the leasing
and use of their patented
machinery while requiring manufacturers to use other
items entirely
independent of these patented machines, thought
the law was giving
too much power to monopoly.
7
The Panama Canal, which interested Morris early in his Senate
career, briefly caught his attention during the last days of this session.
His remarks revealed his pacifism as well as his maturity as a legislator.
Though he had opposed fortification of the canal when the matter
was originally before the House, after Congress
had decided to fortify
it Morris deemed it foolish and even unpatriotic to prevent proper im
plementation of a decision that had been made. He explained:
As long as we have decided to fortify, as long as we have
decided to take any particular port and fortify it, we ought not to
do it in any slipshod or half-way manner. The minute we begin
to fortify the Panama Canal we invite the attack of any nation
that is at war with us, and it would be silly, it seems to me, to
build any fortification that is not ample, that is not absolutely
the best that modern ingenuity can devise.
8
This pattern of initial, strenuous opposition followed by final sup
port of the majority view was one that would be repeated by Morris
on a more dramatic scale at the time of World War L
As the short session drew to a close, its time was given to the con
sideration of necessary appropriation bills. Other items were cast
aside in the rush to provide the functioning agencies of government
with necessary funds. Morris, though interested in some of the other
items, realized that nothing would come of them at this time and that
he would have another chance to consider most of them in the Senate.
He looked forward to service in the other branch of the federal legisla
ture, and it was with some anticipation early in January that he
awaited his formal election as a United States senator by the Nebraska
legislature.
Shortly after the election, defeated Democratic candidates for seats
in both houses of the state legislature from Douglas County an-
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nounced they would contest their rivals' victory. Rumor had it, how
ever, that their real objective was to prevent Norris from becoming
senator. If the Democrats could control the legislature, they could
choose someone other than Norris for the post, despite their pledge to
vote for the people's choice. This potential threat, however, did not
materialize. Early in December the Democrats dropped their contest.9
Norris was too busy to pay much attention to these charges. Re
turning to McCook during the Christmas recess, he devoted most of
Ms time to congressional matters, particularly the Archbald impeach
ment. He did not discuss politics, though McCarl assured him that he
had nothing but good reports about members of the state legislature
who would be meeting to choose a United States senator on January
22.10
By the end of the second week in January, things seemed "to be in
mighty good shape"; the legislature would probably elect him without
a hitch. Nevertheless, rumors were rampant. According to law and
the personal pledge of many members, the legislature would have to
vote for Norris, but for the first time since Nebraska adopted the
"Oregon" pledge system in 1909, one house of the legislature was not
of the same political persuasion as the people's choice for senator.
The legislature would vote in joint session, and the fact that the
Democrats outnumbered the Republicans seventy-one to sixty-two
made observers anxious about Norris' selection. McCarl insisted that
Norris be in Lincoln on January 22 to forestall by his presence any un
toward action and, if none occurred, to address the legislature and
promote political goodwill.
11
At this time it was rumored that Norris might be appointed to
Wilson's cabinet. This report may have helped to insure Norris' unani
mous selection by the Nebraska legislature. In January, the New York
Times announced that Wilson was considering placing a political op
ponent in his cabinet and that Norris was the opponent in question.
Liberals in die Democratic party, especially those from New Jersey,
argued that the progressives were largely responsible for recent
changes in public sentiment on economic issues; placing a prominent
exponent of their point of view in the cabinet might lead many such
individuals into the Democratic party.
12 Norris was not appointed and
never mentioned the suggestion, but the episode helped his election
by the legislature to go smoothly even in his absence.
On January 21, the Nebraska legislative bodies, meeting separately,
unanimously elected George Norris as United States senator from
Nebraska. The next day in joint session they repeated the formality in
an election which was significant in several ways. Norris was the first
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and only senator from Nebraska to receive the
unanimous vote of the
entire legislature. He was the first and only Republican
to be elected
by a Democratic legislature and the only senator in
the history of the
state to receive his election while absent from the state. His election,
furthermore, was the last in which the Nebraska legislature elected a
senator. Several months later the Seventeenth Amendment to the Con
stitution went into effect and direct election of senators became the
established procedure.
13
Members of the legislature who had not signed a pledge during the
campaign, emphatically voted for Norris; others,
who had supported
him, spoke his full name "in sonorous tones
that respectfully but
emphatically expressed their joy at the happy culmination
of his
campaign." One Lincoln newspaper commented, "Never in
the history
of this state has a man gone to the United States Senate more closely
identified with the people and possessing a larger degree of confidence
on the part of the public, than Senator Norris/'
u
McCarl, who was present at these proceedings, summarized by
saying "it was splendid." He reported that Democrats and Republicans
vied with one another in lauding Norris, while visitors in the galleries
and members on the floor applauded. A large group from the Fifth
District, including old friends from Beaver City, were on hand for the
ceremony and were prepared to give him a royal reception. But legisla
tors and visitors were not totally disappointed by Norris' absence; the
secretary of the senate read a letter he had written to the joint session
expressing his gratitude for the confidence placed in him and apologiz
ing for his absence.
15
Norris was delighted with the reports he received of the proceed
ings in Lincoln. A number of things about his election seemed remark
able to him, especially when compared to the situation that had
existed before the insurgency revolt and the broader progressive
movement. He would enter the Senate with a clear conscience, be
holden to no man. It gave him much pleasure to think that during the
recent campaign, one of the most hotly contested in the history of the
state, he had never been asked even indirectly to make any promise
or pledge. No member of the legislature had approached him after
the election with a suggestion that could in any way be construed as
an effort to control his vote. Recalling the political bartering that had
occurred in the past, Norris thought that all Nebraska citizens were to
be congratulated. He was convinced that his efforts in Congress
against boss rule and blind partisanship, in favor of progressive legisla
tion and the restoration of governmental control to the people, had
not been in vain. He appreciated the efforts that were made in his
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behalf because they represented a vindication of the democratic
process and of popular government. Thus, having received support
for his past efforts, he intended to continue to pursue the same path
even though progressive-minded citizens were confused about their
future course.16
Norris was keenly aware of the dispute raging among progressives
concerning organization. As long as they remained divided, he felt
they could accomplish little and hoped that all progressive-minded
citizens would eventually unite in a separate party. But so great were
the prevailing divisions and so bitter the feeling among numerous
leaders that he did little to ally himself with the debilitated third
party, though Roosevelt considered him a leading Progressive.
17
Norris himself was confused about his political status. Preparing a
biographical sketch for the forthcoming Congressional Directory.,
McCarl retained the word
"Republican," though he was not sure of
Norris' wishes on this matter. He told Norris he could change it, and
suggested "Progressive-Republican" as a more satisfactory delineation.
However, in the Congressional Directory for the first session of the
Sixty-third Congress, Norris listed himself as a Republican.
18
On February 17, 1913, Senator Norris Brown, recognizing the
action of the Nebraska legislature, presented to the president pro tem-
pore of the Senate, Jacob H. Gallinger of New Hampshire, the
credentials of his successor and asked to have them read. The secretary
of the Senate read the credentials of George Norris, chosen by the
legislature of Nebraska as senator for the term beginning March 4,
1913, and they were ordered to be filed.
19 Two weeks later Norris'
notable career as a member of Congress from the Fifth Congressional
District of the state of Nebraska came to an end, and a more distin
guished one one that would span the following thirty years began,
As a congressman, Norris had proven himself one of the most forceful
and intelligent fighters in the House, alert to every parliamentary
opportunity to advance the progressive cause. Strong in debate, know
ing neither fear nor favor, he had been a most valuable member.
While his apprenticeship as a legislator had come to an end, the char
acter, ideas, and approach to national problems of the senator-elect
were already defined. The future years in the Senate of the United
States would write in large letters on the national scene what was al
ready evident in smaller print to the citizens of Nebraska. Thus Norris
had gradually moved from a conservative Republican politician to a
prominent progressive leader who, already entitled to historical notice
for his role in the insurgency revolt, was destined to become one of
the outstanding legislators in American history.
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ris to George W. Post, September 4, 1896; Lardin to Norris, December 31,
1895.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 (pages 38-45)
1. G. W. Norris to D. M. Ure, September 4, 1896; Norris to Mrs. Me
lissa N. Lowe, September 6, 1897; Norris to A. Campbell, October 9, 1897;
George W. Norris Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. Un
less otherwise noted all manuscript citations are from this collection.
2. Jeanne Williamson, Chief Deputy, Clerk of Courts, Sandusky County,
Fremont, Ohio, to author, July 13, 1957.
3. See John Henry Norris, Pension Claim, War Department Records,
National Archives. Claim was filed by Mary Norris in 1893.
4. Solomon Mook to Norris, March 1, 1896; Norris to Mrs. Lowe, Jan
uary 7, 1897.
5. Mrs. Lowe to Norris, June 30, 1897, September 26, 1897, November
26, 1897; Norris to Mrs. Lowe, May 4, 1898, June 21, 1898; Norris to
D. R. Limbocker, October 8, 1898.
6. Norris to John M. Smuth Company, June 11, 1897; Norris to The
Harvey & Watts Company, November 21, 1897; Norris to Baker Boyles
Shoe Company, January 6, 1899.
7. Norris to Clara Wheeler, March 30, 1891, Letter-press book; Norris
to Coifax Mineral Water Company, August 28, 1892, Letter-press book;
Norris to Brunswick-Balke-Callender Company, December 26, 189 l y Letter
press book.
8. West Publishing Company to Norris, January 8, 1896 and January
15, 1896.
9. Norris to North American Review, June 5, 1888, Letter-press book;
Norris to Toledo Blade, November 16, 1893, Letter-press book; Norris to
State Journal Company, July 30, 1898; Norris to Honolulu Advertiser, July
18, 1898.
10. Norris to Perry L. Hole, September 24, 1896; Norris to Brother (a
fellow member of the IOOF), September 25, 1896.
11. Norris to Hole, March 17, 1897; Norris to Charles Bailey, March 24,
1897; Norris to L. H. Blackledge, February 2, 1899; Norris to George
Williams, February 20, 1899; Norris to E. N. Rakestraw, April 15, 1899;
Norris to Dr. Lucas, April 29, 1899; Norris to W. S. Morlan, April 29, 1899,
12. Hole to Norris, July 1, 1899; Norris to A. H. Andrus, August 21,
1897; Norris to Rakestraw, April 15, 1899.
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13. Mrs. Lowe to Norris, May 29, 1893; Norris to F. C. Schroeder, June
6, 1898; Grant D. Harrington to Norris, November 20, 1897; Norris to
Morland, November 16, 1897; Norris to C. L. Kinney, February 17, 1898;
Norris to Mrs. Lowe, May 4, 1898; William A. Poynter (Governor) to
Norris, November 13, 1899; Norris to Poynter, November 24, 1899.
14. E. A. Armstrong Company to Norris, July 22, 1892; J. E. Coapar to
Norris, December 8, 1892; J. A. Miller to Norris, March 18, 1896; Norris
to George C. Eisenhart, January 8, 1897; Norris to Hole, September 16,
1897, September 10, 1899; Norris to C. K. Wilbur, July 21, 1898; Norris
to L P. Gage, October 7, 1898.
15. Norris to Mrs. Lowe, January 7, 1897, Letter-press book.
16. Norris to Mrs. Lowe, January 7, 1897, Letter-press book. By July,
1898, he had paid back most of the money he had borrowed from her.
See Norris to Mrs. Lowe, July 25, 1898.
17. Norris to W. S. Colvin, July 15, 1896; Stull Brothers to Norris, Octo
ber 31, 1896; R. E. Moore to Norris, October 31, 1896; Norris to J. W.
Tomblin, November 12, 1896, Letter-press book.
18. Norris to H. C. Fletcher, March 27, 1897; Norris to J. E. Axtell,
April 14, 1898; Norris to E. A. Wyatt, July 27, 1897; Norris to A. Lofgreen,
February 23, 1898; Norris to Secretary of Agriculture, December 26, 1897.
19. Norris to J. W. Thayer, January 6, 1898, March 9, 1899; Norris to
Daniel Bisbee, December 12, 1899; Norris to J. W. Holt, February 2, 1898;
Norris to Arie Andrus, February 3, 1898; Norris to J. H. Miles, February
17, 1898, April 8, 1898, May 4, 1898.
20. Norris to M. J. Evans, August 11, 1897; Norris to Mrs. Eva Kene-
strick, September 28, 1897; Hole to Norris, March 1, 1898; Norris to Holt,
July 28, 1899.
21. Norris to Albert Andrus, January 18, 1897.
22. Norris to Miles, March 15, 1898; Norris to W. B. Whitney, March
28, 1898.
23. Norris to Frank Neubauer, December 12, 1898; Norris to George
Zulauf, December 12, 1898; Norris to C. P. Lashley, February 14, 1899;
Norris to Creamery Package Company, February 2, 1899; Norris to Rake-
straw, April 15, 1899; Norris to Miles, March 30, 1899; Norris to Nordyke
& Marmon Company, June 5, 1899.
24. G. W. Shafer to T. J. Cress, June 24, 1899; Norris to W. P. Slocum,
June 24, 1899; Norris to Cress, June 30, 1899; Norris to Miles Tulv 24
1899.
J '
25. Norris to W. W. Tallman, September 11, 1899, December 18, 1899,
December 28, 1899.
26. H. H. Harrington to Norris, January 26, 1896; A. T. Lardin to Norris,
March 30, 1896, May 23, 1896; Norris to Lardin, October 8, 1896; Norris
to E. E. Smith, January 12, 1897; Norris to A. J. Cole, November 9, 1899;
Fleming Brothers (Western managers of Mutual Life Insurance Company
of New York) to Norris, November 24, 1899.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 (pages 46-54)
1. George W. Norris, Fighting Liberal (New York, 1946), p. 69.
2. Ibid., p. 69.
3. Mark De Wolfe Howe, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: The Shaping
Years 1841-1870 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1957), Vol. I, p. 278.
Holmes' review appeared in The American Law Review, Vol. Ill, January,
1869, p. 357.
4. I have relied heavily for the material in this paragraph upon the
insights contained in William Dudley Foulke, A Hoosier Autobiography
(New York, 1922), p. 42. For the quote by Oliver Wendell Holmes,
see Howe, op. cit., p. 250.
5. Norris to F. C. Krotter, July 23, 1896, Letter-press book; George W.
Norris Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. Unless other
wise noted all manuscript citations are from this collection.
6. E. J. Dudley to Norris, May 17, 1896; Norris to A. E. Bailer, De
cember 31, 1897; Norris to J. D. Shahan, March 9, 1899.
7. Norris, op. cit., p. 70.
8. Ibid., pp. 70-71.
9. W. F. Button to Norris, January 13, 1896; W. S. Morlan to Norris,
February 2, 1896; F. M. Flausburg to Norris, February 3, 1896; F. B.
Sheldon and E. E. Harden to Norris, February 6, 1896; N. S. Harwood to
Norris, February 7, 1896; Norris to H. W. Sipe, November 27, 1896,
Letter-press book.
10. L. H. Cheney to Norris, January 22, 1896; T. L. Warrington to
Norris, January 23, 1896; J. W. Hann to Norris, March 10, 1896; Norris
to J. E. Cochran, August 5, 1896.
11. Harlow W. Keyes to Norris, October 2, 1896; Norris, op. cit., pp.
72-77; Alfred Lief, Democracy's Norm (New York, 1939), pp. 48-51.
12. Morlan to Norris, July 29, 1896, December 15, 1896.
13. Norris to W. E. Andrews, January 11, 1896, Letter-press book.
14. Norris to Andrews, July 15, 1896.
15. G. W. Meiklejohn to Norris, January 21, 1896; D. F. Smith to Norris,
February 6, 1896; A. C. Wright to Norris, March 24, 1896; Lon Cone to
Norris, April 6, 1896; Norris to Charles F. Manderson, September 21, 1896;
Norris to G. W. Post, September 4, 1896; Post to Norris, September 8,
1896.
16. Norris to A. T. Lardin, November 27, 1896; Norris to John M.
Thurston, November 27, 1896.
17. John H. Christner to Norris, October 18, 1897; Norris to Andrews,
September 16, 1897; A. E. Sheldon, Nebraska: The Land and the People
(Chicago, 1931), p. 767,
18. H. H. Taylor to Norris, November 5, 1897; H. A. Rowe to Norris,
November 8, 1897.
290 GEORGE W. NORRIS
19. Norris to H. H. Taylor, November 11, 1897; for the Bartley and
Moore matter see A. E. Sheldon, op. tit., pp. 767, 772-73, 788, 810.
20. Norris to M. L. Hayward, July 2, 1898; Norris to W. V. Van Patten,
February 15, 1899. Hayward, elected in 1899, died before
he could be sworn
in as a senator and the governor chose the defeated candidate, Populist
W. V. Allen, to serve until a special election could be held; Norris to G. H,
Thummel, October 22, 1898.
21. I. P. Gage to Norris, September 3, 1898; Perry L. Hole
to Norris,
February 10, 1899.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 (pages 55-62)
1. G. W. Norris to Perry L. Hole, February 15, 1899; George Williams
to Norris, February 22, 1899, George W. Norris Papers, Manuscripts Divi
sion, Library of Congress. Unless otherwise noted all manuscript
citations
are from this collection.
2. Norris to P. W. Scott, July 7, 1899.
3. George Eisenhart to Norris, August 1, 1899; Norris
to Eisenhart,
August 16, 1899.
4. Eisenhart to Norris, August 20, 1899; Norris to A. A. White, Sep
tember 7, 1899; Norris to Scott, September 8, 1899.
5. Scott to Norris, September 10, 1899.
6. L. H. Cheney to Norris, September 19, 1899; Norris to G. W. Dow,
September 11, 1899; Norris to J. L. McPheeley, September 11, 1899.
7. O. L. Burson to Norris, October 12, 1899; Charles W. Meeker to
Norris, October 7, 1899; C. C. Vennum to Norris, October 27, 1899.
8. Vennum to Norris, October 27, 1899, October 28, 1899.
9. Vennum to Norris, October 31, 1899; Williams to Norris, October
28, 1899.
10. C. W. Meeker to Norris, October 31, 1899; Vennum to Norris, Octo
ber 31, 1899.
11. Vennum to Norris, October 31, 1899.
12. Williams to Norris, November 8, 1899; D. T. Welty to Norris, No
vember 10, 1899.
13. Norris to F. L Foss, November 13, 1899; Norris to Stanley E. Fil-
kins, November 24, 1899; Norris to Hole, December 12, 1899.
14. Norris to Welty, November 13, 1899; Statement and Affidavit of
Election Expenses, Notarized November 13, 1899.
15. Cyrus E. Watson, Nebraska's Industries and Resources (Lincoln,
1902), pp. 138, 230-31; See Norris to Lizzie Tuck, March 10, 1900, where
Norris gives his reason for moving to McCook.
16. Norris to C. H. Wilson, February 13, 1900, May 5, 1900; Norris to
J. F. Fults, April 7, 1900; Norris to O. E. Champe, April 19, 1900; Norris
to W. L. Leonard, May 3, 1900.
17. Norris to M. F. Doud, April 19, 1900. . -
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18. Norris to J. W. Gull, July 25, 1900.
19. Norris to Williams, July 7, 1900; Norris to J. W. Holt, June 23, 1900.
20. Norris to Judge o Probate Court, Fremont, Ohio, June 11, 1900;
Mrs. Melissa N. Lowe to Norris, October 4, 1900.
21. Roscoe Lashley to Norris, August 14, 1900; Norris to A. A. McCoy,
August 16, 1900. The dry weather and the failure of the wheat crop bank
rupted W. W. Tallman who had rented the Beaver City mill owned by
Norris and Shafer. In mid-October it was leased to another tenant. See
Norris to Western Mutual Millers Insurance Company, October 12, 1900.
22. Norris to R. C. Orr, September 9, 1900; Norris to T. A. Boyd, Sep
tember 9, 1900.
23. Norris to Charles M. Riggs, September 11, 1900; Norris to J. O.
Hane, September 10, 1900.
24. Norris to Riggs, September 11, 1900; Norris to H. C. Lindsay, Octo
ber 25, 1900; Norris to C. H. Dietrich, January 11, 1901; Norris to C. A.
Ferrand, November 3, 1900.
25. Norris to C. E. Hopping, November 21, 1900; Norris to John M.
Thurston, December 27, 1900; Wilson to Norris, November 10, 1900;
Norris to J. H. Miles, November 24, 1900, December 21, 1900.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 8 (pages 63-70)
1. G. W. Norris to F. I. Foss, January 18, 1901; E. N. Allen to Norris,
January 17, 1901; Norris to Allen, January 31, 1901. George W, Norris
papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. Unless otherwise noted,
all manuscript citations are from this collection.
2. Norris to H. M. Sullivan, February 2, 1901; Norris to J. W. Holt,
March 11, 1901; Norris to W. F. Wood, March 6, 1901.
3. A. J. Green to Norris, March 29, 1901, March 31, 1901.
4. Emma McKean to Norris, April 8, 1901; Norris to G. W. Holdrege,
April 14, 1901; Mrs. A. J. Green to Norris, May 5, 1901.
5. Arie Andrus to Norris, May 22, 1901, July 15, 1901.
6. A. J. Green to Norris, July 1, 1901; Perry L. Hole to Norris, June 5,
1901; Norris to Thomas Kirtley, July 9, 1901; Sara S. Harrington to Norris,
July 22, 1901; Norris to W. A. McCarl, August 23, 1901; Norris to Arie
Andrus, May 29, 1901.
7. Norris to J. C. Gammill, April 25, 1901; Norris to J. H. Miles, April
13, 1901.
8. Norris to C. H. Dietrich, September 30, 1901.
9. Norris to Dietrich, September 30, 1901; Norris to Fletcher W. Mer-
win, September 30, 1901; Norris to A. Bonham, October 3, 1901; Norris to
C. C. Green, November 6, 1901.
10. Norris to Hole, December 9, 1901.
11. Norris to Miles, November 19, 1901, June 5, 1902; Norris to Fred
D. Webster, April 1, 1902; Norris to Mrs. Knowles, February 5, 1902.
12. Norris to T. Sumney, November 25 ? 1901; Norris to G. W. Shafer,
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November 25, 1901; Norris to A. P. Hyatt, June 3, 1902; Norris to Stanley
E. Filkins, January 30, 1902.
13. Ella Leonard to Norris, January 28, 1902; Norris to H. J. Thorpe,
April 29, 1902.
14. Fletcher W. Merwin to Norris, February 6, 1902.
15. Merwin to Norris, February 6, 1902; Norris to Merwin, February
10, 1902.
16. Norris to Walker Smith, February 11, 1902; Norris to George Jud-
kins, February 14, 1902.
17. Norris to H. M. Grimes, February 11, 1902, February 15, 1902.
18. Norris to C. H. Tanner, March 10, 1902; Norris to E. C. Shobell,
March 25, 1902.
19. Norris to A. J. Green, April 1, 1902; Norris to Merwin, April 1,
1902; Norris to Mrs. Watie Van Patten, April 8, 1902.
20. Norris to Walker Smith, May 3, 1902; Norris to Merwin, May 13,
1902.
21. Merwin to Norris, May 12, 1902; Norris to Hole, May 13, 1902.
22. Nebraska State Journal, May 21, 1902; Norris to Walker Smith,
May 20, 1902; Norris to Hole, May 21, 1902.
23. Norris to John Sanders, June 3, 1902; Norris to W. A. McCool, June
4, 1902; H. M. Crane to Norris, June 12, 1902; Nebraska State Journal,
June 11, 1902.
24. Nebraska Blue Book: 1948 (Lincoln, 1945), p. 392.
25. Norris to Crane, June 18, 1902. Norris at first thought the chairman
of the congressional committee should be a resident of Hastings which
seemed to him <cby common consent to be the capital of the district," but
on account of the many factional differences there he soon concluded that
he could not select anyone there who would prove satisfactory to all of
the Republicans even of Hastings. He offered the position to E. G. Titus
of Holdrege before finally choosing Merwin. See G. W. Norris to E. G.
Titus, June 21, 1902.
26. Norris to F. J. Coates, June 19, 1902.
27. Norris to S. C. Brady, June 25, 1902; Norris to J. D. Stine, June 26,
1902.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 (pages 71-78)
1. George W. Norris to C. W. Lindsay, July 28, 1902; George W.
Norris Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. Unless otherwise
noted, all manuscript citations are from this collection.
2. Norris to Elliott Lowe, July 1, 1902.
3. Norris to C. P. Schwer, July 22, 1902; Norris to W. B. Ireland,
August 19, 1902; Norris to M. B. Carman, September 16, 1902; Norris to
J. S. Hoagland, September 20, 1902.
4. J. M. Hollingsworth to Norris, September 24, 1902; E. V. Overman
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to Norris, September 29, 1902, October 17, 1902; A. Galusha to Norris,
October 17, 1902.
5. Norris to G. W. Holdrege, July 10, 1902.
6. The Swanson Reservoir near Trenton in Hitchcock County was com
pleted after World War II.
7. Norris to E. A. Hitchcock, August 15, 1902; Norris to H. C. Lindsay,
August 15, 1902; Norris to C. H. Dietrich, August 15, 1902.
8. Dietrich to Norris, September 29, 1902.
9. Dietrich to Norris, August 2, 1902.
10. Dietrich to Norris, August 8, 1902, August 10, 1902, August 14,
1902; A. H. Clarke to Dietrich, August 9, 1902 (copy in Norris papers).
11. Norris to Dietrich, August 30, 1902; W. S. Shallenberger to Dietrich,
September 4, 1902.
12. Dietrich to Norris, September 23, 1902, September 28, 1902, Sep
tember 29, 1902, October 17, 1902, October 21, 1902; Norris to C. W.
McConaughy, September 20, 1902; J. L. Lashbrook to Norris, September
29, 1902.
13. Norris to J. W. Babcock, September 8, 1902; Norris, Fighting Liberal
(New York, 1946), p. 93.
14. Typewritten resume of the early career of Norris, p. 8, for informa
tion about Champ Clark. George W. Norris Papers, Nebraska Historical
Society, Lincoln, Nebraska; David H. Mercer to Norris, October 17, 1902;
Harlow W. Keyes to Norris, October 18, 1902; Norris, op. cit., pp. 90-91.
The Republican press in the district unmercifully attacked Shallenberger's
banking connections. For example, the Superior Journal, in its issue of July
10, 1902, asked, "Will Congressman Shallenberger take his name out of
the list of officers in his bank advertisement in his home paper this year?
He resorted to this cheap trick two years ago." This same paper also argued
on its editorial page on August 7, 1902, "The result of the elections in
November can not change the complexion of either branch of Congress;
both will remain Republican. The Fifth Nebraska District consequently
should make sure to send up a representative belonging to the dominant
party, who can accomplish something for the district after he is elected/
7
See also editorial on September 4, 1902.
15. Norris to F. B. Johnson, August 30, 1902; Norris to J. W. Hamm,
September 27, 1902; Norris to J. R. Mercer, September 27, 1902; George
Eisenhart to A. T. McCoy, September 27, 1902. Norris received the support
of many small town Republican newspapers of which the following are
a partial listing: the Superior Journal, the Hildreth Telescope, the Holdrege
Citizen, the Edgar Post, the Oxford Standard, the Franklin Free Press,
the Benkelman News, the Alma Journal in Shallenberger's home town, the
Cambridge Clarion, the Hastings Tribune, the McCook Republican, and the
McCook Tribune.
16. Norris, op. cit,, p. 90.
17. George A. Allen to Norris, September 26, 1902, October 3, 1902.
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Typewritten resume of the early career of Norris, p.
8. Copy in Nebraska
Historical Society. For Welty's statement see the
Benkelman News, October
17 1902
18. Will Brookley to Fletcher W. Merwin, September 30, 1902,
Octo
ber 9, 1902; A. B. Allen to Norris, October 8, 1902, October 9, 1902,
Octo
ber 13, 1902; Galusha to Norris, October 17, 1902; J. B. Dinsmore to
Norris, October 8, 1902; Keyes to Norris, October 18, 1902.
19. W. W. Campbell to Norris, October 23, 1902.
20. George A. Allen to Norris, October 23, 1902.
See also the Franklin
Free Press, October 24, 1902, for an account of Norris' position on national
issues. In addition to following the administration on pertinent national
issues, Norris in a speech before a veterans' reunion favored
the direct
election of United States senators and complained about American mil
lionaires and heiresses spending so much time and money in Europe. The
Franklin Free Press, August 22, 1902.
21. Allen to Norris, October 24, 1902, October 25, 1902; Norris, op. cit,
pp. 90-91. Two of Shallenberger's brothers owned banks in the district:
one at Elwood and the other at Imperial, while another of his brothers
was an official of the International Harvester Company in Chicago. This
third brother, a writer for the Lincoln Daily Star assured Norris, was not
interested in the re-election of his brother to Congress. A charge of this
land to be effective had to be backed by evidence, and the writer urged
Norris to secure such evidence "by persuasion, if possible, but beg, steal
or borrow it, and use dynamite if necessary." See G. W. Bemis to Norris,
December 10, 1902.
22. Allen to Norris, November 1, 1902, November 5, 1902; W. W.
Campbell to G. W. Norris, November 11, 1902.
23. A. E. Sheldon, Nebraska: The Land and the People (Chicago, 1931),
p. 796; Norris to A. R. Cruzen, December 5, 1902; Norris to A. J. Halford,
December 10, 1902.
24. James A. Cline to Norris, November 6, 1902; George R. Chaney to
Norris, November 5, 1902; Dietrich and J. H. Millard to Norris, November
5, 1902; J. S. and W. V. Hoagland to Norris, November 7, 1902.
25. Merwin to Norris, November 10, 1902, December 6, 1902.
26. Allen to Norris, November 10, 1902; W. W. Campbell to Norris,
November 11, 1902.
27. Most Republican newspapers in the district believed along with the
Oxford Standard (clipping, n.d.) that "old General Prosperity and a big
crop have this year emblazoned a way to Republican success/'
NOTES TO CHAPTER 10 (pages 79-87)
I. G. W. Norris to D. S. Hasty, July 14, 1902; Norris to G. W. Shafer,
September 16, 1902; Norris to C. S. Graham, November 24, 1902; Norris
to C. O. Morse, January 24, 1903, January 30, 1903; Norris to Mill Own-
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ers' Mutual Insurance Company (Des Moines, Iowa), April 4, 1903; Norris
to C. H. Pierce, June 6, 1903. George W. Norris Papers, Manuscripts
Division, Library of Congress. All manuscript citations, unless otherwise
noted, are from this collection.
2. Norris to J. F. Fults, December 28, 1902; Norris to C. E. Hopping,
June 8, 1903, September 6, 1903.
3. Norris to May & Feiberger, April 17, 1903; Norris to I. P. Gage,
September 20, 1902; Norris to Fleming Brothers, October 27, 1902; Norris
to E. T. McGuire, December 6, 1902; Norris to M. T. Phelps, August 30,
1902.
4. Norris to Andrew Carnegie, June 12, 1903.
5. Norris to H. C. Miller, December 29, 1902; Miller to Norris, Janu
ary 12, 1903.
6. MiUer to Norris, May 3, 1903; Norris to Miller, May 2, 1903;
Fletcher W. Merwin to A. T. Lardin, May 18, 1903.
7. Merwin to J. W. Eby, May 9, 1903; Merwin to Lardin, May 18,
1903; Merwin to W. D. Pruitt, May 5, 1903.
8. W. E. Horton to Norris, May 29, 1903; C. C. Green to Norris, May
30, 1903.
9. Norris, Fighting Liberal (New York, 1946), pp. 83-85. Norris
wrote this account in which he stresses his loss of will to live after his
heartbreaking defeat in 1942 by Kenneth Wherry. Repudiation at the polls
induced a feeling of depression which probably lasted until his death in
1944 and colored his writing of this incident. That Norris was originally
very ill is attested by both of the letters cited in note 8. While Norris
claimed in his autobiography that this illness occurred in the fall of 1903,
it actually happened in the spring. And Norris, as soon as he regained his
strength, married Ellie Leonard, a McCook school teacher, whom he must
have courted, however briefly, before his illness.
Norris, in his autobiography (pp. 85-86), mentions his second marriage
and the marvelous change that occurred in his life and that of his children.
He correctly states the date of the marriage as July 8, 1903, while on the
previous two pages when discussing this illness which occurred "after
my election [November, 1902] to the House of Representatives, but before
I was sworn in [November, 1903]
"
and "in the fall of the year" which
would place it from these statements in either September or October,
1903. He is, in his autobiography, still a lonely bachelor obviously mourn-
ing the loss of his first wife. In other words, Norris, in writing of these
events, had his chronology confused and was probably projecting his cur
rent condition back to a serious illness suffered forty years previously.
Furthermore, during his illness the doctor had to convince Norris that it
would be imprudent for him to travel and deliver the commencement ad
dress at the Wilsonville High School. Norris also wanted to get up and
about before he had fully recovered his strength, an action not usually
associated with a person who had no desire to get well or to live. See
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Merwin to The Class of
'03, May 18, 1903; C. C. Green to Norris, May
30, 1903, where Dr. Green writes, "I am glad that you have improved to
such an extent that you feel able to go to Fairfield."
10. John H. Mickey to Merwin, May 21, 1903; Norris to William Peter
son, June 4, 1903; Norris to F. Kuenneth, June 4, 1903.
11.
"Juliette" to Norris, January 6, 1903, May 23, 1903.
12. A. J. Green to Norris, March 14, 1903.
13. Norris to C. J. Miller, March 28, 1903; Clyde Castle to Norris,
March 25, 1903.
14. Grant Harrington to Norris, September 2, 1903; Norris to Grant
Harrington, September 10, 1903; Norris to H. H. Harrington, September
10, 1903; Norris to G. H. Merriam, September 10, 1903.
15. Merwin to J. R. Balding, July 21, 1903; C. E. Stine to Norris, July
10, 1903; Norris, op. cit., p. 86.
16. Norris to G. W. Shafer, September 22, 1903; R. H. Allard to Norris,
December 28, 1903.
17. Norris to J. W. Edwards, December 6, 1902; Norris to Mickey,
December 28, 1902.
18. Joseph G. Cannon to Norris, November 16, 1902.
19. C. H. Dietrich to Norris, December 4, 1902.
20. Norris to E. J. Burkett, December 9, 1902.
21. Norris to Cannon, September 15, 1903.
22. Norris to Charles F. Manderson, December 9, 1902.
23. E. W. Eckerman to Norris, November 22, 1902; Norris to Merwin,
December 29, 1902; Merwin to Norris, January 11, 1903.
24. Norris to E. F. Ware, December 8, 1902. Norris, as befitted a Re
publican politician, was ready to do anything he could "to contribute to
the welfare and comfort of the gallant boys in blue who preserved this
glorious nation." In the matter of pensions or in private bills for the relief
of veterans, he intended to make "a direct contribution." See Norris to
Pruitt, April 20, 1903.
25. Norris to J. M. Jones, February 20, 1903; Norris to James McNally,
December 30, 1902; Norris to A. W. Machen, March 14, 1903.
26. Norris to J. A. Andrews, March 25, 1903; the StockviUe Republican,
October 2, 1903.
27. The Stockville Republican, October 9, 1903. Incidentally, Judge Orr
was elected in the November, 1903, judicial election.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 11 (pages 88-96)
1. G. W. Norris, Fighting Liberal (New York, 1946) , p. 93-94.
2. Ibid., pp. 95-96.
3. Congressional Record, Fifty-eighth Congress, Second Session, Jan
uary 13, 1904, p. 728.
4. William Dudley Foulke, Fighting the Spoilsmen (New York, 1919),
footnote 1, p. 174.
NOTES TO CHAPTERS
5. Congressional Record, loc. cit.
6. Congressional Record, Fifty-eighth Congress, Second Session, March
14, 1904, pp. 3256-57.
7. Fletcher W. Merwin to George Allen, March 12, 1904. George W.
Norris Papers, Library of Congress. All manuscript citations, unless other
wise noted, are from this source.
8. Norris in his later years related an anecdote which all previous
biographers have accepted about an incident that occurred during his first
term in Congress. The incident, involving his growing awareness of the
evils of partisanship, supposedly took place on February 20, 1904, in the
House, when John Sharp Williams, the minority leader, moved that the
House adjourn on February 22 after the reading of George Washington's
Farewell Address. Congressman Sereno Payne, who had the floor, objected
and claimed that it would be "a far more patriotic observance of duty for
this Congress to be in session on Monday, and to provide for the building
of a proper navy, than to take a holiday on account of the birthday of
George Washington." Since Payne had moved for immediate adjournment
before Williams made his motion to adjourn after the Farewell Address was
read on Washington's birthday, the speaker ruled that Payne's motion to
adjourn had precedence and this motion was agreed to by the House which
thereupon adjourned. Williams' motion was not voted upon.
On February 22, Williams again presented a motion to adjourn after the
reading of the Farewell Address. When the yeas and nays were called for,
93 Democratic members voted to adjourn, 104 Republican members voted
to remain in session, 10 members answered present, and 175, including
Norris, were listed as not voting.
Norris' biographers claim that on February 20, 1904, on a standing vote
on Williams' motion, Norris was the lone Republican to stand, and that
this incident started his questioning the validity of partisanship especially
when two days later he found the Republican-controlled Senate chamber
empty out of respect for the memory of George Washington.
The Congressional Record (Fifty-eighth Congress, Second Session) re
veals no vote on a motion by John Sharp Williams on February 20 to ad
journ on Washington's birthday (p. 2178), while the vote on February 22
(pp. 2208-09) is recorded above. Moreover, the Senate, on February 22,
1904, adjourned at 5:15 P.M. (p. 2207) after conducting a full days busi
ness.
One of Norris' biographers relates this Washington's birthday incident
and then cites in his footnote the relevant pages of the Congressional
Record. My examination of the Record has yielded no such verification and
has convinced me that this incident must be regarded as a fictional anecdote
which, like Patrick Henry's famous oration (though never delivered),
should have occurred. In 1912, on Washington's birthday, Norris offered a
motion to adjourn which was defeated when the question was taken. At
this time the Democrats controlled the House and Champ Clark of Mis
souri was speaker. The Senate on this day met at twelve noon and ad-
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journed after the reading of the Farewell Address. See Congressional
Record, Sixty-second Congress, Second Session, February 22, 1912, pp.
2317, 2325.
9. Norris Typescript, p. 8. George W. Norris Papers, Nebraska State
Historical Society, Lincoln, Nebraska.
10. Norris to James R. Mann, June 7, 1904; Norris to Perry
L. Hole, June
15. 1904.
11. George Allen to Norris, July 23, 1904. AUen wrote, "We can win as
the feeling is so strong in this state against the Parker deal
that the kicking
would be so vigorous that it would carry everything and we would win all
lines in the state."
12. Quoted in Addison E. Sheldon, Nebraska: The Land and the People,
(Chicago, 1932), Vol. I, p. 805.
13. James C. Olson, History of Nebraska (Lincoln, 1955), p. 251.
14. George Allen to Norris, July 23, 1904; Norris to E. H. Hinshaw, Au
gust 5, 1904.
15. Allen to Norris, July 29, 1904.
16. W. E. Andrews to Norris, August 27, 1904.
17. Allen to Norris, September 17, 1904. In another letter on this same
date Allen noted that in Hall County a fight had broken out between the
Democrats and Populists because some Populist leader proclaimed that
they could not support the Democratic nominee.
18. Cannon delivered his main speech for Norris at Hastings on Sep
tember 26; Norris appeared with the Speaker when Cannon campaigned
for him throughout his three day visit.
19. Norris to J. J. McCarthy, October 16, 1904; Allen to Merwin, Oc
tober 18, 1904; Norris to B. K. Schaeffer, October 24, 1904.
20. Allen to Merwin, November 3, 1904; Merwin to Allen, November 5,
1904; Allen to Norris, November 5, 1904; C. E. Stine to Norris, November
4, 1904.
21. Merwin to A. T. Lardin, November 14, 1904; Addison E. Sheldon,
op. tit., pp. 808-09; Edgar Eugene Robinson, The Presidential Vote: 1896-
1932 (Stanford University, California, 1934), p. 66.
22. Norris to Joseph C. Cannon, November 14, 1902.
23. Norris to Mrs. Emma Scott, August 5, 1904, September 12, 1904;
Norris to Mrs. Julia G. Yager, November 14, 1904.
24. Merwin to J. F. Cordeal, January 31, 1905; Norris to Allen, January
30. 1905.
25. Norris to J. F. Crocker, January 14, 1905; Allen to Norris, February
18, 1905.
26. Norris to Editor of the Outlook, January 16, 1905; Congressional
Record, Fifty-eighth Congress, Third Session, December 8, 1904, p. 92.
27. Norris to W. H. Moore, February 14, 1905.
28. Norris to E. A. Hitchcock, September 12, 1904; Cordeal to Merwin,
December 18, 1904.
29. Cordeal to Merwin, December 18, 1904.
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30. Norris to Cordeal, December 23, 1904; Morris to F. M. Rathbun,
December 23, 1904.
31. Norris to Allen, March 27, 1905.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 12 (pages 97-108)
1. G. W. Norris to George Allen, April 15, 1905; Norris to C. A. Brandt,
October 4, 1905. George W. Norris Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library
of Congress. All manuscript citations, unless otherwise noted, are from this
collection.
2. Norris to Patrick Heogney, May 18, 1905.
3. Norris to James Wilson, February 24, 1906.
4. Congressional Record, Fifty-ninth Congress, First Session, May 1,
1906, pp. 6218-19.
5. For good brief discussions of the Kinkaid Act and its significance see
A. E. Sheldon, Land Systems and Land Policies in Nebraska (Lincoln, 1936),
pp. 15&-65, and James C. Olson, History of Nebraska (Lincoln, 1955),
pp. 268-70.
Several years later Norris claimed that he was the originator of the 640-
acre homestead concept. On March 20, 1908, he wrote the following letter
to H. E. Langerin explaining his role: "I supposed at one time that I was
the originator of the idea of the 640-acre homestead in Nebraska. When I
first came to Washington I told a newspaper correspondent that I intended
to introduce this kind of a bill in Congress. A day or so afterwards Mr.
Kinkaid came to me and said that he had read my interview in the paper
and that he also had been thinking of introducing this kind of a bill. He
asked me to withhold my bill and to consult with him over the matter with
a view of agreeing upon a bill and thus securing united and harmonious
action. I most cheerfully agreed to this and after waiting some time, saw
Mr. Kinkaid in regard to it and suggested we get together and commence
work upon the bill. I did this several times and on each occasion he agreed
with me that we should get together with a view of agreeing upon the
terms of the bill, but each time he postponed the meeting for one reason or
another. It seems that during this time he was working on the bill, which he
finally introduced. I have always thought that he made studied effort to
prevent me from introducing any bill on the subject. His conduct and repre
sentations certainly did deceive me, because if it had not been for his re
quests for delay I would have introduced that kind of a bill long before he
introduced his. In fact I had the matter practically mapped out when he
came to me and requested the delay. It rather looks to me that he did this
with a studied effort to get whatever credit there might be in the introduc
tion of such a measure. I do not know much foundation there was in his
claim that he had been thinking about introducing the same kind of bill.
He may have given it much thought, but I never knew of it until he told
me at the time he requested me to practically make a joint matter out of it.
... I have never given any publicity to this matter, because I did not
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want to get into a controversy with the members of the delegation and I
have suffered in silence what to me seems an injustice from Mr. Kinkaid,
rather than to have the matter aired in public. I have no desire now to have
the matter made public and prefer that nothing be said about it."
6. Norris to Franklin E, Brooks, June (?), 1905.
7. Fremont Herald, February 24, 1906; Norris in the Fifty-ninth Con
gress actually introduced a bill (H.R. 16132) incorporating these sugges
tions. See Norris to S. N. Wolback, March 12, 1906.
Norris changed his mind chiefly because of several cases where defend
ants were charged with unlawfully fencing thousands of acres of the
public domain and with intimidating homesteaders. Theodore Roosevelt
endeared himself to many more Nebraska citizens when he obtained the
resignations of several federal officials in Nebraska who were lax in their
duties and responsibilities. For a discussion of these cases, see A. E. Shel
don, Land Systems and Land Policies in Nebraska, pp. 194-203.
8. Merle Curti, Peace or War (New York, 1936), pp. 218-19. Curti
(p. 219) states, "Within a few years more than two hundred senators and
representatives were enrolled as members of the Interparliamentary Union."
Norris to Richard Bartholdt, April (?), 1905.
The Interparliamentary Union helped indirectly to bring about the
meeting of the first peace conference at the Hague, while the second was
due directly to its initiative. See William I. Hull, The Two Hague Con
ferences (Boston, 1908), pp. 4-5.
9. Norris to Bartholdt, June 10, 1905; incidentally, Norris did not
bother to acquire a passport from the Department of State, and later
claimed that he had found no use for one. See Norris to Cora A. Garber,
March 16, 1906.
10. Bartholdt, From Steerage to Congress (Philadelphia, 1930), pp.
260-75, passim.
11. Congressional Record, Sixty-fourth Congress, First Session, July 13,
1916, p. 10932.
12. Norris to Bartholdt, October 13, 1905, October 16, 1905.
13. George Allen to J, R. McCarl, November 3, 1905; Norris to W. A. Mc-
Cool, October 13, 1905; Norris to M. B. Carman, June 8, 1906. An article
by Norris on the Interparliamentary Union appeared in the December 1,
1905 issue of the Beaver City Times-Tribune.
14. For example, see Norris to L. T. Brooking, October 26, 1905.
15. Joseph Cannon to Norris, September 17, 1905.
16. Norris to Eugene Allen, June 5, 1906; Cannon to Norris, October 20,
1905.
17. William W. Phillips, "The Growth of a Progressive: Asle J. Gronna"
(Master's thesis, University of North Dakota, 1951), p. 47.
18. Norris, Fighting Liberal (New York, 1946), p. 86; Adams County
Democrat, March 9, 1906, which quotes an Omaha World Herald news
item from Washington.
19. Norris to David Diamond, December 18, 1905; Norris to William
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Loeb, Jr., January 8, 1906; Norris to E. Benjamin Andrews, May 24, 1906.
20. Congressional Record, Fifty-ninth Congress, First Session, January
13, 1906, pp. 1044-48, for the entire speech. The tariff measure, while
easily passing the House, was never acted upon in the Senate.
21. Norris to W. L. Hilyard, January 24, 1906; Norris to W. F. Buck,
January 26, 1906. For another view of the Philippine tariff bill see John M.
Blum's essay, "Theodore Roosevelt and the Legislative Process: Tariff Revi
sion and Railroad Regulation, 1904-1906,** printed as Appendix 1 in Elting
E. Morison (ed.), The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, 1951),
Vol. IV, pp. 1333-42. Blum argues that Roosevelt used the threat of tariff
legislation as a lever to obtain an effective railroad bill from Congress and
that he never vigorously supported the Philippine tariff bill. Blum further
develops his views in The Republican Roosevelt (Cambridge, 1954), Chap
ter VI. Norris insisted that while the interests of his "beet sugar" con
stituents were considered, his position on the bill was a matter of principle
and he would always do what he believed "to be right on principle" even
though he felt sure "that the effect would prove injurious" to the personal
interests of some of his constituents. Concern about unduly benefiting the
sugar refiners and not hostility to American policy in the Philippine Islands
was central to his position. See Norris to A. F. Buechler, March 30, 1906.
22. George Allen to Norris, January 25, 1906; Norris to Buechler, Jan
uary 26, 1906; Norris to George Lyon, Jr., January 26, 1906.
23. Norris to C. E. V. Smith, April 30, 1906, for a full analysis of the
tariff situation.
24. C. A. Patton to Norris, November 1, 1905; McCarl to Patton, Novem
ber 4, 1905.
25. Norris to Daniel Cook, December 12, 1905.
26. Norris to Charles F. Manderson, December 28, 1905. This letter has
been edited and published. See Richard Lowitt (ed.), "George W. Norris,
James J. Hill, and the Railroad Rate Bill," Nebraska History, Vol. 40, No. 2,
June, 1959, pp. 137-45.
27. A. E. Sheldon, Nebraska: The Land and the People (Chicago, 1931),
Vol. I, p. 815.
28. Norris to Manderson, January 20, 1906.
29. Norris to Fletcher W. Merwin, May 18, 1906; Norris to McCool,
May 19, 1906, May 26, 1906; Norris to A. H. Thomas, May 19, 1906, May
26, 1906.
30. Norris to First National Bank of Holdrege, Nebraska, June 8, 1906;
Norris to C. E. V. Smith, June 11, 1906; Norris to T. L. Jones, June 18,
1906.
31. Washington, D.C. Times, January 20, 1906; Congressional Record,
Fifty-ninth Congress, First Session, June 20, 1906, pp. 8827-29.
32. Congressional Record, Fifty-ninth Congress, First Session, December
16, 1905, p. 509 in particular, for entire speech see pp. 509-11. In his ini
tial message to the Fifty-ninth Congress, Roosevelt requested such regula
tion, though it made no effective headway in Congress. In the Senate,
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Morgan G. Bulkeley of Connecticut, since 1879 the president of the Aetna
Life Insurance Company, led the fight against national regulation of the
life insurance industry.
33. George Allen to Norris, December 4, 1905.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 13 (pages 109-116)
1. G. W. Norris to C. M. Brown, January 13, 1906; Norris to Charles W.
Meeker, January 19, 1906; George AUen to Norris, June 21, 1906; Norris to
T. C. Hacker, June 14, 1906, June 18, 1906. George W. Norris Papers,
Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. All other manuscript citations,
unless otherwise noted, are from this collection.
2. Norris to A. F. Buechler, August 2, 1906.
3. Norris to Buechler, August 2, 1906.
4. Norris to A. C. Wright, August 20, 1906; Adams County Republican,
August 17, 1906.
5. Norris to Alexander DcDowell, August 20, 1906, September 18.
1906.
6. Wright to Norris, August 14, 1906; Norris to Wright, August 20,
1906; Norris to W. L. Hilyard, September 1, 1906; Norris to the American
Protective Tariff League, July 23, 1906; for other and later statements of
Norris* optimism about the outcome of his campaign, see Norris to W. E.
Andrews, September 24, 1906; and J. R. McCarl to W. L. Crounse, October
23, 1906. Crounse, a former congressman and governor of Nebraska, now
a lobbyist for the National Cigar Leaf Tobacco Association offered on be
half of the association to support Norris' campaign because of his vote
against the Philippine tariff measure. See Crounse to Norris, October 13,
1906.
7. George Allen to McCarl, September 7, 1906; Allen to Norris, Sep
tember 8, 1906.
8. Allen to McCarl, September 8, 1906, September 12, 1906; AUen to
Norris, September 18, 1906.
9. Norris to Harry Hallenbeck, September 17, 1906; Norris to Charles
Montgomery, September 19, 1906.
10. Allen to Norris, October 6, 1906.
11. McCarl to H. M. Crane, October 8, 1906; McCarl to H. C. Miller,
October 15, 1906; AUen to McCarl, October 18, 1906, Allen, of course,
handled aU of the arrangements when Norris spoke in Clay County; McCarl
to S. A. Dravo, October 22, 1906; McCarl to John S. Wise, October 8,
1906.
12. Allen to McCarl, October 25, 1906.
13. AUen to McCarl, October 28, 1906, October 30, 1906.
14. AUen to McCarl, November 4, 1906.
15. McCarl to Buechler, October 15, 1906.
16. Allen to McCarl, November 4, 1906, November 10, 1906.
17. AUen to McCarl, November 4, 1906, November 5, 1906.
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18. McCarl to W. A. McCool, October 30, 1906; McCarl to Samuel
Premer, November 1, 1906; McCarl to Allen, November 1, 1906, Novem
ber 13, 1906.
19. Norris to Joint Committee on Printing, February 1, 1907; A. E. Shel
don, Nebraska: The Land and the People (Chicago, 1931), Vol. I, pp. 820-
21; James C. Olson, History of Nebraska (Lincoln, 1955), pp. 251-52.
20. Norris to James McNally, November 26, 1906; Allen to Norris,
November 8, 1906; Allen to McCarl, November 7, 1906, November 10,
1906.
21. Norris to Joseph G. Cannon, November 12, 1906; Cannon to Norris,
November 14, 1906.
22. Norris to George Williams, December 14, 1906; Norris to Buechler,
February 19, 1907.
23. Congressional Record, Fifty-ninth Congress, Second Session, January
24, 1907, pp. 1594, 1596; Norris to D. M. Francis, February 2, 1907; Roose
velt, in February, 1907, signed the McCumber Act which provided grad
uated pensions to veterans of the Mexican or Civil War. On reaching the
age of sixty-two the veteran was eligible to receive twelve dollars a month,
at sixty-five, fifteen dollars a month, and after seventy-five, twenty dollars a
month. The great advantage of this law was that it obviated the necessity
for most special pension bills.
24. Congressional Record, Fifty-ninth Congress, Second Session, Feb
ruary 23, 1907, pp. 3785, 3803-04; McCarl to McNally, October 2, 1906;
Norris to E, J. Overing, November 10, 1906.
25. Congressional Record, Fifty-ninth Congress, Second Session, Feb
ruary 18, 1907, pp. 3209-10; Allen to Norris, February 19, 1907; Alfred
Lief, Democracy's Norris (New York, 1939) , p. 78.
26. Norris to Fred Brown, January 4, 1907 (1908); see A. E. Sheldon,
Land Systems and Land Policies in Nebraska (Lincoln, 1936), pp. 196-98,
for a 1905 Nebraska example of Roosevelt's insistence upon the honesty of
government employees.
27. At least one congressman, disgruntled with Speaker Cannon and his
authority, thought that Norris was sympathetic with his critical views dur
ing the Fifty-ninth Congress. However, he was not sure where Norris stood
on this issue, and Norris never committed himself, on paper at least, to
any criticism of Cannon at this time. See E. A. Hayes to Norris, September
30, 1907; see also the discussion in Chapter 14, pp. 126-28.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 14 (pages 117-128)
1. G. W. Norris to George D. McGill, March 27, 1907; George W. Nor
ris Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. Unless otherwise
noted, all manuscript citations are from this collection.
2.
J.
R. McCarl to George Allen, April 9, 1907; McCarl to Fletcher W.
Merwin, July 26, 1907; McCaii to Norris, July 8, 1907.
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3. Norris to J. K. Kalanianaole, April 13, 1907;
McCarl to Burt E.
Brown, Epril 29, 1907.
4. McCarl to Louis A. Arthur, May 6, 1907; Norris to L. A. Thurston,
September 21, 1907.
5. A. E. Sheldon, Nebraska: The Land and the People (Chicago,
1931), Vol. I, pp. 824-26; the editorial (April 7, 1907) is quoted on
p. 826.
6. McCarl to Norris, September 2, 1907; McCarl to Allen, July 11,
1907; Norris to William Loeb, November 8, 1907; Norris to McCarl, March
30, 1908.
7. McCarl to Norris, September 2, 1907; McCarl to H. M. Grimes,
September 18, 1907; McCarl to M. B. Reese, September 19, 1907.
8. A. E. Sheldon, op. cit., p. 827; A. I. Vorys to Norris, September 19,
1907; Norris to Fred Brown, January 4, 1908.
9. McCarl to Reese, September 19, 1907; Norris to F. P. Corrick, Oc
tober 9, 1907, October 23, 1907; Corrick to Norris, November 6, 1907.
10. Norris to McCarl, December 13, 1907, December 20, 1907; Norris
to Percy M. Bell, December 23, 1907; McCarl to Norris, December 17,
1907, January 23, 1908; De Alva Stanwood Alexander, History and Proce
dure of the House of Representatives (Boston, 1916), p. 40.
11. Norris to Edward W. Hoch, November 18, 1907; Norris to George
L. Sheldon, November 18, 1907.
12. Norris to Sheldon, November 18, 1907; Norris to Charles Bunce,
November 18, 1907; Norris to I. D. Evans, December 20, 1907; Congres
sional Record, Sixtieth Congress, First Session, January 7, 1908, p, 520.
13. Norris to Sheldon, November 18, 1907; Congressional Record, Six
tieth Congress, First Session, January 17, 1908, p. 520; Norris to S. M.
Davis, December 14, 1907.
14. Norris to Davis, December 14, 1907; Norris to D. J. Wood, Decem
ber 23, 1907; Congressional Record, Sixtieth Congress, First Session, Jan
uary 7, 1908, pp. 519-22, for the entire speech.
15. This was the chief criticism Norris had for the bill introduced by
Charles N. Fowler, chairman of the House Banking and Currency Com
mittee; Norris to S. C. Smith, December 17, 1907.
16. Norris to S. C. Smith, December 17, 1907; Congressional Record,
Sixtieth Congress, First Session, January 7, 1908, p. 522.
17. Norris to S. H. Burnham, March 27, 1908; Norris to W. E. Stephen-
son, April 13, 1908; Norris to Charles K. Hart, May 13, 1908. The provi
sion in the Aldrich-Vreeland Act calling for a national monetary commission
to investigate the currency problem and suggest permanent reform assured
those members of Congress, including Norris, who wanted a stronger bill,
that banking and currency reform would again be a subject of legislation
in the near future. This provision pleased many members of Congress who
thought it might not be wise for Congress to enact a comprehensive bank
ing and currency law at this time, that more study and thought were needed
on the subject and the situation.
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18. Norris to C. F. Bentley, December 20, 1907; Norris to Hart, May 13,
1908; Norris to B. Travis, May 18, 1908.
19. Congressional Record, Sixtieth Congress, First Session, February 3,
1908, Appendix: pp. 22-23; Norris to A. A. Burdick, November 16, 1907;
Norris to F. N. Richardson, November 19, 1907; McCarl to H. C. Miller,
March 24, 1908; McCarl to George Allen, March 24, 1908. In 1912 there
were 2,348 veterans in Nebraska receiving federal pensions. See William
H. Glasson, Federal Military Pensions in the United States (New York,
1918), p. 257, footnote 2.
20. Congressional Record, Sixtieth Congress, First Session, January 15,
1908, p. 760; Norris to Merwin, February 10, 1908.
21. Norris to Adam Breede, February 4, 1908; Norris to Merwin, Feb
ruary 10, 1908; Norris to A. F. Buechler, February 24, 1908.
22. Congressional Record, Sixtieth Congress, First Session, January 21,
1908, p. 936; incidentally, Norris was aware that Champ Clark derived part
of his livelihood by appearing on the lecture platform.
23. Norris to J. E. Costello, May 20, 1908; Norris to O. T. Kountze, May
23, 1908; Norris to Chester M. Culver, May 25, 1908.
24. Norris to Isaac Le Droyt, November 9, 1907.
25. The Philippine tariff measure was probably the only instance where
Norris did not support Theodore Roosevelt, though he did not agree with
Roosevelt's requests for appropriations for more battleships. For a list of
measures he did support see McCarl to Allan Elliott, October 22, 1908, and
Norris to Corrick, May 1, 1908.
26. Norris to McCarl, March 30, 1908; McCarl to C. W. Meeker, April
2, 1908; Norris to McCarl, February 21, 1908, April 14, 1908.
27. E. A. Hayes to Norris, September 30, 1907; Norris to Hayes, Octo
ber 9, 1907.
28. Norris to E. F. Baldwin, May 28, 1908; Norris to W. E. Andrews,
September 21, 1908; Congressional Record, First Session, May 16, 1908,
p. 6440.
29. Norris to Baldwin, May 28, 1908; Norris to Allen, June 22, 1908.
30. Norris to W. E. Andrews, September 21, 1908; Norris to W. L.
Hilyard, September 26, 1908.
31. Norris to Hayne Davis, August 21, 1908; McCarl to J. F. Boyd, July
15, 1908; G. W. Norris to Hayne Davis, August 21, 1908; Norris to Jacob
Fisher, September 3, 1908.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 15 (pages 129-138)
1. A. E. Sheldon, Nebraska: The Land and the People (Chicago,
1931), Vol. I, pp. 827, 831; Nebraska State Journal, November 29, 1907;
William H. Taft to G. W. Norris, January 1, 1908; Norris to Fred Brown,
January 4, 1907 (8); George W. Norris Papers, Manuscripts Division,
Library of Congress. All other manuscript citations in this chapter, unless
otherwised noted, are from this collection.
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2. Norr.'s to J. R. McCarl, January 2, 1908.
3. McCarl to George Allen, January 11, 1907 (8);
McCarl to Moms,
January 12, 1907 (8), April 14, 1908;
Norris to M. T. Garlow, March 4,
1908
4 McCarl to J. F. Boyd, July 15, 1908, September 25, 1908; Norris to
George C. Junkin, July 20, 1908;' H.
C. Lindsay to Charles W. Meeker, July
22, 1908; Norris to MeekerJuly 28, 1908.
5. Norris to E. B. Perry, August 11, 1908;
Norris to John C. Gammill,
August 19, 1908. t t w ^ . t
6. F. P. Corrick to Norris, December 16, 1907; Fletcher W. Merwm to
Norris February 10, 1908; Jacob Fisher to Norris, September
2, 1908.
7. McCarl to Corrick, September 10, 1908; Norris to Henry Casson,
September 10, 1908; McCarl to L. Morse, September 23,
1908.
8. Norris to Corrick, September 16, 1908; Norris to Boyd, September
21, 1908; Norris in his letter to Corrick confused
ex-Governor Myron T.
Herrick of Ohio (1903-06) with Governor Charles Evans Hughes of New
York. Herrick did not campaign for Taft in Nebraska, while Hughes spoke
at Hastings in a hall provided by the Democrats early
in October, 1908. See
Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes (New York, 1952), Vol. I, p. 247.
9. Norris to W. E. Andrews, September 21, 1908; Nebraska State Jour
nal September 21, 1908.
10. Nebraska State Journal, September 21, 1908; the complete statement
made by Norris on September 19 appears on p. 5.
11. Norris to Merwin, September 24, 1908; there were only two daily
newspapers in the district at this time, The Daily Independent
of Grand
Island and The Hastings Daily Tribune, and they were both Republican
in their point of view. The other local papers were usually weeklies
and
most of them were in continual financial difficulties. Selling their support
to the highest bidder in an election year was one way of avoiding
bank
ruptcy. All newspapers in the district had to meet the competition of
the
large Omaha and Lincoln dailies which circulated throughout the state.
12. Norris to Merwin, September 24, 1908; Norris to H. C. Lindsay,
October 4, 1908.
13. Norris to Lindsay, October 4, 1908; McCarl to J. Warren Keifer, Jr.,
September 6, 1908; McCarl in this letter noted that 50 per cent of the
funds contributed by the postmasters of the Fifth Congressional District
were to be segregated and kept intact for the use of the congressional
committee.
14. McCarl to George C, Eisenhart, September 26, 1908; F. Kuenneth
to McCarl, September 30, 1908; McCarl to A. H. Thomas, October 3, 1908;
Norris to A. B. Allen, September 28, 1908; McCarl to S. A. Dravo, October
10, 1908; McCarl to Dan Garber, October 10, 1908.
15. McCarl to H. M. Crane, September 28, 1908; McCarl to J. W. Ham
mond, October 1, 1908; McCarl to A. V. Shaffer, October 2, 1908; Shaf
fer to McCarl, October 4, 1908; George Allen to McCarl, October 3, 1908.
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16. McCarl to John McCallum, October 13, 1908; Merwin to Norris,
February 10, 1908.
17. George Allen to McCarl, October 14, 1908, October 15, 1908; Mc
Carl to Allen, October 14, 1908; Shaffer to McCarl, October 16, 1908;
Nebraska State Journal, October 16, 1908, editorial entitled "Butting Into
the Fifth District" delineates Ashton's record.
18. McCarl to Allen, October 14, 1908.
19. Allen to McCarl, October 15, 1908, October 16, 1908; McCarl to
Merwin, October 16, 1908.
20. Shaffer to McCarl, October 16, 1908; McCarl to S. W. Clark, Octo
ber 17, 1908; McCarl to Norris, October 20, 1908.
21. William Lammers to McCarl, October 21, 1908; J. Frank Lantz to
McCarl, October 23, 1908; McCarl to Thomas, October 22, 1908; McCarl
to Norris, October 23, 1908; Albert Peek to McCarl, October 24, 1908.
22. McCarl to Norris, October 23, 1908; George Allen to McCarl, Octo
ber 23, 1908; McCarl to Allen Elliott, October 29, 1908; Davis to Kuen-
neth, November 10, 1908; Norris to A. C. Rankin, November 10, 1908;
Norris to J. H. Christner, November 17, 1908.
23. McCarl to C. A. Ready, October 23, 1908; McCarl to H. C. Miller,
October 24, 1908; McCarl to E. B. Perry, October 25, 1908; McCarl to
J. W. James, October 25, 1908; McCarl to J. A. Martin, October 25, 1908;
Hastings Democrat, October 30, 1908, caustically discusses the rally.
24. McCarl to H. C. Lindsay, October 29, 1908; Lindsay to J. F. Cordeal,
October 28, 1908; M. S. Storer to McCarl, October 30, 1908; McCarl to
Dravo, October 31, 1908; A. C. Felt to McCarl, October 31, 1908.
25. JvicCarl to H. C. Miller, November 1, 1908; McCarl to Merwin,
November 2, 1908; McCarl to H. G. Thomas, November 2, 1908.
26. Edgar Eugene Robinson, The Presidential Vote: 1896-1932 (Stan
ford, 1934), p. 14.
27. Robinson, op. tit., pp. 99-101, 264; A. E. Sheldon, op. cit., pp. 834-
35; James C. Olson, History of Nebraska (Lincoln, 1955), pp. 253-54;
Norris to J. H. Jones, November 23, 1908; McCarl to Ready, November 4,
1908; Lincoln Star, November 9, 1908. This paper, six days after the elec
tion, thought that Ashton had probably defeated Norris with a plurality of
five hundred votes.
28. H. C. MiUer to McCarl, November 5, 1908; George H. Thomas to
McCarl, November 6, 1908; Norris to C. P. Auderbury, November 10,
1908.
29. Norris to George C. Junkin, November 10, 1908.
30. Norris to J. F. Boyd, November 10, 1908; Jacob Fisher to Norris,
November 21, 1908; Norris to Perry L. Hole, November 21, 1908; Norris
to N. M. Ayers, November 23, 1908; Norris to J. H. Jones, November 23,
1908; the congressional committee came out $100.39 behind their expenses
and Norris made up this amount out of his own pocket. See McCarl to
Garber, November 20, 1908.
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31. Junkin to Norris, November 13, 1908; Charles W. Meeker to McCarl,
November 24, 1908; Norris to S. M. Erickson, November 24, 1908; McCarl
to Garber, November 24, 1908; Norris to H. C. Miller, November 24, 1908;
McCarl to Harry Bartenbach, November 25, 1908; McCarl to A. F.
Buechler, November 30, 1908.
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1. Kenneth W. Hechler, Insurgency (New York, 1940), p. 43.
2. J. R. McCarl to A. F. Buechler, November 30, 1908; McCarl to
George Allen, December 5, 1908; McCarl to G. W. Norris, December 7,
1908; Norris to James K. Polk, November 19, 1908; Norris to D. C. Turner,
November 19, 1908; George W. Norris Papers, Manuscripts Division,
Library of Congress. All other manuscript citations in this chapter, unless
otherwise noted, are from this collection.
3. McCarl to Norris, December 6, 1908, December 7, 1908; Congres
sional Record, Sixtieth Congress, Second Session, December 9, 1908, p. 74.
4. McCarl to Norris, December 8, 1908; McCarl to Alice Anderson,
December 14, 1908; Norris to Turner, December 21, 1908.
5. John Ely Briggs, William Peters Hepburn (Iowa City, 1919), p. 320.
6. Ibid., pp. 320-21.
7. Briggs, op. dt., p. 322; Norris to Norman Hapgood, November 17,
1908; Congressional Record, Sixtieth Congress, Second Session, January 12,
1909, p. 817.
8. The "Reed rules" refers to the arbitrary method, later accepted by
the Democrats, by which Speaker Thomas B. Reed in the Fifty-first Con
gress in 1890, with a Republican majority of less than a dozen votes,
proceeded to count silent members as present to achieve a quorum neces
sary for the House of Representatives to conduct its business.
9. House Resolution 417 stated in part: "The States of the Union shall
be divided into nine groups, each group containing, as near as may be, an
equal number of Members belonging to the majority party, and such
Members in each of said groups shall meet and select one of their number
as a member of said Committee on Rules. The States of the Union shall
likewise be divided into six groups, each containing, as near as may be, an
equal number of Members belonging to the minority party, and such Mem
bers in each of said groups shall meet and select one of their number as a
member of said Committee on Rules." This resolution, Norris hoped, would
limit the use of the caucus, since the most important committee in the
Congress, chosen according to a geographic basis, would then choose
chairmen of all standing committees.
10. Congressional Record, Sixtieth Congress, Second Session, January
18, 1909, pp. 1056-58; Representative Mann's questions occur on p. 1057.
11. The House Calendar consists of all bills of a public character that do
not have as a purpose the raising or appropriating of money, while the
Calendar of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union,
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or the Union Calendar, consists of all bills, previously considered and re
ported by committees, that involve the raising or spending of money.
Normally when these measures are taken from the calendar they are con
sidered by the entire House of Representatives acting as if it were a com
mittee.
12. Briggs, op. cit., pp. 322-23.
13. Congressional Record, Sixtieth Congress, Second Session, February
9, 1909, p. 2116.
14. Congressman A. P. Gardner, while one of the twenty-nine sponsors
of this resolution, had previously on January 6, 1909, sponsored a "Calendar
Tuesday" resolution. For a discussion of this point see Briggs, op. cit., foot
notes 463 and 495 on pp. 429, 430-31.
15. Briggs, op. cit., pp. 324-27.
16. Congressional Record, Sixtieth Congress, Second Session, March 1,
1909, p. 3570.
17. Ibid.
18. In order to placate the few people in Furnas County who did not
take kindly to Norris' part in the rules fight, Fletcher W. Merwin sug
gested that he send them a government document and an explanatory letter.
Merwin's list of critics contained ten names. See Merwin to Norris, January
17, 1909.
19. See Charles R. Atkinson, The Committee on Rules and the Over
throw of Speaker Cannon (New York, 1911). Chapter VI, pp. 71-93, en
titled "The Development of Public Sentiment Against the Speaker," presents
an excellent survey of growing press and periodical hostility. The author
has surveyed all the major magazines at this time on the question. La Fol-
lette's Magazine between February and the end of April, 1909, contained
six articles attacking the power of the Speaker. The magazine, a weekly,
started publication in January, 1909. Blair Bolles, Tyrant from
Illinois
(New York, 1951), is a study of Cannon as Speaker. This book, while
not carefully researched, is well written; the author,
unlike Norris, is more
concerned with the Speaker than with the rules.
20. See Siting E. Morison (ed.), The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt
(Cambridge, 1951, 1952), volumes III-VI, for the large correspondence
the president conducted with the Speaker. And see especially the Chro
nology in Volume VI for an indication of how frequently Cannon visited
the White House when Congress was in session.
21. Norris to O. E. Reynolds, November 21, 1908.
22. Norris to O. E. Reynolds, November 21, 1908.
23. Norris to W. A. Reynolds, December 21, 1908; Norris to Lon Cone,
January 19, 1909.
24. Norris to Adam Breede, November 12, 1908; Norris to J. C. Hedge,
January 25, 1909.
25. Norris to William Howard Taft, February 15, 1909.
26. Norris to Mrs. N. L. Cronkhite, February 12, 1909. Norris was one
of the few House members to return home. Most of the insurgents and
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Cannon men remained in Washington trying to obtain support for their
position from the administration and Democratic
members of the House of
Representatives. See Hechler, op. cit., pp.
49-55.
27. Norris to James G. King, March 13, 1909.
28. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress,
First Session, March 15,
1909, p. 32. For a discussion of administrative pressure against
the insur
gents which Norris comments upon see Hechler, op. cit., pp.
52-53. Taft
apparently was confused as to how to handle this situation.
While he had
some sympathy for the insurgents and was very critical
of Cannon, he
knew that he needed the Speakers support if tariff revision were to be
accomplished.
29. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress,
First Session, March 15,
1909, p. 32.
30. Ibid.
31. Hechler, op. cit., pp. 54-59. Hechler's evidence of
this arrangement
is understandably rather skimpy, coming entirely from insurgent sources
such as a 1910 newspaper article by Victor Murdock and a 1939 interview
with John M. Nelson. For another version of this arrangement
see Bolles,
op. cit., p. 181. Norris, too, believed that a deal
had been made between
Cannon and the Tammany Democrats. Commenting upon the charges by
his New York Republican colleague, Herbert Parsons, that a tie-up existed,
Norris said, "I can not prove absolutely what I think; but I could come
pretty near it if forced, though some of this proof is confidential."
See
Nebraska State Journal, October 10, 1910.
32. Norris to E. A. Van Valkenburg, March 19, 1909; incidentally, the
insurgents at this time aroused the admiration of Champ Clark, the Demo
cratic leader, who on the floor of the House on March 15, 1909, said that
the Republican insurgents were entitled to more credit than the Democrats
who supported them.
33. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, First Session, March 15,
1909, p. 18.
34. Norris to Breede, June 4, 1909. Norris in this letter denied that he
had promised during the campaign of 1908 to vote against Cannon. His
correspondence and his statement to the press during the campaign reveal
the opposite to be true. The first words of a press statement, which he
commended to his correspondents, reads, *1 am opposed to the re-election
of Mr. Cannon as Speaker/' (See Nebraska State Journal, September 21,
1908, and the discussion in Chapter 15.) In his defense Norris noted,
somewhat ingenuously, in this 1909 letter, that he did not state in the
campaign interview that he would vote against Cannon. He also correctly
argued that in his campaign speeches he said he would vote for Cannon,
notwithstanding his opposition, before he would vote for a Democrat as
Speaker. In a February, 1910, article in Current Literature (pp. 127-31)
Norris, reminiscing about the contest that occurred at the opening of this
session, wrote, "It is doubtful if there was a single insurgent who did not
most devoutly hope that the Speaker might be defeated for re-election."
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See Norris to W. G. Partridge, December 20, 1909, where he tries to ex
plain his position.
35. Atkinson, op. cit., p. 97, suggests that a number of the insurgents
were in favor of continuing their agitation against the rules even at the risk
of postponing tariff legislation. But at one of their conferences a member
(possibly Gardner of Massachusetts) reported that the manufacturers in
his district were becoming demoralized over the uncertainty of business
conditions and feared a panic on Wall Street. After discussion the insur
gents then decided to cease their tactics, deeming it the patriotic thing to
put nothing in the way of the earliest possible revision of the tariff.
36. Norris to J. H. Rushton, March 16, 1909.
37. Norris, Fighting Liberal (New York, 1946), pp. 101-02. Though
Norris was not a member of the subcommittee, his old friend Edgar D.
Crumpacker of Indiana was a Republican member. Crumpacker had been
practicing law in Valparaiso when Norris was attending law school there.
Incidentally, this account in Norris' autobiography adds further indirect
evidence to Hechler's thesis of a deal between Cannon and some Demo
cratic members to raise the rates on petroleum in return for their votes
against a major curtailment of his powers. See supra., footnote 31.
38. Norris, op. cit., p. 102; Hechler, op. cit., pp. 60-63; Congressional
Record, Sixty-first Congress, First Session, April 7, 1909, pp. 1164-65,
1168, 1170, and April 9, 1909, p. 1266.
39. McCarl to Norris, April 8, 1909.
40. Norris to C. E. V. Smith, April 13, 1909.
41. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, First Session, April 12,
1909, p. 1344.
42. Norris to Tom Cook, May 3, 1909; Norris to James E. Buck, May
30, 1909. Norris in this letter comments on conditions in the Canal Zone.
43. Norris to McCarl, May 14, 1909; Norris to L. Morse, June 1, 1909;
Norris to E. M. Pollard, July 7, 1909. In 1896 while traveling in an official
capacity for the IOOF he was overcome with heat prostration and found
it necessary for the rest of his life to be very careful of his health in the
hot weather, although for a period of about ten years after 1896 he thought
he had completely recovered.
44. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, First Session, July 9,
1909, p. 4374.
45. Ibid., pp. 4374-75.
46. Hechler, op. cit., p. 136.
47. Norris to W. A. Lindley, July 19, 1909; Norris to A. H. Bumham,
July 26, 1909; Norris to Thomas R. Kimball, July 19, 1909; for a discus
sion of Taft's role in the corporation tax proposal, see Henry F. Pringle,
The Life and Times of William Howard Toft (New York, 1939), Vol. I,
pp. 433-36.
48. Norris to Clayton C. Rhoades, August 3, 1909; Hechler, op. cit.,
p. 141; Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, First Session, July 31,
1909, pp. 4754-55.
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49. Nebraska State Journal October 10, 1909. For a devastating analysis
of the cost of production tariff theory,
which was included ^ the Republi
can platforms of 1904 and 1908, see
F. W. Taussig, The Tanf E^sWry
of the United States (New York, 1931) , pp. 363-67,
50. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress,
First Session, August 4,
1909, p. 4909, and August 5, 1909, pp.
5091-92; Norris to Breede, Sep
tember 4, 1900.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 17 (pages 153-165)
1 An open primary allowed a voter to cast
his primary vote for any
candidate of any party running for nomination, regardless
of what party
ticket he had previously voted. Wisconsin already
had such a system m
PT Addison E. Sheldon, Nebraska: The Land and the People (Chicago,
1931) Vol I pp 838-39; James C. Olson, History of
Nebraska (Lincoln,
1955)' p. 254; Nebraska State Journal July 7, 1909. Incidentally
both
Norris' and Burkett had criticized the tariff during the debate
and then
voted for it in its final version.
3 G W. Norris to J. R. McCarl, July 16, 1909; Norris to T. A. Boyd,
July 15 1909; Norris to A. C. Christensen,
December 6, 1909; George W.
Norris Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library
of Congress. All letters, unless
otherwise noted, are from this collection.
4. Norris to J. T. McBrien, July 26, 1909;
McCarl to George Allen,
October 4, 1909.
5. Norris to A. J. Watson, December 24, 1908.
6. Orleans Chronicle, September 10, 1909; Nebraska
State Journal
October 11, 1909, November 2, 1909; Norris to F. Milton Willis, April 20,
1910. J , . ,
7. In the next session of Congress he introduced an amendment which,
if it carried, would have reduced naval appropriations by five million
dol
lars, because it struck out one battleship and called for six merchant
vessels
in place of it. These vessels, he claimed,
would develop our trade with
Central and South America, provide for a merchant marine, expedite
the
services of the Panama Railroad Company which had the responsibility
for carrying freight, mail, and passengers from
American ports to those of
Panama, and at the same time reduce naval expenses. See Congressional
Record, Sixty-first Congress, Second Session, April 8, 1910, p.
4433.
8. Nebraska State Journal October 11, 1909; Norris to William S,
Mattley, February 18, 1910.
9. Norris to McBrien, August 3, 1909; Norris to J. C. Murtland, January
5, 1910; Nebraska State Journal January 2, 1910, quoting an article by
Judson C. Welliver in Success Magazine.
10. Another criticism, besides expense, was that it gave an incentive "to
dishonorable and disreputable men" to enter the primary for the purpose
of
"holding up" candidates, securing money from special interests
or individuals
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desiring particular legislation, or defeating another candidate. It gave mon
eyed men another undue political advantage. See Norris to Samuel Merwin,
December 17, 1909.
11. McCarl to George Allen, October 4, 1909; Nebraska State Journal,
October 10, 1909, January 2, 1910; Norris to Welliver, September 14, 1909.
12. Norris to Mrs. J. A. Andrews, September 22, 1909; McCarl to Norris,
November 14, 1909,
13. Norris to F. M. Richard, December 18, 1909. In a letter to Richard
on December 23, 1909, Norris noted that the Republican National Con
gressional Committee had recently launched a systematic campaign to
defeat insurgent congressmen through the country press. This committee,
"under the absolute control of Speaker Cannon," had just issued the first
of a series of weekly newsletters purporting to present congressional news.
By presenting in these letters critical items and malicious statements about
the insurgents, the committee, Norris thought, hoped to reach the con
stituents of these men through the rural newspapers.
14. Norris to W. T, K. Thompson, December 22, 1909; Norris to C. A.
Bride, June 10, 1909.
15. Norris to Mrs. Mary H. Williams, January 11, 1910.
16. Norris to David Cole, February 8, 1910; Norris to R. M. Joyce,
February 25, 1910; Norris to C. P. Grandfield, January 15, 1910, January
28, 1910; Norris to L. A. Sheldon, January 28, 1910; Norris to H. A. Tal-
cott, January 3, 1910; Norris to A. E. Yorkel, January 21, 1910.
17. Norris to L. A. Sheldon, January 28, 1910; Norris to Ben Patterson,
January 31, 1910; Norris to S. R. McKelvie, February 5, 1910, February
18, 1910; Norris to W. B. Hargleroad, April 20, 1910.
18. S. L. Perkins to Norris, February, n.d., 1910; Norris to F. C. Robb,
January 31, 1910.
19. Norris to William T. Evans, February 2, 1910; Norris to B. J.
Seger, April 16, 1910. The settlers in the North Platte project requested
that the term of payment be extended from ten to fifteen or twenty years,
with the first two payments not to exceed a dollar per year per acre, con
struction charges. See Perkins to Norris, February, n.d., 1910.
20. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, Second Session, June 21,
1910, p. 8696.
21. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, Second Session, January
31, 1910, p. 1305.
22. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, Second Session, February
3, 1910, p. 1456.
23. Rose M. Stahl, The Ballinger-Pinchot Controversy (Northampton,
Massachusetts, 1926), p. 123; Norris to C. L. Abbott, December 31, 1909.
24. Stahl, op. cit., pp. 123-24; Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress,
Second Session, January 7, 1910, p. 390.
25. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, Second Session, January
7, 1910, pp. 390, 404. The vote was 149 to 146 with five members answer
ing "present" and eighty-seven not voting. Over forty pairs were announced.
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Norris in later years became confused as to the details of what occurred.
He thought that Walter Smith of Iowa, an amiable supporter
of Cannon
and a "warm personal friend," granted him the two minutes while
Dalzell
was out to lunch. But the Congressional Record for January 7, 1910 (p.
390) reveals that it was Dalzell who yielded him the two minutes in which
he presented the amendment. After Norris spoke,
Dalzell then yielded
time to Smith who held the floor and allotted time to other members. For
Norris' later version of what occurred see his speech of June 25, 1932, at
a Cosmos Club dinner honoring Harry Slattery and printed in the Con
gressional Record, Seventy-second Congress,
First Session, July 15, 1932,
pp. 15456-57 and Norris to Harold Ickes, May 26, 1933.
26. Norris to Alfred Lief, May 4, 1934; Norris erred in his recollection
when he thought a ten-man committee was to be chosen and that. conse
quently the insurgent member would prevent a standpat Republican major
ity from dominating it Kenneth W. Hechler, Insurgency (New York, 1940),
p. 64.
27. Norris to Walter J. Locke, January 22, 1910; Norris to Lief, May
4, 1934; Norris to Ickes, May 26, 1933; Norris, Fighting Liberal (New
York, 1946), p. 110; Senator Knute Nelson of Minnesota, the chairman of
the committee, was personally sympathetic to Ballinger's position and in
tensely disliked Pinchot. Eventually the seven Republican members pre
pared a report exonerating Ballinger, while the Democratic
members and
Madison held that Ballinger should not be retained in office since he had
violated the trust reposed in him as secretary of the interior. Congressman
Edwin Denby of Michigan, who later as secretary of the navy was involved
in the Teapot Dome scandal, signed the majority report. In the light of
the strict party vote on these reports, Norris' claim about a "real investiga
tion" can be singularly applied to Madison, who was probably the only
member willing to reach a conclusion on the basis of the evidence. Madi
son filed a separate report, agreeing in less partisan terms with the Demo
cratic members that Ballinger should resign. For a thorough monographic
study of the Ballinger-Pinchot affair see Alpheus T. Mason, Bureaucracy
Convicts Itself (New York, 1941); Stahl, op. cit., is a careful study based
on easily accessible published materials. Mason had access to manuscript
collections, notably the papers of Louis D. Brandeis. More recent studies by
Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency (Cambridge,
1959), and Elmo R. Richardson, The Politics of Conservation (Berkeley and
Los Angeles, 1962), present well balanced scholarly accounts which are
more critical of Pinchot and more favorable to Ballinger than is Mason's
study.
28. Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft
(New York, c. 1939), Vol. I, p. 480, The quote is from a letter of June,
1909, from the president to his brother Horace.
29. Norris to William Howard Taft, January 6, 1910.
30. Norris was here referring to the pressure supposedly exerted by
Taft and other administration members to prevent the insurgents from
making a fight against the rules on March 15, 1909. See Norris to Taft,
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January 10, 1909; Hechler, op. eft., pp. 50-53, reveals that Taft, though
secretly sympathetic, made no commitment to insurgent members in March,
1909. Of course Taft, by taking no part in the fight against the House
rules, became to many insurgents an avowed supporter of Cannonism.
31. Norris to Taft, January 6, 1910.
32. Hechler, op. cit., p. 216.
33. Taft to Norris, January 7, 1910.
34. Norris to Taft, January 10, 1910.
35. Ibid. The measures cited by Norris as indicative of his support of
the administration were the following: increase in the power of the Inter
state Commerce Commission, further regulation of corporations, physical
valuation of railroads, publication of campaign expenses, a postal savings
bank law, conservation of natural resources, regulation of injunctions, re
form of federal court procedures, and a permanent nonpartisan tariff com
mission. Norris opposed the administration on the ship subsidy question,
but so did many of the regular Republicans who continued to benefit
from patronage. Incidentally, for the rest of his congressional career,
Norris
never again received executive patronage.-
36. Taft to Norris, January 11, 1910; Constance Gardner, (ed.),
Some
Letters of Augustus Peabody Gardner (Boston, 1920), p. 59. Gardner at
tended an insurgent meeting on the evening of January 10, 1910, at which
a show of hands was requested to find out which insurgents had had trouble
with their patronage.
37. Archie Butt, Taft and Roosevelt: The Intimate Letters of Archie
Butt (Garden City, New York, 1930), Vol. I, p. 41; Pringle, op. cit., Vol.
II, pp. 612-13 discusses Taft's handling of the patronage
at this time;
Hechler, op. cit., pp. 216-19.
38. Congressman Gardner, for example, had previously informed
Norris
that he could depend on his vote in matters pertaining to the rules at any
time he notified him. See Constance Gardner, op. cit., p. 57.
39. G. L. Keith to Norris, January 7, 1910.
40. McCarl to Norris, January 7, 1910.
41. Norris to C. L. Fahnestock, January 11, 1910.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 18 (pages 166-179)
1. George W. Norris, "Cannonism: What It Is," Part II, La Follette's
Magazine, Vol. II, No. 14, April 9, 1910, p. 8.
2. William Kittle, "The Progressive Movement/' Twentieth Century
Magazine, Vol. I, No. 4, January, 1910, p.
315. With the economic analysis
presented in this statement, Norris
was in full accord. At the time this
article appeared, Norris wrote to a critical constituent,
"The facts are, that
behind this power given by the rules to the Speaker, are
intrenched all the
special interests and combines that are seeking special
favors at the hands
of Congress."
3. Kittle, loc. cit., p. 315.
4. Lillian Tuttle, "The Congressional Career of Victor Murdock: 1909-
19ir (master's thesis, University of Kansas, 1948), p. 63. Quoting from
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the "Mail and Breeze" column of the Topeka Daily Capital, January 16,
1910.
5. Kittle, loc. cit., p. 315.
6. The articles were entitled "The Secret of His Power/' January 8,
1910, and "Cannonism: What It Is/* which appeared in two parts on
April 2, 1910 and April 9, 1910. The articles on Cannonism, though ap
pearing after the Speaker's defeat in March, 1910,
were undoubtedly
written before that time. Norris inserted all three articles in the Congres
sional Record, Sixty-first Congress, Second Session, May 14, 1910, pp.
6274-78.
7. Norris to George A. Mosshart, January 15, 1910; Norris
to Walter
J. Locke, January 22, 1910; Norris to Ross L. Hammond, February 4, 1910;
George W. Norris Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress.
Un
less otherwise noted, all letters are from this collection.
8. Norris to G. E. Hager, February 15, 1910. In a letter to a former
judicial colleague, for example, Norris revealed that
the insurgents were
divided over what position to take on membership of the committee to
investigate the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy once
his amendment had
been accepted. See Norris to H. M. Grimes, January 14, 1910.
9. Norris to T. L. Porter, January 15, 1910; Norris to H. C. Miller,
January 18, 1910; Norris to Hammond, February 4, 1910; Norris to A. F.
Buechler, February 7, 1910.
10. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, Second Session, March
15, 1910, pp. 3221-22.
11. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, Second Session, March
16, 1910, pp. 3250-51.
12. Detroit News, March 20, 1910.
13. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, Second Session, March
17, 1910, p. 3290.
14. Ibid., p. 3285.
15. Detroit News, March 20, 1910; Washington Times, March 21, 1910;
Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, Second Session, March 17, 1910,
p. 3292; Norris to D. J. Cowden, May 19, 1910.
16. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, Second Session, March
17, 1910, pp. 3292, 3294.
17. Ibid., p. 3294.
18. Z&ii., p. 3307.
19. Chicago Daily Tribune, March 19, 1910; Brooklyn Eagle, March 19,
1910.
20. Chicago Daily Tribune, March 19, 1910; Congressional Record,
Sixty-first Congress, Second Session, March 17, 1910, pp. 3320-21.
21. Detroit News, March 20, 1910.
22. After the House had been in session thirteen and one-half hours,
James Tawney of Minnesota, one of the Speaker's lieutenants, tried for the
last time to secure a recess. The House remained in continuous session for
another twelve and one-half hours.
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23. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, Second Session, March
18, 1910, p. 3405.
24. Ibid., pp. 3396-97.
25. Brooklyn Eagle, March 19, 1910.
26. Chicago Daily Tribune, March 19, 1910; Brooklyn Eagle, March
19, 1910.
27. New York Evening Telegram, March 18, 1910; Washington Herald,
March 20, 1910.
28. New York Evening Telegram, March 18, 1910.
29. Ibid.
30. New York Evening Telegram, March 18, 1910; Brooklyn Eagle,
March 19, 1910.
31. New York Evening Telegram, March 18, 1910; Washington Herald,
March 20, 1910; Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, Second Ses
sion, March 18, 1910, pp. 3415-16.
32. New York Evening Telegram, March 18, 1910.
33. Detroit News, March 19, 1910; Washington Herald, March 20, 1910;
Kenneth W. Hechler, Insurgency (New York, 1940), p. 70.
34. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, Second Session, March
18, 1910, pp. 3416-17.
35. Chicago Sunday Tribune, March 20, 1910. Since the House did not
adjourn until late in the afternoon o March 18, these proceedings were
included in the Journal of March 17, 1910.
36. Chicago Sunday Tribune, March 20, 1910. Taft, on a speaking tour,
first heard of the events in the House in Erie, Pennsylvania, on March 18.
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sion, April 16, 1912, p. 4878, July 10, 1912, p. 8872.
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23, 1912, p. 11757; Norris to A. W. Sinclair, February 22, 1912; Norris to
M. E. McClellan, March 18, 1912; Norris to Perm P. Fodrea, April 15,
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32. Congressional Record, Sixty-second Congress, Second Session, July
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pers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. Unless otherwise noted,
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December 15, 1911; Norris to J. J. McCarthy, December 30, 1911.
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4. Norris to F. P. Corrick, December 19, 1911.
5. J. R. McCarl to Arthur V. Shaffer, December 22, 1911.
6. Norris to Theodore Roosevelt, December 27, 1911, Theodore Roose
velt Papers (Box 306), Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress.
7. Elting E. Morrison, et al., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cam
bridge, 1954), Vol. VII, pp. 470-71, 445.
8. Norris to Roosevelt, January 5, 1912, Roosevelt Papers (Box 306),
Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress.
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10. Norris to Corrick, January 4, 1912; Norris to D. McLeod, January
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11. Omaha Daily Bee, January 19, 1912, January 28, 1912; McCarl to
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12. Norris to Corrick, January 24, 1912; Norris to McCarl, January 24,
1912. Norris in his correspondence at this time stressed the fact that while
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Senator La Follette. Despite his efforts Aldrich was rebuffed by the Taft
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13. Norris to McCarl, January 24, 1912; Norris to H. E. Larimer, Jan
uary 25, 1912.
14. Norris to John O. Yeiser, January 27, 1912; Omaha Daily Bee,
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15. Omaha Daily Bee, January 31, 1912; Corrick to Norris, January 30,
1912; Norris to Corrick, February 2, 1912.
16. R. A. Simpson to Norris, February 1, 1912; McCarl to Fletcher
W.
Merwin, January 28, 1912; Omaha Daily Bee, January 29, 1912.
17. Norris to Yeiser, February 2, 1912.
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20. Omaha Daily Bee, February 8, 1912, February 9, 1912.
21. Norris to Corrick, February 8, 1912; Norris to Simpson, February 9,
1912; Norris to McCarl, February 10, 1912.
22. Corrick to Norris, February 13, 1912.
23. McCarl to A. V. Pease, February 19, 1912; McCarl to H. M. Grimes,
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25. McCarl to Norris, February 19, 1912.
26. Norris to W. B. Ely, February 20, 1912; McCarl to Norris, February
20, 1912; Norris to M. E. Wells, February 29, 1912; Norris to R. W. Devoe,
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27. Confidential source.
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6. Norris to Corrick, March 18, 1912.
7. McCarl to Norris, March 16, 1912; McCarl to McCarthy, March 18,
1912; McCarl to Norris, March 18, 1912, March 19, 1912.
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13. George Allen to Norris, April 9, 1912.
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15. Norris to Corrick, April 13, 1912; Lewis to McCarl, April 13, 1912;
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April 23, 1912; W. P. Pierce to Norris, April 23, 1912.
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21. Confidential source.
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Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement (Madison, 1947), pp. 234-35;
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and Fola La Follette, Robert M. La Follette (New York, 1953), Vol. I, pp.
437-39.
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25. Norris to Theodore Roosevelt, July 19, 1912, Theodore Roosevelt
Papers (Box 309), Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress; Roosevelt to
Norris, July 22, 1912, Roosevelt Papers (Box 468) .
26. Omaha Daily Bee, July 30, 1912; McCarl to Norris, August 1, 1912.
27. McCarl to Norris, August 1, 1912; McCarl to Lawrence, August 2,
1912; Omaha Daily Bee, July 31, 1912.
28. McCarl to Norris, August 1, 1912; McCarl to Lawrence, August 2,
1912.
29. McCarl to Norris, August 1, 1912, August 4, 1912; Omaha Daily Bee,
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30. McCarl to Norris, August 1, 1912.
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Bee, August 4, 1912, August 19, 1912.
3. Norris to G. O. Van Meter, August 21, 1912.
4. Norris to F. P. Corrick, August 31, 1912.
5. McCarl to Norris, August 22, 1912.
6. McCarl to Norris, August 22, 1912.
7. Norris to Corrick, August 31, 1912; Omaha Daily Bee, September 2,
1912; A. E. Sheldon, Nebraska: The Land and the People (Chicago, 1931),
Vol. I, p. 877.
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10. Omaha Daily Bee, September 16, 1912.
11. Norris to Corrick, September 18, 1912; Omaha Daily Bee, September
20, 1912, September 21, 1912; Corrick to McCarl, September 16, 1912.
12. McCarl to James Schoonover, September 18, 1912; McCarl to M. F.
Harrington, September 19, 1912; Epperson to McCarl, September 19, 1912;
Corrick to McCarl, September 20, 1912; McCarl to Epperson, September
23, 1912.
13. McCarl to J. M. Cottrell, September 22, 1912; McCarl to Epperson,
September 23, 1912.
14. H. G. Taylor to McCarl, September 24, 1912.
15. H. G. Taylor to McCarl, September 25, 1912; W. V. Hoagland to
McCarl, September 25, 1912.
16. McCarl to H. G. Taylor, September 26, 1912; McCarl to Meyer
Brandvig, September 24, 1912; McCarl to E. J. Mitchell, September 24,
1912; McCarl to Corrick, September 25, 1912; McCarl to Epperson, October
3, 1912.
17. McCarl to George Thomas, October 3, 1912, October 6, 1912; George
Thomas to McCarl, October 5, 1912.
18. A. E. Sheldon, op. cit,, pp. 877-78; McCarl to George Thomas, Octo
ber 6, 1912.
19. Don L. Love to Norris, October 4, 1912; Norris to Secretary of the
United States Senate, October 7, 1912; Norris to H. D. Duncan, May 14,
1912.
20. Norris, "Bryan as a Political Leader," Current History (September,
1925), Vol. XXII, p. 866. See also Alfred Lief, Democracy $ Norris (New
York, 1939) , p. 133, for a slightly different version.
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1912, October 13, 1912, October 14, 1912.
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23. Omaha Bee, October 22, 1912, October 24, 1912; McCarl to Ferdi
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24. McCarl to F. C. Marshall, October 10, 1912; McCarl to T. W. Barton,
October 10, 1912; McCarl to Arthur V. Shaffer, October 12, 1912; McCarl
to G. A. Dudley, October 22, 1912; McCarl to Norris, October 13, 1912.
25. McCarl to Norris, October 13, 1912; McCarl to John L. Kennedy,
October 14, 1912.
26. McCarl to Kennedy, October 14, 1912.
27. George H. Thomas to McCarl, October 14, 1912; McCarl to Joseph
Polcar, October 14, 1912; R. B. Howell to Norris, October 14, 1912; Mc
Carl to Howell, October 23, 1912. While Norris carried Douglas County,
Roosevelt lost it to Wilson by less than three thousand votes. For the
presidential vote see Edgar Eugene Robinson, The Presidential Vote:
1896-1932 (Stanford, 1934), p. 263.
28. H. G. Thomas to McCarl, October 15, 1912; McCarl to Will Rice,
October 22, 1912. Norris spent $585.30 on his campaign. This sum included
a $150 contribution to the Republican State Committee and a similar
amount to the Progressive State Committee. See Nebraska State Journal,
November 15, 1912.
29. McCarl to Corriclc, October 14, 1912; Omaha Bee, November 2,
1912; Nebraska State Journal, November 3, 1912.
30. Chicago Tribune, Novembers, 1912.
31. Edgar Eugene Robinson, op. cit. (Stanford, 1934), p. 49; A. E. Shel
don, op. cit., p. 878-79; Omaha Bee, November 7, 1912, November 8,
1912, November 10, 1912; Norris to Chester H. Aldrich, November 8, 1912.
32. Edgar Eugene Robinson, op. cit., p. 263; Norris to Gifford Pinchot,
November 22, 1912, Gifford Pinchot Papers (Box 155) Manuscripts Divi
sion, Library of Congress; Norris to Theodore Roosevelt, November 22,
1912, Theodore Roosevelt Papers (Box 309), Manuscripts Division, Library
of Congress; J. W. Hoagland to McCarl, September 28, 1912; A. E. Shel
don, op. cit., pp. 877-79.
33. Epperson to McCarl, November 8, 1912; Sackett to McCarl, Novem
ber 9, 1912; A. V. Pease to McCarl, November 9, 1912.
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1. Congressional Record, Sixty-second Congress, Second Session, July
11, 1912, p. 8933. John R. Farr of Scranton, Pennsylvania, Archbald's home
town, was the only congressman to vote against impeachment. The House
Judiciary Committee unanimously agreed to all the charges and indictments
it presented to the House for approval.
2. Archbald was voted not guilty under articles Seven through Twelve
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12. New York Times, January 10, 1913.
13. McCarl to Norris, January 23, 1913; Omaha World Herald, January
22, 1913.
14. New York Times, January 22, 1913; Omaha World Herald, January
22, 1913; Lincoln Trade Review, January 25, 1913.
15. McCarl to Norris, January 23, 1913.
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17. Norris to William P. Gulp, January 22, 1912; Theodore Roosevelt to
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18. Congressional Directory, Sixty-third Congress, First Session, April,
1913, p. 62.
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Index
Adams (Captain), 69
Agriculture, 97-98, 157, 203-04,
211, 220, 233-34
Aldrich, Chester H., 194, 195, 238,
239, 247, 250, 255, 256, 259, 260,
267
Aldrich, Nelson W., 108
Aldrich-Vreeland Act, 122, 304
Allen, E. N., 63, 67-69
Allen, Ceorge, 77, 91, 92, 109, 110-
11, 112-13
Anderson, C. S., 35
Andrews (Doctor), 68
Andrews, William E., 31, 51, 52
Archbald, Robert W., 269-72
Arizona and New Mexico, admission
to the union, 210-11, 324
Ashton, Fred, 129-31, 133, 134-35,
136, 137
Babcock, Joseph W., 84, 88
Baldwin University, 56
Ballinger, Richard, 158-59, 160-62,
314
Ballot (1912), 264-65
Bank of Rulo, 21-22
Banking and currency, 120-23, 304
Barngrover, W. W., 34
Bartholdt, Richard, 99
Barton, Silas R., 267
Beaver City, description of, 11-12,
13-14
Boland, William P., 270-71
Brandeis, Louis D., 239
Brown, Norris, 114, 192, 238, 243,
247, 248, 267-68, 277
Bryan, William Jennings, 52, 57-58,
61, 90, 92, 130-31, 134, 136, 222,
263-64
Burkett, Elmer, 84, 91, 93, 153, 190,
195
Burleson resolution, 181-82, 194
Burlington and Missouri Railroad,
11, 12, 29, 68, 85
Burnham, Trevett & Mattis, 23
Calendar Tuesday, 142
Calendar Wednesday, 143-44, 148,
169-70
Campaign expenses, 184r-86
Campbell, Philip B., 224
Canadian reciprocity, 202-04, 211-
12, 219-20
Cannon, Joseph G.: attacks against,
142-45, 146-48, 159-63, 169-79;
attempts to oust, 181-82; and
committee assignments, 114, 120;
criticism of, 126-28, 131-32; Nor
ris* support of, 83-84, 93, 144,
148, 310; reaction to attacks, 180-
81; mentioned passim
Cannonism, 144, 145; endorsement
of Norris' attacks on, 191-92;
Norris' speeches on, 155, 193
Castle, Lorinda (Norris), 6
Caucus control, 224-25, 226
Census amendment, 169-70, 171
Cheney, L. H., 86
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Rail
road, 104-06
Civil Service, 88-89
Civil War, 2-3
Clark, Champ, 124-25, 148, 177,
178, 247; as Speaker, 208, 226
Coffee trust, 212-15, 223
Committee assignments, 84-85, 87,
114, 120, 161-64, 209
337
338 INDEX
Committee on Election of President,
Vice-President and Representa
tives, 87, 120
Committee on Labor, 120
Committee on Public Lands and
Buildings, 84-85, 87, 120
Committee on Rules, 126-27, 170-
79
Conference of Progressive Republi
cans, 221
Cooper, Henry Allen, 172
Corrick, F. P., 237, 242, 243, 244,
250, 259, 263
Crescent Literary Society, 8
Crumpacker, Edgar D., 169, 170
DaHman, James C., 194, 268
Dalzell, John, 171, 177
Davis, John W., 269
Delaware, Lackawanna- & Western
Railroad, 271
Democratic party: and relation to
Populists, 27; weaknesses in 1904,
90; mentioned passim
Devanter, Willis Van. See Van De-
vanter, Willis
Dietrich, C. H., 61, 64-65, 84, 91;
and campaign of 1902, 72-74, 78
Dingley Tariff, 103
Direct election of senators, 210
Discharge Calendar, 187
District judge: Norn's and office of,
31-36; Norris re-elected as, 55-
58
Election results: 1890, 28; 1892, 29;
1894, 30-31; 1895, 34-36, 56-57,
71; 1896, 52; 1898, 53-54; 1899,
55; 1902, 77; 1904, 92-93; 1906,
114; 1908, 136; 1910, 195-96;
1912, 267-68
Epperson, Ambrose, 259, 263
Farm credit, 233-34
Filkins, Stanley E., 23
First National Bank of Falls City, 21,
22
First National Bank of Rulo, 17-18
Formation of separate party, 252-
55,258
Furnas County, description of, 11-
13
Fusion, 30, 51, 52-53, 91-92
Gardner, Augustus P., 167, 172, 177
Glavis, Louis R., 158, 160-61
Grand Island federal building, 70,
84-85, 94
Grimes, H. M., 67
Gronna, Asle J., 208
Harrington, H. H., 11
Harrison, Frank A., 240, 244, 248
Henry, Robert Lee, 225
Hepburn, William P., 137, 139, 142,
143
Hill, James J., 105
Hinshaw, E. H., 136
Hitchcock, 195
Holcomb, Silas A., 30-31, 52, 55
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 46-47
H.R. 417, 127, 308
H.R. 502, 170-79; amendment to,
177-79
H.R. 551, 142-43
House rules. See Rules, House of
Representatives
Howell, R. B., 239, 247, 266
Immigration, 231
Initiative, referendum, recall, 211
Interparliamentary Union, 98-100
Irrigation, 72-73, 157
Jones, Wesley L., 88, 159
Judiciary, 197-99
Kelley, J. E., 69
Kennedy, John L., 257-58, 266, 267
Kenyon, William S., 208
Kinkaid, M. P., 136, 299-300
Kinkaid Act, 98, 299-300
La Follette, Robert M.: and cam
paign tours (1912), 246; candi
dacy and support of (1912), 216-
17, 218, 221-22, 236, 238-39,
240, 242, 244; and primary re
sults (1912), 245; and Roosevelt,
235, 237, 239-40, 241, 244, 255;
INDEX 339
sentiment for and against (1912),
238, 240; mentioned passim
La Follette League (formerly Pro
gressive League), 237, 240, 242,
243
Land distribution, 98
Lashley, David H., 18
Lashley, Pluma. See Norris, Pluma
Law: Norris* interest in, 5; Norris'
practice of, 9, 11, 14, 23-24, 29-
30; Norris receives degree in, 89
Lenroot, Irvine, 224
Leonard, Ella. See Norris, Ella
Lewis, David J., 230
Lincoln, Nebraska, 10
Liquor issue, 156, 194, 223
Long School district, 67
Loomis, N. H., 231-32
L.U.N. (Loyal United Nine), 8, 82-
83
McCaD, Samuel W., 185
McCarl, J. R., 95, 111-12, 118, 119,
129, 133, 134, 135-36, 218-19,
235, 243, 244-45, 246, 248, 255,
257, 258, 259, 260, 263, 265-66
McClure, John T., 13; and election
of 1890, 28; and election of 1895,
31, 32, 33; and election of 1899,
55-57, 58
McCook, Nebraska, description of,
58-59
McCook land office, 94-95
McCumber Act, 123, 303
McKinley, William, 42
Madison, Edmund H., 160, 167, 198,
224, 234, 314
Majors, Thomas J., 30-31
Manderson, Charles F., 85, 104-05,
106
Mann, James R., 141-42, 186, 208,
224
Mann-Elkins Act, 186-87, 271
Marian Coal Company, 270-71
Mauck, H. H., 91, 92
Merwin, Fletcher .W., 13, 66-67, 69,
77, 81; as Norris' secretary, 85;
resignation as secretary, 9596
Mickey, John H., 71, 77
Miles, J. H., 17-18, 21, 22
Mill (Beaver Creek), 18, 24-25, 43-
45, 79-80
Miller (Attorney), 56
Mook, Mary Magdalene. See Norris,
Mary Mook
Morehead, John H., 267, 268
Morlan, W. S., 61, 104; and election
of 1902, 66-69; and Norris
7
.rise,
28-29
Mortgage-loan business, 1418, 19,
21-24
Mount Carmel district school, 5
Murdock, Victor, 195, 224
National Progressive Republican
League, 201
Nelson, John M., 167, 207-08
Norris, Chauncey, 2, 3, 279
Norris, Clara, 5-6
Norris, Ella, 66, 82, 83, 139-40
Norris, Emma, 5-6, 63-64
Norris, Gertrude, 63, 64, 139-40
Norris, Hazel, 38, 40, 64
Norris, John Henry, 2-3, 279
Norris, Marian, 38, 40, 64
Norris, Mary Mook, 2, 3-5, 9, 38-
39,60
Norris, Pluma, 18-19, 38, 40, 63
Norris Block, 25-26, 43
Odd Fellows, 41 ,
Orchestra Hall, 252-53, 254
Orr, R. C., 86
Pacifism, 154
Palmer (Editor), 113
Panama Canal, 274
Parcel post system, 145, 201-02,
230-31
Parker, Alton B., 90, 93, 136
Parker, Isaac, 4, 38
Patents, 273-74
Patronage, 161-64
Payne, Sereno, 148, 149, 182
Payne-Aldrich tariff, 148-52, 214,
226, 227, 318
Pensions, 123
Philippine tariff, 101-03, 111, 301
Pinchot, Gifford, 158-59, 160-62,
314
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Poindexter, Miles, 208
Polk, James K. (Norris' assistant),
119-20
Populist party: demise in Nebraska,
90; and Norris' election, 55; prom
inence of, 27-28; rise of, 26
Postal issues, 72, 73-74, 122-23,
145, 156, 201-02, 228-30, 230-
31
"Progressive," use of term, 168, 207-
08
Progressive movement: height of
(1906), 114, 118; mentioned pas
sim
Progressive party, 258-61, 264-65,
267-68
Prosecuting attorney, Norris and of
fice of, 28, 29-30
Railroad regulation, 103-07, 186-
87, 231-32
Rainbow Lake (Wisconsin), 8, 82-
83
Real estate, 24-26, 42
Reclamation Act, 157
"Reed rules," 141, 308
Republican party: and election of
1900, 61-62; and fusionists, 52-
53; and populists ideas, 90; and
Populists, 27-28; tensions in, 108;
mentioned passim
Republican party organization, Nor
ris' independence of, 138
Republican platform (1912), 252,
258
Republican State Central Commit
tee, 130
Rhodes, J. EL, 9
Roosevelt, Theodore: and campaign
(1912), 262; candidacy of
(1912), 236-37, 251; and Civil
Service, 8889; and election of
1904, 90, 92; and election results
(1912), 267-68; and La Follette,
239-40, 241; and Norris, 102-03,
107-08, 116, 246-47; and Philip
pine tariff, 102-03, 301; and pri
mary results (1912), 245, 247;
and progressives, 217, 235, 252-
53, 254, 257, 259-60; and rail
road regulation, 10304; and
Russo-Japanese War, 100; senti
ment for, 238, 239, 242; men
tioned, 61, 78, 131, 136, 144, 192-
93, and passim
Rosewater, Victor, 217, 237, 252,
256-58
Rules, House of Representatives: at
tacks against, 223-26; attempts to
change, 126-27, 140-44, 145-48,
170-79, 199, 209-10; conflicting
interpretations of, 200; criticisms
of, 100, 126, 131-32
Rules changes, 208; effects and re
sults of, 182-84, 187-88, 200
Rural postal routes, 72, 73-74
Russo-Japanese War, 98-100
Sandusky County, Ohio, description
of, 1-2
Savage, Ezra P., 71
Shafer, George, 17, 44, 79
Shallenberger, A. C., 32, 61, 70, 114,
130-31, 247, 261, 262-63, 268;
and campaign of 1902, 72-73, 74,
75-77, 293, 294
Sheldon, George L., 114, 135
Sherman Antitrust Act, 214, 215,
272-73
Slavery, attitudes toward, 2
Smith, Walter L, 198
Snow, Church & Company, 23-24
Speaker of the House, power of, 225,
318. See also Cannon, Joseph G.;
Rules, House of Representatives
Sugar trust, 101-03, 111, 226-28,
301
Sutherland, Roderick D., 110, 111,
114, 195
Taft, William Howard: campaign
management (1912), 251; chances
of nomination (1912), 251; and
election of 1912, 216, 218, 221-
22, 235, 237, 241-42, 245, 248,
260, 265, 267-68; and insurgents,
160-64; and Nebraska convention
(1912), 257-58; and Norris' can
didacy, 256; and separate party,
257; mentioned, 119, 129, 130-31,
INDEX
136, 144-45, 146, 158, 197, 198,
and passim
Tallman, W. W., 44-45
Tariffs, 145, 148-52, 226-28
Tawney, James A., 194
Teaching positions, 6-7, 9
Trusts. See Coffee trust; Payne-Ald-
rich tariff; Philippine tariff; Sher
man Antitrust Act; Sugar trust
Underwood, Oscar, 211, 224
Valparaiso University (Northern In
diana Normal School and Business
Institute), 7-8
Van Devanter, Willis, 197, 198
Wait, Addison, 264-65
Washington Territory, 9-10
Watson, George M., 271
Welty, D. T., 75; and campaign of
1896, 51; compared with Norris,
48-49; and election of 1895, 31,
32, 33, 34-36, 286; and election
of 1899, 55-56, 57, 58
White, J. L., 86
Williams, John Sharp, 297
Wilson, James, 219
Wilson, Woodrow, 209, 263-64, 267,
268, 275
Woman suffrage, 156
Works, John D., 208
Worthington, A. S., 270
Yeiser, John O., 236, 238-39, 240
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